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MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS,

BY

H. T. COLEBROOKE.

WITH

LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

BY HIS SON,

SIR T. E. COLEBROOKE.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

TRÜBNER & CO., 57 AND 59, LUDGATE HILL.

1873.

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MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS.

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MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS,

BY

H. T. COLEBROOKE.

A NEW EDITION, WITH NOTES,

BY

E. B. COWELL,

PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
TRÜBNER & CO., 57 AND 59, LUDGATE HILL.

1873.

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HERTFORD:
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PREFACE.

COLEBROOKE'S collected essays were edited in two volumes by Dr. Rosen in 1837, and the work was published during its gifted author's last illness. The different essays, comprised in the edition, had been published at various intervals during the previous forty years, and from their first appearance they had won for their author a pre-eminent place among all Oriental scholars. In every part his calm judgment and minute accuracy were no less conspicuous than his vast learning and industry; nearly every essay seemed to exhaust its respective subject, or even, when it was only a sketch, it was still so vigorously drawn that succeeding inquirers had little left to do but to fill up the outlines and add minute details. Nearly forty years have passed since the publication of the collected series, and great advances have been made in our knowledge of ancient India and its literature; but these essays still retain their ground. Succeeding scholars have accumulated stores of fresh

materials, and they have in many respects widened our view by new facts and fuller details; but Colebrooke's calm judgment had generally seized the main points of interest, and anticipated the results of these later researches.

Some years ago Dr. Hall had planned a new edition of the Essays, which was to have contained a body of notes, bringing up the work to the state of our knowledge at the present time. Dr. Hall was himself to have annotated the greater part of the work, while Professor Whitney had promised to contribute the notes to the Essay on the Vedas, and those on the Indian Astronomy and Algebra. I much regret that this undertaking was afterwards abandoned; as we have thus lost those continual outpourings of interesting information, with which the Editor of the "Vishṇu Puráṇa" would have undoubtedly enriched the text; and the Mathematical Essays also would have been edited by a mathematician.

Sir T. E. Colebrooke subsequently requested me to undertake the superintendence of the new edition, but I only consented to do so on a much more limited plan. My object has been to edit Colebrooke's Essays in a similar manner to that in which I edited Elphinstone's History of India. I have endeavoured to correct any important errors, and to

give notes on those points, respecting which new facts have come to light, and to subjoin references to other works where the reader may find further information; but I have not attempted to comprise in the book a complete record of all that is known on each of the subjects of which it successively treats. I have rather left the essays as they originally stood, and have only tried to give those few corrections and additions, which seemed needed in order that the book might fulfil the purpose of its author.

In one essay, however, I have deviated from this plan. When I began to collect my materials, I learned that Professor Whitney had already prepared his notes for the Essay on the Vedas before the former plan had been relinquished, and I gladly accepted his kind offer to transfer them to the present edition. This essay was the only one which was confessedly behind the present state of our knowledge. It had been written many years before any Vaidik text had been printed; and during the last thirty years German scholars have thrown a flood of light on this dark portion of Hindu antiquity. For this essay, therefore, continual notes on a more extended plan were absolutely necessary; and Professor Whitney has furnished a complete commentary, which will enable the reader to fill up the outlines of the original

essay with the successive discoveries of later scholars. It is only just, however, to the annotator to remind the reader that the notes were originally prepared some years ago, and consequently the lesser details have not been always supplied for the literature of the last three or four years.

In the Essay on the Philosophical Doctrines of the Jainas and the Chárvákas, Colebrooke had expressly mentioned the deficiency of his materials; and I have therefore ventured to add as an appendix a translation of part of the two chapters of Mádhava's Sarva-darśana-sangraha, which treated of those systems. I had originally thought of adding similar translations of the corresponding chapters of that work at the end of each of the other essays on the Hindu philosophies, as Mádhava's summaries have often reminded me of Colebrooke's own masterly analyses; but I feared that it would be too great a deviation from my plan.

In addition to the Essays originally comprised in the edition of 1837, I have added at the end of the first volume the Prefaces to "the Digest of Hindu Law," and to the translation of "Two Treatises on the Hindu Law of Inheritance," and the Essays on "Hindu Courts of Justice," and on "Indian Weights and Measures;" and in the second volume I have given as an appendix to the Astronomical Essays the

reply to Bentley's remarks in his "Hindu Astronomy," which Colebrooke published in 1826 in the Asiatic Journal. I have also added the translation of the Sánkhya-káriká as an Appendix to the Essay on the Sánkhya philosophy.

I have ventured in some points to alter the original spelling of the Sanskrit words, and to bring it into general harmony with the usually accepted system of transliteration. The use of *c* for *k*, and of *c'h*, *t'h* for *kh* and *th* is disagreeable to the eye, and puzzling to the ordinary reader, especially as they are now retained in few books of general reference. I have tacitly corrected most obvious errors of a merely verbal nature, especially in the first volume; but I am sorry to see that several in the second volume escaped my notice, and these I have pointed out in the Errata. The second volume was printed before the first; and hence there is a slight want of uniformity in the printing of the proper names in the first few sheets of the second volume.

My warm thanks are due to Prof. R. Childers for kindly contributing a note on the twelve nidánas of the Buddhists, which illustrates this obscure doctrine from the Páli books of Ceylon—our most authentic materials for ancient Buddhism.

E. B. C.

ORIGINAL ADVERTISEMENT.

THE volumes now laid before the public comprise a selection from the several Essays, originally published by the Author in the Transactions of the learned Asiatic Societies, with the addition of four prefaces to works originally edited or translated by him. It is not his intention to carry the selection into a third volume.

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ERRATA TO VOLUME I.

Page 53, line 11, *read* Jyotisha.
,, 286, line 28, *read* niḥśreyasa.
,, 438, line 29, *read* dṛishṭopakárake.

MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS.

I.

A DISCOURSE READ AT A MEETING OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, ON THE 15TH OF MARCH, 1823.

[From the *Transactions* of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. pp. xvii.—xxiii.]

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[1] CALLED by the indulgence of this meeting to a chair, which I could have wished to have seen more worthily filled, upon so interesting an occasion as the first general meeting of a Society instituted for the important purpose of *the advancement of knowledge in relation to Asia*, I shall, with your permission, detain you a little from the special business of the day, while I draw your more particular attention to the objects of the Institution, for the furtherance of which we are now assembled.

To those countries of Asia, in which civilization may be justly considered to have had its origin, or to have attained its earliest growth, the rest of the civilized world owes a large debt of gratitude, which it cannot but be solicitous to repay; and England, as most advanced in refinement, is, for that very cause, the most beholden; and, by acquisition of dominion in the East, is bound by a yet closer tie. As Englishmen, we participate in the earnest wish that this duty may be fulfilled, and that obligation requited; and we share in the anxious desire of contributing to such a happy result, by promoting an interchange of benefits, and returning in an improved state that which was received in a ruder form.

But improvement, to be efficient, must be adapted to the actual condition of things: and hence a necessity for [2] exact information of all that is there known, which belongs to science; and all that is there practised, which appertains to arts.

Be it then our part to investigate the sciences of Asia, and inquire into the arts of the East, with the hope of facilitating ameliorations of which they may be found susceptible.

In progress of such researches, it is not perhaps too much to expect that something may yet be gleaned for the advancement of knowledge and improvement of arts at home. In many recent instances, inventive faculties have been tasked to devise anew, what might have been as readily copied from an Oriental type; or unacknowledged imitation has reproduced in Europe, with an air of novelty, what had been for ages familiar to the East. Nor is that source to be considered as already exhausted. In beauty of fabric, in simplicity of process, there possibly yet remains something to be learnt from China, from Japan, from India, which the refinement of Europe need not disdain.

The characteristic of the arts in Asia is simplicity. With rude implements, and by coarse means, arduous tasks have been achieved, and the most finished results have been obtained; which, for a long period, were scarcely equalled, and have, but recently, been surpassed, by polished artifice and refined skill in Europe. Were it a question of mere curiosity, it might yet be worth the inquiry, what were the rude means by which such things have been accomplished? The question, however, is not a merely idle one. It may be investigated with confidence, that a useful answer will be derived. If it do not point to the way of perfecting European skill, it assuredly will to that of augmenting Asiatic attainments.

The course of inquiry into the arts, as into the sciences, of Asia, cannot fail of leading to much which is curious [3] and instructive. The inquiry extends over regions, the most

anciently and the most numerously peopled on the globe. The range of research is as wide as those regions are vast; and as various as the people who inhabit them are diversified. It embraces their ancient and modern history; their civil polity; their long-enduring institutions; their manners and their customs; their languages and their literature; their sciences, speculative and practical: in short, the progress of knowledge among them; the pitch which it has attained; and last, but most important, the means of its extension.

In speaking of the history of Asiatic nations (and it is in Asia that recorded and authentic history of mankind commences), I do not refer merely to the succession of political struggles, national conflicts, and warlike achievements; but rather to less conspicuous, yet more important occurrences, which directly concern the structure of society, the civil institutions of nations, their internal, more than their external relations, and the yet less prominent, but more momentous events, which affect society universally, and advance it in the scale of civilized life.

It is the history of the human mind which is most diligently to be investigated: the discoveries of the wise, the inventions of the ingenious, and the contrivances of the skilful.

Nothing which has much engaged the thoughts of man is foreign to our inquiry, within the local limits which we have prescribed to it. We do not exclude from our research the political transactions of Asiatic states, nor the lucubrations of Asiatic philosophers. The first are necessarily connected, in no small degree, with the history of the progress of society; the latter have great influence on the literary, the speculative, and the practical avocations of men.

[4] Nor is the ascertainment of any fact to be considered destitute of use. The aberrations of the human mind are a part of its history. It is neither uninteresting nor useless to ascertain what it is that ingenious men have done, and contemplative minds have thought, in former times, even where

they have erred: especially where their error has been graced by elegance, or redeemed by tasteful fancy.

Mythology then, however futile, must, for those reasons, be noticed. It influences the manners, it pervades the literature of nations which have admitted it.[1]

Philosophy of ancient times must be studied, though it be the edifice or large inference raised on the scanty ground of assumed premises. Such as it is, most assiduously has it been cultivated by Oriental nations, from the further India to Asiatic Greece. The more it is investigated, the more intimate will the relation be found between the philosophy of Greece and that of India. Whichever is the type or the copy, whichever has borrowed or has lent, certain it is that the one will serve to elucidate the other. The philosophy of India may be employed for a commentary on that of Greece; and conversely, Grecian philosophy will help to explain Indian. That of Arabia, too, avowedly copied from the Grecian model, has preserved much which else might have been lost. A part has been restored through the medium of translation, and more may yet be retrieved from Arabic stores.

The ancient language of India, the polished Sanskrit, not unallied to Greek and various other languages of Europe, may yet contribute something to their elucidation, and still more to the not unimportant subject of general grammar.[2]

Though Attic taste be wanting in the literary performances of Asia, they are not on that sole ground to be utterly neglected. Much that is interesting may yet be [5] elicited from Arabic and Sanskrit lore, from Arabian and Indian antiquities.

Connected as those highly polished and refined languages are with other tongues, they deserve to be studied for the

[1] [Comparative mythology has since thrown a new light on the myths of early times, and in many instances we seem to have recovered the physical fact of which they were the exaggerated poetical expression.—Ed.]

[2] [Bopp published his essay on Conjugation in 1816, and the first volume of his Comparative Grammar in 1833.]

sake of the particular dialects and idioms to which they bear relation; for their own sake, that is, for the literature which appertains to them; and for the analysis of language in general, which has been unsuccessfully attempted on too narrow ground, but may be prosecuted, with effect, upon wider induction.

The same is to be said of Chinese literature and language. This field of research, which is now open to us, may be cultivated with confident reliance on a successful result; making us better acquainted with a singular people, whose manners, institutions, opinions, arts, and productions, differ most widely from those of the West; and through them, perhaps, with other tribes of Tartaric race, still more singular, and still less known.

Wide as is the geographical extent of the region to which primarily our attention is directed, and from which our Association has taken its designation, the range of our research is not confined to those geographical limits. Western Asia has, in all times, maintained intimate relation with contiguous, and not unfrequently with distant, countries: and that connexion will justify, and often render necessary, excursive disquisition beyond its bounds. We may lay claim to many Grecian topics, as bearing relation to Asiatic Greece; to numerous topics of yet higher interest, connected with Syria, with Chaldæa, with Palestine.

Arabian literature will conduct us still further. Wherever it has followed the footsteps of Moslem conquest, inquiry will pursue its trace. Attending the Arabs in Egypt, the Moors in Africa; accompanying these into Spain, and [6] cultivated there with assiduity, it must be investigated without exclusion of countries into which it made its way.

Neither are our researches limited to the old continent, nor to the history and pursuits of ancient times. Modern enterprise has added to the known world a second Asiatic continent, which British colonies have annexed to the British domain.

The situation of Austral Asia connects it with the Indian Archipelago: its occupation by English colonies brings it in relation with British India. Of that new country, where everything is strange, much is yet to be learnt. Its singular physical geography, its peculiar productions, the phenomena of its climate, present numerous subjects of inquiry; and various difficulties are to be overcome, in the solution of the problem of adapting the arts of Europe to the novel situation of that distant territory. The Asiatic Society of Great Britain will contribute its aid towards the accomplishment of those important objects.

Remote as are the regions to which our attention is turned, no country enjoys greater advantages than Great Britain for conducting inquiries respecting them. Possessing a great Asiatic empire, its influence extends far beyond its direct and local authority. Both within its territorial limits and without them, the public functionaries have occasion for acquiring varied information, and correct knowledge of the people and of the country. Political transactions, operations of war, relations of commerce, the pursuits of business, the enterprise of curiosity, the desire of scientific acquirements, carry British subjects to the most distant and the most secluded spots. Their duties, their professions, lead them abroad; and they avail themselves of opportunity, thus afforded, for acquisition of accurate acquaintance with matters presented to their notice. One requisite is there wanting, as long since remarked by [7] the venerable founder of the Asiatic Society of Bengal—it is leisure: but that is enjoyed on their return to their native country. Here may be arranged the treasured knowledge which they bring with them; the written or the remembered information which they have gathered. Here are preserved in public and private repositories, manuscript books collected in the East, exempt from the prompt decay which would there have overtaken them. Here, too, are preserved, in the archives of families, the manuscript obser-

vations of individuals, whose diffidence has prevented them from giving to the public the fruits of their labours in a detached form.

An Association established in Great Britain, with views analogous to those for which the parent Society of Bengal was instituted, and which happily are adopted by Societies which have arisen at other British stations in Asia, at Bombay, at Madras, at Bencoolen, will furnish inducement to those who, during their sojourn abroad, have contributed their efforts for the promotion of knowledge, to continue their exertions after their return. It will serve to assemble scattered materials, which are now liable to be lost to the public for want of a vehicle of publication. It will lead to a more diligent examination of the treasures of Oriental literature, preserved in public and private libraries. In cordial co-operation with the existing Societies in India, it will assist their labours, and will be assisted by them. It will tend to an object first in importance: the increase of knowledge in Asia by diffusion of European science. And whence can this be so effectually done as from Great Britain?

For such purposes we are associated; and to such ends our efforts are directed. To further these objects we are now assembled: and the measures which will be proposed to you, Gentlemen, are designed for the commencement of [8] a course, which, I confidently trust, may, in its progress, be eminently successful, and largely contribute to the augmented enjoyments of the innumerable people subject to British sway abroad; and (with humility and deference be it spoken, yet not without aspiration after public usefulness), conspicuously tend to British prosperity as connected with Asia.

II.

ON THE VEDAS, OR SACRED WRITINGS OF THE HINDUS.[1]

[From the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. viii. pp. 369—476. *Calcutta*, 1805. 4to.]

[9] In the early progress of researches into Indian literature, it was doubted whether the *Vedas* were extant; or, if portions of them were still preserved, whether any person, however learned in other respects, might be capable of understanding their obsolete dialect. It was believed too, that, if a *Bráhmaṇa* really possessed the Indian scriptures, his religious prejudices would nevertheless prevent his imparting the holy knowledge to any but a regenerate Hindu. These notions, supported by popular tales, were cherished long after the *Vedas* had been communicated to Dárá Shukoh, and parts of them translated into the Persian language by him, or for his use.[2] The doubts were not finally abandoned until Colonel Polier obtained from Jaipúr a transcript of what purported to be a complete copy of the *Vedas*, and which he deposited in the British Museum. About the same time Sir Robert Chambers collected at Benares numerous fragments of the Indian scripture: General Martine, at a later period, obtained copies of some parts of it; and Sir William Jones was successful in procuring valuable portions of the *Vedas*, and in

[1] [Professor Whitney has contributed the notes which follow at the end of this Essay on the Vedas.]

[2] Extracts have also been translated into the Hindí language; but it does not appear upon what occasion this version into the vulgar dialect was made.

translating several curious passages from one [10] of them.[1] I have been still more fortunate in collecting at Benares the text and commentary of a large portion of these celebrated books; and, without waiting to examine them more completely than has been yet practicable, I shall here attempt to give a brief explanation of what they chiefly contain.

It is well known that the original *Veda* is believed by the Hindus to have been revealed by Brahmá, and to have been preserved by tradition, until it was arranged in its present order by a sage, who thence obtained the surname of Vyása, or Vedavyása: that is, compiler of the *Vedas*. He distributed the Indian scripture into four parts, which are severally entitled *Ṛich, Yajus, Sáman*, and *A'tharvaṇa;* and each of which bears the common denomination of *Veda*.

Mr. Wilkins and Sir William Jones were led, by the consideration of several remarkable passages, to suspect that the fourth is more modern than the other three. It is certain that Manu, like others among the Indian lawgivers, always speaks of three only, and has barely alluded to the *A'tharvaṇa*,[2] without however terming it a *Veda*. Passages of the Indian scripture itself seem to support the inference: for the fourth *Veda* is not mentioned in the passage cited by me in a former essay[3] from the white *Yajus;*[4] nor in the following text, quoted from the Indian scripture by the commentator of the *Ṛich*.

[11] "The *Ṛigveda* originated from fire; the *Yajurveda* from air; and the *Sámaveda* from the sun."[5]

[1] See Preface to Manu, page vi. and the works of Sir William Jones, vol. vi.

[2] Manu, chap. 11, v. 33.

[3] Essay Second, on Religious Ceremonies. See Asiatic Researches, vol. vii., p. 251.

[4] From the 31st chapter; which, together with the preceding chapter (30th), relates to the *Purushamedha*, a type of the allegorical immolation of Náráyaṇa, or of Brahmá in that character.

[5] Manu alludes to this fabulous origin of the *Vedas* (chap. I. v. 23). His commentator, Medhátithi, explains it by remarking that the *Ṛigveda* opens with a hymn to fire; and the *Yajurveda* with one in which air is mentioned. But Kullúkabhaṭṭa has recourse to the renovations of the universe. "In one *Kalpa*, the *Vedas* proceeded from fire, air, and the sun; in another, from Brahmá, at his allegorical immolation."

Arguments in support of this opinion might be drawn even from popular dictionaries; for Amarasinha notices only three *Vedas*, and mentions the *A'tharvaṇa* without giving it the same denomination. It is, however, probable, that some portion at least of the *A'tharvaṇa* is as ancient as the compilation of the three others; and its name, like theirs, is anterior to Vyása's arrangement of them: but the same must be admitted in regard to the *Itihása* and *Puráṇas*, which constitute a fifth *Veda*, as the *A'tharvaṇa* does a fourth.

It would, indeed, be vain to quote in proof of this point the *Puráṇas* themselves, which always enumerate four *Vedas*, and state the *Itihása* and *Puráṇas* as a fifth; since the antiquity of some among the *Puráṇas* now extant is more than questionable, and the authenticity of any one in particular does not appear to be as yet sufficiently established. It would be as useless to cite the *Maṇḍúka* and *Tápaniya Upanishads*, in which the *Atharva-veda* is enumerated among the scriptures, and in one of which the number of four *Vedas* is expressly affirmed: for both these *Upanishads* appertain to the *A'tharvaṇa* itself. The mention of the sage Atharvan in various places throughout the *Vedas*[1] proves nothing; and even a text of the *Yajurveda*,[2] where he is named in contrast with the *Ṛich*, *Yajus*, and *Sáman*, and their supplement or *Bráhmaṇa*, [12] is not decisive. But a very unexceptionable passage may be adduced, which the commentator of the *Ṛich* has quoted for a different purpose from the *Chhándogya Upanishad*, a portion of the *Sáman*. In it, Nárada, having solicited instruction from Sanatkumára, and being interrogated by him as to the extent of his previous knowledge, says, "I have learnt the *Ṛigveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sámaveda*, the *A'tharvaṇa*, [which is] the fourth, the *Itihása* and *Puráṇa*, [which are] a fifth, and [grammar, or] the *Veda* of *Vedas*, the obsequies of the manes, the art of computation, the knowledge of omens, the revolutions of periods, the intention of speech

[1] Vide *Vedas* passim.

[2] In the *Taittiriya Upanishad*.

[or art of reasoning], the maxims of ethics, the divine science [or construction of scripture], the sciences appendant on holy writ [or accentuation, prosody, and religious rites], the adjuration of spirits, the art of the soldier, the science of astronomy, the charming of serpents, the science of demigods [or music and mechanical arts]: all this have I studied; yet do I only know the text, and have no knowledge of the soul."[1]

From this, compared with other passages of less authority, and with the received notions of the Hindus themselves, it appears that the *Ṛich*, *Yajus*, and *Sáman*, are the three principal portions of the *Veda;* that the *Átharvaṇa* is commonly admitted as a fourth; and that divers mythological poems, entitled *Itihása* and *Puráṇas*, are reckoned a sup-[13]plement to the scripture, and as such constitute a fifth *Veda*.[2]

The true reason why the three first *Vedas* are often mentioned without any notice of the fourth must be sought, not in their different origin and antiquity, but in the difference of their use and purport. Prayers employed at solemn rites, called *yajnas*, have been placed in the three principal *Vedas:* those which are in prose are named *Yajus;* such as are in

[1] *Chhándogya Upanishad*, ch. 7, § 1. I insert the whole passage, because it contains an ample enumeration of the sciences. The names by which grammar and the rest are indicated in the original text are obscure; but the annotations of S'ankara explain them. This, like any other portion of a *Veda* where it is itself named (for a few other instances occur), must of course be more modern than another part to which the name had been previously assigned. It will hereafter be shown that the *Vedas* are a compilation of prayers, called *mantras;* with a collection of precepts and maxims, entitled *Bráhmaṇa*, from which last portion the *Upanishad* is extracted. The prayers are properly the *Vedas*, and apparently preceded the *Bráhmaṇa*.

[2] When the study of the Indian scriptures was more general than at present, especially among the *Bráhmaṇas* of Kanyákubja, learned priests derived titles from the number of *Vedas* with which they were conversant. Since every priest was bound to study one *Veda*, no title was derived from the fulfilment of that duty; but a person who had studied two *Vedas* was surnamed *Dwivedí;* one who was conversant with three, *Trivedí;* and one versed in four, *Chaturvedí:* as the mythological poems were only figuratively called a *Veda*, no distinction appears to have been derived from a knowledge of them in addition to the four scriptures. The titles above mentioned have become the surnames of families among the *Bráhmans* of Kanoj, and are corrupted by vulgar pronunciation into *Dobe*, *Tiwáre*, and *Chaube*.

metre are denominated *Ṛich;* and some, which are intended to be chanted, are called *Sáman:* and these names, as distinguishing different portions of the *Vedas*, are anterior to their separation in Vyása's compilation. But the *A'tharvaṇa* not being used at the religious ceremonies above mentioned, and containing prayers employed at lustrations, at rites conciliating the deities, and as imprecations on enemies, is essentially different from the other *Vedas;* as is remarked by the author of an elementary treatise on the classification of the Indian sciences.[1]

But different schools of priests have admitted some variations in works which appear under the same title. This circumstance is accounted for by the commentators on the *Vedas*, who relate the following story taken from *Puráṇas* [14] and other authorities. Vyása having compiled and arranged the scriptures, theogonies, and mythological poems, taught the several *Vedas* to as many disciples: *viz.* the *Ṛich* to Paila, the *Yajus* to Vaiśampáyana, and the *Sáman* to Jaimini; as also the *A'tharvaṇa* to Sumantu, and the *Itihása* and *Puráṇas* to Súta. These disciples instructed their respective pupils, who, becoming teachers in their turn, communicated the knowledge to their own disciples; until at length, in the progress of successive instruction, so great variations crept into the text, or into the manner of reading and reciting it, and into the no less sacred precepts for its use and application, that eleven hundred different schools of scriptural knowledge arose.

The several *Sanhitás*, or collections of prayers in each *Veda*, as received in these numerous schools or variations, more or less considerable, admitted by them either in the arrangement of the whole text (including prayers and precepts), or in regard to particular portions of it, constituted the *S'ákhás*, or branches of each *Veda*. Tradition, preserved in the *Puráṇas*, reckons sixteen *Sanhitás* of the *Ṛigveda;* eighty-six of the *Yajus*, or including those which branched from a second re-

[1] Madhusúdana-saraswatí, in the *Prasthánabheda*.

velation of this *Veda*, a hundred and one; and not less than a thousand of the *Sámaveda*, besides nine of the *A'tharvaṇa*. But treatises on the study of the *Veda* reduce the *S'ákhás* of the *Ṛich* to five; and those of the *Yajus*, including both revelations of it, to eighty-six.[1]

The progress by which (to use the language of the *Puráṇas*) the tree of science put forth its numerous branches is thus related. Paila taught the *Ṛigveda*, or *Bahvṛich*, to two disciples, Báshkala and Indrapramati. The first, also called Báshkali, was the editor of a *Sanhitá*, or [15] collection of prayers, and a *S'ákhá* bearing his name still subsists: it is said to have first branched into four schools; afterwards into three others. Indrapramati communicated his knowledge to his own son Máṇḍukeya, by whom a *Sanhitá* was compiled, and from whom one of the *S'ákhás* has derived its name. Vedamitra, surnamed Śákalya, studied under the same teacher, and gave a complete collection of prayers: it is still extant; but is said to have given origin to five varied editions of the same text. The two other and principal *S'ákhás* of the *Ṛich* are those of Áśwaláyana and Śánkháyana, or perhaps Kaushítaki: but the *Viśhṇu-puráṇa* omits them, and intimates that Śákapúrṇi, a pupil of Indrapramati, gave the third varied edition from this teacher, and was also the author of the *Nirukta*: if so, he is the same with Yáska. His school seems to have been subdivided by the formation of three others derived from his disciples.

The *Yajus*, or *Adhwaryu*, consists of two different *Vedas*, which have separately branched out into various *S'ákhás*. To explain the names by which both are distinguished, it is necessary to notice a legend, which is gravely related in the *Puráṇas* and the commentaries on the *Veda*.

The *Yajus*, in its original form, was at first taught by Vaiśampáyana to twenty-seven pupils. At this time, having

[1] The authorities on which this is stated are chiefly the *Vishṇu-puráṇa*, part 3, chap. 4, and the *Vijayavilása* on the study of scripture; also the *Charaṇavyúha*, on the *S'ákhás* of the *Vedas*.

instructed Yájnavalkya, he appointed him to teach the *Veda* to other disciples. Being afterwards offended by the refusal of Yájnavalkya to take on himself a share of the sin incurred by Vaiśampáyana, who had unintentionally killed his own sister's son, the resentful preceptor bade Yájnavalkya relinquish the science which he had learnt.[1] He instantly disgorged it in a tangible form. The rest of Vaiśampáyana's disciples [16] receiving his commands to pick up the disgorged *Veda*, assumed the form of partridges, and swallowed these texts which were soiled, and for this reason termed "black:" they are also denominated *Taittiríya*, from *tittiri*, the name for a partridge.

Yájnavalkya, overwhelmed with sorrow, had recourse to the sun; and through the favour of that luminary obtained a new revelation of the *Yajus*, which is called "white" or pure, in contradistinction to the other, and is likewise named *Vájasaneyi*, from a patronymic, as it should seem, of Yájnavalkya himself; for the *Veda* declares, "These pure texts, revealed by the sun, are published by Yájnavalkya, the offspring of Vájasani."[2] But according to the *Vishṇu-puráṇa* (3, 5, ad finem), the priests who studied the *Yajus* are called *Vájins*, because the sun, who revealed it, assumed the form of a horse (*vájin*).

I have cited this absurd legend because it is referred to by the commentators on the white *Yajus*. But I have yet found no allusion to it in the *Veda* itself, nor in the explanatory table of contents. On the contrary, the index of the black *Yajus* gives a different and more rational account. Vaiśampáyana, according to this authority,[3] taught the *Yajurveda*

[1] The *Vishṇu-puráṇa*, part 3, chap. 5. A different motive of resentment is assigned by others.

[2] *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka* ad calcem. The passage is cited by the commentator on the *Ṛigveda*. In the index likewise, Yájnavalkya is stated to have received the revelation from the sun.

[3] *Káṇḍánukrama*, verse 25. This index indicatorius is formed for the *Átreyí Śákhá*. Its author is Kuṇḍina, if the text (verse 27) be rightly interpreted.

to Yáska, who instructed Tittiri:[1] from him Ukha received it, and communicated it to Átreya; who framed the *Śákhá* which is named after him, and for which that index is arranged.

[17] The white *Yajus* was taught by Yájnavalkya to fifteen pupils, who founded as many schools. The most remarkable of which are the *Śákhás* of Kaṇwa and Madhyandina; and next to them, those of the *Jábálas, Baudháyanas,* and *Tápaníyas.* The other branches of the *Yajus* seem to have been arranged in several classes. Thus the *Charakas,* or students of a *Śákhá,* so denominated from the teacher of it, Charaka, are stated as including ten subdivisions; among which are the *Kaṭhas,* or disciples of Kaṭha, a pupil of Vaiśampáyana; as also the *Śwetáśwataras, Aupamanyavas,* and *Maitráyaṇíyas:* the last mentioned comprehend seven others. In like manner, the *Taittiríyakas* are, in the first instance, subdivided into two, the *Aukhyáyas* and *Kháṇḍikeyas;* and these last are again subdivided into five, the *Ápastambíyas,* etc. Among them, Ápastamba's *Śákhá* is still subsisting; and so is Átreya's among those which branched from Ukha: but the rest, or most of them, are become rare, if not altogether obsolete.

Sumantu, son of Jaimini, studied the *Sámaveda,* or *Chhándogya,* under his father; and his own son, Sukarman, studied under the same teacher, but founded a different school; which was the origin of two others, derived from his pupils, Hiraṇyanábha and Paushyinji, and thence branching into a thousand more: for Lokákshi, Kuṭhumi, and other disciples of Paushyinji,[2] gave their names to separate schools, which were increased by their pupils. The *Śákhá* entitled *Kauṭhumi*[3] still subsists. Hiraṇyanábha, the other pupil of Sukarman, had fifteen disciples, authors of *Sanhitás,* collectively called the northern *Sámagas;* and fifteen others, entitled the southern *Sámagas:*

[1] This agrees with the etymology of the word *Taittiríya;* for according to grammarians (see Páṇini 4, iii. 102), the derivative here implies 'recited by *Tittiri,* though composed by a different person.' A similar explanation is given by commentators on the *Upanishads.*

[2] [Paushpinji ?]

[3] [Kauthumí ?]

and Kṛiti, one of his pupils, had twenty-four disciples, by whom, and by their followers, the other schools were founded. Most of them are now lost; and, according [18] to a legend, were destroyed by the thunderbolt of Indra. The principal *Śákhá* now subsisting is that of the *Ráṇáyantyas*, including seven subdivisions; one of which is entitled *Kauṭhumi*, as above mentioned, and comprehends six distinct schools. That of the *Talavakáras*, likewise, is extant, at least, in part: as will be shown in speaking of the *Upanishads*.

The *Atharva-veda* was taught by Sumantu to his pupil Kabandha, who divided it between Devadarśa and Pathya. The first of these has given name to the *Śákhá* entitled *Devadarśi;* as Pippaláda, the last of his four disciples, has to the *Śákhá* of the *Paippaláḍis*. Another branch of the *Átharvaṇa* derives its appellation from Śaunaka, the third of Pathya's pupils. The rest are of less note.

Such is the brief history of the *Veda* deducible from the authorities before cited. But those numerous *Śákhás* did not differ so widely from each other as might be inferred from the mention of an equal number of *Sanhitás*, or distinct collections of texts. In general, the various schools of the same *Veda* seem to have used the same assemblage of prayers; they differed more in their copies of the precepts or *Bráhmaṇas;* and some received into their canon of scripture portions which do not appear to have been acknowledged by others. Yet the chief difference seems always to have been the use of particular rituals taught in aphorisms (*sútras*) adopted by each school; and these do not constitute a portion of the *Veda*, but, like grammar and astronomy, are placed among its appendages.

It may be here proper to remark that each *Veda* consists of two parts, denominated the *Mantras* and the *Bráhmaṇas*, or prayers and precepts. The complete collection of the hymns, prayers, and invocations, belonging to one *Veda*, is entitled its *Sanhitá*. Every other portion of Indian [19]

scripture is included under the general head of divinity (*Bráhmaṇa*). This comprises precepts which inculcate religious duties, maxims which explain these precepts, and arguments which relate to theology.[1] But, in the present arrangement of the *Vedas*, the portion which contains passages called *Bráhmaṇas*, includes many which are strictly prayers or *Mantras*. The theology of the Indian scripture comprehending the argumentative portion entitled *Vedánta* is contained in tracts denominated *Upanishads*, some of which are portions of the *Bráhmaṇa* properly so called, others are found only in a detached form, and one is a part of a *Sanhitá* itself.

On the Ṛigveda.

The *Sanhitá* of the first *Veda*[2] contains *mantras*, or prayers, which for the most part are encomiastic, as the name of the *Ṛigveda* implies.[3] This collection is divided into eight parts (*ashṭaka*), each of which is subdivided into as many lectures (*adhyáya*). Another mode of division [20] also runs through the volume, distinguishing ten books (*maṇḍala*), which are subdivided into more than a hundred chapters (*anuváka*), and comprise a thousand hymns or invocations (*súkta*). A further subdivision of more than two thousand sections (*varga*) is common to both methods; and the whole contains above ten thousand verses, or rather stanzas, of various measures.

[1] The explanation here given is taken from the *Prasthána-bheda*.

[2] I have several copies of it, with the corresponding index for the *S'ákalya S'ákhá*; and also an excellent commentary by Sáyaṇáchárya. In another collection of *mantras*, belonging to the *Áśwaláyani S'ákhá* of this *Veda*, I find the first few sections of each lecture agree with the other copies, but the rest of the sections are omitted. I question whether it be intended as a complete copy for that *S'ákhá*.

[3] Derived from the verb *ṛich*, 'to laud'; and properly signifying any prayer or hymn in which a deity is praised. As those are mostly in verse, the term becomes also applicable to such passages of any *Veda* as are reducible to measure, according to the rules of prosody. The first *Veda*, in Vyása's compilation, comprehending most of these texts, is called the *Ṛigveda*; or as expressed in the Commentary on the Index, "because it abounds with such texts (*ṛich*)."

On examining this voluminous compilation, a systematical arrangement is readily perceived. Successive chapters, and even entire books, comprise hymns of a single author; invocations, too, addressed to the same deities, hymns relating to like subjects, and prayers intended for similar occasions, are frequently classed together. This requires explanation.

In a regular perusal of the *Veda*, which is enjoined to all priests, and which is much practised by Mahrátṭas and Telingas, the student or reader is required to notice, especially, the author, subject, metre, and purpose of each *mantra*, or invocation. To understand the meaning of the passage is thought less important. The institutors of the Hindu system have indeed recommended the study of the sense; but they have inculcated with equal strenuousness, and more success, attention to the name of the *Ṛishi* or person by whom the text was first uttered, the deity to whom it is addressed, or the subject to which it relates, and also its rhythm or metre, and its purpose, or the religious ceremony at which it should be used. The practice of modern priests is conformable with these maxims. Like the *Koran* among the Muhammadans, the *Veda* is put into the hands of children in the first period of their education; and continues afterwards to be read by rote, for the sake of the words, without comprehension of the sense.

Accordingly the *Veda* is recited in various superstitious modes: word by word, either simply disjoining them, or [21] else repeating the words alternately, backwards and forwards, once or oftener. Copies of the *Ṛigveda* and *Yajus* (for the *Sámaveda* is chanted only) are prepared for these and other modes of recital, and are called *Pada, Krama, Jaṭá, Ghana*, etc. But the various ways of inverting the text are restricted, as it should appear, to the principal *Vedas;* that is, to the original editions of the *Ṛigveda* and *Yajus:* while the subsequent editions, in which the text or the arrangement of it is varied, being therefore deemed subordinate *Śákhás*, should be repeated only in a simple manner.

It seems here necessary to justify my interpretation of what is called the "*Ṛishi* of a *mantra*." The last term has been thought to signify an incantation rather than a prayer: and, so far as supernatural efficacy is ascribed to the mere recital of the words of a *mantra*, that interpretation is sufficiently accurate; and, as such, it is undoubtedly applicable to the unmeaning incantations of the *Mantra-śástra*, or *Tantras* and *Á'gamas*. But the origin of the term is certainly different. Its derivation from a verb, which signifies 'to speak privately,' is readily explained by the injunction for meditating the text of the *Veda*, or reciting it inaudibly: and the import of any *mantra* in the Indian scriptures is generally found to be a prayer, containing either a petition to a deity, or else thanksgiving, praise, and adoration.

The *Ṛishi* or saint of a *mantra* is defined, both in the index of the *Ṛigveda* and by commentators, "he by whom it is spoken:" as the *Devatá*, or deity, is "that which is therein mentioned." In the index to the *Vájasaneyi Yajurveda*, the *Ṛishi* is interpreted "the seer or rememberer" of the text; and the *Devatá* is said to be "contained in the prayer; or [named] at the commencement of it; or [indicated as] the deity, who shares the oblation or [22] the praise." Conformably with these definitions, the deity that is lauded or supplicated in the prayer is its *Devatá;* but in a few passages, which contain neither petition nor adoration, the subject is considered as the deity that is spoken of. For example, the praise of generosity is the *Devatá* of many entire hymns addressed to princes, from whom gifts were received by the authors.

The *Ṛishi*, or speaker, is of course rarely mentioned in the *mantra* itself: but in some instances he does name himself. A few passages, too, among the *mantras* of the *Veda* are in the form of dialogue; and, in such cases, the discoursers were alternately considered as *Ṛishi* and *Devatá*. In general, the person to whom the passage was revealed, or according to

another gloss, by whom its use and application was first discovered,[1] is called the *Ṛishi* of that *mantra*. He is evidently then the author of the prayer; notwithstanding the assertions of the Hindus, with whom it is an article of their creed, that the *Vedas* were composed by no human author. It must be understood, therefore, that in affirming the primeval existence of their scriptures, they deny these works to be the original composition of the editor (Vyása), but believe them to have been gradually revealed to inspired writers.

The names of the respective authors of each passage are preserved in the *Anukramaṇi*, or explanatory table of contents, which has been handed down with the *Veda* it[23]self, and of which the authority is unquestioned.[2] According to this index, Viśwámitra is author of all the hymns contained in the third book of the *Ṛigveda;* as Bharadwája is, with rare exceptions, the composer of those collected in the sixth book; Vasishṭha, in the seventh; Gṛitsamada, in the second; Vámadeva, in the fourth; and Budha[3] and other descendants of Atri, in the fifth. But, in the remaining books of this *Veda*, the authors are more various: among these, besides Agastya, Kaśyapa son of Maríchi, Angiras, Jamadagni son of Bhṛigu, Paráśara father of Vyása, Gotama and his son Nodhas, Vṛihaspati, Nárada, and other celebrated Indian saints, the

[1] Translating literally, "the *Ṛishi* is he by whom the text *was seen*." Páṇini (4, ii. 7) employs the same term in explaining the import of derivatives used as denominations of passages in scripture; and his commentators concur with those of the *Veda* in the explanation here given. By *Ṛishi* is generally meant the supposed inspired writer; sometimes, however, the imagined inspirer is called the *Ṛishi* or saint of the text; and at other times, as above noticed, the *dialogist* or speaker of the sentence.

[2] It appears from a passage in the *Vijaya-vilása*, as also from the *Veda-dípa*, or abridged commentary on the *Vájasaneyi*, as well as from the index itself, that Kátyáyana is the acknowledged author of the index to the white *Yajus*. That of the *Ṛigveda* is ascribed by the commentator to the same Kátyáyana, pupil of S'aunaka. The several indexes of the *Veda* contribute to the preservation of the genuine text; especially where the metre, or the number of syllables, is stated, as is generally the case.

[3] First of the name, and progenitor of the race of kings called 'children of the moon.'

most conspicuous are Kaṇwa, and his numerous descendants, Medhátithi, etc.; Madhuchhandas, and others among the posterity of Viśwámitra; Śunaḥśepha son of Ajígarta; Kutsa, Hiraṇyastúpa, Savya, and other descendants of Angiras; besides many other saints, among the posterity of personages above mentioned.

It is worthy of remark, that several persons of royal birth (for instance, five sons of the king Vṛisházir; and Tryaruṇa and Trasadasyu, who were themselves kings) are mentioned among the authors of the hymns which constitute this *Veda:* and the text itself, in some places, actually points, and in others obviously alludes, to [24] monarchs, whose names are familiar in the Indian heroic history. As this fact may contribute to fix the age in which the *Veda* was composed, I shall here notice such passages of this tendency as have yet fallen under my observation.

The fifth hymn of the eighteenth chapter of the first book is spoken by an ascetic named Kakshívat, in praise of the munificence of Swanaya, who had conferred immense gifts on him. The subject is continued in the sixth hymn, and concludes with a very strange dialogue between the king Bhávayavya and his wife Romaśá, daughter of Vṛihaspati. It should be remarked, concerning Kakshívat, that his mother Uśij was bondmaid of King Anga's queen.

The eighth book opens with an invocation which alludes to a singular legend. Áśanga, son of Playoga, and his successor on the throne, was metamorphosed into a woman; but retrieved his sex through the prayers of Medhyátithi, whom he therefore rewarded most liberally. In this hymn he is introduced praising his own munificence; and, towards the close of it, his wife Śaśwatí, daughter of Angiras, exults in his restoration to manhood.

The next hymns applaud the liberality of the kings Vibhindu, Pákasthámán (son of Kurayáṇa), Kurunga, Kaśu (son of Chedi), and Tirindira (son of Paraśu), who had

severally bestowed splendid gifts on the respective authors of these thanksgivings. In the third chapter of the same book, the seventh hymn commends the generosity of Trasadasyu, the grandson of Mándhátṛi. The fourth chapter opens with an invocation containing praises of the liberality of Chitra; and the fourth hymn of the same chapter celebrates Varu, son of Sushámán.

In the first chapter of the tenth book there is a hymn to water, spoken by a king named Sindhudwípa, the son of Ambaríśha. The fourth chapter contains several pas-[25] sages, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth *súkta*, which allude to a remarkable legend. Asamáti, son or descendant of Ikshwáku, had deserted his former priests and employed others: the forsaken *Bráhmaṇas* recited incantations for his destruction: his new priests, however, not only counteracted their evil designs, but retaliated on them, and caused the death of one of those *Bráhmaṇas:* the rest recited these prayers for their own preservation, and for the revival of their companion.

The fifth chapter opens with a hymn which alludes to a story respecting Nábhánedishṭha, son of Manu, who was excluded from participation with his brethren in the paternal inheritance. The legend itself is told in the *Aitareya Bráhmaṇa*,[1] or second portion of the *Ṛigveda*.

Among other hymns by royal authors in the subsequent chapters of the tenth book of the *Sanhitá*, I remark one by Mándhátṛi, son of Yuvanáśwa, and another by Śivi, son of Uśínara, a third by Vasumanas, son of Rohidaśwa, and a fourth by Pratardana, son of Divodása, king of Káśí.

The deities invoked appear, on a cursory inspection of the *Veda*, to be as various as the authors of the prayers addressed to them: but, according to the most ancient annotations on the Indian scripture, those numerous names of persons and things are all resolvable into different titles of three deities,

[1] In the second lecture and fourteenth section of the fifth book.

and ultimately of one god. The *Nighaṇṭu*, or glossary of the *Vedas*, concludes with three lists of names of deities: the first comprising such as are deemed synonymous with fire; the second, with air; and the third, with the sun.[1] In the last part of the *Nirukta*, which entirely relates to deities, it is twice asserted that there are [26] but three gods; '*Tisra eva devatáḥ.*'[2] The further inference, that these intend but one deity, is supported by many passages in the *Veda;* and is very clearly and concisely stated in the beginning of the index to the *Ṛigveda*, on the authority of the *Nirukta* and of the *Veda* itself.

'*Yasya vákyam, sa ṛishir; yá tenochyate, sá devatá; yad akshara-parimáṇam, tach chhando. Arthepsava ṛishayo devatáś chhandobhir abhyadhávan.*

'Tisra eva devatáḥ; *kshity-antariksha-dyu-sthánáḥ, agnir váyuḥ súrya ity: evam vyáhṛitayaḥ proktá vyastáḥ; samastánám prajápatir. Onkáraḥ sarvadevatyaḥ, párameshṭhyo vá, bráhmo, daivo vá, ádhyátmikas. Tat-tatsthánáḥ anyás tad-vibhútayaḥ; karma-pṛithaktwád dhi pṛithag-abhidhána-stutayo bhavanty: ekaiva vá mahán átmá devatá; sa súrya ity áchakshate; sa hi sarva-bhútátmá. Tad uktam ṛishiṇá:* "súrya átmá jagatas tasthushaś cheti." *Tad-vibhútayo 'nyá devatás. Tad apy etad ṛishiṇoktam;* "Indram Mitram Varuṇam Agnim áhur *iti.*"

'The *Ṛishi* [of any particular passage] is he whose speech it is; and that which is thereby addressed, is the deity [of the text]: and the number of syllables constitutes the metre [of the prayer]. Sages (*Ṛishis*) solicitous of [attaining] particular objects, have approached the Gods with [prayers composed in] metre.

[1] *Nighaṇṭu*, or first part of the *Nirukta*, c. 5.

[2] In the fifth and eighth sections of the twelfth chapter, or lecture, of the glossary and illustrations of the *Veda*. The *Nirukta* consists of three parts. The first, a glossary, as above mentioned, comprises five short chapters or lectures; the second, entitled *Naigama*, or the first half of the *Nirukta*, properly so called, consists of six long chapters; and the third, entitled *Daivata*, or second half of the proper *Nirukta*, contains eight more. The chapter here cited is marked as the twelfth, including the glossary, or seventh exclusive of it.

'The deities are only three: whose places are, the earth, [27] the intermediate region, and heaven: [namely] fire, air, and the sun. They are pronounced to be [the deities] of the mysterious names[1] severally; and (Prajápati) the lord of creatures is [the deity] of them collectively. The syllable *Om* intends every deity: it belongs to (*Parameshṭhi*) him who dwells in the supreme abode; it appertains to (*Brahma*) the vast one; to (*Deva*) God; to (*Adhyátmá*) the superintending soul. Other deities belonging to those several regions are portions of the [three] Gods; for they are variously named and described, on account of their different operations: but [in fact] there is only one deity, THE GREAT SOUL (*Mahán átmá*). He is called the sun; for he is the soul of all beings: [and] that is declared by the sage, "the sun is the soul of (*jagat*) what moves, and of (*tasthushas*) that which is fixed." Other deities are portions of him: and that is expressly declared by the text):[2] "The wise call fire, Indra, Mitra, and Varuṇa;" etc.'[3]

This passage of the *Anukramaṇí* is partly abridged from the *Nirukta* (c. 12), and partly taken from the *Bráhmaṇa* of the *Veda*. It shows (what is also deducible from texts of the Indian scriptures, translated in the present and former essays), that the ancient Hindu religion, as founded on the Indian scriptures, recognizes but one God, yet not sufficiently discriminating the creature from the creator.

The subjects and uses of the prayers contained in the [28] *Veda* differ more than the deities which are invoked, or the titles by which they are addressed. Every line is replete

[1] *Bhúr, bhuvaḥ*, and *swar;* called the *Vyáhṛitis*. See Manu, c. 2, v. 76. In the original text, the nominative case is here used for the genitive; as is remarked by the Commentator on this passage. Such irregularities are frequent in the *Vedas* themselves.

[2] *Rishi* here signifies text (not sage). See Haradatta, Bhaṭṭojí, etc. and Páṇini, 3, ii. 186.

[3] *Nirukta*, c. 12, § 5. The remainder of the passage that is here briefly cited by the author of the Index identifies fire with the great and only soul.

with allusions to mythology,[1] and to the Indian notions of the divine nature and of celestial spirits. For the innumerable ceremonies to be performed by a householder, and still more for those endless rites enjoined to hermits and ascetics, a choice of prayers is offered in every stage of the celebration. It may be here sufficient to observe, that Indra, or the firmament, fire, the sun, the moon, water, air, the spirits, the atmosphere and the earth, are the objects most frequently addressed: and the various and repeated sacrifices with fire, and the drinking of the milky juice of the moon-plant or acid asclepias,[2] furnish abundant occasion for numerous prayers adapted to the many stages of those religious rites. I shall, therefore, select for remark such prayers as seem most singular, rather than such as might appear the fairest specimens of this *Veda*.

In the fifteenth chapter of the first book there are two hymns ascribed to Kutsa, and also to Trita, son of water. Three ascetics, brothers it should seem, since they are named in another portion of the *Veda* as (*Á'ptya*) sons of water (*ap*), were oppressed with thirst while travelling in a sandy desert. At length they found a well, and one of [29] them descended into it and thence lifted water for his companions; but the ungrateful brothers stole his effects and left him in the well, covering it with a heavy cart-wheel. In his distress he pronounced the hymns in question. It appears from the text that Kutsa also was once in similar distress, and pronounced the same or a similar invocation: and, for this reason, the

[1] Not a mythology which avowedly exalts deified heroes (as in the *Puráṇas*), but one which personifies the elements and planets, and which peoples heaven and the world below with various orders of beings.

I observe, however, in many places, the ground-work of legends which are familiar in mythological poems: such, for example, as the demon Vṛitra slain by Indra, who is thence surnamed Vṛitrahan; but I do not remark anything that corresponds with the favourite legends of those sects which worship either the *Linga* or *S'akti*, or else Ráma or Kṛishṇa. I except some detached portions, the genuineness of which appears doubtful; as will be shown towards the close of this essay.

[2] *Soma-latá*, Asclepias acida, or Cynanchum viminale.

hymns have been placed, by the compiler of the *Veda*, among those of which Kutsa is the author.

The twenty-third chapter of the same book commences with a dialogue between Agastya, Indra, and the Maruts; and the remainder of that, with the whole of the twenty-fourth chapter, comprises twenty-six hymns addressed by Agastya to those divinities, and to the Aświns, fire, the sun, and some other deities. The last of these hymns was uttered by Agastya, under the apprehension of poison, and is directed by rituals to be used as an incantation against the effects of venom. Other incantations, applicable to the same purpose, occur in various parts of the *Veda;* for example, a prayer by Vasishṭha for preservation from poison (book 7, ch. 3, h. 17).

The third book, distributed into five chapters, contains invocations by Viśwámitra, son of Gáthin and grandson of Kuśika. The last hymn, or *súkta*, in this book, consists of six prayers, one of which includes the celebrated *Gáyatri*. This remarkable text is repeated more than once in other *Vedas;* but since Viśwámitra is acknowledged to be the *Ṛishi* to whom it was first revealed, it appears that its proper and original place is in this hymn. I therefore subjoin a translation of the prayer which contains it, as also the preceding one (both of which are addressed to the sun), for the sake of exhibiting the Indian priest's confession of faith, with its context; after having, in former essays, given more than one version of it apart from the [30] rest of the text. The other prayers contained in the same *súkta*, being addressed to other deities, are here omitted.

'This new and excellent praise of thee, O splendid, playful, sun (*Púshan*)! is offered by us to thee. Be gratified by this my speech: approach this craving mind, as a fond man seeks a woman. May that sun (*Púshan*), who contemplates and looks into all worlds, be our protector.

'Let us meditate on the adorable light of the divine

RULER (*Savitṛi*):[1] MAY IT GUIDE OUR INTELLECTS. Desirous of food, we solicit the gift of the splendid sun (*Savitṛi*), who should be studiously worshipped. Venerable men, guided by the understanding, salute the divine sun (*Savitṛi*) with oblations and praise.'

The last two hymns in the third chapter of the 7th book are remarkable, as being addressed to the guardian spirit of a dwelling-house, and used as prayers to be recited with oblations on building a house. The legend belonging to the second of these hymns is singular: Vasishṭha coming at night to the house of Varuṇa (with the intention of sleeping there, say some; but as others affirm, with the design of stealing grain to appease his hunger after a fast of three days), was assailed by the house-dog. He uttered this prayer, or incantation, to lay asleep the dog, who was barking at and attempting to bite him. A literal version of the first of those hymns is here subjoined:

'Guardian of this abode! be acquainted with us; be to us a wholesome dwelling; afford us what we ask of thee, and grant happiness to our bipeds and quadrupeds. Guardian of this house! increase both us and our wealth. Moon! [31] while thou art friendly, may we, with our kine and our horses, be exempted from decrepitude: guard us as a father protects his offspring. Guardian of this dwelling! may we be united with a happy, delightful, and melodious abode afforded by thee: guard our wealth now under thy protection, or yet in expectancy, and do thou defend us.'

The fourth hymn in the fourth chapter concludes with a prayer to Rudra, which being used with oblations after a fast of three days, is supposed to insure a happy life of a hundred years. In the sixth chapter three hymns occur, which being recited with worship to the sun, are believed to occasion a fall

[1] Sáyaṇáchárya, the commentator whose gloss is here followed, considers this passage to admit of two interpretations: 'the light, or *Brahma*, constituting the splendour of the supreme ruler or creator of the universe,' or 'the light, or orb, of the splendid sun.'

of rain after the lapse of five days. The two first are aptly addressed to a cloud; and the third is so to frogs, because these had croaked while Vasishṭha recited the preceding prayers, which circumstance he accepted as a good omen.

The sixth chapter of the tenth book closes with two hymns, the prayer of which is the destruction of enemies, and which are used at sacrifices for that purpose.

The seventh chapter opens with a hymn, in which Súryá, surnamed Sávitrí, the wife of the moon,[1] is made the speaker; as Dakshiṇá, daughter of Prajápati, and Juhú, daughter of Brahmá, are in subsequent chapters.[2] A very singular passage occurs in another place, containing a dialogue between Yama and his twin-sister Ya[32]muná, whom he endeavours to seduce; but his offers are rejected by her with virtuous expostulation.

Near the close of the tenth chapter, a hymn in a very different style of composition is spoken by Vách, daughter of Ambhṛiṇa, in praise of herself as the supreme and universal soul.[3] *Vách*, it should be observed, signifies speech; and she is the active power of Brahmá, proceeding from him. The following is a literal version of this hymn, which is expounded by the commentator consistently with the theological doctrines of the *Vedas*.

'I range with the *Rudras*, with the *Vasus*, with the *Ádityas*, and with the *Viśwedevas*. I uphold both the sun and the ocean [Mitra and Varuṇa], the firmament [Indra] and

[1] This marriage is noticed in the *Aitareya Bráhmaṇa*, where the second lecture of the fourth book opens in this manner; 'Prajápati gave his daughter, Súryá Sávitrí, to Soma, the king.' The well-known legend in the *Puráṇas*, concerning the marriage of Soma with the daughters of Daksha, seems to be founded on this story in the *Vedas*.

[2] In the introduction to the index, these, together with other goddesses, who are reckoned authors of holy texts, are enumerated and distinguished by the appellation of *Brahmavádiní*. An inspired writer is, in the masculine, termed *Brahmavádin*.

[3] Towards the end of the *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, Vách is mentioned as receiving a revelation from Ambhiṇí, who obtained it from the sun: but here she herself bears the almost similar patronymic, Ambhriṇí.

fire, and both the Aświns. I support the moon [Soma] destroyer of foes; and [the sun entitled] Twashṭri, Púshan, or Bhaga. I grant wealth to the honest votary who performs sacrifices, offers oblations, and satisfies [the deities]. Me, who am the queen, the conferrer of wealth, the possessor of knowledge, and first of such as merit worship, the gods render, universally, present everywhere, and pervader of all beings. He who eats food through me, as he who sees, who breathes, or who hears, through me, yet knows me not, is lost; hear then the faith which I pronounce. Even I declare this self, who is worshipped by gods and men: I make strong whom I choose; I make him *Brahmá*, holy and wise. For Rudra I bend the bow, to slay the demon, foe of Brahmá; for the people I make war [on their foes]; and I pervade heaven and earth. I bore the father on the head of this [universal mind], and [33] my origin is in the midst of the ocean;[1] and therefore do I pervade all beings, and touch this heaven with my form. Originating all beings, I pass like the breeze; I am above this heaven, beyond this earth; and what is the great one, that am I.'

The tenth chapter closes with a hymn to night; and the eleventh begins with two hymns relative to the creation of the world. Another on this subject was translated in a former essay:[2] it is the last hymn but one in the *Ṛigveda*, and the author of it is Aghamarshaṇa (a son of Madhuchhandas), from whom it takes the name by which it is generally cited. The other hymns, of which a version is here subjoined, are not ascribed to any ascertained author. Prajápati, surnamed

[1] Heaven, or the sky, is the father; as expressly declared in another place: and the sky is produced from mind, according to one more passage of the *Vedas*. Its birth is therefore placed on the head of the supreme mind. The commentator suggests three interpretations of the sequel of the stanza: 'my parent, the holy *Ambhṛiṇa*, is in the midst of the ocean;' or, 'my origin, the sentient deity, is in waters, which constitute the bodies of the gods;' or, 'the sentient god, who is in the midst of the waters, which pervade intellect, is my origin.'

[2] In the first Essay on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, Asiatic Researches, vol. v. p. 361.

Parameshṭhi, and his son Yajna, are stated as the original speakers. But of these names, one is a title of the primeval spirit, and the other seems to allude to the allegorical immolation of Brahmá.

I. 'Then was there no entity, nor non-entity; no world, nor sky, nor aught above it: nothing, anywhere, in the happiness of any one, involving or involved: nor water, deep and dangerous. Death was not; nor then was immortality; nor distinction of day or night. But THAT[1] [34] breathed without affiation, single with (*Sraadhá*) her who is sustained within him. Other than him, nothing existed [which] since [has been]. Darkness there was; [for] this universe was enveloped with darkness, and was undistinguishable [like fluids mixed in] waters: but that mass, which was covered by the husk, was [at length] produced by the power of contemplation. First desire was formed in his mind: and that became the original productive seed; which the wise, recognizing it by the intellect in their hearts, distinguish, in non-entity, as the bond of entity.

'Did the luminous ray of these [creative acts] expand in the middle? or above? or below? That productive seed at once became providence [or sentient souls], and matter [or the elements]: she, who is sustained within himself,[2] was inferior; and he, who heeds, was superior.

'Who knows exactly, and who shall in this world declare, whence and why this creation took place? The gods are subsequent to the production of this world: then who can know whence it proceeded? or whence this varied world arose? or whether it uphold [itself], or not? He who, in the highest

[1] The pronoun (*tad*), thus emphatically used, is understood to intend the Supreme Being, according to the doctrines of the *Vedánta*. When manifested by creation, he is the entity (*sat*); while forms, being mere illusion, are non-entity (*asat*). The whole of this hymn is expounded according to the received doctrines of the Indian theology, or *Vedánta*. Darkness and desire (*Tamas* and *Káma*) bear a distant resemblance to the Chaos and Eros of Hesiod. Theog. v. 116.

[2] So *Sraadhá* is expounded; and the commentator makes it equivalent to *Máyá*, or the world of ideas.

heaven, is the ruler of this universe, does indeed know; but not another can possess that knowledge.'

II. 'That victim who was wove with threads on every side, and stretched by the labours of a hundred and one gods, the fathers, who wove and framed and placed the warp and woof, do worship. The [first] male spreads and encompasses this [web], and displays it in this world and in heaven: these rays [of the creator] assembled at the altar, and prepared the holy strains, and the threads of the warp.

[35] 'What was the size of that divine victim whom all the gods sacrificed? What was his form? what the motive? the fence? the metre? the oblation? and the prayer? First was produced the *Gáyatrí* joined with fire; next the sun (*Savitṛi*) attended by *Ushṇih;* then the splendid moon with *Anushṭubh,* and with prayers; while *Vṛihatí* accompanied the elocution of Vṛihaspati (or the planet Jupiter). *Viráj* was supported by the sun and by water (Mitra and Varuṇa); but the [middle] portion of the day and *Trishṭubh* were here the attendants of Indra; *Jagatí* followed all the gods: and by that [universal] sacrifice sages and men were formed.

'When that ancient sacrifice was completed, sages, and men, and our progenitors, were by him formed. Viewing with an observant mind this oblation, which primeval saints offered, I venerate them. The seven inspired sages, with prayers and with thanksgivings, follow the path of these primeval saints, and wisely practise [the performance of sacrifices], as charioteers use reins [to guide their steeds].'

Some parts of these hymns bear an evident resemblance to one which has been before cited from the white *Yajus,*[1] and to which I shall again advert in speaking of that *Veda.* The commentator on the *Ṛigveda* quotes it to supply some omissions in this text. It appears also, on the faith of his citations, that passages analogous to these occur in the

[1] In the second Essay on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, Asiatic Researches, vol. vii. p. 251.

Taittiríyaka, or black *Yajus*, and also in the *Bráhmaṇa* of the *Veda*.

The hundred and one gods, who are the agents in the framing of the universe, typified by a sacrifice, are, according to this commentator, the years of Brahmá's life, or his afflations personified in the form of Angiras, etc. The seven sages, who instituted sacrifices in imitation of the [36] primeval type, are Maríchi and others. *Gáyatrí*, *Ushṇih*, etc., are names of metres, or of the various lengths of stanzas and measured verses, in the *Vedas*.

The preceding quotations may be sufficient to show the style of this part of the *Veda*, which comprehends the prayers and invocations.

Another part, belonging, as it appears, to the same *Veda*, is entitled *Aitareya Bráhmaṇa*. It is divided into eight books (*panchiká*), each containing five chapters or lectures (*adhyáya*), and subdivided into an unequal number of sections (*khaṇḍa*), amounting in the whole to two hundred and eighty-five. Being partly in prose, the number of distinct passages contained in those multiplied sections need not be indicated.

For want either of a complete commentary[1] or of an explanatory index,[2] I cannot undertake from a cursory perusal to describe the whole contents of this part of the *Veda*. I observe, however, many curious passages in it, especially towards the close. The seventh book had treated of sacrifices performed by kings: the subject is continued in the first four chapters of the eighth book; and three of these relate to a ceremony for the consecration of kings, by pouring on their heads, while seated on a throne prepared for the purpose, water mixed with honey, clarified butter, and spirituous liquor, as well as two sorts of grass and the sprouts of corn. This ceremony, called *Abhisheka*, is celebrated on the accession

[1] I possess three entire copies of the text, but a part only of the commentary by Sáyaṇáchárya.

[2] The index before mentioned does not extend to this part of the *Veda*.

of a king; and subsequently on divers occasions, as part of the rites belonging to certain solemn sacrifices performed for the attainment of particular objects.

The mode of its celebration is the subject of the second chapter of the eighth book, or thirty-seventh chapter, [37] reckoned (as is done by the commentator) from the beginning of the *Aitareya*. It contains an instance, which is not singular in the *Vedas*, though it be rather uncommon in their didactic portion, of a disquisition on a difference of opinion among inspired authors. Some, it says, direct the consecration to be completed with the appropriate prayer, but without the sacred words (*Vyáhṛitis*), which they here deem superfluous: others, and particularly Satyakáma, son of Jabálá, enjoin the complete recitation of those words, for reasons explained at full length; and Uddálaka, son of Aruṇa, has therefore so ordained the performance of the ceremony.

The subject of this chapter is concluded by the following remarkable passage. 'Well knowing all the [efficacy of consecration], Janamejaya, son of Parikshit, declared: "Priests, conversant with this ceremony, assist me, who am likewise apprised [of its benefits], to celebrate the solemn rite. Therefore do I conquer [in single combat], therefore do I defeat arrayed forces with an arrayed army: neither the arrows of the gods, nor those of men, reach me: I shall live the full period of life; I shall remain master of the whole earth." Truly, neither the arrows of the gods, nor those of men, do reach him, whom well-instructed priests assist in celebrating the solemn rite: he lives the full period of life; he remains master of the whole earth.'

The thirty-eighth chapter (or third of the eighth book) describes a supposed consecration of Indra, when elected by the gods to be their king. It consists of similar, but more solemn rites; including, among other peculiarities, a fanciful construction of his throne with texts of the *Veda;* besides a

repetition of the ceremony of consecration in various regions, to ensure universal dominion. This last part of the description merits to be quoted, on account of the geographical hints which it contains.

[38] 'After [his inauguration by Prajápati], the divine *Vasus* consecrated him in the eastern region, with the same prayers in verse and in prose, and with the same holy words [as before mentioned], in thirty-one days, to ensure his just domination. Therefore [even now] the several kings of the *Práchyas*, in the East, are consecrated, after the practice of the gods, to equitable rule (*sámrájya*), and [people] call those consecrated princes *Samráj*.[1]

'Next the divine *Rudras* consecrated him in the southern region, with the same prayers in verse and in prose, and with the same holy words, in thirty-one days, to ensure increase of happiness. Therefore the several kings of the *Satwats*, in the south, are consecrated, after the practice of the gods, to the increase of enjoyment (*bhojya*), and [people] name those consecrated princes *Bhoja*.

'Then the divine *Á'dityas* consecrated him in the western region, with, etc., to ensure sole dominion. Therefore the several kings of the *Nichyas* and *Apáchyas*, in the West, are consecrated, etc., to sole dominion, and [people] denominate them *Swaráj*.[2]

'Afterwards all the gods (*Víśwe deváḥ*) consecrated him in the northern region, with, etc., to ensure separate domination. Therefore the several [deities who govern the] countries of Uttara kuru and Uttara madra, beyond Himavat, in the North, are consecrated, etc., to distinct rule (*Vairájya*), and [people] term them *Viráj*.[3]

'Next the divine *Sádhyas*, and *Á'ptyas* consecrated him, in

[1] In the nominative case, *Samráṭ*, *Samráḍ*, or *Samrál*; substituting in this place a liquid letter, which is peculiar to the *Veda* and to the southern dialects of India, and which approaches in sound to the common *l*.

[2] In the nominative case, *Swaráṭ*, *Swaráḍ*, or *Swarál*.

[3] In the nominative, *Viráṭ*, *Viráḍ*, or *Virál*.

this middle, central, and present region, with, etc., for local dominion. Therefore the several kings of Kuru and [39] Panchála, as well as Vaśa and Uśínara, in the middle, central, and present region, are consecrated, etc., to sovereignty (*rájya*), and [people] entitle them *Rájá*.

'Lastly, the *Maruts*, and the gods named *Angiras*, consecrated him, in the upper region, with, etc., to promote his attainment of the supreme abode, and to ensure his mighty domination, superior rule, independent power, and long reign: and therefore he became a supreme deity (*parameshṭhí*) and ruler over creatures.

'Thus consecrated by that great inauguration, Indra subdued all conquerable [earths], and won all worlds: he obtained over all the gods supremacy, transcendent rank, and pre-eminence. Conquering in this world [below] equitable domination, happiness, sole dominion, separate authority, attainment of the supreme abode, sovereignty, mighty power, and superior rule; becoming a self-existent being and independent ruler, exempt from [early] dissolution; and reaching all [his] wishes in that celestial world; he became immortal: he became immortal.'[1]

The thirty-ninth chapter is relative to a peculiarly solemn rite performed in imitation of the fabulous inauguration of Indra. It is imagined that this celebration becomes a cause of obtaining great power and universal monarchy, and the three last sections of the chapter recite instances of its successful practice. Though replete with enormous and absurd exaggerations, they are here translated at full length, as not unimportant, since many kings are mentioned whose names are familiar in the heroic history of India.

§. VII. 'By this great inauguration similar to Indra's, Tura, son of Kavasha, consecrated Janamejaya, son of Parikshit; and therefore did Janamejaya, son of [40] Parikshit,

[1] In the didactic portion of the *Veda*, the last term in every chapter is repeated, to indicate its conclusion. This repetition was not preserved in a former quotation, from the necessity of varying considerably the order of the words.

subdue the earth completely all around, and traverse it every way, and perform the sacrifice with a horse as an offering.

'Concerning that solemn sacrifice this verse is universally chanted. "In Ásandívat, Janamejaya bound [as an offering] to the gods, a horse fed with grain, marked with a white star on his forehead, and bearing a green wreath round his neck."

'By this, etc., Chyavana, son of Bhṛigu, consecrated Śáryáta sprung from the race of Manu; and therefore did he subdue, etc. He became likewise a householder in the service of the gods.

'By this, etc., Somaśushman, grandson of Vájaratna, consecrated Śatáníka, son of Satrájit; and therefore did he subdue, etc.

'By this, etc., Parvata and Nárada consecrated Ambáshṭhya; and therefore, etc.

'By this, etc., Parvata and Nárada consecrated Yudhánśraushṭi, grandson of Ugrasena; and therefore, etc.

'By this, etc., Kaśyapa consecrated Viśwakarman, son of Bhuvana; and therefore did he subdue, etc.

'The earth, as sages relate, thus addressed him: "No mortal has a right to give me away; yet thou, O Viśwakarman, son of Bhuvana, dost wish to do so. I will sink in the midst of the waters; and vain has been thy promise to Kaśyapa."[1]

'By this, etc., Vasishṭha consecrated Sudás, son of Pijavana; and therefore, etc.

'By this, etc., Samvarta, son of Angiras, consecrated Marutta, son of Avikshit; and therefore, etc.

[41] 'On that subject this verse is everywhere chanted: "The divine *Maruts* dwelt in the house of Marutta, as his guards; and all the gods were companions of the son of Avikshit, whose every wish was fulfilled."[2]

§ VIII. 'By this great inauguration, similar to Indra's,

[1] So great was the efficacy of consecration, observes the commentator in this place, that the submersion of the earth was thereby prevented, notwithstanding this declaration.

[2] All this, observes the commentator, was owing to his solemn inauguration.

Udamaya, son of Atri, consecrated Anga; and therefore did Anga subdue the earth completely all around, and traverse it every way, and perform a sacrifice with a horse, as an offering.

'He, perfect in his person, thus addressed [the priest, who was busy on some sacrifice]: "Invite me to this solemn rite, and I will give thee [to complete it], holy man! ten thousand elephants and ten thousand female slaves."

'On that subject these verses are everywhere chanted: "Of the cows, for which the sons of Priyamedha assisted Udamaya in the solemn rite, this son of Atri gave them [every day], at noon, two thousand each, out of a thousand millions.

"The son of Virochana [Anga] unbound and gave, while his priest performed the solemn sacrifice, eighty-eight thousand white horses fit for use.

"The son of Atri bestowed in gifts ten thousand women adorned with necklaces, all daughters of opulent persons, and brought from various countries.

"While distributing ten thousand elephants in Avachatnuka, the holy son of Atri grew tired, and despatched messengers to finish the distribution.

"'A hundred [I give] to you;' 'A hundred to you;' still the holy man grew tired; and was at last forced to draw breath while bestowing them by thousands."[1]

[42] § IX. 'By this great inauguration, similar to Indra's, Dírghatamas, son of Mamatá, consecrated Bharata, the son of Duḥshanta;[2] and therefore did Bharata, son of Duḥshanta, subdue the earth completely all around, and traverse it every way, and perform repeated sacrifices with horses as offerings.

'On that subject too these verses are everywhere chanted:

[1] It was through the solemn inauguration of Anga that his priest was able to give such great alms. This remark is by the commentator.

[2] So the name should be written, as appears from this passage of the *Veda*; and not, as in copies of some of the *Puráṇas*, Dushmanta or Dushyanta.

"Bharata distributed in Mashṇára[1] a hundred and seven thousand millions of black elephants with white tusks and decked with gold.

"A sacred fire was lighted for Bharata, son of Duḥshanta, in *Sáchiguṇa*, at which a thousand *Bráhmaṇas* shared a thousand millions of cows apiece.

'Bharata, son of Duḥshanta, bound seventy-eight horses [for solemn rites] near the Yamuná, and fifty-five in Vṛitraghna, on the Gangá.

"Having thus bound a hundred and thirty-three horses fit for sacred rites, the son of Duḥshanta became pre-eminently wise, and surpassed the prudence of [every rival] king.

"This great achievement of Bharata, neither former nor later persons [have equalled]; the five classes of men have not attained his feats, any more than a mortal [can reach] heaven with his hands."[2]

'The holy saint, Vṛihaduktha, taught this great inauguration to Durmukha, king of Panchála; and therefore Durmukha, the Pánchála, being a king, subdued [43] by means of that knowledge the whole earth around, and traversed it every way.[3]

'The son of Satyahavya, sprung from the race of Vasishṭha, communicated this great inauguration to Atyaráti, son of Janantapa; and therefore Atyaráti, son of Janantapa, being no king, [nevertheless] subdued by means of that knowledge the whole earth around, and traversed it every way.

'Sátyahavya, of the race of Vasishṭha, addressed him, saying, "Thou hast conquered the whole earth around; [now] aggrandize me." Atyaráti, son of Janantapa, replied: "When I conquer Uttara kuru, then thou shalt be king of the earth,

[1] The several manuscripts differ on this name of a country; and having no other information respecting it, I am not confident that I have selected the best reading. This observation is applicable also to some other uncommon names.

[2] All this, says the commentator, shows the efficacy of inauguration.

[3] It is here remarked in the commentary, that a *Bráhmaṇa*, being incompetent to receive consecration, is however capable of knowing its form; the efficacy of which knowledge is shown in this place.

holy man! and I will be merely thy general." Sátyahavya rejoined: "That is the land of the gods; no mortal can subdue it: thou hast been ungrateful towards me, and therefore I resume from thee this [power]." Hence the king Śushmiṇa, son of Śivi, destroyer of foes, slew Atyaráti, who was [thus] divested of vigour and deprived of strength.

'Therefore let not a soldier be ungrateful towards the priest, who is acquainted [with the form], and practises [the celebration, of this ceremony], lest he lose his kingdom and forfeit his life: lest he forfeit his life.'

To elucidate this last story, it is necessary to observe that, before the commencement of the ceremony of inauguration, the priest swears the soldier, by a most solemn oath, not to injure him. A similar oath, as is observed in this place by the commentator, had been administered, previously to the communication of that knowledge to which Atyaráti owed his success. The priest considered his answer as illusory and insulting, because Uttara kuru, being north of Meru, [44] is the land of the gods, and cannot be conquered by men. As this ungrateful answer was a breach of his oath, the priest withdrew his power from him; and, in consequence, he was slain by the foe.

The fortieth, and last chapter of the *Aitareya Bráhmaṇa,* relates to the benefit of entertaining a *Purohita,* or appointed priest; the selection of a proper person for that station, and the mode of his appointment by the king; together with the functions to be discharged by him. The last section describes rites to be performed, under the direction of such a priest, for the destruction of the king's enemies. As it appears curious, the whole description is here translated; abridging, however, as in other instances, the frequent repetitions with which it abounds.

'Next then [is described] destruction around air (*Brahma*).[1] Foes, enemies, and rivals, perish around him, who is conver-

[1] So this observance is denominated, viz. *Brahmaṇaḥ parimaraḥ.*

sant with these rites. That which [moves] in the atmosphere, is air (*Brahma*), around which perish five deities, lightning, rain, the moon, the sun, and fire.

'Lightning having flashed, disappears behind rain:[1] it vanishes, and none know [whither it is gone]. When a man dies, he vanishes; and none know [whither his soul is gone]. Therefore, whenever lightning perishes, pronounce this [prayer]; "May my enemy perish: may he disappear, and none know [where he is]." Soon, indeed, none will know [whither he is gone].

'Rain having fallen, [evaporates and] disappears within the moon, etc. When rain ceases, pronounce this [prayer], etc.

'The moon, at the conjunction, disappears within the sun, etc. When the moon is dark, pronounce, etc.

[45] 'The sun, when setting, disappears in fire, etc.[2] When the sun sets, pronounce, etc.

'Fire, ascending, disappears in air, etc. When fire is extinguished, pronounce, etc.

'These same deities are again produced from this very origin. Fire is born of air; for, urged with force by the breath, it increases. Viewing it, pronounce [this prayer], "May fire be revived: but not my foe be reproduced: may he depart averted." Therefore, does the enemy go far away.

'The sun is born of fire.[3] Viewing it, say, "May the sun rise; but not my foe be reproduced, etc."

'The moon is born of the sun.[4] Viewing it, say, "May the moon be renewed, etc."

[1] Behind a cloud.

[2] The *Taittiriya Yajurveda* contains a passage which may serve to explain this notion; 'The sun, at eve, penetrates fire; and therefore fire is seen afar at night; for both are luminous.'

[3] At night, as the commentator now observes, the sun disappears in fire; but re-appears thence next day. Accordingly, fire is destitute of splendour by day, and the sun shines brighter.

[4] The moon, as is remarked in the commentary, disappears within the sun at the conjunction; but is reproduced from the sun on the first day of the bright fortnight.

'Rain is produced from the moon.[1] Viewing it, say, "May rain be produced, etc."

'Lightning comes of rain. Viewing it, say, "May lightning appear, etc."

'Such is destruction around air. Maitreya, son of Kusháru, communicated these rites to Sutwan, son of Kiriśa, descended from Bhárga. Five kings perished around him, and Sutwan attained greatness.

'The observance [enjoined] to him [who undertakes these rites, is as follows]: let him not sit down earlier than the [46] foe; but stand, while he thinks him standing. Let him not lie down earlier than the foe; but sit, while he thinks him sitting. Let him not sleep earlier than the foe; but wake, while he thinks him waking. Though his enemy had a head of stone, soon does he slay him: he does slay him.'

Before I quit this portion of the *Veda*, I think it right to add, that the close of the seventh book contains the mention of several monarchs, to whom the observance, there described, was taught by divers sages. For a reason before mentioned, I shall subjoin the names. They are Viśwantara, son of Sushadman; Sahadeva, son of Sarja, and his son Somaka; Babhru, son of Devávṛidha, Bhíma of Vidarbha, Nagnajit of Gandhára, Sanaśruta of Arindama, Kratuvid of Janaka; besides Janamejaya and Sudás, who have been also noticed in another place.

The *Aitareya Áraṇyaka* is another portion of the *Ṛigveda*. It comprises eighteen chapters or lectures, unequally distributed in five books (*Áraṇyaka*). The second, which is the longest, for it contains seven lectures, constitutes with the third an *Upanishad* of this *Veda*, entitled the *Bahvṛich Bráhmaa Upanishad;* or more commonly, the *Aitareya*, as having been recited by a sage named Aitareya.[2] The four

[1] Here the commentator remarks, Rain enters the lunar orb, which consists of water; and, at a subsequent time, it is reproduced from the moon.

[2] It is so affirmed by Ánandatírtha in his notes: and he, and the commentator, whom he annotates, state the original speaker of this *Upanishad* to be Mahidása,

last lectures of that second *Áraṇ*[47]*yaka* are particularly consonant to the theological doctrines of the *Vedánta*, and are accordingly selected by theologians of the *Vedánta* school as the proper *Aitareya Upanishad*.[1] The following is literally translated from this portion of the second *Áraṇyaka*.

The Aitareya Áraṇya. B. 2.

§ IV. 'Originally this [universe] was indeed soul only; nothing else whatsoever existed, active [or inactive]. He thought, "I will create worlds:" thus he created these [various] worlds; water, light, mortal [beings], and the waters. That "water" is the [region] above the heaven, which heaven upholds; the atmosphere comprises light; the earth is mortal; and the regions below are "the waters."[2]

an incarnation of Náráyaṇa, proceeding from Viśála, son of Abja. He adds, that on the sudden appearance of this deity at a solemn celebration, the whole assembly of gods and priests fainted, but at the intercession of Brahmá, they were revived; and after making their obeisance, they were instructed in holy science. This *Avatára* was called Mahidása, because those venerable personages (*Mahin*) declared themselves his slaves (*dása*).

In the concluding title of one transcript of this *Áraṇya*, I find it ascribed to Áśwaláyana, probably by an error of the transcriber. On the other hand, S'aunaka appears to be author of some texts of the *Áraṇya;* for a passage from the second lecture of the fifth (Ar. 5, lect. 2, § 11) is cited as S'aunaka's, by the commentator on the prayers of the *Ṛigveda* (lect. 1, § 15).

[1] I have two copies of S'ankara's commentary, and one of annotations on his gloss by Náráyaṇendra; likewise a copy of Sáyaṇa's commentary on the same theological tract, and also on the third *Áraṇyaka;* besides annotations by Ánandatírtha on a different gloss, for the entire *Upanishad*. The concluding prayer, or seventh lecture of the second *Áraṇyaka*, was omitted by S'ankara, as sufficiently perspicuous; but is expounded by Sáyaṇa, whose exposition is the same which is added by S'ankara's commentator, and which transcribers sometimes subjoin to S'ankara's gloss.

As an instance of singular and needless frauds, I must mention, that the work of Ánandatírtha was sold to me, under a different title, as a commentary on the *Taittiríya-sanhitá* of the *Yajurveda*. The running titles at the end of each chapter had been altered accordingly. On examination I found it to be a different but valuable work; as above described.

[2] *Ambhas*, 'water,' and *ápas*, 'the waters.' The commentators assign reasons for these synonymous terms being employed, severally, to denote the regions above the sky, and those below the earth.

[48] 'He thought, "These are indeed worlds; I will create guardians of worlds." Thus HE drew from the waters, and framed, an embodied being.[1] He viewed him; and of that being, so contemplated, the mouth opened as an egg: from the mouth, speech issued; from speech, fire proceeded. The nostrils spread; from the nostrils, breath passed; from breath, air was propagated. The eyes opened; from the eyes, a glance sprung; from that glance, the sun was produced. The ears dilated: from the ears came hearkening; and from that, the regions of space. The skin expanded: from the skin, hair rose; from that grew herbs and trees. The breast opened; from the breast, mind issued; and from mind, the moon. The navel burst: from the navel came deglutition;[2] from that, death. The generative organ burst: thence flowed productive seed; whence waters drew their origin.

'These deities, being thus framed, fell into this vast ocean: and to HIM they came with thirst and hunger: and HIM they thus addressed: "Grant us a [smaller] size, wherein abiding we may eat food." HE offered to them [the form of] a cow: they said, "that is not sufficient for us." HE exhibited to them [the form of] a horse: they said, "neither is that sufficient for us." HE showed them the human form: they exclaimed: "well done! ah! wonderful!" Therefore man alone is [pronounced to be] "well formed."

'HE bade them occupy their respective places. Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth. Air, becoming breath, proceeded to the nostrils. The sun, becoming sight, penetrated the eyes. Space became hearing, and occupied [49] the ears. Herbs and trees became hair, and filled the skin. The moon, becoming mind, entered the breast. Death, becoming deglutition, penetrated the navel; and water became productive seed, and occupied the generative organ.

[1] *Purusha*, 'a human form.'

[2] *Apána*. From the analogy between the acts of inhaling and of swallowing; the latter is considered as a sort of breath or inspiration: hence the air drawn in by deglutition is reckoned one of five breaths or airs inhaled into the body.

'Hunger and thirst addressed him, saying, "Assign us [our places]." He replied: "You I distribute among these deities; and I make you participant with them." Therefore is it, that to whatever deity an oblation is offered, hunger and thirst participate with him.

'He reflected, "These are worlds, and regents of worlds: for them I will frame food." He viewed the waters: from waters, so contemplated, form issued; and food is form, which was so produced.

'Being thus framed, it turned away and sought to flee. The [primeval] man endeavoured to seize it by speech, but could not attain it by his voice: had he by voice taken it, [hunger] would be satisfied by naming food. He attempted to catch it by his breath, but could not inhale it by breathing: had he by inhaling taken it, [hunger] would be satisfied by smelling food. He sought to snatch it by a glance, but could not surprise it by a look: had he seized it by the sight, [hunger] would be satisfied by seeing food. He attempted to catch it by hearing, but could not hold it by listening: had he caught it by hearkening, [hunger] would be satisfied by hearing food. He endeavoured to seize it by his skin, but could not restrain it by his touch: had he seized it by contact, [hunger] would be satisfied by touching food. He wished to reach it by the mind, but could not attain it by thinking: had he caught it by thought, [hunger] would be satisfied by meditating on food. He wanted to seize it by the generative organ, but could not so hold it; had he thus seized it, [hunger] would be satisfied by emission. Lastly he endeavoured to catch it by deglutition; [50] and thus he did swallow it: that air, which is so drawn in, seizes food; and that very air is the bond of life.

'He [*the universal soul*] reflected, "How can this [body] exist without me?" He considered by which extremity he should penetrate. He thought, "If [without me] speech discourse, breath inhale, and sight view; if hearing hear, skin

feel, and mind meditate; if deglutition swallow, and the organ of generation perform its functions; then, who am I?"

'Parting the suture [*sîman*], HE penetrated by this route. That opening is called the suture (*vidṛiti*) and is the road to beatitude (*nándana*).[1]

'Of that soul, the places of recreation are three; and the modes of sleep, as many. This (*pointing to the right eye*) is a place of recreation; this (*pointing to the throat*) is [also] a situation of enjoyment; this (*pointing to the heart*) is [likewise] a region of delight.

'Thus born [as the animating spirit], he discriminated the elements, [remarking], "What else [but him] can I here affirm [to exist];" and he contemplated this [thinking] person,[2] the vast expanse,[3] [exclaiming] IT have I seen. Therefore is he named IT-SEEING (IDAM-DRA): IT-SEEING is indeed his name: and him, being IT-SEEING, they call, by a remote appellation, Indra; for the gods generally delight in the concealment [of their name]. The gods delight in privacy.[4]

[51] § V. 'This [living principle] is first, in man, a fetus, or productive seed, which is the essence drawn from all the members [of the body]: thus the man nourishes himself within himself. But when he emits it into woman, he procreates that [fetus]: and such is its first birth.

'It becomes identified with the woman; and being such, as is her own body, it does not destroy her. She cherishes his ownself,[5] thus received within her; and, as nurturing him, she ought to be cherished [by him]. The woman nourishes

[1] The Hindus believe that the soul, or conscious life, enters the body through the sagittal suture; lodges in the brain; and may contemplate, through the same opening, the divine perfections. Mind, or the reasoning faculty, is reckoned to be an organ of the body, situated in the heart.

[2] *Purusha.*

[3] *Brahma*, or the great one.

[4] Here, as at the conclusion of every division of an *Upanishad*, or of any chapter in the didactic portion of the *Vedas*, the last phrase is repeated.

[5] For the man is identified with the child procreated by him.

that fetus: but he previously cherished the child, and further does so after its birth. Since he supports the child before and after birth, he cherishes himself: and that, for the perpetual succession of persons; for thus are these persons perpetuated. Such is his second birth.

'This [second] self becomes his representative for holy acts [of religion]: and that other [self], having fulfilled its obligations and completed its period of life, deceases. Departing hence, he is born again [in some other shape]: and such is his third birth.

'This was declared by the holy sage. "Within the womb I have recognized all the successive births of these deities. A hundred bodies, like iron chains, hold me down: yet, like a falcon, I swiftly rise." Thus spoke Vámadeva, reposing in the womb: and possessing this [intuitive] knowledge, he rose, after bursting that corporeal confinement; and, ascending to the blissful region of heaven,[1] he attained every wish and became immortal. He became immortal.

§ VI. 'What is this soul? that we may worship him. Which is the soul? Is it that by which [a man] sees? by which he hears? by which he smells odours? by which he [52] utters speech? by which he discriminates a pleasant or unpleasant taste? Is it the heart [or understanding]? or the mind [or will]? Is it sensation? or power? or discrimination? or comprehension? or perception? or retention? or attention? or application? or haste [or pain]? or memory? or assent? or determination? or animal action?[2] or wish? or desire?

'All those are only various names of apprehension. But this [soul, consisting in the faculty of apprehension] is Brahmá; he is Indra; he is (Prajápati) the lord of creatures: these gods are he; and so are the five primary elements,

[1] *Swarga*, or place of celestial bliss.

[2] *Asu*, the unconscious volition, which occasions an act necessary to the support of life, as breathing, etc.

earth, air, the ethereal fluid, water, and light:[1] these, and the same joined with minute objects and other seeds [of existence], and [again] other [beings] produced from eggs, or borne in wombs, or originating in hot moisture,[2] or springing from plants; whether horses, or kine, or men, or elephants, whatever lives, and walks or flies, or whatever is immovable [as herbs and trees]: all that is the eye of intelligence. On intellect [every thing] is founded: the world is the eye of intellect, and intellect is its foundation. Intelligence is (Brahma) the great one.

'By this [intuitively] intelligent soul, that sage ascended from the present world to the blissful region of heaven; and, obtaining all his wishes, became immortal. He became immortal.

[53] § VII. 'May my speech be founded on understanding, and my mind be attentive to my utterance. Be thou manifested to me, O self-manifested [intellect]! For my sake [O speech and mind!] approach this *Veda*. May what I have heard, be unforgotten: day and night may I behold this, which I have studied. Let me think the reality: let me speak the truth. May it preserve me; may it preserve the teacher: me may it preserve: the teacher may it preserve; the teacher may it preserve; may it preserve the teacher.[3]

On the Kaushítaki.

Another *Upanishad* of this *Veda*, appertaining to a particular *Śákhá* of it, is named from that, and from the *Bráhmaṇa*,

[1] Brahmá (in the masculine gender) here denotes, according to commentators, the intelligent spirit, whose birth was in the mundane egg; from which he is named Hiraṇyagarbha. Indra is the chief of the gods, or subordinate deities, meaning the elements and planets. Prajápati is the first embodied spirit, called Viráj, and described in the preceding part of this extract. The gods are fire, and the rest as there stated.

[2] Vermin and insects are supposed to be generated from hot moisture.

[3] This, like other prayers, is denominated a *mantra*, though it be the conclusion of an *Upanishad*.

of which it is an extract, *Kaushítaki Bráhmaṇa Upanishad.* From an abridgment of it (for I have not seen the work at large), it appears to contain two dialogues; one, in which Indra instructs Pratardana in theology; and another, in which Ajátaśatru, king of Káśí, communicates divine knowledge to a priest named Báláki. A similar conversation between these two persons is found likewise in the *Vṛihadáraṇyaka* of the *Yajurveda,* as will be subsequently noticed. Respecting the other contents of the *Bráhmaṇa* from which these dialogues are taken, I have not yet obtained any satisfactory information.

The abridgment above mentioned occurs in a metrical paraphrase of twelve principal *Upanishads* in twenty chapters, by Vidyáraṇya, the preceptor of Mádhava-áchárya. He expressly states *Kaushítaki* as the name of a *Śákhá* of the *Ṛigveda.*

[54] The original of the *Kaushítaki* was among the portions of the *Veda* which Sir Robert Chambers collected at Benares, according to a list which he sent to me some time before his departure from India. A fragment of an *Upanishad* procured at the same place by Sir William Jones, and given by him to Mr. Blaquiere, is marked in his handwriting, "The beginning of the *Kaushítaki.*" In it the dialogists are Chitra, surnamed Gángáyani, and Śwetaketu, with his father Uddálaka, son of Aruṇa.

I shall resume the consideration of this portion of the *Ṛigveda,* whenever I have the good fortune to obtain the complete text and commentary, either of the *Bráhmaṇa,* or of the *Upanishad,* which bears this title.

On the White Yajurveda.

The *Vájasaneyi,* or white *Yajus,* is the shortest of the *Vedas;* so far as respects the first and principal part,

which comprehends the *mantras*. The *Sanhitá*, or collection of prayers and invocations belonging to this *Veda*, is comprised in forty lectures (*adhyáya*), unequally subdivided into numerous short sections (*kaṇḍiká*); each of which, in general, constitutes a prayer or *mantra*. It is also divided, like the *Ṛigveda*, into *anuvákas*, or chapters. The number of *anuvákas*, as they are stated at the close of the index to this *Veda*, appears to be two hundred and eighty-six: the number of sections, or verses, nearly two thousand (or exactly 1987). But this includes many repetitions of the same text in divers places. The lectures are very unequal, containing from thirteen to a hundred and seventeen sections (*kaṇḍiká*).[1]

[55] Though called the *Yajurveda*, it consists of passages, some of which are denominated *Ṛich*, while only the rest are strictly *Yajus*. The first are, like the prayers of the *Ṛigveda*, in metre: the others are either in measured prose, containing from one to a hundred and six syllables;[2] or such of them as exceed that length are considered to be prose reducible to no measure.

The *Yajurveda* relates chiefly to oblations and sacrifices, as the name itself implies.[3] The first chapter, and the greatest part of the second, contain prayers adapted for sacrifices at the full and change of the moon; but the six last sections regard oblations to the manes. The subject of the third chapter is the consecration of a perpetual fire and the sacrifice of victims; the five next relate chiefly to a ceremony called *Agnishṭoma*, which includes that of drinking the juice of the acid asclepias. The two following relate to the *Vájapeya* and *Rájasúya*; the last of which ceremonies involves the consecra-

[1] I have several copies of Mádhyandina's white *Yajus*, one of which is accompanied by a commentary, entitled *Vedadípa*; the author of which, Mahídhara, consulted the commentaries of Uvaṭa and Mádhava, as he himself informs us in his preface.

[2] [A hundred and four?]

[3] *Yajus* is derived from the verb *yaj*, to worship or adore. Another etymology is sometimes assigned: but this is most consistent with the subject; viz. (*yajna*) sacrifices, and (*homa*) oblations to fire.

tion of a king. Eight chapters, from the eleventh to the eighteenth, regard the sanctifying of sacrificial fire; and the ceremony named *Sautrámaṇí*, which was the subject of the last section of the tenth chapter, occupies three other chapters, from the nineteenth to the twenty-first. The prayers to be used at an *Áśvamedha*, or ceremony emblematic of the immolation of a horse and other animals, by a king ambitious of universal empire, are placed in four chapters, from the twenty-second to the twenty-fifth. The two next are miscellaneous chapters; the *Sautrámaṇí* and *Áśvamedha* are completed in two others; and the *Purushamedha*, or ceremony performed as the type of the allegorical immolation of Náráyaṇa, fills the thirtieth and thirty-first chapters. The three next belong [56] to the *Sarvamedha*, or prayers and oblations for universal success. A chapter follows on the *Pitṛimedha*, or obsequies in commemoration of a deceased ancestor: and the last five chapters contain such passages of this *Veda* as are ascribed to Dadhyach, son or descendant of Atharvan: four of them consist of prayers applicable to various religious rites, as sacraments, lustrations, penance, etc.; and the last is restricted to theology.

Excepting these five chapters, most of the passages contained in the preceding part of this collection of prayers are attributed to divine personages: many are ascribed to the first manifested being, named Prajápati, Parameshṭhí, or Náráyaṇa Purusha; some are attributed to Swayambhú Brahma, or the self-existent himself: the reputed authors of the rest are Vṛihaspati, Indra, Varuṇa, and the Aświns: except a few scattered passages, which are ascribed to Vasishṭha, Viśwámitra, Vámadeva, Madhuchhandas, Medhátithi, and other human authors; and some texts, for which no *Ṛishi* is specified in the index, and which are therefore assigned either to the sun (*Virasvat* or *Áditya*), as the deity supposed to have revealed this *Veda;* or to Yájnavalkya, as the person who received the revelation: in the same manner as the unappro-

priated passages of the *Rigveda* are assigned to Prajápati or Brahmá.

Several prayers and hymns of the *Yajurveda* have been already translated in former essays,[1] and may serve as a sufficient example of the style of its composition. I shall here insert only two passages, both remarkable The first is the beginning of the prayers of the *Sarvamedha*. It constitutes the thirty-second lecture, comprising two chapters (*anuváka*) and sixteen verses.

'FIRE is THAT [original cause]; the sun is that; so is [57] air; so is the moon: such too is that pure Brahma, and those waters, and that lord of creatures. Moments [and other measures of time] proceeded from the effulgent person, whom none can apprehend [as an object of perception], above, around, or in the midst. Of him, whose glory is so great, there is no image: he it is who is celebrated in various holy strains.[2] Even he is the god who pervades all regions: he is the first born: it is he, who is in the womb; he, who is born; and he, who will be produced: he, severally and universally, remains with [all] persons.

'HE, prior to whom nothing was born, and who became all beings; himself the lord of creatures, with [a body composed of] sixteen members, being delighted by creation, produced the three luminaries [the sun, the moon, and fire].

'To what god should we offer oblations, but to him who made the fluid sky and solid earth, who fixed the solar orb (*swar*) and celestial abode (*náka*), and who framed drops [of rain] in the atmosphere? To what god should we offer oblations, but to him whom heaven and earth mentally contemplate, while they are strengthened and embellished by offerings, and illuminated by the sun risen above them?

'The wise man views that mysterious [being], in whom the universe perpetually exists, resting on that sole support. In

[1] On the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, As. Res., vols. v. and vii.

[2] The text refers to particular passages.

him, this [world] is absorbed; from him it issues: in creatures he is twined and wove, with various forms of existence. Let the wise man, who is conversant with the import of revelation,[1] promptly celebrate that immortal being, the mysteriously existing and various abode; he who knows its three states [its creation, continuance, and destruction], which are involved in mystery, is father of the father. That [Brahma], in whom the gods attain immor[58]tality, while they abide in the third [or celestial] region, is our venerable parent, and the providence which governs all worlds.

'Knowing the elements, discovering the worlds, and recognizing all regions and quarters [to be him], and worshipping [speech or revelation, who is] the first-born, the votary pervades the animating spirit of solemn sacrifice by means of [his own] soul. Recognizing heaven, earth, and sky [to be him], knowing the worlds, discovering space and (*swar*) the solar orb [to be the same], he views that being: he becomes that being; and is identified with him, on completing the broad web of the solemn sacrifice.

'For opulence and wisdom, I solicit this wonderful lord of the altar, the friend of Indra, most desirable [fire]: may this oblation be effectual. Fire! make me, this day, wise by means of that wisdom which the gods and the fathers worship: be this oblation efficacious. May Varuṇa grant me wisdom; may fire and Prajápati confer on me sapience; may Indra and air vouchsafe me knowledge; may providence give me understanding: be this oblation happily offered! May the priest and the soldier both share my prosperity; may the gods grant me supreme happiness: to thee, who art that [felicity], be this oblation effectually presented!'

The next passage which I shall cite is a prayer to fire.[2]

'Thou art (*samvatsara*) the [first] year [of the cycle]; thou art (*parivatsara*) the [second] year; thou art (*idávatsara*) the

[1] For the word *Gandharba* is here interpreted as intending one who investigates holy writ.

[2] Ch. 27, § 45th and last.

[third] year; thou art (*id-vatsara*) the [fourth] year; thou art (*vatsara*) the fifth year: may mornings appertain to thee; may days and nights, and fortnights, and months, and seasons, belong to thee; may (*samvatsara*) the year be a portion of thee: to go, or to come, contracting or expanding [thyself], thou art winged thought. Together with that deity, remain thou firm like Angiras.'

[59] I have quoted this almost unmeaning passage, because it notices the divisions of time which belong to the calendar of the *Vedas*, and which are explained in treatises on that subject annexed to the sacred volume, under the title of *Jyotis*. To this I shall again advert in a subsequent part of this essay. I shall here only observe, with the view of accounting for the seeming absurdity of the text now cited, that fire, as in another place,[1] sacrifice, is identified with the year and with the cycle, by reason of the near connexion between consecrated fire and the regulation of time relative to religious rites; at which one is used, and which the other governs.

The fortieth and last chapter of this *Veda* is an *Upanishad*, as before intimated: which is usually called *Íśávásyam*, from the two initial words; and sometimes *Iśádhyáya*, from the first word; but the proper title is '*Upanishad* of the *Vájasaneya-sanhitá*.' The author, as before mentioned, is Dadhyach, son or descendant of Atharvan.[2] A translation of it has been published in the posthumous works of Sir William Jones.

The second part of this *Veda*, appertaining to the *Mádhyandina Śákhá*, is entitled the *Śatapatha Bráhmaṇa*, and is much

[1] In the *S'atapatha Bráhmaṇa*, b. ii. ch. 1. The reason here assigned is expressly stated by the commentator.

[2] Besides Mahídhara's gloss on this chapter, in his *Vedadípa*, I have the separate commentary of S'ankara, and one by Bálakrishṇánanda, which contains a clear and copious exposition of this *Upanishad*. He professes to expound it as it is received by both the *Káṇwa* and *Mádhyandina* schools. Sir William Jones, in his version of it, used S'ankara's gloss; as appears from a copy of that gloss which he had carefully studied, and in which his handwriting appears in more than one place.

more copious than the collection of prayers. It consists of fourteen books (*káṇḍa*), unequally distributed in two parts (*bhága*): the first of which contains ten books; and the second, only four. The number of [60] lectures (*adhyáya*) contained in each book varies; and so does that of the *bráhmaṇas*, or separate precepts, in each lecture. Another mode of division, by chapters (*prapáṭhaka*), also prevails throughout the volume: and the distinction of *bráhmaṇas*, which are again subdivided into short sections (*kaṇḍiká*), is subordinate to both modes of division.

The fourteen books which constitute this part of the *Veda* comprise a hundred lectures, corresponding to sixty-eight chapters. The whole number of distinct articles entitled *bráhmaṇa* is four hundred and forty: the sections (*kaṇḍiká*) are also counted, and are stated at 7624.[1]

The same order is observed in this collection of precepts concerning religious rites, which had been followed in the arrangement of the prayers belonging to them. The first and second books treat of ceremonies on the full and change of the moon, the consecration of the sacrificial fire, etc. The third and fourth relate to the mode of preparing the juice of the acid asclepias, and other ceremonies connected with it, as the *Jyotishṭoma*, etc. The fifth is confined to the *Vájapeya* and *Rájasúya*. The four next teach the consecration of sacrificial fire: and the tenth, entitled *Agni-rahasya*, shows the benefits of these ceremonies. The three first books of the second part are stated by the commentator[2] as relating to the *Sautrámaṇí* and *Aśwamedha;* and the fourth, which is the last, belongs [61] to theology. In the original, the thirteenth book is specially

[1] My copies of the text and of the commentary are both imperfect; but the deficiencies of one occur in places where the other is complete, and I have been thus enabled to inspect cursorily the whole of this portion of the *Veda*.

Among fragments of this *Bráhmaṇa* comprising entire books, I have one which agrees, in the substance and purport, with the second book of the *Mádhyandina Śatapatha*, though differing much in the readings of almost every passage. It probably belongs to a different *Śákhá*.

[2] At the beginning of his gloss on the eleventh book.

denominated *Aśwamedha;* and the fourteenth is entitled *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka.*

The *Aśwamedha* and *Purushamedha,* celebrated in the manner directed by this *Veda,* are not really sacrifices of horses and men. In the first-mentioned ceremony, six hundred and nine animals of various prescribed kinds, domestic and wild, including birds, fish, and reptiles, are made fast, the tame ones, to twenty-one posts, and the wild, in the intervals between the pillars; and, after certain prayers have been recited, the victims are let loose without injury. In the other, a hundred and eighty-five men of various specified tribes, characters, and professions, are bound to eleven posts; and, after the hymn concerning the allegorical immolation of Náráyaṇa[1] has been recited, these human victims are liberated unhurt; and oblations of butter are made on the sacrificial fire. This mode of performing the *Aśwamedha* and *Purushamedha,* as emblematic ceremonies, not as real sacrifices, is taught in this *Veda:* and the interpretation is fully confirmed by the rituals,[2] and by commentators on the *Sanhitá* and *Bráhmaṇa;* one of whom assigns as the reason, 'because the flesh of victims which have been actually sacrificed at a *Yajna* must be eaten by the persons who offer the sacrifice: but a man cannot be allowed, much less required, to eat human flesh.'[3] It may be hence inferred, or conjectured at least, that human sacrifices were not authorized by the *Veda* itself; but were either then abrogated, and an emblematical ceremony substituted in their place; or they [62] must have been introduced in later times, on the authority of certain *Puráṇas* or *Tantras,* fabricated by persons who, in this as in other matters, established many unjustifi-

[1] See the second Essay on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, Asiatic Researches, vol. vii. p. 251.

[2] I particularly advert to a separate ritual of the *Purushamedha* by Yájnadeva [Yájnikadeva?].

[3] Cited from memory: I read the passage several years ago, but I cannot now recover it.

able practices, on the foundation of emblems and allegories which they misunderstood.

The horse, which is the subject of the religious ceremony called *Áśvamedha*, is also avowedly an emblem of *Virâj*, or the primeval and universal manifested being. In the last section of the *Taittiriya Yajurveda*, the various parts of the horse's body are described, as divisions of time and portions of the universe: 'morning is his head; the sun, his eye; air, his breath; the moon, his ear; etc.' A similar passage in the fourteenth book of the *Śatapatha-brâhmaṇa* describes the same allegorical horse, for the meditation of such as cannot perform an *Áśvamedha;* and the assemblage of living animals, constituting an imaginary victim, at a real *Áśvamedha*, equally represents the universal being, according to the doctrines of the Indian scripture. It is not, however, certain, whether this ceremony did not also give occasion to the institution of another, apparently not authorized by the *Vedas*, in which a horse was actually sacrificed.

The *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, which constitutes the fourteenth book of the *Śatapatha-brâhmaṇa*, is the conclusion of the *Vájasaneyi*, or white *Yajus*. It consists of seven chapters or eight lectures: and the five last chapters in one arrangement, corresponding with the six last lectures in the other, form a theological treatise entitled the *Vṛihad Upanishad*, or *Vájasaneyi-brâhmaṇa Upanishad*, but more commonly cited as the *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*.[1] The [63] greatest part of it is in dialogue, and Yájnavalkya is the principal speaker. As an *Upanishad*, it properly belongs to the *Káṇwa Śákhá:* at least, it is so cited by Vidyáraṇya, in his paraphrase of *Upanishads* before mentioned. There does not, however, appear to be any material variation in it, as received by the *Mádhyandina* school: unless

[1] Besides three copies of the text, and two transcripts of S'ankara's commentary, I have, also in duplicate, another very excellent commentary by Nityánandás'rama, which is entitled *Mitákshará;* and a metrical paraphrase of S'ankara's gloss by Sures'waráchárya, as well as annotations in prose by Ánandagiri.

in the divisions of chapters and sections, and in the lists of successive teachers by whom it was handed down.[1]

To convey some notion of the scope and style of this *Upanishad*, I shall here briefly indicate some of the most remarkable passages, and chiefly those which have been paraphrased by Vidyáraṇya. A few others have been already cited, and the following appears likewise to deserve notice.

Towards the beginning of the *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, a passage, concerning the origin of fire hallowed for an *Aśwamedha*, opens thus: 'Nothing existed in this world before [the production of mind]: this universe was encircled by death eager to devour; for death is the devourer. He framed mind, being desirous of himself becoming endued with a soul.'

Here the commentators explain death to be the intellectual being who sprung from the golden mundane egg: and the passage before cited from the *Ṛigveda*,[2] where the primeval existence of death is denied, may be easily reconciled with this, upon the Indian ideas of the periodical destruction and renovation of the world, and finally of all beings but the supreme one.

The first selection by Vidyáraṇya from this *Upanishad* is the fourth article (*bráhmaṇa*) of the third lecture of the [64] *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*. It is descriptive of Viráj, and begins thus:

'This [variety of forms] was, before [the production of body], soul, bearing a human shape. Next, looking around, that [primeval being] saw nothing but himself; and he, first, said, "I am I." Therefore, his name was "I": and thence, even now, when called, [a man] first answers, "it is I," and then declares any other name which appertains to him.

'Since he, being anterior to all this [which seeks supremacy], did consume by fire all sinful [obstacles to his own supremacy], therefore does the man who knows this [truth], overcome him who seeks to be before him.

[1] This is the *Upanishad* to which Sir William Jones refers, in his preface to the translation of the Institutes of Manu, p. viii. (in Sir G. C. Haughton's edition, p. xi.)

[2] Page 30.

'He felt dread; and therefore man fears when alone. But he reflected, "Since nothing exists besides myself, why should I fear?" Thus his terror departed from him; for what should he dread, since fear must be of another?

'He felt not delight; and therefore man delights not when alone. He wished [the existence of] another; and instantly he became such as is man and woman in mutual embrace. He caused this his own self, to fall in twain; and thus became a husband and a wife. Therefore was this [body, so separated], as it were an imperfect moiety of himself: for so Yájnavalkya has pronounced it. This blank, therefore, is completed by woman. He approached her; and thence were human beings produced.

'She reflected, doubtingly, "How can he, having produced me from himself, [incestuously] approach me? I will now assume a disguise." She became a cow; and the other became a bull, and approached her; and the issue were kine. She was changed into a mare, and he into a stallion; one was turned into a female ass, and the other into a male one: thus did he again approach her; and the one-hoofed kind was the offspring. She became a female [65] goat, and he a male one; she was an ewe, and he a ram: thus he approached her; and goats and sheep were the progeny. In this manner did he create every existing pair whatsoever, even to the ants [and minutest insects].'

The sequel of this passage is also curious, but is too long to be here inserted. The notion of Viráj dividing his own substance into male and female occurs in more than one *Puráṇa*. So does that of an incestuous marriage and intercourse of the first Manu with his daughter Śatarúpá; and the commentators on the *Upanishad* understand that legend to be alluded to in this place. But the institutes ascribed to Manu make Viráj to be the issue of such a separation of persons, and Manu himself to be his offspring.[1] There is, indeed, as the reader may

[1] See Sir W. Jones's translation of Manu, ch. I. v. 32 and 33.

observe from the passages cited in the present essay, much disagreement and consequent confusion, in the gradation of persons interposed by Hindu theology between the Supreme Being and the created world.

The author of the paraphrase before mentioned has next selected three dialogues from the fourth lecture or chapter of the *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*. In the first, which begins the chapter and occupies three articles (*bráhmaṇas*), a conceited and loquacious priest, named Báláki (from his mother Baláká), and Gárgya (from his ancestor Garga), visits Ajátaśatru, King of Káśí, and offers to communicate to him the knowledge of God. The king bestows on him a liberal recompense for the offer; and the priest unfolds his doctrine, saying he worships, or recognizes, as God, the being who is manifest in the sun; him, who is apparent in lightning, in the ethereal elements, in air, in fire, in water, in a mirror, in the regions of space, in shade, and in the soul itself. The king, who was, as it appears, a well-[66] instructed theologian, refutes these several notions successively; and finding the priest remain silent, asks, "Is that all you have to say?" Gárgya replies, "That is all." "Then," says the king, "that is not sufficient for the knowledge of God." Hearing this, Gárgya proposes to become his pupil. The king replies, "It would reverse established order, were a priest to attend a soldier in expectation of religious instruction: but I will suggest the knowledge to you." He takes him by the hand, and rising, conducts him to a place where a man was sleeping. He calls the sleeper by various appellations suitable to the priest's doctrine, but without succeeding in awakening him: he then rouses the sleeper by stirring him; and afterwards, addressing the priest, asks, "While that man was thus asleep, where was his soul, which consists in intellect? and whence came that soul when he was awakened?" Gárgya could not solve the question: and the king then proceeds to explain the nature of soul and mind, according to the received notions of the *Vedánta*. As it is not the purpose of this essay

to consider those doctrines, I shall not here insert the remainder of the dialogue.

The next, occupying a single article, is a conversation between Yájnavalkya and his wife Maitreyí. He announces to her his intention of retiring from the civil world, requests her consent, and proposes to divide his effects between her and his second wife, Kátyáyaní. She asks, "Should I become immortal, if this whole earth, full of riches, were mine?" "No," replies Yájnavalkya, "riches serve for the means of living, but immortality is not attained through wealth." Maitreyí declares she has no use, then, for that by which she may not become immortal; and solicits from her husband the communication of the knowledge which he possesses, on the means by which beatitude may be attained. Yájnavalkya answers, [67] "Dear wert thou to me, and a pleasing [sentiment] dost thou make known: come, sit down; I will expound [that doctrine]; do thou endeavour to comprehend it." A discourse follows, in which Yájnavalkya elucidates the notion, that abstraction procures immortality; because affections are relative to the soul, which should therefore be contemplated and considered in all objects, since every thing is soul; for all general and particular notions are ultimately resolvable into one, whence all proceed, and in which all merge; and that is identified with the supreme soul, through the knowledge of which beatitude may be attained.

I shall select, as a specimen of the reasoning in this dialogue, a passage which is material on a different account; as it contains an enumeration of the *Vedas*, and of the various sorts of passages which they comprise, and tends to confirm some observations hazarded at the beginning of this essay.

'As smoke, and various substances, separately issue from fire lighted with moist wood, so from this great being were respired the *Rigveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sámaveda*, and the *Atharvan* and *Angiras;* the *Itihása* and *Puráṇa*, the sciences

and *Upanishads*, the verses and aphorisms, the expositions and illustrations, all these were breathed forth by him.'

The commentators remark, that four sorts of prayers (*mantra*) and eight sorts of precepts (*bráhmaṇa*) are here stated. The fourth description of prayers comprehends such as were revealed to, or discovered by, Atharvan and Angiras: meaning the *Átharvaṇa Veda*. The *Itihása* designates such passages in the second part of the *Vedas* entitled *Bráhmaṇa*, as narrate a story: for instance, that of the nymph Urvaśí and the king Purúravas. The *Puráṇa* intends those which relate to the creation and [68] similar topics. "Sciences" are meant of religious worship: "Verses" are memorial lines: "Aphorisms" are short sentences in a concise style: "Expositions" interpret such sentences; and "Illustrations" elucidate the meaning of the prayers.

It may not be superfluous to observe in this place, that the *Itihása* and *Puráṇas*, here meant, are not the mythological poems bearing the same title, but certain passages of the Indian scriptures, which are interspersed among others, throughout that part of the *Vedas* called *Bráhmaṇa*, and instances of which occur in more than one quotation in the present essay.

The dialogue between Yájnavalkya and Maitreyí, above mentioned, is repeated towards the close of the sixth lecture, with a short and immaterial addition to its introduction. In this place it is succeeded by a discourse on the unity of the soul; said, towards the conclusion, to have been addressed to the two *Áświns*, by Dadhyach, a descendant of Atharvan.

The fourth lecture ends with a list of the teachers, by whom that and the three preceding lectures were handed down, in succession, to Pautimáshya. It begins with him, and ascends, through forty steps, to Ayásya; or, with two more intervening persons, to the *Áświns*; and from them, to Dadhyach, Atharvan, and Mṛityu, or death; and, through other gradations of spirits, to Viráj; and finally to Brahma. The same list occurs again at the end of the sixth lecture; and similar lists

are found in the corresponding places of this *Upanishad*, as arranged for the *Mádhyandina Śákhá*. The succession is there traced upwards, from the reciter of it, who speaks of himself in the first person, and from his immediate teacher Śaurpaṇáyya, to the same original revelation, through [69] nearly the same number of gradations. The difference is almost entirely confined to the first ten or twelve names.[1]

The fifth and sixth lectures of this *Upanishad* have been paraphrased, like the fourth, by the author before mentioned. They consist of dialogues, in which Yájnavalkya is the chief discourser.

'Janaka, a king paramount, or emperor of the race of Videhas, was celebrating at great expense a solemn sacrifice, at which the *Bráhmaṇas* of Kuru and Panchála were assembled; and the king, being desirous of ascertaining which of those priests was the most learned and eloquent theologian, ordered a thousand cows to be made fast in his stables, and their horns to be gilt with a prescribed quantity of gold. He then addressed the priests, "Whoever, among you, O venerable *Bráhmaṇas*, is most skilled in theology, may take the cows." The rest presumed not to touch the cattle; but Yájnavalkya bade his pupil Sámaśravas drive them to his home. He did so; and the priests were indignant that he should thus arrogate to himself superiority. Aśwala, who was the king's officiating priest, asked him, "Art thou, O Yájnavalkya! more skilled in theology than we are?" He replied, "I bow to the most learned; but I was desirous of possessing the cattle."'

[70] This introduction is followed by a long dialogue, or rather by a succession of dialogues, in which six other rival

[1] I do not find Vyása mentioned in either list; nor can the surname *Páráśarya*, which occurs more than once, be applied to him, for it is not his patronymic, but a name deduced from the feminine patronymic *Páráśarí*. It seems therefore questionable, whether any inference respecting the age of the *Vedas* can be drawn from these lists, in the manner proposed by the late Sir W. Jones in his preface to the translation of Manu (p. viii). The anachronisms which I observe in them deter me from a similar attempt to deduce the age of this *Veda* from these and other lists, which will be noticed further on.

priests (besides a learned female, named Gárgí, the daughter of Vachaknu) take part as antagonists of Yájnavalkya; proposing questions to him, which he answers; and, by refuting their objections, silences them successively. Each dialogue fills a single article (*bráhmaṇa*); but the controversy is maintained by Gárgí in two separate discussions; and the contest between Yájnavalkya and Vidagdha, surnamed Śákalya in the ninth or last article of the fifth lecture, concludes in a singular manner.

Yájnavalkya proposes to his adversary an abstruse question, and declares, "If thou dost not explain this unto me, thy head shall drop off." 'Śákalya (proceeds the text) could not explain it, and his head did fall off; and robbers stole his bones, mistaking them for some other thing.'

Yájnavalkya then asks the rest of his antagonists, whether they have any question to propose, or are desirous that he should propose any. They remain silent, and he addresses them as follows:

'Man is indeed like a lofty tree: his hairs are the leaves, and his skin the cuticle. From his skin flows blood, like juice from bark; it issues from his wounded person, as juice from a stricken tree. His flesh is the inner bark; and the membrane, near the bones, is the white substance of the wood.[1] The bones within are the wood itself, and marrow and pith are alike. If then a felled tree spring anew from the root, from what root does mortal man grow again when hewn down by death? Do not say, from prolific seed; for that is produced from the living person. [71] Thus, a tree, indeed, also springs from seed; and likewise sprouts afresh [from the root] after [seemingly] dying; but, if the tree be torn up by the root, it doth not grow again. From what root, then, does mortal man rise afresh, when hewn down by death? [Do you answer] He was born [once for all]? No; he is born [again]: and [I ask you] what is it that produces him anew?'

[1] *Snáva* and *Kináṭa*, answering to the *periosteum* and *alburnum*.

The priests, thus interrogated, observes the commentator, and being unacquainted with the first cause, yielded the victory to Yájnavalkya. Accordingly, the text adds a brief indication of the first cause as intended by that question. 'Brahma, who is intellect with [the unvaried perception of] felicity, is the best path [to happiness] for the generous votary, who knows him, and remains fixed [in attention].'

The sixth lecture comprises two dialogues between Yájnavalkya and the king Janaka, in which the saint communicates religious instruction to the monarch, after inquiring from him the doctrines which had been previously taught to the king by divers priests.

These are followed by a repetition of the dialogue between Yájnavalkya and his wife Maitreyí, with scarcely a variation of a single word, except the introduction as above mentioned. The sixth lecture concludes with repeating the list of teachers, by whom, successively, this part of the *Veda* was taught.

Concerning the remainder of the *Vrihad-áranyaka* I shall only observe, that it is terminated by a list of teachers, in which the tradition of it is traced back from the son of Pautimáshí, through forty steps, to Yájnavalkya; and from him, through twelve more, to the sun. In copies belonging to the *Mádhyandina Śákhá* the list is varied, interposing more gradations, with considerable difference in the names, from the reciter, who speaks in the [72] first person, and his teacher, the son of Bháradwájí, up to Yájnavalkya, beyond whom both lists agree.

The copy belonging to the *Káṇwa Śákhá* subjoins a further list, stated by the commentators to be common to all the *Śákhás* of the *Vájin*, or *Vájasaneyi Yajurveda*, and to be intended for the tracing of that *Veda* up to its original revelation. It begins from the son of Sánjíví, who was fifth, descending from Yájnavalkya, in the lists above mentioned; and it ascends by ten steps, without any mention of that

saint, to Tura, surnamed Kávasheya, who had the revelation from Prajápati, and he from Brahma.

Before I proceed to the other *Yajurveda*, I think it necessary to remark, that the Indian saint last mentioned (Tura, son of Kavasha) has been named in a former quotation from the *Aitareya*, as the priest who consecrated Janamejaya, son of Parikshit. It might, at the first glance, be hence concluded, that he was contemporary with the celebrated king who is stated in Hindu history to have reigned at the beginning of the *Kali* age. But, besides the constant uncertainty respecting Indian saints, who appear and re-appear in heroic history at periods most remote, there is in this, as in many other instances of the names of princes, a source of confusion and possible error, from the recurrence of the same name, with the addition even of the same patronymic, for princes remote from each other. Thus, according to *Puráṇas*, Parikshit, third son of Kuru, had a son named Janamejaya; and he may be the person here meant, rather than one of the same name, who was the great-grandson of Arjuna.

On the Black Yajurveda.

The *Taittirîya*, or black *Yajus*, is more copious (I mean in regard to *mantras*) than the white *Yajus*, but [73] less so than the *Ṛigveda*. Its *Sanhitá*, or collection of prayers, is arranged in seven books (*ashṭaka* or *káṇḍa*), containing from five to eight lectures, or chapters (*adhyáya*, *praśna*, or *prapáṭhaka*). Each chapter, or lecture, is subdivided into sections (*anuváka*), which are equally distributed in the third and sixth books, but unequally in the rest. The whole number exceeds six hundred and fifty.

Another mode of division, by *káṇḍas*, is stated in the index. In this arrangement, each book (*káṇḍa*) relates to a separate

subject; and the chapters (*praśna*) comprehended in it are enumerated and described. Besides this, in the *Sanhitá* itself, the texts contained in every section are numbered, and so are the syllables in each text.

The first section (*anuváka*) in this collection of prayers corresponds with the first section (*kaṇḍiká*) in the white *Yajus*,[1] but all the rest differ, and so does the arrangement of the subjects. Many of the topics are indeed alike in both *Vedas*, but differently placed and differently treated. Thus the ceremony called *Rájasúya* occupies one *káṇḍa*, corresponding with the eighth *praśna* of the first book (*ashṭaka*), and is preceded by two *káṇḍas*, relative to the *Vájapeya* and to the mode of its celebration, which occupy fourteen sections in the preceding *praśna*. Consecrated fire is the subject of four *káṇḍas*, which fill the fourth and fifth books. Sacrifice (*adhwara*) is noticed in the second and third lectures of the first book, and in several lectures of the sixth. The subject is continued in the seventh and last book, which treats largely on the *Jyotishṭoma*, including the forms of preparing and drinking the juice of the acid asclepias. The *Aśwamedha*, *Nṛimedha*, and *Pitṛimedha*, [74] are severally treated of in their places; that is, in the collection of prayers,[2] and in the second part of this *Veda*. Other topics, introduced in different places, are numerous; but it would be tedious to specify them at large.

Among the *Rishis* of the texts I observe no human authors. Nine entire *káṇḍas*, according to the second arrangement indicated by the index, appear to be ascribed to Prajápati, or the lord of creatures; as many to Soma, or the moon; seven to Agni, or fire; and sixteen to all the gods. Possibly some passages may be allotted by the commentators to their real

[1] Translated in the first Essay on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, with the first verse in each of the three other *Vedas*. Asiatic Researches, vol. v. p. 364.

[2] The prayers of the *Aśwamedha* occur in the concluding sections, between the twelfth section of the fourth chapter, and the end of the fifth chapter of the seventh and last book.

authors, though not pointed out by the index for the *A'treyi Śákhá*.

Several prayers from this *Veda* have been translated in former essays.[1] Other very remarkable passages have occurred, on examining this collection of *mantras*.[2] The following, from the seventh and last book,[3] is chosen as a specimen of the *Taittiríya Yajurveda*. Like several before cited, it alludes to the Indian notions of the creation; and, at the risk of sameness, I select passages relative to that topic, on account of its importance in explaining the creed of the ancient Hindu religion. The present extract was recommended for selection by its allusion to a mythological notion, which apparently gave origin to the story of the *Varáha-avatára*, and from which an astronomical period, entitled *Kalpa*, has perhaps been taken.[4]

[75] 'Waters [alone] there were; this world originally was water. In it the lord of creation moved, having become air: he saw this [earth]; and upheld it, assuming the form of a boar (*varáha*): and then moulded that [earth], becoming Viśwakarman, the artificer of the universe. It became celebrated (*aprathata*) and conspicuous (*pṛithivi*); and therefore is that name (*Pṛithivi*) assigned to the earth.

'The lord of creation meditated profoundly on the earth; and created the gods, the *Vasus*, *Rudras*, and *A'dityas*. Those gods addressed the lord of creation, saying, "How can we form creatures?" He replied, "As I created you by profound contemplation (*tapas*), so do you seek in devotion (*tapas*) the means of multiplying creatures." He gave them consecrated fire, saying, "With this sacrificial fire perform devotions." With it they did perform austerities; and, in one year, framed a single cow. He gave her to the *Vasus*, to the

[1] Asiatic Researches, vols. v. and vii.

[2] I have several complete copies of the text, but only a part of the commentary by Sáyaṇa.

[3] Book vii., chapter I., section 5.

[4] One of the *Kalpas*, or renovations of the universe, is denominated *Várdha*.

Rudras, and to the *A'dityas* [successively], bidding them "Guard her." The *Vasus*, the *Rudras*, and the *A'dityas*, [severally] guarded her; and she calved for the *Vasus* three hundred and thirty-three [calves]; and [as many] for the *Rudras;* and [the same number] for the *A'dityas:* thus was she the thousandth.

'They addressed the lord of creation, requesting him to direct them in performing a solemn act of religion with a thousand [kine for a gratuity]. He caused the *Vasus* to sacrifice with the *Agnishṭoma;* and they conquered this world, and gave it [to the priests]: he caused the *Rudras* to sacrifice with the *Ukthya;* and they obtained the middle region, and gave it away [for a sacrificial fee]: he caused the *A'dityas* to sacrifice with the *Atirátra;* and they acquired that [other] world, and gave it [to the priests for a gratuity].'

This extract may suffice. Its close, and the remainder of the section, bear allusion to certain religious ceremonies, [76] at which a thousand cows must be given to the officiating priests.

To the second part of this *Veda*[1] belongs an *A'raṇya*, divided, like the *Sanhitá*, into lectures (*práśna*), and again subdivided into chapters (*anuváka*), containing texts, or sections, which are numbered, and in which the syllables have been counted. Here also a division by *káṇḍas*, according to the different subjects, prevails. The six first lectures, and their corresponding *káṇḍas*, relate to religious observances. The two next constitute three *Upanishads;* or, as they are usually cited, two; one of which is commonly entitled the *Taittiriyaka Upanishad:* the other is called the *Náráyaṇa*, or, to distinguish it from another belonging exclusively to the *Atharvaveda*, the great (*Mahá*, or *Vṛihan*) *Náráyaṇa*. They are all admitted in collections of theological treatises appen-

[1] The *Taittiriya*, like other *Vedas*, has its *bráhmaṇa*, and frequent quotations from it occur in the commentary on the prayers, and in other places. But I have not yet seen a complete copy of this portion of the Indian sacred books.

dant on the *A'tharvaṇa;* but the last-mentioned is there subdivided into two *Upanishads.*

For a further specimen of this *Yajurveda*, I shall only quote the opening of the third and last chapter of the *Váruṇí*, or second *Taittirîyaka Upanishad*, with the introductory chapter of the first.[1]

'Bhṛigu, the offspring of Varuṇa, approached his father, saying, "Venerable [father]! make known to me *Brahma.*" Varuṇa propounded these: namely, food [or body], truth [or life], sight, hearing, mind [or thought], and speech: and thus proceeded, "That whence all beings are [77] produced, that by which they live when born, that towards which they tend, and that into which they pass, do thou seek, [for] that is *Brahma.*"

'He meditated [in] devout contemplation; and having thought profoundly, he recognized food [or body] to be *Brahma:* for all beings are indeed produced from food; when born, they live by food; towards food they tend; they pass into food. This he comprehended; [but yet unsatisfied] he again approached his father Varuṇa, saying, "Venerable [father]! make known to me *Brahma.*" Varuṇa replied, "Seek the knowledge of *Brahma* by devout meditation: *Brahma* is profound contemplation."

'Having deeply meditated, he discovered breath [or life] to be *Brahma;* for all these beings are indeed produced from breath; when born, they live by breath; towards breath they tend; they pass into breath. This he understood; [but] again he approached his father Varuṇa, saying, "Venerable [father]! make known to me *Brahma.*" Varuṇa replied, "Seek him by profound meditation: *Brahma* is that."

'He meditated in deep contemplation, and discovered intellect to be *Brahma:* for all these beings are indeed produced

[1] I use several copies of the entire *Áraṇya*, with S'ankara's commentary on the *Taittirîya Upanishad*, and annotations on his gloss by Ánandajnána; besides separate copies of that, and of the *Mahánáráyaṇa*, and a commentary on the *Váruṇí Upanishad*, entitled *Laghu-dípiká.*

from intellect: when born, they live by intellect; towards intellect they tend; and they pass into intellect. This he understood; [but] again he came to his father Varuṇa, saying, "Venerable [father]! make known to me *Brahma*." Varuṇa replied, "Inquire by devout contemplation: profound meditation is *Brahma*."

'He thought deeply; and having thus meditated [with] devout contemplation, he knew *Ánanda* [or felicity] to be *Brahma:* for all these beings are indeed produced from pleasure; when born, they live by joy; they tend towards happiness; they pass into felicity.

'Such is the science which was attained by Bhṛigu, [78] taught by Varuṇa, and founded on the supreme ethereal spirit. He who knows this, rests on the same support, is endowed with [abundant] food, and becomes [a blazing fire] which consumes food: great he is by progeny, by cattle, and by holy perfections, and great by propitious celebrity.'

The above is the beginning of the last chapter of the *Váruṇí Upanishad*. I omit the remainder of it. The first *Taittiríyaka Upanishad* opens with the following prayer. 'May Mitra [who presides over the day], Varuṇa [who governs the night], Aryaman [or the regent of the sun and of sight], Indra [who gives strength], Vṛihaspati [who rules the speech and understanding], and Vishṇu, whose step is vast, grant us ease. [I] bow to *Brahma*. Salutation unto thee, O air! Even thou art *Brahma*, present [to our apprehension]. Thee I will call, "present *Brahma:*" thee I will name, "the right one:" thee I will pronounce, "the true one." May THAT [*Brahma*, the universal being entitled air] preserve me; may that preserve the teacher: propitious be it.'[1]

[1] I have inserted here, as in other places, between crotchets, such illustrations from the commentary as appear requisite to render the text intelligible.

On other Upanishads of the Yajurveda.

Among the *Śákhás* of the *Yajurveda*, one, entitled *Maitráyaṇí*, furnishes an *Upanishad* which bears the same denomination. An abridged paraphrase of it, in verse,[1] shows it to be a dialogue in which a sage, named Śákáyanya, communicates to the king Vṛihadratha theological knowledge derived from another sage, called Maitra.[2]

[79] A different *Śákhá* of this *Veda*, entitled the *Kaṭha*, or *Káṭhaka*, furnishes an *Upanishad* bearing that name, and which is one of those most frequently cited by writers on the *Vedánta*. It is an extract from a *Bráhmaṇa*, and also occurs in collections of *Upanishads*, appertaining to the *Atharvaṇa*.

Śwetáśwatara, who has given his name to one more *Śákhá* of the *Yajurveda*, from which an *Upanishad* is extracted,[3] is introduced in it as teaching theology. This *Upanishad*, comprised in six chapters or lectures (*adhyáya*), is found in collections of theological tracts appertaining to the *Atharvaveda;* but, strictly, it appears to belong exclusively to the *Yajus*.

On the Sámaveda.

A peculiar degree of holiness seems to be attached, according to Indian notions, to the *Sámaveda;* if reliance may be placed on the inference suggested by the etymology of its name, which indicates, according to the derivation[4] usually assigned to it, the efficacy of this part of the *Vedas* in removing sin. The prayers belonging to it are, as before

[1] By Vidyáraṇya. I have not seen the original.

[2] [Maitri in the Upanishad.]

[3] In the abridgment of it by Vidyáraṇya, this is the description given of the *S'wetáśwatara Upanishad.*

[4] From the root *sho*, convertible into *so* and *sd*, and signifying 'to destroy.' The derivative is expounded as denoting something 'which destroys sin.'

observed, composed in metre, and intended to be chanted, and their supposed efficacy is apparently ascribed to this mode of uttering them.

Not having yet obtained a complete copy of this *Veda*, or of any commentary on it, I can only describe it imperfectly, from such fragments as I have been able to collect.

A principal, if not the first, part of the *Sámaveda* is that [80] entitled *Á'rchika*. It comprises prayers, among which I observe many that constantly recur in rituals of *Sámavedíya*, or *Chhandoga* priests, and some of which have been translated in former essays.[1] They are here arranged, as appears from two copies of the *Á'rchika*,[2] in six chapters (*prapáṭhaka*), subdivided into half chapters, and into sections (*daśati*); ten in each chapter, and usually containing the exact number of ten verses each. The same collection of prayers, in the same order, but prepared for chanting, is distributed in seventeen chapters, under the title of the *Grámageya-gána*. That, at least, is its title in the only copy which I have seen. But rituals, directing the same prayers to be chanted, employ the designation of *Á'rchika-gána*, among other terms applicable to various modes of rhythmical recitation.

Another portion of the *Sámaveda*, arranged for chanting, bears the title of *Á'raṇya-gána*. Three copies of it,[3] which seem to agree exactly, exhibit the same distribution into three chapters, which are subdivided into half chapters and decades or sections, like the *Á'rchika* above mentioned.[4] But I have not yet found a plain copy of it, divested of the additions made for guidance in chanting it.

The additions here alluded to consist in prolonging the sounds of vowels, and resolving diphthongs into two or more

[1] Asiatic Researches, vols. v. and vii.

[2] One of them dated nearly two centuries ago, in 1672 *Samvat*. This copy exhibits the further title of *Chhandasí Sanhitá*.

[3] The most ancient of those in my possession is dated nearly three centuries ago, in 1587 *Samvat*.

[4] This *Áraṇya* comprises nearly three hundred verses (*sáman*), or exactly 290. The *Árchika* contains twice as many, or nearly 600.

syllables, inserting likewise, in many places, other additional syllables, besides placing numerical marks for the management of the voice. Some of the prayers being [81] subject to variation in the mode of chanting them, are repeated once or oftener, for the purpose of showing these differences, and to most are prefixed the appropriate names of the several passages.

Under the title of *A'rsheya Bráhmaṇa*, I have found what seems to be an index of these two portions of the *Sámaveda:* for the names of the passages, or sometimes the initial words, are there enumerated in the same order in which they occur in the *Grámageya*, or *A'rchika*, followed by the *A'raṇya-gána.* This index does not, like the explanatory tables of the other *Vedas*, specify the metre of each prayer, the deity addressed in it, and the occasion on which it should be used, but only the *Ṛishi*, or author: and, from the variety of names stated in some instances, a conclusion may be drawn, that the same texts are ascribable to more than one author.

It has been already hinted, that the modes of chanting the same prayers are various, and bear different appellations. Thus, the rituals frequently direct certain texts of this *Veda* to be first recited simply, in a low voice according to the usual mode of inaudible utterance of the *Vedas*, and then to be similarly chanted in a particular manner, under the designation of *A'rchika-gána;* showing, however, divers variations and exceptions from that mode, under the distinct appellation of *Anirukta-gána.*[1] So, likewise, the same, or nearly the same passages, which are contained in the *A'rchika* and *Grámageya*, are arranged in a different order, with further variations as to the mode of chanting them, in another collection named the *U'ha-gána.*

From the comparison and examination of these parts of the *Sámaveda*, in which, so far as the collation of them has [82]

[1] The ritual, which is the chief authority for this remark, is one by Sáyaṇáchárya, entitled *Yajnatantra-sudhánidhi.*

been carried, the texts appear to be the same, only arranged in a different order, and marked for a different mode of recitation, I am led to think, that other collections, under similar names,[1] may not differ more widely from the *Árchika* and *Áraṇya* above mentioned: and that these may possibly constitute the whole of that part of the *Sámaveda*, which corresponds to the *Sanhitás* of other *Vedas*.

Under the denomination of *Bráhmaṇa*, which is appropriated to the second part or supplement of the *Veda*, various works have been received by different schools of the *Sámaveda*. Four appear to be extant; three of which have been seen by me, either complete or in part. One is denominated *Shaḍvinśa*; probably from its containing twenty-six chapters. Another is called *Adbhuta*, or, at greater length, *Adbhuta Bráhmaṇa*. The only portion, which I have yet seen, of either, has the appearance of a fragment, and breaks off at the close of the fifth chapter: both names are there introduced, owing, as it should seem, to some error; and I shall not attempt to determine which of them it really belongs to. A third *Bráhmaṇa* of this *Veda* is termed *Panchavinśa*; so named, probably, from the number of twenty-five chapters comprised in it: and I conjecture this to be the same with one in my possession not designated by any particular title, but containing that precise number of chapters.

The best known among the *Bráhmaṇas* of the *Sámaveda* is that entitled *Táṇḍya*. It was expounded by [83] Sáyaṇáchárya; but a fragment of the text with his commentary, including the whole of the second book (*panchiká*), from the sixth to the tenth lecture, is all that I have been yet able to procure. This fragment relates to the religious ceremony named *Agnishṭoma*. I do not find in it, nor in other portions of the *Sámaveda*

[1] Sir Robert Chambers's copy of the *Sámaveda* comprised four portions, entitled *Gána*, the distinct names of which, according to the list received from him, are *Vigána Árṇá*, *Vegana*, *Ugána*, and *Uhya-gana*. The first of these, I suspect to be the *Áraṇya*, written in that list *Árṇá*: the last seems to be the same with that which is in my copy denominated *U'ha-gána*.

before described, any passage, which can be conveniently translated as a specimen of the style of this *Veda*.

Leaving, then, the *Mantras* and *Bráhmaṇas* of the *Sámaveda*, I proceed to notice its principal *Upanishad*, which is one of the longest and most abstruse compositions bearing that title.

The *Chhándogya Upanishad* contains eight chapters (*prapáṭhakas*), apparently extracted from some portion of the *Bráhmaṇa*, in which they are numbered from three to ten.[1] The first and second, not being included in the *Upanishad*, probably relate to religious ceremonies. The chapters are unequally subdivided into paragraphs or sections; amounting, in all, to more than a hundred and fifty.

A great part of the *Chhándogya*[2] is in a didactic form: including however, like most of the other *Upanishads*, several dialogues. The beginning of one, between Sanatkumára and Nárada, which occupies the whole of the seventh chapter,[3] has already been quoted. The preceding chapter consists of two dialogues between Śwetaketu, grandson of Aruṇa, and his own father, Uddálaka, the son of Aruṇa. These had been prepared in the fifth [84] chapter, where Praváhaṇa, son of Jívala, convicts Śwetaketu of ignorance in theology: and where that conversation is followed by several other dialogues, intermixed with successive references for instruction. The fourth chapter opens with a story respecting Jánaśruti, grandson of Putra; and, in this and the fifth chapter, dialogues, between human beings, are interspersed with others in which the interlocutors are either divine or imaginary persons. The eighth or last chapter contains a disquisition on the soul, in a conference between Prajápati and Indra.

[1] I have several copies of the text, with the gloss of S'ankara, and annotations on it by Ánandajńánagiri; besides the notes of Vyásatírtha on a commentary by Ánandatírtha.

[2] Its author, indicated by Vyásatírtha, is Hayagríva.

[3] That is, the seventh of the extract which constitutes this *Upanishad*; but the ninth, according to the mode of numbering the chapters in the book, whence it is taken.

I shall here quote, from this *Upanishad*, a single dialogue belonging to the fifth chapter.

'Práchínaśála, son of Upamanyu, Satyayajna, issue of Pulusha, Indradyumna, offspring of Bhallavi, Jana, descendant of Śarkaráksbya, and Vuḍila, sprung from Aśwataráśwa, being all persons deeply conversant with holy writ, and possessed of great dwellings, meeting together, engaged in this disquisition, "What is our soul? and who is *Brahma?*"

'These venerable persons reflected, "Uddálaka, the son of Aruṇa, is well acquainted with the universal soul: let us immediately go to him." They went: but he reflected, "These great and very learned persons will ask me; and I shall not [be able] to communicate the whole [which they inquire]: I will at once indicate to them another [instructor]." He thus addressed them, "Aśwapati, the son of Kekaya, is well acquainted with the universal soul; let us now go to him."

'They all went; and, on their arrival, [the king] caused due honours to be shown to them respectively; and, next morning, civilly dismissed them; [but, observing that they staid, and did not accept his presents,] he thus spoke: "In my dominions there is no robber; nor miser; no drunkard; nor any one neglectful of a consecrated hearth; [85] none ignorant; and no adulterer, nor adulteress. Whence [can you have been aggrieved]?" [As they did not state a complaint, he thus proceeded:] "I must be asked, O venerable men! [for what you desire]." [Finding that they made no request, he went on:] "As much as I shall bestow on each officiating priest, so much will I also give to you. Stay then, most reverend men." They answered: "It is indeed requisite to inform a person of the purpose of a visit. Thou well knowest the universal soul; communicate that knowledge unto us." He replied: "To-morrow I will declare it to you." Perceiving his drift, they, next day, attended him, bearing [like pupils] logs of firewood. Without bowing to them, he thus spoke:—

'"Whom dost thou worship as the soul, O son of Upamanyu?" "Heaven," answered he, "O venerable king!" "Splendid is that [portion of the] universal self, which thou dost worship as the soul: therefore, in thy family, is seen [the juice of the acid asclepias] drawn, expressed, and prepared, [for religious rites]; thou dost consume food [as a blazing fire]; and thou dost view a [son or other] beloved object. Whoever worships this for the universal soul, similarly enjoys food, contemplates a beloved object, and finds religious occupations in his family. But this is [only] the head of the soul. Thy head had been lost," added the king, "hadst thou not come to me."

'He now turned to Satyayajna, the son of Pulusha, saying, "Whom dost thou worship as the soul, O descendant of Práchínayoga?" "The sun," answered he, "O venerable king!" "Varied is that [portion of the] universal self, which thou dost worship as the soul; and, therefore, in thy family, many various forms are seen; a car yoked with mares, and treasure, together with female slaves, surround thee; thou dost consume food, and contemplate a pleasing object. Whoever worships this, for [86] the universal soul, has the same enjoyments, and finds religious occupations in his family. But this is only the eye of soul. Thou hadst been blind," said the king, "hadst thou not come to me."

'He next addressed Indradyumna, the son of Bhallavi: "Whom dost thou worship as the soul, O descendant of Vyághrapad." "Air," replied he, "O venerable king!" "Diffused is that portion of the universal self, which thou dost worship as the soul; numerous offerings reach thee; many tracts of cars follow thee: thou dost consume food: thou viewest a favourite object. Whoever worships this, for the universal soul, enjoys food and contemplates a beloved object: and has religious occupations in his family. But this is only the breath of soul. Thy breath had expired," said the king, "hadst thou not come to me."

'He next interrogated Jana, the son of Śarkarákshya: "Whom dost thou worship as the soul, O son of Śarkarákshya?" "The ethereal element," said he, "O venerable king!" "Abundant is that universal self, whom thou dost worship as the soul; and, therefore, thou likewise dost abound with progeny and wealth. Thou dost consume food; thou viewest a favourite object. Whoever worships this, for the universal soul, consumes food, and sees a beloved object; and has religious occupations in his family. But this is only the trunk of soul. Thy trunk had corrupted," said the king, "hadst thou not come to me."

'He afterwards inquired of Vudila, the son of Aśwataráśwa: "Whom dost thou worship as the soul, O descendant of Vyághrapad?" "Water," said he, "O venerable king!" "Rich is that universal self, whom thou dost worship as the soul; and, therefore, art thou opulent and thriving. Thou dost consume food; thou viewest a favourite object. Whoever worships this, for the universal [87] soul, partakes of similar enjoyments, contemplates as dear an object, and has religious occupations in his family. But this is only the abdomen of the soul. Thy bladder had burst," said the king, "hadst thou not come to me."

'Lastly, he interrogated Uddálaka, the son of Aruṇa: "Whom dost thou worship as the soul, O descendant of Gotama?" "The earth," said he, "O venerable king!" "Constant is that universal self, whom thou dost worship as the soul: and, therefore, thou remainest steady, with offspring and with cattle. Thou dost consume food; thou viewest a favourite object. Whoever worships this, for the universal soul, shares like enjoyments, and views as beloved an object, and has religious occupations in his family. But this forms only the feet of the soul. Thy feet had been lame," said the king, "hadst thou not come to me."

'He thus addressed them [collectively]: "You consider this universal soul, as it were an individual being; and you partake

of distinct enjoyment. But he, who worships, as the universal soul, that which is known by its [manifested] portions, and is inferred [from consciousness], enjoys nourishment in all worlds, in all beings, in all souls: his head is splendid, like that of this universal soul; his eye is similarly varied; his breath is equally diffused; his trunk is no less abundant; his abdomen is alike full; and his feet are the earth; his breast is the altar; his hair is the sacred grass; his heart, the household fire; his mind, the consecrated flame; and his mouth, the oblation.

'"The food, which first reaches him, should be solemnly offered: and the first oblation, which he makes, he should present with these words: 'Be this oblation to breath efficacious.' Thus breath is satisfied; and, in that, the eye is satiate; and, in the eye, the sun is content; and, in the sun, the sky is gratified; and, in the sky, heaven and the sun, and whatever is dependant, become replete: and after [88] that, he himself [who eats] is fully gratified with offspring and cattle; with vigour proceeding from food, and splendour arising from holy observances.[1]

'"But whoever makes an oblation to fire, being unacquainted with the universal soul, acts in the same manner, as one who throws live coals into ashes: while he, who presents an oblation, possessing that knowledge, has made an offering in all worlds, in all beings, in all souls. As the tip of dry grass, which is cast into the fire, readily kindles; so are all the faults of that man consumed. He, who knows this, has only presented an oblation to the universal soul, even though he knowingly give the residue to a *Cháṇḍála*. For, on this point, a text is [preserved]: 'As, in this world, hungry infants press round their mother; so do all beings await the holy oblation: they await the holy oblation.'"'

Another *Upanishad* of the *Sámaveda* belongs to the *Śákhá* of

[1] Several similar paragraphs, respecting four other oblations, so presented to other inspirations of air, are here omitted for the sake of brevity. The taking of a mouthful, by an orthodox Hindu theologian, is considered as an efficacious oblation: and denominated *Práṇágnihotra*.

the *Talavakáras*. It is called, the "*Keneshita*," or "*Kena*" *Upanishad*, from the word, or words, with which it opens: and, as appears from Śankara's commentary,[1] this treatise is the ninth chapter (*adhyáya*) of the work, from which it is extracted. It is comprised in four sections (*khaṇḍa*). The form is that of a dialogue between instructors and their pupils. The subject is, as in other *Upanishads*, a disquisition on abstruse and mystical theology. I shall not make any extract from it, but proceed to describe the fourth and last *Veda*.

On the Atharva-veda.

[89] The *Sanhitá*, or collection of prayers and invocations, belonging to the *A'tharvaṇa*, is comprised in twenty books (*káṇḍa*), subdivided into sections (*anuváka*), hymns (*súkta*), and verses (*ṛich*). Another mode of division by chapters (*prapáṭhaka*) is also indicated. The number of verses is stated at 6015; the sections exceed a hundred; and the hymns amount to more than seven hundred and sixty. The number of chapters is forty nearly.

A passage from this *Veda* was quoted by Sir W. Jones in his essay on the literature of the Hindus;[2] and a version of it was given, as a specimen of the language and style of the *A'tharvaṇa*. That passage comprises the whole of the forty-third hymn of the nineteenth book.[3] In the beginning of the same book, I find a hymn (numbered as the sixth) which is

[1] I have S'ankara's gloss, with the illustrations of his annotator, and the ample commentary of Kṛishṇánanda: besides a separate gloss, with annotations, on the similar *Upanishad* belonging to the *Atharvaveda*.

[2] Asiatic Researches, vol. i. p. 347.

[3] Sir W. Jones cites it, as from the first book; I suspect, that, in Colonel Polier's copy, the nineteenth book might stand first in the volume. It does so in General Martine's transcript, though the colophon be correct. I have another, and very complete, copy of this *Veda*. General Martine's, which I also possess, is defective; containing only the ten first and the two last books. An ancient fragment, also in my possession, does not extend beyond the sixth.

almost word for word the same with that, which has been before cited from the thirty-first chapter of the white *Yajus*.[1] Some of the verses are indeed transposed, and here and there a word differs: for example, it opens by describing the primeval man (*purusha*) with a thousand arms, instead of a thousand heads. The purport is, nevertheless, the same: and it is needless, therefore, to insert a version of it in this place.

The next hymn, in the same book, includes an important passage. It names the twenty-eight asterisms in their [90] order, beginning with *Kṛittiká:* and seems to refer the solstice to the end of *Aśleshá*, or beginning of *Maghá*. I call it an important passage; first, because it shows, that the introduction of the twenty-eighth asterism is as ancient as the *Atharva-veda;* and, secondly, because it authorizes a presumption, that the whole of that *Veda*, like this particular hymn, may have been composed when the solstice was reckoned in the middle, or at the end, of *Aśleshá*,[2] and the origin of the Zodiac was placed at the beginning of *Kṛittiká*. On the obvious conclusion, respecting the age of the *Veda*, I shall enlarge in another place.

An incantation, which appears to be the same that is mentioned by Sir W. Jones,[3] occurs in the fourth section of the nineteenth book. It is indeed a tremendous incantation; especially three *súktas*, or hymns, which are numbered 28, 29, and 30. A single line will be a sufficient specimen of these imprecations, in which, too, there is much sameness.

'Destroy, O sacred grass,[4] my foes; exterminate my enemies; annihilate all those, who hate me, O precious gem!'

The *Atharva-veda*, as is well known, contains many forms

[1] Asiatic Researches, vol. vii. p. 251.

[2] The middle of *Aśleshá*, if the divisions be twenty-seven, and its end, when they are twenty-eight equal portions, give the same place for the colure.

[3] Asiatic Researches, vol. i. p. 348.

[4] *Darbha*, Poa Cynosuroides.

of imprecation for the destruction of enemies. But it must not be inferred, that such is the chief subject of that *Veda;* since it also contains a great number of prayers for safety and for the averting of calamities: and, like the other *Vedas*, numerous hymns to the gods, with prayers to be used at solemn rites and religious exercises, excepting such as are named *Yajna*.

[91] The *Gópatha Bráhmaṇa* appears to belong to the second part of this *Veda*. Not having seen a commentary, nor an index, of this work, I can only speak of it from a copy in my possession: this contains five chapters (*prapáṭhaka*) with the date of the transcript[1] and the name of the transcriber, at the end of the fifth, as is usual in the colophon at the close of a volume.

The first chapter of this *Gopatha Bráhmaṇa* traces the origin of the universe from *Brahma;* and it appears from the fourth section of this chapter, that Atharvan is considered as a *Prajápati* appointed by *Brahma* to create and protect subordinate beings.

In the fifth chapter several remarkable passages, identifying the primeval person (*purusha*) with the year (*samvatsara*), convey marked allusions to the calendar. In one place (the fifth section), besides stating the year to contain twelve or thirteen lunar months, the subdivision of that period is pursued to 360 days; and, thence, to 10,800 *muhúrtas*, or hours.

I proceed to notice the most remarkable part of the *Atharva-veda*, consisting of the theological treatises, entitled *Upanishads*, which are appendant on it. They are computed at fifty-two: but this number is completed by reckoning, as distinct *Upanishads*, different parts of a single tract. Four such treatises, comprising eight *Upanishads*, together with six of those before described as appertaining to other *Vedas*, are perpetually cited

[1] It is dated at Mathurá, in the year (*Samvat*) 1732.

in dissertations on the *Vedanta*.[1] Others are either more sparingly, or not at all, quoted.

[92] It may be here proper to explain what is meant by *Upanishad*. In dictionaries, this term is made equivalent to *Rahasya*, which signifies mystery. This last term is, in fact, frequently employed by Manu, and other ancient authors, where the commentators understand *Upanishads* to be meant. But neither the etymology, nor the acceptation, of the word, which is now to be explained, has any direct connexion with the idea of secrecy, concealment, or mystery. Its proper meaning, according to Śankara, Sáyaṇa, and all the commentators, is divine science, or the knowledge of GOD: and, according to the same authorities, it is equally applicable to theology itself, and to a book in which this science is taught. Its derivation is from the verb *sad* (*shad-ḷṛi*), to destroy, to move, or to weary, preceded by the prepositions *upa* near, and *ni* continually, or *nis* certainly. The sense, properly deducible from this etymology, according to the different explanations given by commentators, invariably points to the knowledge of the divine perfections, and to the consequent attainment of beatitude through exemption from passions.[2]

The whole of the Indian theology is professedly founded on the *Upanishads*.[3] Those, which have been before described, have been shown to be extracts from the *Veda*. The rest are also considered as appertaining to the Indian scripture: it does not, however, clearly appear, whether they are detached essays, or have been extracted from a *Bráhmaṇa* of the *Atharva-veda*.

[1] The *Kena* and *Chhándogya* from the *Sámaveda*; the *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka* and *Ísávásya* from the white *Yajus*, and the *Taittiríyaka* from the black *Yajus*; the *Aitareya* from the *Ṛigveda*; and the *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka*, and *Máṇḍúkya* from the *Atharvaṇa*. To these should be added, the *Nṛisinha-tápaníya*.

[2] S'ankara, and Ánandáśrama on the *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*; as also the commentaries on other *Upanishads*: especially S'ankara on the *Káṭhaka*. Other authors concur in assigning the same acceptation and etymology to the word: they vary only in the mode of reconciling the derivation with the sense.

[3] It is expressly so affirmed in the *Vedánta-sára*, v. 3.

I have not found any of them in the *Sanhitá* of the *A'tharvaṇa*, nor in the *Gopatha Bráhmaṇa*.

[93] In the best copies of the fifty-two *Upanishads*,[1] the first fifteen are stated to have been taken from the *Śaunakíyas*, whose *Śákhá* seems to be the principal one of the *Atharva-veda*. The remaining thirty-seven appertain to various *Śákhás*, mostly to that of the *Paippaládis*: but some of them, as will be shown, are borrowed from other *Vedas*.

The *Muṇḍaka*, divided into six sections, unequally distributed in two parts, is the first *Upanishad* of the *A'tharvaṇa*; and is also one of the most important, for the doctrines which it contains. It has been fully illustrated by Śankara, whose gloss is assisted by the annotations of Ánandajnána. The opening of this *Upanishad*, comprising the whole of the first section, is here subjoined.

'Brahmá was first of the gods, framer of the universe, guardian of the world. He taught the knowledge of God, which is the foundation of all science, to his eldest son Atharva. That holy science, which Brahmá revealed to Atharvan,[2] was communicated by him to Angir, who transmitted it to Satyaváha, the descendant of Bharadwája; and this son of Bharadwája imparted the traditional science to Angiras.

'Śaunaka, or the son of Śunaka, a mighty householder, addressing Angiras with due respect, asked, "What is it, O venerable sage, through which, when known, this universe is understood?"

'To him the holy personage thus replied: "Two sorts [94] of science must be distinguished; as they, who know God,

[1] I possess an excellent copy, which corresponds with one transcribed for Mr. Blaquiere, from a similar collection of *Upanishads* belonging to the late Sir W. Jones. In two other copies, which I also obtained at Benares, the arrangement differs, and several *Upanishads* are inserted, the genuineness of which is questionable; while others are admitted, which belong exclusively to the *Yajurveda*.

[2] S'ankara remarks, that Atharva, or Atharvan, may have been the first creature, in one of the many modes of creation, which have been practised by Brahmá.

declare; the supreme science, and another. This other is the *Rigveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sámaveda*, the *Atharvaveda*;[1] the rules of accentuation, the rites of religion, grammar, the glossary and explanation of obscure terms, prosody, and astronomy: also the *Itihása* and *Puráṇa*; and logic, with the rules of interpretation, and the system of moral duties.

'"But the supreme science is that, by which this unperishable [nature] is apprehended; invisible [or imperceptible, as is that nature]: not to be seized; not to be deduced; devoid of colour; destitute of eyes and ears: without hands or feet, yet ever variously pervading all: minute, unalterable; and contemplated by the wise for the source of beings.

'"As the spider spins and gathers back [its thread]; as plants sprout on the earth; as hairs grow on a living person: so is this universe, here, produced from the unperishable nature. By contemplation, the vast one germinates; from him food [or body] is produced; and thence, successively, breath, mind, real [elements], worlds, and immortality arising from [good] deeds. The omniscient is profound contemplation, consisting in the knowledge of him, who knows all: and, from that, the [manifested] vast one, as well as names, forms, and food, proceed: and this is truth."'

The *Praśna*, which is the second *Upanishad*, and equally important with the first, consists, like it, of six sections; and has been similarly interpreted by Śankara and Bálakṛishṇa.[2] In this dialogue, Sukeśa, the son of Bharad[95]wája, Satyakáma, descended from Śivi, Sauryáyaṇi, a remote descendant of the Sun, but belonging to the family of Garga, Kauśalya, surnamed Áśwaláyana, or son of Aśwala, Vaidarbhi of the race of Bhṛigu, together with Kabandhí, surnamed Kátyáyana, or descendant of Katya, are introduced as seeking the knowledge of theology, and applying to Pippaláda for instruction. They successively interrogate him concerning the origin of creatures,

[1] Meaning the prayers contained in the four *Vedas*, disjoined from theology.

[2] I have several copies of the text, besides commentaries on both *Upanishads*.

the nature of the gods, the union of life with body, and the connexion of thoughts with the soul.

The nine succeeding *Upanishads* (from the 3rd to the 11th) are of inferior importance, and have been left unexplained by the writers on the *Vedánta*, because they do not directly relate to the *Śáríraka*, or theological doctrine respecting the soul.[1] They are enumerated in the margin.[2]

The *Máṇḍúkya* follows, and consists of four parts, each constituting a distinct *Upanishad*. This abstruse treatise, comprising the most material doctrines of the *Vedánta*, has been elucidated by the labours of Gauḍapáda, and Śankara. Gauḍapáda's commentary is assisted by the notes of Ánandagiri.

Among the miscellaneous *Upanishads*, the first thirteen (from the 16th to the 28th) have been left uncommented by the principal expounders of the *Vedánta*, for a reason before mentioned. The names of these *Upanishads* will be found in the subjoined note.[3]

[96] The following six (from the 29th to the 34th) constitute the *Nṛisinha Tápaníya;* five of them compose the *Púrva Tápaníya*, or first part of the *Upanishad* so called; and the last, and most important, is entitled *Uttara Tápaníya*. It has been expounded by Gauḍapáda, as the first part (if not the whole *Upanishad*) has been by Śankara.[4] The object of this treatise appears to be the identifying of Nṛisinha with all the gods: but, so far as I comprehend its meaning (for I have not sufficiently examined it to pronounce confidently on this point),

[1] This reason is assigned by the annotator on S'ankara's gloss, at the beginning of his notes on the *Maṇḍaka Upanishad*.

[2] 3rd *Brahma-vidyá*. 4th *Kshurikú*. 5th *Chúlikú*. 6th and 7th *Atharva-síras*. 8th *Garbha*. 9th *Mahá*. 10th *Brahma*. 11th *Prúṇágnihotra*.

[3] 16th *Nila-rudra*. 17th *Náda-vindu*. 18th *Brahma-vindu*. 19th *Amṛita-vindu*. 20th *Dhyána-vindu*. 21st *Tejo-vindu*. 22nd *Yoga-Śikshá*. 23rd *Yoga-tattwa*. 24th *Sannyása*. 25th *Áraṇya* or *Áruṇiyoga*. 26th *Kaṇṭha-Śruti*. 27th *Píṇḍa*. 28th *Átmá*.

[4] I have several copies of the text, and of Gauḍapáda's commentary; with a single transcript of S'ankara's gloss on the five first of the treatises entitled *Tápaníya*.

the fabulous incarnation of Vishṇu, in the shape of a vast lion, does not seem to be at all intended; and the name of Nṛisinha is applied to the divinity, with a superlative import, but with no apparent allusion to that fable.

The two next *Upanishads* constitute the first and second parts of the *Káṭhaka*, or *Valli*, or *Kaṭhavalli* (for the name varies in different copies). It belongs properly to the *Yajurveda*, as before mentioned; but it is usually cited from the *Átharvaṇa;* and has been commented, as appertaining to this *Veda*, by Śankara, and by Bálakṛishṇa.[1]

It comprises six sections, severally entitled *Valli;* but constituting two chapters (*adhyáya*) denominated *Púrva-valli* and *Uttara-valli*. The dialogue is supported by *Mṛityu*, or death, and the prince Nachiketas, whom his father, Vájaśravasa, consigned to Yama, being provoked by the boy's importunately asking him (through zeal, how[97]ever, for the success of a sacrifice performed to ensure universal conquest), "To whom wilt thou give me?" Yama receives Nachiketas with honour, and instructs him in theology, by which beatitude and exemption from worldly sufferings may be attained, through a knowledge of the true nature of the soul, and its identity with the Supreme Being. The doctrine is similar to that of other principal *Upanishads*.

The *Keneshita*, or *Kena Upanishad*, is the thirty-seventh of the *Átharvaṇa*, and agrees, almost word for word, with a treatise bearing the same title, and belonging to a *Śákhá* of the *Sámaveda*. Śankara has, however, written separate commentaries on both, for the sake of exhibiting their different interpretations.[2] Both commentaries have, as usual, been annotated.

[1] The commentary of S'ankara is, as usual, concise and perspicuous: and that of Bálakṛishṇa, copious but clear. Besides their commentaries, and several copies of the text, together with a paraphrase by Vidyáraṇya, I have found this *Upanishad* forming a chapter in a *Bráhmaṇa*, which is marked as belonging to the *Sámaveda*, and which I conjecture to be the *Panchavinśa Bráhmaṇa* of that *Veda*.

[2] Here, as in other instances, I speak from copies in my possession.

A short *Upanishad*, entitled *Náráyaṇa*, is followed by two others (39th and 40th), which form the first and second parts of the *Vṛihan-náráyaṇa*. This corresponds, as before mentioned, with an *Upanishad*, bearing the same title, and terminating the *Áraṇya* of the *Taittiríya Yajurveda*.

On the three subsequent *Upanishads* I shall offer no remarks; they have not been commented among such as relate to the *Vedánta;* and I have not ascertained whence they are extracted.[1]

Under the name of *Ánandavalli* and *Bhṛiguvalli*, two *Upanishads* follow (44th and 45th), which have been already noticed as extracts from the *Áraṇya* of the black *Yajus*, distinguished by the titles of *Taittiríya* and *Váruṇi*.

The remaining seven *Upanishads*[2] are unexplained by [98] commentators on the *Vedánta*. They are, indeed, sufficiently easy, not to require a laboured interpretation: but there is room to regret the want of an ancient commentary, which might assist in determining whether these *Upanishads* be genuine. The reason of this remark will be subsequently explained.

Entertaining no doubts concerning the genuineness of the other works, which have been here described, I think it nevertheless proper to state some of the reasons, on which my belief of their authenticity is founded. It appears necessary to do so, since a late author has abruptly pronounced the *Vedas* to be forgeries.[3]

It has been already mentioned, that the practice of reading the principal *Vedas* in superstitious modes, tends to preserve the genuine text. Copies, prepared for such modes of recital, are spread in various parts of India, especially Benares, Jayanagar, and the banks of the Godávarí. Interpolations and forgeries have become impracticable since this usage has been

[1] Their titles are, 41st *Sarvopanishatsára*. 42nd *Hansa*. And 43rd *Parama-hansa*.

[2] 46th *Garuḍa*. 47th *Kálágni-rudra*. 48th and 49th *Ráma-tápaníya*, first and second parts. 50th *Kaivalya*. 51st *Jábála*. 52nd *Áśrama*.

[3] Mr. Pinkerton, in his Modern Geography, vol. ii.

introduced: and the *Ṛigveda*, and both the *Yajurvedas*, belonging to the several *Śákhás*, in which that custom has been adopted, have been, therefore, long safe from alteration.

The explanatory table of contents, belonging to the several *Vedas*, also tends to ensure the purity of the text; since the subject and length of each passage are therein specified. The index, again, is itself secured from alteration by more than one exposition of its meaning, in the form of a perpetual commentary.

It is a received and well grounded opinion of the learned in India, that no book is altogether safe from changes and interpolations until it have been commented: but when once a gloss has been published, no fabrication could afterwards [99] succeed: because the perpetual commentary notices every passage, and, in general, explains every word.

Commentaries on the *Vedas* themselves exist, which testify the authenticity of the text. Some are stated to have been composed in early times: I shall not, however, rely on any but those to which I can with certainty refer. I have fragments of Uvaṭa's gloss; the greatest part of Sáyaṇa's on several *Vedas;* and a complete one by Mahídhara on a single *Veda*. I also possess nearly the whole of Śankara's commentary on the *Upanishads;* and a part of Gauḍapáda's; with others, by different authors of less note.

The genuineness of the commentaries, again, is secured by a crowd of annotators, whose works expound every passage in the original gloss; and whose annotations are again interpreted by others. This observation is particularly applicable to the most important parts of the *Vedas*, which, as is natural, are the most studiously and elaborately explained.

The *Nirukta*, with its copious commentaries on the obsolete words and passages of scripture, further authenticates the accuracy of the text, as there explained. The references and quotations, in those works, agree with the text of the *Vedas*, as we now find it.

The grammar of the Sanskrit language contains rules applicable to the anomalies of the ancient dialect. The many and voluminous commentaries on that, and on other parts of the grammar, abound in examples cited from the *Vedas:* and here, also, the present text is consonant to those ancient quotations.

Philosophical works, especially the numerous commentaries on the aphorisms of the *Mímánsá* and *Vedánta,* illustrate and support every position advanced in them, by ample quotations from the *Vedas.* The object of the *Mímánsá* is to establish the cogency of precepts contained in [100] scripture, and to furnish maxims for its interpretation; and, for the same purpose, rules of reasoning, from which a system of logic is deducible. The object of the *Vedánta* is to illustrate the system of mystical theology taught by the supposed revelation, and to show its application to the enthusiastic pursuit of unimpassioned perfection and mystical intercourse with the divinity. Both are closely connected with the *Vedas:* and here, likewise, the authenticity of the text is supported by ancient references and citations.

Numerous collections of aphorisms, by ancient authors,[1] on religious ceremonies, contain, in every line, references to passages of the *Vedas.* Commentaries on these aphorisms cite the passages at greater length. Separate treatises also interpret the prayers used at divers ceremonies. Rituals, some ancient, others modern, contain a full detail of the ceremonial, with all the prayers which are to be recited at the various religious rites for which they are formed. Such rituals are extant, not only for ceremonies which are constantly observed, but for others which are rarely practised;

[1] The *Sútras* of Á'swaláyana, S'ánkháyana, Baudháyana, Kátyáyana, Látyáyana, Gobhila, Ápastamba, etc.

These, appertaining to various *S'ákhás* of the *Vedas,* constitute the *kalpa,* or system of religious observances. I have here enumerated a few only. The list might be much enlarged, from my own collection; and still more so, from quotations by various compilers: for the original works, and their commentaries, as well as compilations from them, are very numerous.

and even for such as have been long since disused. In all, the passages taken from the *Vedas* agree with the text of the general compilation.

The Indian legislators, with their commentators, and the copious digests and compilations from their works, frequently refer to the *Vedas;* especially on those points of the law which concern religion. Here also the references are consistent with the present text of the Indian scripture.

[101] Writers on ethics sometimes draw from the *Vedas* illustrations of moral maxims, and quote from their holy writ passages at full length, in support of ethical precepts.[1] These quotations are found to agree with the received text of the sacred books.

Citations from the Indian scripture occur in every branch of literature studied by orthodox Hindus. Astronomy, so far as it relates to the calendar, has frequent occasion for reference to the *Vedas*. Medical writers sometimes cite them; and even annotators on profane poets occasionally refer to this authority, in explaining passages which contain allusions to the sacred text.

Even the writings of the heretical sects exhibit quotations from the *Vedas*. I have met with such in the books of the Jainas, unattended by any indication of their doubting the genuineness of the original, though they do not receive its doctrines, nor acknowledge its cogency.[2]

In all these branches of Indian literature, while perusing or consulting the works of various authors, I have found perpetual references to the *Vedas*, and have frequently verified the quotations. On this ground I defend the authentic text of the Indian scripture, as it is now extant; and although the

[1] A work entitled *Niti-manjarí* is an instance of this mode of treating moral subjects.

[2] The *S'atapatha-brâhmaṇa*, especially the 14th book, or *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, is repeatedly cited, with exact references to the numbers of the chapters and sections, in a fragment of a treatise by a *Jaina* author, the communication of which I owe to Mr. Speke, among other fragments collected by the late Capt. Hoare, and purchased at the sale of that gentleman's library.

passages which I have so verified are few, compared with the great volume of the *Vedas*, yet I have sufficient grounds to argue, that no skill in the nefarious arts of forgery and falsification could be equal to the [102] arduous task of fabricating large works, to agree with the very numerous citations, pervading thousands of volumes, composed on diverse subjects, in every branch of literature, and dispersed through the various nations of Hindus, inhabiting Hindustán and the Dakhin.

If any part of what is now received as the *Veda* cannot stand the test of such a comparison, it may be rejected, as at least doubtful, if not certainly spurious. Even such parts as cannot be fully confirmed by a strict scrutiny, must be either received with caution, or be set aside as questionable. I shall point out parts of the fourth *Veda*, which I consider to be in this predicament. But, with the exceptions now indicated, the various portions of the *Vedas*, which have been examined, are as yet free from such suspicion; and, until they are impeached by more than vague assertion, have every title to be admitted as genuine copies of books, which (however little deserving of it) have been long held in reverence by the Hindus.

I am apprized that this opinion will find opponents, who are inclined to dispute the whole of Indian literature, and to consider it all as consisting of forgeries, fabricated within a few years, or, at best, in the last few ages. This appears to be grounded on assertions and conjectures, which were inconsiderately hazarded, and which have been eagerly received, and extravagantly strained.

In the first place, it should be observed, that a work must not be hastily condemned as a forgery, because, on examination, it appears not to have been really written by the person, whose name is usually coupled with quotations from it. For if the very work itself show that it does not purport to be written by that person, the safe conclusion is, that it was never meant to be ascribed to him. Thus the two principal codes of Hindu law are usually cited as Manu's and Yájnavalkya's:

but in the codes them[103]selves, those are dialogists, not authors: and the best commentators expressly declare that these institutes were written by other persons than Manu and Yájnavalkya.[1] The *Súrya-siddhánta* is not pretended to have been written by Maya: but he is introduced as receiving instruction from a partial incarnation of the Sun; and their conversation constitutes a dialogue, which is recited by another person in a different company. The text of the *Sánkhya* philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by Íswarakṛishṇa; and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Panchaśikha, who had been himself instructed by Ásuri, the pupil of Kapila.

To adduce more instances would be tedious: they abound in every branch of science. Among works, the authors of which are unknown, and which, therefore, as usual, are vulgarly ascribed to some celebrated name, many contain undisguised evidence of a more modern date. Such are those parts of *Puráṇas* in which the prophetic style is assumed, because they relate to events posterior to the age of the persons who are speakers in the dialogue. Thus Buddha is mentioned under various names in the *Matsya*, *Vishṇu*, *Bhágavata*, *Garuḍa*, *Nṛisinha*, and other *Puráṇas*. I must not omit to notice, that Śankaráchárya, the great commentator on the abstrusest parts of the *Vedas*, is celebrated, in the *Vṛihad-dharma-puráṇa*,[2] as an incarna[104]tion of Vishṇu; and Gauḍapáda is described, in the *Śankara-vijaya*, as the pupil of Śuka, the son of Vyása.[3]

[1] Vijnánayogí, also named Vijnáneśwara, who commented the institutes which bear the name of Yájnavalkya, states the text to be an abridgment by a different author.

[2] In the 78th chapter of the 2nd part. This is the *Puráṇa* mentioned by me with doubt in a former essay (Asiatic Researches, vol. v. p. 53). [See vol. ii. p. 157 of the present edition.] I have since procured a copy of it.

[3] If this were not a fable, the real age of Vyása might be hence ascertained;

I do not mean to say, that forgeries are not sometimes committed; or that books are not counterfeited, in whole or in part. Sir W. Jones, Mr. Blaquiere, and myself, have detected interpolations. Many greater forgeries have been attempted: some have for a time succeeded, and been ultimately discovered: in regard to others, detection has immediately overtaken the fraudulent attempt. A conspicuous instance of systematic fabrication, by which Captain Wilford was for a time deceived, has been brought to light, as has been fully stated by that gentleman. But though some attempts have been abortive, others may doubtless have succeeded. I am myself inclined to adopt an opinion supported by many learned Hindus, who consider the celebrated *Śrí Bhágavata* as the work of a grammarian, supposed to have lived about six hundred years ago.

In this, as in several other instances, some of which I shall have likewise occasion to notice, the learned among the Hindus have resisted the impositions that have been attempted. Many others might be stated, where no imposition has been either practised or intended. In Europe, as well as in the East, works are often published anonymously, with fictitious introductions: and diverse compositions, the real authors of which are not known, have, on insufficient grounds, been dignified with celebrated names. To such instances, which are frequent everywhere, the imputation of forgery does not attach.

[105] In Europe, too, literary forgeries have been committed, both in ancient and modern times. The poems ascribed to Orpheus are generally admitted not to have been composed by that poet, if, indeed, he ever existed. Nani, or Annius, of Viterbo, is now universally considered as an impostor, notwithstanding the defence of his publication, and

and, consequently, the period when the *Vedas* were arranged in their present form. Govindanátha, the instructor of S'ankara, is stated to have been the pupil of Gaudapáda; and, according to the traditions generally received in the peninsula of India, S'ankara lived little more than eight hundred years ago.

of himself, by some among the learned of his age. In our own country, and in recent times, literary frauds have been not unfrequent. But a native of India, who should retort the charge, and argue from a few instances, that the whole literature of Europe, which is held ancient, consists of modern forgeries, would be justly censured for his presumption.

We must not then indiscriminately condemn the whole literature of India. Even Father Hardouin, when he advanced a similar paradox respecting the works of ancient writers, excepted some compositions of Cicero, Virgil, Horace, and Pliny.

It is necessary in this country, as everywhere else, to be guarded against literary impositions. But doubt and suspicion should not be carried to an extreme length. Some fabricated works, some interpolated passages, will be detected by the sagacity of critics in the progress of researches into the learning of the East: but the greatest part of the books, received by the learned among the Hindus, will assuredly be found genuine. I do not doubt that the *Vedas*, of which an account has been here given, will appear to be of this description.

In pronouncing them to be genuine, I mean to say, that they are the same compositions, which, under the same title of *Veda*, have been revered by Hindus for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. I think it probable, that they were compiled by Dwaipáyana, the person who is said to have collected them, and who is thence surnamed *Vyása*, [106] or the compiler. I can perceive no difficulty in admitting, that those passages which are now ascribed to human authors, either as the *Rishis*, or as the reciters of the text, were attributed to the same persons, so long ago, as when the compilation was made; and probably, in most instances, those passages were really composed by the alleged authors. Concerning such texts as are assigned to divine persons, according to Hindu mythology, it may be fairly concluded, that the true writers of them were not known when the compilation was made; and, for this reason, they were assigned to fabulous personages.

The different portions which constitute the *Vedas* must have been written at various times. The exact period when they were compiled, or that in which the greatest part was composed, cannot be determined with accuracy and confidence from any facts yet ascertained. But the country may; since many rivers of India are mentioned in more than one text; and, in regard to the period, I incline to think, that the ceremonies called *Yajna*, and the prayers to be recited at those ceremonies, are as old as the calendar, which purports to have been framed for such religious rites.

To each *Veda* a treatise, under the title of *Jyotisha*, is annexed, which explains the adjustment of the calendar, for the purpose of fixing the proper periods for the performance of religious duties. It is adapted to the comparison of solar and lunar time with the vulgar or civil year; and was evidently formed in the infancy of astronomical knowledge. From the rules delivered in the treatises which I have examined,[1] it appears, that the cycle (*Yuga*) there employed is a period of five years only. The month is lunar; but at the end, and in the middle, of the quin[107]quennial period, an intercalation is admitted, by doubling one month. Accordingly, the cycle comprises three common lunar years, and two, which contain thirteen lunations each. The year is divided into six seasons; and each month into half months. A complete lunation is measured by thirty lunar days: some one of which must of course, in alternate months, be sunk, to make the dates agree with the nycthemera. For this purpose, the sixty-second day appears to be deducted:[2] and thus the cycle of five years consists of 1860 lunar days, or 1830 nycthemera; subject to a further correction, for the excess of nearly four days above the true

[1] I have several copies of one such treatise, besides a commentary on the *Jyotisha* of the *Rigveda*, by an unknown author; which is accordingly assigned to a fabulous personage, S'eshanâga.

[2] The Athenian year was regulated in a similar manner; but, according to Geminus, it was the sixty-third day which was deducted. Perhaps this Hindu calendar may assist in explaining the Grecian system of lunar months.

sidereal year: but the exact quantity of this correction, and the method of making it, according to this calendar, have not yet been sufficiently investigated to be here stated. The zodiac is divided into twenty-seven asterisms, or signs, the first of which, both in the *Jyotisha* and in the *Vedas*, is *Kṛittiká*, or the Pleiads. The place of the colures, according to these astronomical treatises, will be forthwith mentioned: but none of them hint at a motion of the equinoxes. The measure of a day by thirty hours, and that of an hour by sixty minutes, are explained; and the method of constructing a clepsydra is taught.

This ancient Hindu calendar, corresponding in its divisions of time, and in the assigned origin of the ecliptic, with several passages of the *Vedas*, is evidently the foundation of that which, after successive corrections, is now received by the Hindus throughout India. The progress of those corrections may be traced, from the cycle of five,[1] [108] to one of sixty lunar years (which is noticed in many popular treatises on the calendar, and in the commentary of the *Jyotisha*); and thence, to one of sixty years of Jupiter; and, finally, to the greater astronomical periods of twelve thousand years of the gods, and a hundred years of Brahmá. But the history of Indian astronomy is not the subject of this essay. I shall only cite, from the treatises here referred to, a passage in which the then place of the colures is stated.

'*Swar ákramete somárkau yadi sákam savásavau; syát tadádi yugam, mághas, tapas, śuklo, 'yanam hy udak.*

'*Prapadyete śravishṭhádau súryachandramasáv udak; sárpárdhe dákshiṇárkas tu: mágha-śrávaṇayoḥ sadá.*

[1] The treatises in question contain allusions to the ages of the world: but without explaining whether any, and what, specific period of time was assigned to each age. This cycle of five years is mentioned by the name of *Yuga*, in Paráśara's institutes of law edited by Suvrata, and entitled *Vṛihat-paráśara*. It is there (ch. 12, v. 83) stated, as the basis of calculation for larger cycles: and that of 3600 years, deduced from one of sixty (containing twelve simple *yugas*), is denominated the *yuga* of Vákpati; whence the *yuga* of Prajánátha, containing 216,000 years, is derived; and twice that constitutes the *Kaliyuga*. The still greater periods are afterwards described under the usual names.

'Gharma-vriddhir, apám prasthaḥ, kshapá-hrása, udaggatau : dakshiṇe tau viparyastau, shaṇ-muhúrty ayanena tu.'

The following is a literal translation of this remarkable passage, which occurs in both the treatises examined by me.

'When the sun and moon ascend the sky together, being in the constellation over which the *Vasus* preside; then does the cycle begin, and the [season] *Mágha*, and the [month] *Tapas*, and the bright [fortnight], and the northern path.

'The sun and moon turn towards the north at the beginning of *Śravishṭhá;* but the sun turns towards the south in the middle of the constellation over which the serpents preside; and this [his turn towards the south, and towards the north], always [happens] in [the months of] *Mágha* and *Śrávaṇa*.

[109] 'In the northern progress, an increase of day, and decrease of night, take place, amounting to a *prastha* (or 32 *palas*) of water: in the southern, both are reversed (*i.e.* the days decrease and the nights increase), and [the difference amounts], by the journey, to six *muhúrtas*.'[1]

Śravishṭhá is given, in all the dictionaries of the Sanskrit language, as another name of *Dhanishṭhá;* and is used for it in more than one passage of the *Vedas*. This is the constellation which is sacred to the *Vasus;* as *Aśleshá* is to the serpents. The deities presiding over the twenty-seven constellations are enumerated in three other verses of the *Jyotisha* belonging to the *Yajus*, and in several places of the *Vedas*. The *Jyotisha* of the *Rich* differs in transposing two of them; but the commentator corrects this as a faulty reading.

In several passages of the *Jyotisha*, these names of deities are used for the constellations over which they preside; especially one, which states the situation of the moon, when the sun reaches the tropic, in years other than the first of the cycle. Everywhere these terms are explained, as indicat-

[1] I cannot, as yet, reconcile the time here stated. Its explanation appears to depend on the construction of the clepsydra, which I do not well understand; as the rule for its construction is obscure, and involves some difficulties which remain yet unsolved.

ing the constellations which that enumeration allots to them.[1] Texts, contained in the *Vedas* themselves, confirm the correspondence; and the connexion of *Áśvinì* and the *Áśvins* is indeed decisive.

Hence it is clear, that *Dhanishṭhá* and *Áśleshá* are the constellations meant; and that when this Hindu calendar was regulated, the solstitial points were reckoned to be at the beginning of the one, and in the middle of the other: and such was the situation of those cardinal points, in the [110] fourteenth century before the Christian era. I formerly[2] had occasion to show from another passage of the *Vedas*, that the correspondence of seasons with months, as there stated, and as also suggested in the passage now quoted from the *Jyotisha*, agrees with such a situation of the cardinal points.

I now proceed to fulfil the promise of indicating such parts of the fourth *Veda* as appear liable to suspicion. These are the remaining detached *Upanishads*, which are not received into the best collections of fifty-two theological tracts, belonging to the *Atharva-veda;* and even some of those which are there inserted, but which, so far as my inquiries have yet reached, do not appear to have been commented by ancient authors, nor to have been quoted in the old commentaries on the *Vedánta*. Two of these *Upanishads* are particularly suspicious: one entitled *Ráma-tápaniya*, consisting of two parts (*Púrva* and *Uttara*); and another called *Gopála-tápaniya*, also comprising two parts, of which one is named the *Kṛishṇa Upanishad*. The introduction to the first of these works contains a summary, which agrees in substance with the mythological history of the husband of Sítá, and conqueror of Lanká. The other exalts the hero of Mathurá.

Although the *Ráma-tápaniya* be inserted in all the collections of *Upanishads*, which I have seen; and the *Gopála-*

[1] I think it needless to quote the original of this enumeration.

[2] Asiatic Researches, vol. vii. p. 283. [See note B. to Essay II. in the present vol. on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus.]

tápaniya appear in some, yet I am inclined to doubt their genuineness, and to suspect that they have been written in times, modern, when compared with the remainder of the *Vedas*. This suspicion is chiefly grounded on the opinion, that the sects, which now worship Ráma and Kṛishṇa as incarnations of Vishṇu, are comparatively new. I have not found, in any other part of the *Vedas*, the least trace of such a worship. The real doctrine of the whole Indian [111] scripture is the unity of the deity, in whom the universe is comprehended: and the seeming polytheism which it exhibits, offers the elements, and the stars, and planets, as gods. The three principal manifestations of the divinity, with other personified attributes and energies, and most of the other gods of Hindu mythology, are indeed mentioned, or at least indicated, in the *Vedas*. But the worship of deified heroes is no part of that system; nor are the incarnations of deities suggested in any other portion of the text, which I have yet seen; though such are sometimes hinted at by the commentators.

According to the notions, which I entertain of the real history of the Hindu religion, the worship of Ráma, and of Kṛishṇa, by the *Vaishṇavas*, and that of Mahádeva and Bhaváni by the *Śaivas* and *Śáktas*, have been generally introduced, since the persecution of the *Bauddhas* and *Jainas*. The institutions of the *Vedas* are anterior to Buddha, whose theology seems to have been borrowed from the system of Kapila, and whose most conspicuous practical doctrine is stated to have been the unlawfulness of killing animals, which in his opinion were too frequently slain for the purpose of eating their flesh, under the pretence of performing a sacrifice or *Yajna*. The overthrow of the sect of Buddha, in India, has not effected the full revival of the religious system inculcated in the *Vedas*. Most of what is there taught, is now obsolete: and, in its stead, new orders of religious devotees have been instituted; and new forms of religious ceremonies have been established. Rituals founded on the *Puráṇas*, and observances

borrowed from a worse source, the *Tantras*, have, in a great measure, antiquated the institutions of the *Vedas*. In particular, the sacrificing of animals before the idols of Kálí,[1] [112] has superseded the less sanguinary practice of the *Yajna;* and the adoration of Ráma and of Kṛishṇa has succeeded to that of the elements and planets. If this opinion be well founded, it follows that the *Upanishads* in question have probably been composed in later times, since the introduction of those sects, which hold Ráma and Gopála in peculiar veneration.

On the same ground, every *Upanishad*, which strongly favours the doctrines of these sects, may be rejected, as liable to much suspicion. Such is the *Átmabodha Upanishad*,[2] in which Kṛishṇa is noticed by the title of Madhusúdana, son of Devakí: and such, also, is the *Sundarítápaní*,[3] which inculcates the worship of Deví.

The remaining *Upanishads* do not, so far as I have examined them, exhibit any internal evidence of a modern date. I state them as liable to doubt, merely because I am not acquainted with any external evidence of their genuineness.[4] [113] But it

[1] In Bengal, and the contiguous provinces, thousands of kids and buffalo calves are sacrificed before the idol, at every celebrated temple; and opulent persons make a similar destruction of animals at their private chapels. The sect which has adopted this system is prevalent in Bengal, and in many other provinces of India: and the Sanguinary Chapter, translated from the *Kálikâ Puráṇa* by Mr. Blaquiere (Asiatic Researches, vol. v. p. 371), is one among the authorities on which it relies. But the practice is not approved by other sects of Hindus.

[2] I have seen but one copy of it, in an imperfect collection of the *Upanishads*. It is not inserted in other compilations, which nevertheless purport to be complete.

[3] According to the only copy that I have seen, it comprises five *Upanishads*, and belongs to the *Átharvaṇa;* but the style resembles that of the *Tantras* more than the *Vedas*. It is followed by a tract, marked as belonging to the same *Veda*, and entitled *Tripura Upanishad*, or *Traipuríya;* but this differs from another bearing the similar title of *Tripurí Upanishad*, and found in a different collection of theological treatises. I equally discredit both of them, although they are cited by writers on the *Mantra-śástra* (or use of incantations); and although a commentary has been written on the *Tripura* by Bhaṭṭa Bháskara.

[4] The same observation is applicable to several *Upanishads*, which are not inserted in the best collections, but which occur in others. For instance, the *Skanda*, *Kaula*, *Gopichandana*, *Darśana*, and *Vajrasúchí*. I shall not stop to indicate a few questionable passages in some of these dubious tracts.

is probable, that further researches may ascertain the accuracy of most of them, as extracts from the *Vedas;* and their authenticity, as works quoted by known authors. In point of doctrine they appear to conform with the genuine *Upanishads.*

The preceding description may serve to convey some notion of the *Vedas.* They are too voluminous for a complete translation of the whole; and what they contain would hardly reward the labour of the reader; much less that of the translator. The ancient dialect in which they are composed, and especially that of the three first *Vedas,* is extremely difficult and obscure: and, though curious, as the parent of a more polished and refined language (the classical Sanskrit), its difficulties must long continue to prevent such an examination of the whole *Vedas,* as would be requisite for extracting all that is remarkable and important in those voluminous works. But they well deserve to be occasionally consulted by the Oriental scholar.

PROFESSOR WHITNEY'S NOTES TO COLEBROOKE'S ESSAY ON THE VEDAS.

P. 8. *On the Vedas.* Other and later comprehensive accounts of the same general subject are: R. Roth, Zur Litteratur und Geschichte des Weda, Stuttgart, 1846; A. Weber, Akademische Vorlesungen über Indische Literaturgeschichte, Berlin, 1852; W. D. Whitney, in Journal of the American Oriental Society, vols. iii., iv., New Haven, 1853–4; Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Des Védas, Paris, 1854; M. Müller, History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, London, 1859; etc., etc.

P. 9, l. 4. *these celebrated books.* Colebrooke's collection of manuscripts is now in the Library of the India Office, London, and is still, it is believed, the largest and most valuable ever made for the Vedic literature. A part, at least, of General Martine's Vedic MSS. are in the same Library: the collection of Sir Robert Chambers forms a part of the Royal Library at Berlin.

P. 9, l. 14. *Veda.* The legend here referred to is now fully recognized as modern and valueless, and the name Vyása as signifying nothing but the personification of the whole period and work of collecting and arranging the sacred writings, which are of very different age and origin.

P. 9, l. 24. *the Ṛich.* For this citation, see Müller's edition of the Rig-Veda with commentary, vol. i., p. 8, l. 6. The quotation is from the Aitareya-Bráhmaṇa, v. 32.

P. 10, l. 4. *denomination.* See Amarakosha, edition of Loiseleur Deslongchamps, I. i., 5, 4, and III. iii., 43.

P. 10, l. 9. *a fifth Veda.* The epic and Puranic literature is in no such sense a Veda as is the Átharvaṇa, which, in the whole composition of its original text and accompanying literature, is analogous with the other three Vedas, but is distinguished from them by inferior age, dignity, and sanctity.

P. 10, l. 16. *M. and T. Upanishads.* There can be hardly any doubt that Colebrooke quotes the two authorities here mentioned at second

hand, from Sáyaṇa's introduction to his commentary on the Rig-Veda (see Müller's Rig-Veda, vol. i., p. २ ll. 11–13), where we read: मुण्डकोपनिषद्येवमाम्नायते । ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदो ऽथर्ववेद इति। तायनीयोपनिषदपि मन्त्रराजपादेषु क्रमेणाध्ययनमेवमामनन्ति। ऋग्यजुःसामाथर्वाणश्चत्वारो वेदाः etc. That this is so, is proved by the joint mention of the two Upanishads, the close correspondence of the passages cited with their description by Colebrooke, and the fact that the latter refers to the "Tápaníya Upanishad"; whereas, if he had been making an independent quotation, he would doubtless have informed us to which of the various Upanishads bearing that appellation he intended to refer. It is, then, only by a slip of the pen that he has written "Maṇḍúka" instead of "Muṇḍaka." The former Upanishad, in fact, contains no mention of the Atharva-Veda; the latter has the passage quoted by Sáyaṇa, in the fifth paragraph of its first section, or *muṇḍaka* (p. 266 of the edition in the Bibliotheca Indica), of which a complete translation is offered further on [pp. 84–5]. By the Tápaníya-Upanishad is meant the Nṛsiṁha-Tápaníya, in which the words cited by Sáyaṇa are to be found at I. ii., 6. See Weber's Ind. Studien, vol. ix., p. 76.

P. 10, note [2]. The passage which is here referred to is found at ii. 3 (pp. 76–7 of the edition in the Bibliotheca Indica); where, along with *yajuḥ*, *ṛch*, *sáma*, and *ádeśa* ('direction'; the commentator explaining it by *bráhmaṇa*), are mentioned *atharváṅgirasaḥ*, 'songs of Atharvan and Angiras.' This term denotes material like that composing the Atharva-Veda, being often applied to such material elsewhere, and even in the Atharvan itself (see A.V., x., 7, 20); but none of the expressions used are necessarily to be understood as implying definite collections. That such hymns as compose the greater portion of the Atharvan—and in part, also, the tenth book of the Rig-Veda—were in the keeping of Hindu tradition from a very early period, is sufficiently evident; when they were collected and arranged, and what were the steps by which, gradually and partially, they attained the rank and consideration of a fourth Veda, is less clear.

P. 11, note [1]. For this passage of the Chhándogya Upanishad, see pages 473–5 of the edition in the Bibliotheca Indica. Sankara's explanations of the obscurer terms in the list are in part of more than doubtful correctness.

P. 12, l. 8. *the other Vedas.* The relations of the four fundamental collections are, briefly stated, as follows. The Rig-Veda is an assemblage of the ancient religious hymns, as such, arranged chiefly

according to their authors and the divinities to whom they are addressed; the Sáma-Veda is a liturgical collection of single verses and brief passages, almost all of them parts of hymns which are contained in the Rig-Veda, employed in certain (Soma) ceremonies, and chanted by priests called *sámagás* or *chhandogás*; the Yajur-Veda is also liturgical, made up of the utterances of the *adhvaryu* priests in the performance of their sacrifices, in part metrical and mainly extracted from the hymns of the Rig-Veda, in part prosaic; the Atharva-Veda is, like the Rig-Veda, a collection of complete hymns, chiefly of a later period, and of a superstitious rather than a religious character.

P. 12, note [1]. Published, text and translation, in Weber's Indische Studien, vol. i., Berlin, 1850.

P. 13, l. 5. On the *charaṇas*, or schools of Vedic study, and their *śákhás*, or received texts, see especially Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 187 sq.

P. 13, note [1], l. 3. The Charaṇavyúha was published, text and translation, in Weber's Ind. Stud., vol. iii., Berlin, 1855.

P. 13, l. 11. The existing and published text of the Rig-Veda is that of the school of Śákalya. The Báshkala text is known by notices of its extent (see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit., p. 220). Bráhmaṇas and Sútras are in existence, belonging to the schools of Áśvaláyana and Sánkháyana: it is doubtful whether they had a peculiar *mantra*-text.

P. 13, l. 24. *the same with Yáska.* This inference is an unnecessary one, as is pointed out by Müller (Hist. Anc. Sansk. Lit., p. 153, note).

P. 14, l. 23. *Vájin.* The names "dark" or "black" (*kṛshṇa*) and "clear" or "white" (*śukla*), applied to the two principal divisions of the Yajur-Veda, are supposed to refer to the commingling of *mantra* and *bráhmaṇa* in the former, and their distinct separation in the latter. Taittiríya and Vájasaneya are names of schools, of patronymic origin.

P. 14, note [2], l. 1. For this passage from the Bṛhad-áraṇyaka, see p. 1095 of the edition in the Bibliotheca Indica.

P. 14, note [2], l. 2. Rather, by the commentator on the White Yajur-Veda? See Weber's edition of the latter, p. ९, l. 14; for the index, see p. lv., note.

P. 14, note [3]. See the text of the Index in Weber's Ind. Stud., vol. iii., p. 396. Kuṇḍina is pronounced the author of a comment (*vṛtti*) on the Átreyí text; the author of the Index itself is unknown.

P. 15, l. 20. *obsolete.* The notices of Yajus schools in this para-

graph are mostly from the Charaṇavyúha; see its text in Weber's Ind. Stud., vol. iii., pp. 256–71. The Káṭhaka, belonging to the Cháráyaṇíya division of the Charaka school, is still in existence: see Weber's Indische Literaturgeschichte, p. 86 sq., and Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit., p. 225. The Átreya text is known only by its Index, or *anukramaṇí*, referred to in the preceding paragraph. The extant Taittiríya text, with Mádhava's commentary, is now publishing at Calcutta, in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica; and Weber has printed the text alone, in Latin characters, in vols. xi., xii., of his Indische Studien (Berlin, 1871–2). The Káṇva and Mádhyandina texts of the White Yajur-Veda are both given in Weber's edition of that work (Berlin, 1852). The Maitráyaṇí text has been recently found in India: see Haug, Brahma und die Brahmanen (Munich, 1871, 4to.), pp. 31–4.

P. 16, l. 16. *of less note.* The Vishṇu Puráṇa is the principal authority from which are derived these notices of the schools of the Sáman and Atharvan. For the considerably different teachings of the Charaṇavyúha, see Weber's Ind. Stud., vol. iii., pp. 272–9, and Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit., pp. 373–5. Two slightly differing texts of the Sáma-Veda are known, belonging to the Kauthuma and Ráṇáyaníya schools; that of the latter is published, by Stevenson (London, 1843; and translation, London, 1844), and by Benfey (text, translation, notes, and glossary, Leipzig, 1848); an additional section, belonging to the Naigeya school (a branch of the Kauthuma), is given by Dr. S. Goldschmidt in the Monatsbericht of the Berlin Academy for April, 1868. The only known text of the Atharvan, of undetermined school, is published by Roth and Whitney (text only, Berlin, 1856). Of the school of Śaunaka, apparently, is the existing Prátiśákhya, or phonetic grammar, of this Veda, published by Prof. Whitney, in Journ. Am. Or. Society (vol. vii., New Haven, 1862).

P. 16, last line. By an exception from the usual rule, as already noticed, *mantra* and *bráhmaṇa* are mingled together in both the Saṁhitá and Bráhmaṇa of the Black Yajus.

P. 17, note [1]. See the Prasthánabheda, in Weber's Ind. Stud., vol. i., pp. 3, 14.

P. 17, l. 12. *the Rigveda.* The existing text of this Veda, with the commentary of Sáyaṇa, has been published, under Müller's editorship (six volumes, quarto, London, 1849–73). Dr. Aufrecht has also published, in the Indische Studien (vols. vi., vii., Berlin, 1861–3), a romanized edition of the text alone. The first two *adhyáyas*, with the commentary, appeared in the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1849), edited by Dr. Röer. Müller put forth the first

maṇḍala, in *sanhitá* and *pada* text (Leipzig, 1856–7, 4to.), and Rosen the first *ashṭaka*, in *sanhitá* and romanized *pada*, with Latin translation (London, 1838, 4to.: the text unaccented); an entire text, in both forms, is this year (1873) issued by Müller in London. There is a complete translation, of little value, into French, by Langlois (4 vols., Paris, 1848–51, republished by Foucaux, 1872); another by Wilson, in English (3 vols., containing four *ashṭakas*, London, 1850–57; the fourth volume, edited chiefly by Prof. Cowell, appeared in 1866, and the work is to be completed from the translator's manuscript), which is much more to be trusted, although too dependent on the commentary. Benfey, in the Orient und Occident (Göttingen, 1860–65), began a German version, in the metres of the original. Of a translation by Müller, one volume has appeared (London, 1869). Publications of the text and translations of single hymns or detached passages are too numerous to be referred to here; for such, see especially Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts (five volumes, London).

P. 17, last line. Of these two discordant modes of division, that into *maṇḍalas* is the original one, founded mainly on the authorship and subject of the hymns; the other is wholly arbitrary and external, separating the text into eighths, these into sixty-fourths, and these again into *vargas* of, as nearly as possible, five stanzas each. The *vargas* have nothing to do with the *maṇḍala* and *súkta* division, but so far respect it that a *varga* is never allowed to include verses of two different hymns. The number of *anuvákas* in the extant and published text is 85, of hymns 1017, not including the Válakhilya, an appendix to the eighth *maṇḍala*, which has eleven more hymns. The complete number of stanzas, or *ṛchas*, is 10,448; or, with the Válakhilya, 10,528. For the Hindu reckonings, which differ slightly from this and from one another, see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit., p. 219 sq.

P. 18, l. 6. *classed together.* This is true throughout of the order of the first seven *maṇḍalas;* the other three are of much more obscure construction. The ninth is composed only of Soma hymns; the tenth contains much material of later origin, and of the same superstitious and imprecatory character which belongs to the Atharvan. The Sáma-Veda is taken chiefly from the hymns of the eighth and ninth *maṇḍalas*, especially the latter.

P. 18, last line. *in a simple manner.* The object of the different modes here mentioned of speaking and writing the Vedic texts appears to have been less superstitious than grammatical and critical, intended for the better understanding and more exact preservation of the text. For a fuller description of them, see Roth, Lit. u. Gesch. d. Weda, p.

82 sq. Colebrooke's opinion, that they are restricted to certain Vedas, and to certain texts of those Vedas, seems founded upon an obscure passage in the Charaṇavyúha (see Ind. Stud. vol. iii. p. 266), and is erroneous: they are, or may be, applied to any *śákhá* of any of the Vedas. Manuscripts, however, of any excepting *saṁhitá* and *pada* are very rare.

P. 19, l. 14. *adoration.* The so-called root *mantr* is simply a denominative of the noun *mantra* itself, which comes from the root *man*, and has not by etymology, or by its earlier use, any superstitious meaning.

P. 19, l. 16. The passage from the Ṛigveda index is cited in full further on (p. 23).

P. 19, l. 22. See Weber's Yajur-Veda, vol. i. p. lv. note: द्रष्टार ऋषयः स्मर्तारः परमेष्ठ्यादयो देवता मन्त्रान्तर्भूता अग्न्यादिका हविर्भाजः स्तुतिभाजो वा ।

P. 19, l. 29. This *dánastuti*, "praise of liberality," is in most cases the subject, reckoned as *devatá*, of a certain number of verses in a longer hymn. There are but three hymns (i. 125, Vál. 7, 8), which are entirely devoted to the theme.

P. 20, note [2], l. 2. For the passage from the Vedadípa, see Weber's Yajur-Veda, vol. i. p. २, ll. 5, 9.

P. 20, note [2], l. 5. Respecting the index to the Rig-veda, see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 215 sq.

P. 21, l. 6. *above mentioned.* The Anukramaṇí is excerpted in full in both Müller's and Aufrecht's editions of the Rig-Veda.

P. 21, l. 17. Kakshívat's hymn is Rig-Veda, *maṇḍ.* i., hymn 125.

P. 21, l. 26. The passage from which this queer story of A'sanga is fabricated is Rig-Veda, viii. 1, 30–34.

P. 21, last line. The verses are Rig-Veda, viii. 2, 41; 3, 24; 4, 19; 5, 37; 6, 46. In the last passage, Colebrooke follows the commentator in translating *parśu* by "son of Paraśu," a wholly improbable interpretation.

P. 22, l. 4. Trasadasyu is called in the text (Rig-Veda, viii. 19, 36) simply the son of Purukutsa or Paurukutsi.

P. 22, li. 6, 7. As to Chitra and Varu, see Rig-Veda, viii. 21, 17–18; 24, 28.

Many of these, and other similar passages, are translated by Dr. Muir in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc., etc., vol. ii. (new series, 1866), pp. 272 sq.

P. 22, l. 10. Sindhudvípa's hymn is Rig-Veda, x. 9.

P. 22, l. 12. For a complete discussion of these hymns (Rig-Veda, x. 57–60) and of the legend put forward by the

commentators to explain them, as well as for a double version, one made according to the commentators, the other according to the true intent of the hymns, see Professor Müller, "The Hymns of the Gaupáyanas and the Legend of King Asamáti," in vol. ii. (new series, 1866), of the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. of G. B. and I. (pp. 426 sq.).

P. 22, l. 20. The Nábhánedishṭha hymn is Rig-Veda, x. 61; for the legend, see Dr. Haug's edition of the Aitareya Bráhmaṇa, text, pp. 121–2, and translation, pp. 341–2. The legend is translated in full by Müller, in his Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 423 sq.; it is also translated and discussed by Roth, in Zeitsch. d. Deutsch. Morg. Ges. vol. vi. (1852), pp. 243 sq.

P. 22, l. 27. Mándhátṛi's hymn is Rig-Veda, x. 134. The three other "royal authors" are said by the tradition to have composed, not each a hymn, but each a verse of a hymn of three verses, Rig-Veda, x. 179.

P. 23, note [2]. Müller (Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 152 sq.) holds a somewhat different view of the nomenclature of the divisions of the Nirukta, regarding the first three chapters of the "glossary" as the *nighaṇṭu*, the fourth as the *naigama*, the fifth as the *daivata*; while the remaining fourteen (of which the two last are a *pariśishṭa*, or later appendix) are a commentary on these. The work is published with notes, by Roth (Göttingen, 1852).

P. 24, l. 18. While it is beyond doubt that Colebrooke faithfully presents here the interpretation of the Hindu commentator whom he follows, his punctuation and his version seem, nevertheless, to do violence to the true meaning and connexion of the passage. The word *vá* (after *ekaiva*) means "or," and cannot be translated by "but"; its introduction marks the principal division of the paragraph, separating it into two alternative arguments, both leading to the same conclusion, expressed in the one case by *anyás tad-vibhútayaḥ*, in the other by *tad-vibhútayo 'nyá devatáḥ*. The introduction of a sentence laudatory of the *om* is wholly wanting in pertinence, and destroys the concinnity of the first argument. The assertion that the nominative *vyáhṛtayaḥ* is used for the genitive is such a one as the scholiasts only too often make, for the purpose of supporting their forced and false constructions; the substitution would be a soleecism, and is unsupported by the usage of any part of the Veda. Nor does it seem possible, in the connexion in which they stand, to separate *ity* and *evam* from one another after *súrya*.

The author of the Index, seeking to establish the virtually monotheistic doctrine of the Veda, conducts us to his desired conclusion by two alternative paths. In the first place, he admits three

representative deities, for the three divisions of the universe (earth, atmosphere, and sky), identifying their names with the *vyáhṛtis*, or mystic names of those divisions; he then pronounces Prajápati to be their sum and essence; as, by a familiar dogma (see, for example, the Praṇava and Nṛsiṅha Upanishads, in Weber's Ind. Stud. vol. ix. pp. 49, 90, etc.), the *om* is sum and essence of the *vyáhṛtis* and of the regions they represent—its *a* indicating *bhúr* or earth, its *u*, *bhuvaḥ* or atmosphere, its *m*, *svar* or sky. That is to say, as in *om* the *vyáhṛtis* are embraced and unified, so are the deities of the three regions in Prajápati. In the second place, he makes the Sun the great soul of the universe, in which all other deities are involved; founding himself, this time, simply on extracts from holy writ.

Translate, therefore, as follows:

"Three deities only, having as their spheres respectively earth, atmosphere, and sky, and known by the names Agni ['fire'], Váyu ['wind'], and Súrya ['sun'], being the *vyáhṛtis*, are proclaimed as separate; of them all, taken together, Prajápati is the om, having the nature of all the deities, or of the Supreme Being, of the *brahma*, or of the gods, of the Over-Soul: the others, having one and another sphere, are parts of this; for from a difference of action they come to have different appellations and praises. Or, there is only one deity, the Great Soul; it is called by the name Súrya ('sun'); for he is the soul of all beings. So it is said by the sage, 'the Sun is the soul of the moving and of the stationary' [Rig-Veda, i. 115, 1]. The other deities are parts of him. So also this is said by the sage; 'they call it Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni' [Rig-Veda, i. 164, 46]."

P. 24, l. 25. *from the creator.* The proper Vedic religion is not monotheistic, but a worship of the personified powers of Nature, and a purer and more primitive nature-religion than antiquity elsewhere offers us. In a few of the hymns, however, evidently of a later date, is to be seen the commencement of theosophic speculation, classifying, identifying, and abstracting, and catching glimpses of the unity of the creation and of its author. The earliest Hindu religion, like the latest, is polytheistic; but the first beginnings of Hindu philosophy point toward the recognition of one God, a recognition fully made in its later stages. For the Vedic mythology and religion, see especially a series of articles by Dr. Muir, in the first volumes (new series, 1864 sq.) of the Journ. Roy. As. Soc., and the fifth volume of his Original Sanskrit Texts, and other authorities there quoted or referred to.

P. 24, note [1], end. See the preceding note on the text.

P. 24, note [2]. There is no occasion for understanding *ṛshi* in any

other than in its natural and usual sense of "sage" here, any more than in the passage just preceding.

P. 25, note [1], l. 2. Of the planets, the sun and moon only are personified. The lesser planets are not noticed and mentioned in India until quite a late period. See Weber's Ind. Stud. ii. 238, and his Jyotisham (in Transactions of the Berlin Academy for 1862), p. 10, note 2.

P. 25, l. 17. The hymns here referred to are the last of the fifteenth chapter and the first of the sixteenth, or hymns 105 and 106, of the first *maṇḍala*. The former of them is ascribed to Trita or Kutsa, the latter to Kutsa only. As regards this and other legends, already or in the sequel referred to, as explaining the origin of the hymns, it must be noticed that they do not go back to the time of the hymns themselves, but are the figments, for the most part artificial and arbitrary, of a much later time; they are often of a character palpably incongruous and absurd.

P. 26, ll. 4, 8. The hymns referred to are Rig-Veda, i. 165 and 191; the latter is the last hymn in the *maṇḍala*, and one of a thoroughly Atharvan character.

P. 26, l. 14. Vasiṣṭha's prayer is Rig-Veda, vii. 50.

P. 26, l. 18. The *gáyatrí* hymn is Rig-Veda, iii. 62; the repetitions of the *gáyatrí* are at Sáma-Veda, ii. 812 (or II. vi. 3, 10, 1); White Yajur-Veda, iii. 35; Black Yajur-Veda, I. v. 6, 4, IV. i. 11, 1. The verse is not found in the Atharva-Veda.

P. 27, l. 5. No good and sufficient explanation of the peculiar sanctity attaching to this verse has ever been given; it is not made remarkable, either by thought or diction, among many other Vedic verses of similar tenor. Its meaning is a matter of some question, depending on the interpretation given to the verb in the second páda, *dhímahi*, whether "may we receive, gain, win," or "let us meditate." If the latter be correct, the correspondence of root and meaning between this verb and the following noun, *dhíyaḥ*, in the third páda, cannot be accidental, and should be regarded in translating: we must read "and may he inspire (quicken) our meditations (adoring or prayerful thoughts)." A more literal rendering than Colebrooke's of the whole passage, in the metre of the original, would run as follows:

7. "This excellent new praise of thee, oh Púshan, splendid, heavenly one! by us is chanted to thy name.

8. Do thou enjoy this song of mine; welcome my strength-imploring prayer, as bridegroom welcometh a spouse.

9. Who on each creature looks abroad, whose vision comprehends them all, that Púshan our protector be!

10. Of Savitar, the heavenly, that longed-for glory may we win! and may himself inspire our prayers!

11. The grace of heavenly Savitar, through our devotion seeking strength, of him, the generous, we implore.

12. To heavenly Savitar, the wise, with well-appointed offerings pay reverence, by devotion urged."

P. 27, note [1], l. 2. Sáyaṇa gives no less than four different explanations of the *gáyatrí*, and leaves his readers free choice as to which they will accept.

P. 27, l. 6. These two hymns are Rig-Veda, vii. 54, 55. The latter of them is translated by Aufrecht, in Weber's Indische Studien, vol. iv., p. 337 sq.; rejecting as unfounded figments the legends of the commentators, he regards it as an incantation used by a lover visiting his beloved by stealth at night. Compare also Roth, in Journ. Am. Oriental Society, vol. iii., pp. 336–7. Of the other hymn is again added a more exact version in the metre of the original:

1. "Lord of the dwelling! bid us welcome hither! freedom from harm grant us, and happy entrance; as we approach with prayer, accept it of us; propitious be to bipeds and to quadrupeds.

2. Lord of the dwelling! ever be our furth'rer; increase our wealth in kine and horses, Soma! Free from decay make us, within thy friendship; accept us as a father doth his children.

3. Lord of the dwelling! with a mighty following, a kindly, prosperous, may we be united. Protect our wealth, in winning and enjoying; and with your benefits protect us ever!"

The last *páda*, or quarter-verse, is the general refrain of the seventh *maṇḍala*.

P. 27, l. 29. The prayer to Rudra is Rig-Veda, vii. 59, 12.

P. 27, l. 31. The three rain-bringing hymns are Rig-Veda, vii. 101, 102, 103. The third is in fact a humorous or satirical hymn, in which the chanting of the Brahmans at their sacrifices is compared to the croaking of frogs in a marsh. It is translated by Müller, in his Anc. Sansk. Lit. (p. 494 sq.). See also especially Haug's Brahma und die Brahmanen, pp. 11, 12, 40–2.

P. 28, l. 5. These two hymns, addressed to *manyu*, "wrath, warlike rage," are Rig-Veda, x. 83, 84; Atharva-Veda, iv. 32, 31.

P. 28, l. 8. The long hymn of Súryá is Rig-Veda, x. 85. It is translated by Weber, in his Indische Studien, vol. v. p. 178. sq. Dakshiṇá and Juhú, called *Brahmajáyá*, "wife [not daughter] of Brahma," are the subjects of Rig-Veda, x. 107, 109.

P. 28, l. 15. Rig-Veda, x. 10. The substance of the hymn is here incorrectly reported. It is, in truth, Yamí (not Yamuná)

who tries to persuade Yama to form a union with her, which he, for moral reasons, steadfastly rejects. The two, according to Roth (Journ. Am. Or. Soc. vol. iii. p. 334 sq.), are the mythologic first pair of human beings, progenitors of the human race: so that the scruples of the hymn are rather overstrained and out of place. Müller (Lectures on the Science of Language, second series, 11th lecture) gives a different explanation of the myths concerning Yama. See also Muir, in Journ. Roy. As. Soc. etc., vol. i. (new series), pp. 287 sq., (and Original Sanskrit Texts, vol. v.), where a version of the hymn here referred to is given.

P. 28, note [3]. See p. 1095 of the edition of the Bṛhad-áraṇyaka in the Bibliotheca Indica.

P. 29, l. 20. Below is a closer version of this curious hymn (Rig-Veda, x. 125), in the original metre, which—as is the case with all the hymns here translated, excepting the first—is *trishṭubh* (*páda*, or quarter-verse, of eleven syllables), with occasional intermixture of *jagatí* (*páda* of twelve syllables). It is obviously meant as a kind of riddle; and that the Hindu diaskeuasts have rightly interpreted it, in conceiving it to be uttered by *Vách*, "speech," is excessively doubtful. Not a single trait in the self-description points distinctly to such a solution. Some parts of the hymn must remain of doubtful meaning, until a more acceptable general explanation is found for it. It occurs also in the Atharva-Veda (A. V. iv. 30), with different readings, which in one or two cases seem more original and genuine.

1. "I wander with the Vasus and the Rudras, I with the Ádityas and Viśvadevas; Mitra and Varuṇa I bear, together; Indra and Agni I, and both the Aśvins. 2. I bear the swelling and fermenting Soma, I bear up Twashṭar also, Púshan, Bhaga too: abundance I bestow upon the offerers, the zealous sacrificers, who the *soma* press. 3. I am the queen, the gatherer of riches, the knowing, first of those who own the off'ring: me have the gods thus variously divided, the stay of many, entering into many. 4. By me enjoyeth food he who discerneth, he who hath breath, he who what's spoken heareth. Those who are ignorant do dwell upon me. Hear, heard-of one! I speak what thou shouldst credit. 5. I, even I myself, this thing do utter, pleasing to gods, and pleasing, too, to mortals. Whomso I love, him I make formidable; him I make priest, him seer, him rich in wisdom. 6. 'Tis I who stretch the bow, fell Rudra's weapon, to slay religion-haters with his arrow; 'tis I, again, who make for men the conflict; I into both the earth and heaven have entered. 7. I in his head do bring to birth the father; my origin is in the sea, the waters: from thence I sally forth upon all beings; and

with my bulk I touch to yonder heaven. 8. I, even as the wind, am onward blowing, reaching and taking hold upon all beings; beyond the earth, and e'en beyond the heaven—of such extent became I with my greatness."

P. 29, l. 21. The hymn to night is Rig-Veda, x. 127; it is translated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, vol. iv. p. 423 sq. Those relative to the creation are Rig-Veda, x. 129, 130. Aghamarshaṇa's hymn is Rig-Veda, x. 190; its version is found later in this volume (p. 140 of the former edition).

The remarkable hymn translated on p. 30 has been repeatedly translated and explained; see Muir's Sanskrit Texts, vol. iv. p. 3 sq., and vol. v. p. 356 sq., and his article on Yama in Journ. Roy. As. Soc. vol. i. (1865), p. 345; also Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 559 sq., where is to be found a somewhat exaggerated estimate of its philosophic depth and significance.

Of the mystic hymn translated on p. 31, the following literal version will give a clearer idea.

1. "What off'ring was set up with warp-threads everywhere, stretched by the labours of a hundred gods and one—that do the Fathers weave upon who hither came: 'Weave forth! weave off!' say they, and sit about it, stretched. 2. The Male stretches it, spins it out; the Male One upon the firmament hath here outstretched it: these holding-pegs have set themselves upon the seat; the *sámans* they have made the shuttles for the woof. 3. What was the rule? the order? what the model? what the libation? what was the inclosure? what was the hymn? the chant? the recitation? when it, the god, by all the gods was offered. 4. The *gáyatrí* became Agni's companion; with *ushṇihá* was Savitar united; with *anushṭubh*, with chants, the mighty Soma; to Bṛhaspati's voice *bṛhatí* listened. 5. To Mitra-Varuṇa *virâj* resorted; *triṣhṭubh* became here daily share of Indra; *jagatí* into all the gods did enter; therewith have mortal sages been conformed. 6. Therewith conformed themselves the mortal sages, our fathers, when was made that ancient off'ring. With mind as eye, I think that I behold them, in ancient times that offering who offered. 7. With songs of praise and holy chants accompanied, with ritual rules, the sages seven of heavenly birth, steadfast the way of them of old regarding, as charioteers the reins, those rites have taken."

The meaning of certain words and phrases here is open to question, but the general idea of the hymn is clearly recognizable. Its subject is the primeval antitypic sacrifice, the model of all later human sacrifices, offered by the gods, with assignment of the seven sacred metres to separate divinities. And the performance of this

sacrifice, with its *nexus* of ceremonies, its contexture of acts and rules and songs, is, by a figure of frequent occurrence in the Vedic hymns and *brâhmaṇas*, compared to the setting up of a warp, and the weaving of a web from it.

Dr. Muir also gives a version of the hymn in his Sanskrit Texts, vol. iii. p. 277 sq.

P. 31, l. 29. The hymn from the White Yajus is the well-known *purusha*-hymn, Rig-Veda, x. 90; Váj.-Saṁhitá, xxxi. 1–16; Atharva-Veda, xix. 6. It is found translated below (at p. 167 of the former edition), also in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, v. 367 sq., and in Weber's Indische Studien, ix. 1 sq.

P. 32, l. 15. The Aitareya Bráhmaṇa is published, with translation and notes, by Dr. Martin Haug, under the patronage of the Government at Bombay (Bombay, 1863, 2 vols. 12mo.). It is wholly in prose.

P. 33, l. 17. For this statement of discordant opinions, see Dr. Haug's edition, vol. i. p. 197; vol. ii. p. 506. There is a very thorough discordance between Colebrooke's interpretation of the passage and that of Haug; but the advantage in point of accuracy is on the side of the former.

P. 33, l. 19. For Janamejaya's declaration, etc., see Haug's edition, vol. i. p. 201; vol. ii. p. 514.

P. 35, ll. 20, 29. The two long passages here translated are to be found in Haug's edition at vol. i. p. 203; vol. ii. p. 517: and vol. i. p. 208; vol. ii. p. 523.

P. 37, note [2], end. Dr. Haug's text and translation read *Dushyanta*. This and *Dushmanta*, however, are regarded as later forms of *Duḥshanta* or *Dushshanta*, which is to be presumed to be the true reading of the Bráhmaṇa text. Compare Weber, in Ind. Stud. vol. ix. p. 345.

P. 38, l. 16. A part of these verses about Bharata are also found in the Śatapatha-Bráhmaṇa (at XIII. v. 4, 11–14, p. 995 of Weber's edition: see Ind. Stud. vol. i. p. 199).

P. 38, l. 19. Read "Durmukha the Pánchála" in both places; and also "being no king," with Dr. Haug; the Sanskrit text would be the same in both cases, with the exception of the accent.

P. 38, note [1]. There seems to be no good reason for questioning the name *Maṣhṇára*.

P. 39, l. 32. See Dr. Haug's edition, vol. i. p. 213 sq.; vol. ii. p. 533 sq. There are many differences, of greater or less consequence, between the version of Dr. Haug and that of Colebrooke, but it was not worth while to point them out or discuss them in detail.

P. 41, l. 17. Ait. Br. vii. 34: see Dr. Haug's edition, vol. i. p. 192; vol. ii. p. 493.

P. 41, l. 26. Respecting the Aitareya Áraṇyaka, see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 335 sq., Weber's Ind. Lit. p. 47 sq.

P. 42, l. 5. The fourth, fifth, and sixth lectures of the Áraṇyaka are published as the Aitareya Upanishad in the collection of the Bibliotheca Indica, by Dr. Röer (Calcutta, 1850), as is also their translation (Calcutta, 1853).

P. 42, notes, l. 11. In the introduction to the 8th hymn of the 1st *maṇḍala*, vol. i. pp. 111–12 of Müller's edition.

P. 42, note [1], l. 4. Sankara's commentary on the Áraṇyaka, with Ánanda-Giri's gloss upon it, is given, along with the text of the Upanishad, in Dr. Röer's edition.

P. 46, l. 14. Vámadeva's verse is Rig-Veda, iv. 27, 1.

P. 48, ll. 1, 18. The Upanishad here spoken of forms the third book of the Kaushítaki-Áraṇyaka, which, as well as the Kaushítaki-Bráhmaṇa (also called Sánkháyana-Bráhmaṇa), is found in manuscript in the Berlin Library, forming part of the Chambers collection. See Weber, Ind. Lit. pp. 43 sq., 49 sq., Ind. Stud. vol. ii. p. 288 sq.; and Müller, Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 337 sq., 346 sq. The Kaushítaki-Upanishad is published, text, commentary, and translation, by Prof. Cowell, in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1863).

P. 48, l. 14. As to this paraphrase of Upanishads, see Weber, Ind. Lit. p. 94, note 1, and Ind. Stud. vol. i. p. 471.

P. 48, l. 30. For notice of the published edition of the White Yajurveda, see the note on p. 15, l. 20.

P. 49, l. 9. In the Mádhyandina text of the White Yajus, according to Weber (Ind. Lit. p. 102), are 303 *anuvákas*, and 1975 *kaṇḍiká*s.

P. 49, note [1]. Mahídhara's commentary, the *Vedadípa*, is published along with the text in Weber's edition of this Veda.

P. 49, note [3]. The root *yaj* means, rather, "to offer or sacrifice." *Yajus* means specifically "a ritual utterance," "a verse or phrase intended to be spoken by the *adhvaryu*-priest in the regular performance of the sacrifice."

P. 50, l. 21. As to the contents of the White Yajus, compare Weber, Ind. Lit. p. 102 sq. For details as to authorship, see Weber's edition, appendix, pp. li.–liv.

P. 51, l. 10. For the passage here translated, see Weber's edition, p. 859 sq.

P. 51, note [2]. The text cites, rather, the first words of three passages already given, which are here to be inserted, one after the other.

P. 52, l. 31. This "prayer to fire" is found on p. 798 of Weber's edition.

P. 53, note [1]. The sacrifice is declared identical with the year in *kaṇḍ.* 3–5 of *br.* 6 of the first *prapáṭhaka* in the second *káṇḍa* (p. 146 of Weber's edition) of the Bráhmaṇa.

P. 53, l. 23. The Íśá Upanishad, in the Káṇva recension, is published and translated by Dr. Röer, in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1850, 1853). The text was edited by Poley also (Bonn, 1844). Dr. Röer's text is accompanied by Sankara's comment, and Ánanda-Giri's gloss upon it. For Jones's translation, see his Works, vol. vi. p. 423 sq.

P. 53, last line. The Mádhyandina text of the Satapatha-Bráhmaṇa, with accompanying brief extracts from commentaries, fills the second volume of Weber's edition of the White Yajur-Veda (Berlin, 1855. 4to.).

P. 54, l. 15. These are the numbers belonging to the Mádhyandina version (but Weber states the *bráhmaṇas* as 438): for those belonging to the Káṇva recension, which is also extant, see Weber's Ind. Lit. p. 113.

P. 55, l. 2. For more special details respecting the contents of this Bráhmaṇa, and its relation to the Sanhitá, see Weber's Ind. Lit. p. 113 sq.

P. 56, l. 2. On human sacrifices in the ancient Hindu religion, see Wilson in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. vol. xiii. (1852), p. 96 sq., Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 419 sq., and especially Weber, in the Zeitsch. d. Deutsch. Morg. Gesellschaft, vol. xviii. (1864), p. 262 sq.

P. 56, l. 6. See Taittiríya-Sanhitá, VII. v. 25, 1. The description of the horse is found at the opening passage of the Bṛhad-Áraṇyaka Upanishad, according to the usual or Káṇva version. It and the next following *bráhmaṇa* are wanting in the Mádhyandina version, which is the one published by Weber complete.

P. 56, l. 26. The Bṛhad-Áraṇyaka is published in full, with Sankara's commentary, and Ánanda-Giri's gloss upon the latter, in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1849), by Dr. Röer; also a translation (Calcutta, 1856), by the same scholar. It was earlier printed by Poley (Bonn, 1844).

P. 57, l. 10. The passage here quoted is at the beginning of the second *bráhmaṇa:* p. 26 sq., in the edition in the Bibl. Indica; p. 12 of the translation. The true reconciliation of the discordance of doctrine referred to is to be sought in the entire independence and freedom of the two authorities, and the unsystematic character of ancient Hindu speculation on such matters.

P. 57, l. 23. For this account of the creation of beings, see p. 125 sq. of the edition in the Bibl. Indica; p. 62 sq. of the translation.

P. 58, l. 28. See Wilson's Vishṇu-Puráṇa, p. 51, n. 5 (or, in Dr. Hall's edition, vol. i., p. 104, n. 2).

P. 59, l. 10. As to Gárgya, see the Bṛhad-Áraṇyaka Upanishad, ch. II., br. 1–3; p. 334 sq. of the edition in the Bibl. Indica; p. 169 sq. translation.

P. 60, l. 3. This conversation is found at ch. II., br. 4: p. 444 sq. of the edition in the Bibl. Indica; p. 177 sq. of the translation. Müller also gives a version of the passage (Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 22 sq.). As is noticed below, the conversation is repeated, with little variation, in another part of the Upanishad (ch. IV., br. 5: pp. 920 and 242).

P. 61, l. 2. For the passage translated here, see II. iv. 10, or IV. v. 11; pp. 455 sq. and 926 of the edition in the Bibl. Indica; pp. 179 and 244 of the translation.

P. 61, l. 9. The story of Urvaśí is found at Satapatha-Bráhmaṇa, III. iv. 1. 22; XI. v. 1, 1 sq.; pp. 259 and 855 of Weber's edition.

P. 61, l. 27. Bṛhad-Áraṇyaka Upanishad, ch. II., br. 5: p. 477 sq. of the edition in the Bibl. Indica; p. 181 sq. of the translation. This section is called the *madhu-bráhmaṇam*, or "honey-section," and can hardly be claimed to have anything really to do with the unity of the soul.

P. 62, l. 2. The Mádhyandina lists are found at Satapatha-Bráhmaṇa, XIV. v. 5, 20–22, and vii. 3, 26–8 (pp. 1066–7 and 1093–4 of Weber's edition).

P. 62, note [1], l. 6. See pp. xi.–xii. of Haughton's edition. It is hardly necessary now to say that such an attempt as this of Jones's is vain. For comparative lists of teachers, from different sources, see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 435–45.

P. 62, l. 12. For Janaka's sacrifice, see p. 507 sq. of the edition, and p. 188 sq. of the translation.

P. 63, l. 7. Rather, "Śákalya the wiseacre (*vidagdha*)."

P. 64, l. 24. For the Mádhyandina list, see Satapatha-Bráhmaṇa, XIV. ix. 4. 30–33 (pp. 1108–9 of Weber's edition).

P. 65, l. 4. For the mention of Tura, see p. 35, bottom.

P. 65, l. 19. Nothing whatever of value, either for history or chronology, is to be derived from these legendary contemporaneities.

P. 65, l. 20. For the editions of the Black Yajur-Veda, see the note to p. 15, l. 20.

P. 65, l. 2 *infra*. The index referred to is the *anukramaṇí* to the Átreya text: see Weber's Ind. Stud. iii. 375 sq.

P. 66, l. 4. Not the syllables are numbered, but the *padas*, or independent words; of which just fifty are allotted to each subdivision of an *anuváka*, the division being made without any regard to the sense.

P. 66, note [3]. Aśvamedha prayers are found in the concluding sections of all the chapters of the seventh book, and in some of the sections of the preceding books: see the index, as given and explained by Weber.

P. 66, l. 29. As to these divine authors, see Weber's Ind. Stud. iii. 388 sq.

P. 67, l. 21. Rather, "It was spread out; it became broad."

P. 68, l. 20. For the Taittiríya Áraṇyaka, see Weber's Ind. Lit. p. 90 sq., Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 334 sq. It has been published in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1871).

P. 68, l. 29. The Taittiríya Upanishad is published in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica, the text, with Sankara's commentary and Ánanda-Giri's gloss (Calcutta, 1849), and the translation (Calcutta, 1853), both by Dr. Röer. Prof. Weber has also described and translated it: see Ind. Stud. vol. ii. pp. 207–36. See further, Müller's List of Upanishads, in Zeitsch. d. Deutsch. Morg. Ges. vol. xix. (1865), pp. 144 sq.

P. 68, l. 31. Respecting the Náráyaṇa Upanishads, see Weber, in Ind. Stud. ii. 78 sq., and Müller's List just cited. The relations and nomenclature of the different treatises are tolerably intricate.

P. 68, note [1]. The Taittiríya Bráhmaṇa—which is a continuation of the Taittiríya-Sanhitá, being composed, like it, of mixed *mantra* and *bráhmaṇa*—is published, along with Sáyaṇa's commentary, by Rájendralála Mitra, in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1855 sq.).

P. 70, l. 17. The extract here translated contains *anuvákas* 2–6 of the Bhṛgu-Vallí, the third division of the Upanishad; see the edition in the Bibl. Indica, p. 123 sq.

P. 70, l. 20. This prayer is the opening invocation of the Síkshá-Vallí, or first division of the Upanishad.

P. 71, l. 7. See Weber, in Ind. Stud. i. 273 sq.; Ind. Lit. p. 93 sq. The Maitri Upanishad is published by Prof. Cowell, in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1870), along with Rámatírtha's commentary, and an English version. Respecting the Maitráyaṇí-*śákhá*, see a previous note (that to p. 15, l. 20).

P. 71, l. 8. The *Kaṭha* Upanishad has been repeatedly published and translated, as by Rammohun Roy, Poley, and finally, in the Bibliotheca Indica, by Dr. Röer (text, Calcutta, 1850; translation, ibid., 1853: the text is accompanied by Sankara's commentary and

Ánanda-Giri's gloss). Weber furnishes an analysis, critical remarks, etc., in Ind. Stud. vol. ii. p. 195 sq. See also below, p. 87.

P. 71, l. 15. The Śvetáśvatara, a modern Upanishad, is also published and translated by Dr. Röer in the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1849, 1853). See further Weber, in Ind. Stud. vol. i. p. 420 sq.

P. 71, l. 19. For the editions, etc., of the Sáma-Veda, see a former note (that to p. 16, l. 16). The text, with Sáyaṇa's commentary, is also publishing in the Bibl. Indica.

P. 71, note [4]. This etymology of *sáman* is worthless. The origin of the word is obscure; but its earliest known meaning is simply "song" or "chant."

P. 72, l. 6. Respecting the Sáma-Veda and its literature, see especially Benfey's Introduction to his edition (Leipzig, 1848), and Weber, in his Ind. Stud. vol. i. p. 25 sq., and Ind. Lit. p. 61 sq.

P. 72, l. 8. The *árchika* is the first part of the *mantra*-text of this Veda, and contains 585 stanzas, mostly single unconnected *ṛch* from the hymns of the Rig-Veda, and arranged in a wholly external manner, by tens, fifties, and hundreds: the second part, called the *uttarárchika*, comprises 1225 stanzas, which are, nearly all of them, brief passages from Rig-Veda hymns (usually of three *ṛch* each). The *Grámageya* (or *Veya*) and *Áraṇya gánas* give the *árchika* in its form as chanted; the *Úha* and *Úhya gánas* do the same for the *uttarárchika*.

P. 73, l. 9. The contents of this index are excerpted in the appendices to Benfey's edition.

P. 74, note [1], end. These are the four *gánas* mentioned in the last note but one. See Weber's Catalogue of the Berlin Sanskrit MSS., Nos. 276–83.

P. 74, l. 14. The Adbhuta Bráhmaṇa has been published, with translation, by Weber, in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy for 1858, pp. 313–43.

P. 74, l. 24. Panchaviṅśa and Táṇḍya-Bráhmaṇa are the same work: the Shadviṅśa is a later appendix to it, a "twenty-sixth chapter"; and of this, the Adbhuta is the fifth or last book. Besides these two, six other little works, of a class not regarded as entitled to the name of Bráhmaṇa in the literatures of the other Vedas, are added to make up the number of eight. See Weber's Ind. Lit. p. 63 sq.; Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 317 sq. The Táṇḍya-Mahá-Bráhmaṇa is publishing in the Bibliotheca Indica, and now (1873) nearly complete.

P. 75, l. 6. The Chhándogya Upanishad is published by Dr. Röer, along with Sáyaṇa's commentary and Ánanda-Giri's gloss,

in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1850); also, a translation, by Rájendralála Mitra, in the same series (1862). The preceding two chapters of the Chhándogya-Bráhmaṇa are not known to be preserved. See Weber's analysis of its contents also in Ind. Stud. vol. i. p. 254 sq.

P. 75, note [2]. There would seem to be some misunderstanding as to this: the attribution by a Hindu commentator of so ancient and revered a work to a human author is hardly conceivable. A Hayagríva-Upanishad is found mentioned in Sir W. Elliot's list of Upanishads (Journ. As. Soc. Bengal, vol. xx. 1851, p. 607 sq.).

P. 75, l. 17. For this extract see above, p. 10, at the bottom.

P. 76, l. 3. The passage translated is Chhándogya-Upanishad v. 11–19, 24; pp. 362–81 of the edition in the Bibliotheca Indica.

P. 80, l. 1. The Talavakára-Upanishad, or the Kena Upanishad of the Sáma-Veda, is published by Dr. Röer, in the series of the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1850), along with Sankara's commentary and Ánanda-Giri's gloss. It is translated by the same author, in the same series (Calcutta, 1853), as it had been before by Rammohun Roy, Poley, Windischmann, etc. See Weber's Ind. Stud. vol. ii. p. 181 sq. The work from which it is said to be an extract is not known to be now in existence.

P. 80, l. 10. For notice of the edition of the Atharva-Veda, etc., see a previous note (to p. 16, l. 16.)

P. 80, l. 18. In the published text of the Atharva-Veda, the hymns are numbered as 731, and the verses as 5847: a more minute sub-division of some of the prose passages would add somewhat to these numbers. The sections are 111. The division into *prapáṭhakas* is subordinate to that into *káṇḍas*, and extends only through eighteen *káṇḍas*, dividing them into thirty-four *prapáṭhakas*.

P. 80, note [2]. For Jones's translation, see his Works, vol. i. p. 356 sq.

P. 81, l. 2. The hymn referred to is the well-known *purusha-súkta;* Rig-Veda, x. 90. [See *infra*, pp. 167, 309 of the old ed.]

P. 81, l. 12. It is very doubtful whether the passage referred to contains any allusion to the solstice. It reads, "May Maghá [grant] me *ayana*," i.e. "progress." The word *ayana* also denotes the sun's progress, northward or southward respectively, from solstice to solstice, and finally (by ellipsis for *ayanánta*, "end of the *ayana* or progress") the solstice itself. It is not necessary to look for anything but the primitive and natural meaning of the term in the hymn in question. But even if a reference to the solstice, or to the commencement of the sun's southward progress, be seen in it, nothing more definite could be implied than that the movement was

regarded as beginning somewhere in Maghá. The asterism Maghá (*α* Leonis, etc., "the Sickle") is at just a quadrant's distance from the asterism Kṛttiká (*η* Tauri, etc., "the Pleiades").

P. 81, l. 20. The nineteenth *káṇḍa* of the Atharva-Veda, in which occurs the hymn here treated of, is a later appendage to the body of the text, a sort of *parišishṭa:* as regards this particular hymn, it is of course impossible to say how much more ancient it may be than the time when it was gathered up with the rest, and tacked on to the collection. But no chronological date derived from it is capable of being carried, in other than a very loosely approximative way, to the main body of the Veda.

P. 81, l. 30. This would answer as a loose version of any of the verses from the fifth verse of the 28th hymn to the end of the 29th. The first of them reads, more literally: "Split, O *darbha,* my enemies! split those who fight against me! split all who are inimical to me! split my haters, O gem!" The verb changes in each verse, the rest of the imprecation remaining the same.

P. 82, l. 7. For more particular descriptions of the Atharva-Veda, see Roth, zur Lit. und Geschichte des Weda, pp. 12 sq., 37 sq. (with specimens); and Prof. Whitney, in Journ. Am. Or. Soc. vol. iii. p. 306 sq.; vol. iv. p. 254 sq. (or Oriental and Linguistic Studies, p. 18 sq.) See also a version of the fifteenth *káṇḍa,* by Dr. Aufrecht, in Weber's Ind. Stud. (vol. i. pp. 121–40), and of the first *káṇḍa,* by Weber (ibid. vol. iv. pp. 393–430), and of the second *káṇḍa,* by the same (Monatsbericht of the Berlin Academy, for June, 1870).

P. 82, l. 8. On the Gopatha-Bráhmaṇa, and its appendix, the Uttara-Bráhmaṇa, see Müller, Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 445 sq. The text of both is now published, in the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1872).

P. 83, l. 2. The number of works claiming to be Upanishads, and among which no distinct line can be drawn, separating those entitled from those not entitled to the appellation, is found to be more considerable than is here stated. Weber (Ind. Stud. i. 247 sq.) reckoned about a hundred; Sir W. Elliot (Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. xx. [1851], p. 607 sq.) gives a list of 108; Müller (Zeitsch. d. Deutsch. Morg. Ges. xix. (1865), 137 sq.), enumerates 149; Haug (Brahma und die Brahmanen, p. 29) gives the names of 101. For further expositions of the character of the Upanishads, and their relations to the rest of the Vedic literature, see those authorities; also Dr. Röer, in his prefaces to his various translations of them.

P. 83, l. 17. The Hindu etymologies of the word *upanishad* are

all false. Its true original meaning is simply "a sitting down by," as an act of reverent and submissive attention on the part of a pupil to his instructor, or the like: hence, through the meaning of "a session," "a lecture," it has come to signify the religious instruction imparted at such a session and reverently received by the pupil:—or else, as Müller suggests (Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 318–19), it has passed from the significations of "submissive listening" and "implicit faith" to that of "divinely revealed truth."

P. 83, note [2]. For these derivations, see Röer's editions of the Bṛhad-Áraṇyaka and Káṭhaka, with their commentaries, at pp. 2–3 of the former, p. 73 of the latter.

P. 84, l. 2. Origination by extraction from a Bráhmaṇa is not to be presumed for the Atharvan Upanishads: they are independent treatises or compilations.

P. 84, l. 9. The Muṇḍaka is published, with its double commentary, and translated, by Dr. Röer, in the Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1850, 1853). Weber analyzes it in Ind. Stud. vol. i. pp. 279–98.

P. 85, l. 6. This closing sentence, beginning with "also the Itihása," is wanting in Dr. Röer's text, but is found in that of Poley (Bonn, 1844). See Weber, ibid. p. 281.

P. 85, l. 23. The Praśna is published and translated by Dr. Röer, in the same volumes with the Muṇḍaka, and is analyzed by Weber in Ind. Stud. vol. i. pp. 439–56.

P. 86, l. 7. Many of these Upanishads, as well as of the others later only mentioned by name in the marginal notes, are described and analyzed by Weber, in the first two and the ninth volumes of the Indische Studien. See also the notes upon them, in Müller's List, referred to above. The sixth and eighth, and the seventeenth to the twenty-fifth, inclusive, are publishing in the Bibl. Indica, with Náráyaṇa's commentary, under the name of "The Atharvaṇa Upanishads."

P. 86, l. 8. The Máṇḍúkya Upanishad, with Gauḍapáda's exposition, and the double comment of Śankara and Ánanda-Giri on both, is published and translated by Dr. Röer, in the same volumes with the two last noticed. For Weber's analysis, see Ind. Stud. vol. ii. pp. 100–9.

P. 86, note [2]. The sixth and seventh Upanishads are to be distinguished as Atharva-śiras and Atharva-śikhá, according to Weber (Ind. Stud. i. 249); but the same authority mentions a second Atharva-śiras (ibid. ii. 53, note * *).

P. 86, l. 20. The Nṛsiṁha-Tápaníya Upanishad is published, translated, and commented by Weber, in Ind. Stud. vol. ix. pp.

53 sq. As to the name Nṛisiṁha, see especially p. 63 sq. The text, with Śaṅkara's commentary, is also published in the Bibl. Indica (Calcutta, 1871).

P. 87, l. 8. See above, p. 71. For the relations of the Kaṭha Upanishad, see Weber's Ind. Stud. vol. ii. pp. 195–97. The account of its origin given in the marginal note is not ratified by later scholars. It is altogether probable that Colebrooke here refers to that version of the story of Nachiketas which is given in the Taittiríya-Bráhmaṇa (III. xi. 8; vol. ii., p. 263 sq. of the edition in the Bibliotheca Indica), and which is not identical with the Upanishad, although probably, as remarked by Weber (Ind. Lit. p. 90), the original out of which the latter has grown. The last three *prapáṭhakas* of the Taittiríya-Bráhmaṇa, with certain additions (ibid. p. 89), are ascribed to the sage Kaṭha.

P. 87, l. 24. As to the Kena Upanishad, see above, p. 80.

P. 88, l. 3. Respecting the Náráyaṇa Upanishads, see Weber's Ind. Stud. vol. i. pp. 380–81, and vol. ii. p. 78 sq.

P. 94, l. 10. See Asiatic Researches, vol. viii.

P. 94, l. 15. As to the authorship of the Bhágavata Puráṇa, see Wilson's Preface to the Vishṇu Puráṇa (Hall's edition, vol. i. pp. xliv.–li.).

P. 94, l. 26. This whole argument, pertinent and valuable at the time when it was written, is now happily become antiquated, since it enters into the mind of no sane person at present to dispute that kind and degree of authority in the Vedas which is here claimed for them.

P. 95, l. 25. Respecting Vyása, see the note to p. 9, l. 14.

P. 96, l. 5. The time of production of the Veda is not less uncertain now than when this sentence was written. It can only be maintained as probable that the period of the oldest hymns, constituting the mass of the Rig-Veda, was somewhere between 2000 and 1000 B.C. The determination is founded altogether upon considerations of a general character, incapable of leading to any definite date: such as the history of Indian language and literature, and the obvious antecedence of the conditions represented in the hymns to the development of the Bráhmanic religion and polity.

P. 96, l. 6. From evidences of the character here alluded to it has been concluded that the north-western part of India, the Penjab and the region yet further west, was the chief place of origin of the Vedic hymns.

P. 96, l. 11. It is indeed true that the literature of each Veda must contain directions respecting the times of sacrifice. But only one Jyotisha treatise is known to be, or to have been, in existence;

of it, however, are found two somewhat different versions, the one claimed to belong to the Rig-Veda, the other to the Yajur-Veda. Both are published together, by Weber, in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy for 1862 (pp. 1–130), accompanied by a partial translation, and extracts from the only commentary known (see, respecting it, the next following note). The date and value of this little treatise, and its relations to the Vedic ceremonial, are still matters of great obscurity. Its special subject is the *yuga*, or lustrum, which is made to begin at the winter solstice, and to consist of 1830 days, or of sixty solar months, sixty-one *sávana*, sixty-two lunar, or sixty-seven lunar-sidereal months. This is equivalent to five years of twelve months, with an extra month, all of thirty days each; and such a reckoning some of the oldest Vedic references seem to imply: but the reckoning of the Jyotisha is lunar, and its period is filled up in the manner explained in the text, by the insertion of a lunar month in the first half of the third year, and another in the last half of the fifth. But this *yuga* is no recognized and familiar period in any part of the Vedic ceremonial literature, nor do the practical rules which the treatise contains find there their application and explanation; on the contrary, they are, for the most part, insoluble riddles to the learned editor. As little is the cycle one which could be continuously used in chronological or ceremonial reckoning: its valuation of the year (366 days) is so grossly wrong that but a few repetitions of it would thoroughly dislocate and embroil the relations of the lunar and solar reckonings.

P. 96, note [1]. The commentary here referred to belongs to the Yajus recension, and is by Somákara (as Colebrooke has himself noted in another place: see vol. ii. of the present ed., p. 58, note. Seshanága is named in the colophon of the commentary only, and not as its author, but as author of the Jyotisha itself. The latter, however, in parts of its own text (not recognized as such by the commentator: see Weber's edition, p. 8), ascribes itself to Lagadha or Lagata.

P. 97, l. 1. The treatise makes no provision whatever for the correction here referred to: its apparent assumption is that the reckoning is exact, and that the periods will go on to follow one another correctly, without further trouble.

P. 97, l. 9. The Jyotisha does not teach any division of the hour (*muhúrta*) into sixtieths, but only into half-hours, or sixtieths of a day (*nádiká*), and into twentieths (*kalá:* of which, more exactly, $20\frac{1}{10}$ equal a *muhúrta*). See Weber's edition, pp. 104–5.

P. 97, l. 10. The construction of a water-clock is hinted at, rather than taught. See Weber's edition, p. 78 sq.

P. 97, l. 15. The Jyotisha contains, indeed, certain elements of chronological reckoning which are found persistent in the Hindu methods of every period; but these latter, in their modern forms, cannot be said to be derived from the Jyotisha, or in any manner dependent upon it. Nor is the history of development of the great astronomical cycles so clear as the expressions here used would lead us to suppose.

P. 97, l. 24. The passage quoted includes vv. 6–8 of the Yajus text, 5–7 of the Rik text: see Weber's edition, p. 26 sq. The passage is also quoted, translated, and commented by Müller, in his Preface to the fourth volume of his edition of the Rig-Veda (p. xxiii.).

P. 98, l. 7. Not the "season," but the "month" Mágha: *mágha* and *tapas* being names of the same month according to two different systems of nomenclature.

P. 98, note [1]. The fact of chief importance is plain: viz. that six *muhúrtas*, or one-fifth of an entire day, is the difference between the longest and the shortest day or night. Such a difference does not suit the latitude of the central parts of India, but only that of its extreme north-western corner. See Weber's Essay on the Nakshatras in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy for 1861, pp. 360 sq., 400; Müller's Preface, as above, p. lxx.; and Prof. Whitney in Journ. Am. Or. Soc. vol. viii. p. 63 sq.

P. 98, l. 25. The deities of the *nakshatras* are given in vv. 32–34; vv. 25–7 of the Rik version: see Weber's edition, p. 94 sq.

P. 98, last line. The passage defining the moon's place is verse 10 of the Yajus version, verse 9 of the Rik: see Weber, p. 32 sq. See also Müller's Preface, as above, pp. xxiv., lxxxiii. sq.

P. 99, l. 10. How this date was arrived at, and what is its value and authority, are questions which have called forth not a little inquiry and controversy; and it is greatly to be regretted that Colebrooke did not give at least a hint of the process by which it was obtained.

In discussing the subject, the first thing to be determined is, what points in the heavens are intended by the author of the Jyotisha, when he speaks of the beginning of Dhanishṭhá and the middle of Áśleshá. This is no easy task. In the modern Hindu astronomy (founded on the Greek, and flourishing especially in the fifth and following centuries after Christ—see the astronomical articles of the next volume, and the notes upon them), the twenty-seven-fold division of the ecliptic has the faint star ζ Piscium (marking the vernal equinox of about A.D. 570, and apparently selected for that reason) as its initial point; and the limits of the twenty-sevenths, or asterismal

portions, succeed one another at distances of 13⅓° apart, reckoning from that point. If, then, we were certain that the star in question formed the actual, as it does the theoretical, basis of the division, we should know precisely what points a modern Hindu astronomer intended, when he spoke of any part of Dhanishṭhá or Áśleshá. But where the Siddhántas or astronomical text-books treat of the lunar asterisms, they define by astronomical co-ordinates the position of one star in each asterism; and these defined positions, when reduced to longitudes and latitudes, after our fashion, are all found more or less discordant with one another and with the initial point: the discordances of longitude ranging up to about 5½°, while the errors of latitude are about twice as great (for the details, see Prof. Whitney's notes to the translation of the Súrya-siddhánta, in Journ. Am. Or. Soc., vol. vi. p. 355; or p. 211 of the separate edition). Hence, if we assume each position in succession to be correct, and its star the real basis of the system of division, we shall fix the limits of the asterisms in twenty-seven different places, and find as many different situations for the "beginning of Dhanishṭhá" and "middle of Áśleshá"—each yielding, of course, a different date as that of the absolute correctness of the Jyotisha observation. And the extreme difference of the dates so deduced would be just about four centuries (that is to say, the fourteenth century B.C. from the asterism Chitrá and some others, and the tenth from Viśákhá and one other). He, therefore, who should attempt to draw a date from a statement like that of the Jyotisha, even as made by a modern Hindu astronomer, would need to find out in what manner the determination was made, and its result located in the sky, before deciding what date to infer from it within a period of at least four hundred years. This condition of things has not been duly considered by the various scholars who have dealt with the Jyotisha datum. Thus, Archdeacon Pratt (in the Journal of the As. Soc. of Bengal for 1862 [vol. xxxi.] p. 49 sq.; the article is reproduced in Müller's Preface to vol. iv. of his edition of the Rig-Veda, p. xxvi. sq.) has selected *a* Leonis (Regulus), the junction-star of the asterism Maghá, as the basis of his calculation, and has derived from it the date 1181 B.C.—a result differing by two centuries from Colebrooke's. The choice of this star is, indeed, recommended by many circumstances: it is a favourable subject of observation, as being a very brilliant star, and situated close upon the ecliptic; it is in the next asterism to Áśleshá, the assigned place of one of the solstices; all the Hindu authorities are agreed as regards the definition of its position; and finally, its error of position, as compared with the initial point of the system,

is less than a degree, and is quite nearly equivalent to the general average of error of all the defined stars, as compared with the same point. Nevertheless, even these favouring considerations do not justify the picking out of a single one among the defined stars, to the neglect of all the rest; and it does not appear from Mr. Pratt's paper that he was aware of them all, or made his choice deliberately and intelligently in view of them.

Davis, one of the earliest and most eminent of the students of Hindu astronomy, appears (as is pointed out by Sir T. E. Colebrooke, in Journ. Roy. As. Soc. vol. i. [new series, 1865], pp. 332 sq.) to have selected in like manner the junction-star of Chitrá, *a* Virginis or Spica (see As. Researches, vol. iii. p. 225, and vol. v. p. 288), deriving from it the date 1391 B.C. This was a decidedly less happy choice; for, though the star in question is also of the first magnitude, and near the ecliptic, its defined position (as given by the Súrya-Siddhánta and adopted by Davis) exhibits the extreme of discordance, in one direction, with those of the other stars; and, what is of yet more consequence, the Siddhántas differ, in respect to the longitude which they assign to it, to the very considerable amount of three degrees—which would make a difference of more than two centuries in the date derived from it. For these two reasons, there is hardly another star in the series which would not better answer the purposes of the calculator.

So far, now, as at present appears, Colebrooke followed the example of Davis, and founded his process upon the Súrya-Siddhánta's position of Chitrá. This has been made probable by Sir T. E. Colebrooke (in the article quoted above), by means of evidence extracted from his papers: and, indeed, the accordance of the date given by him with that of Davis would naturally lead us to adopt the same explanation.

There is, however, another possible way of accounting for this date. If we suppose Colebrooke to have assumed that the difference in the position of the equinox recognized by the two Hindu systems —the ancient, with Kṛttiká as its first asterism, and the modern, with Aśviní in the same position—was two whole asterisms, or 26° 40′, we shall see that he would thus also have arrived at about the middle of the fourteenth century B.C. as the date of the older system. This was put forward by Prof. Whitney in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. vol. i. (new series, 1865), p. 321 sq., as a conjectural explanation of Colebrooke's date. It would involve, it is true, a slight departure from the strict letter of the Jyotisha, since the location of the solstices made by the latter implies that the vernal equinox is at the end of the third quarter of Bharaṇí, instead of at

the beginning of Kṛttiká. But, as is pointed out in the article referred to, Colebrooke might have regarded this as a mere looseness of statement, upon which no stress need be laid, when coupled with the recognition in the same treatise of Kṛttiká as first asterism—a position to which it was no longer entitled, if the vernal equinox were contained in Bharaṇí. This explanation is doubtless less probable than the other; yet it need not be altogether overlooked; nor does it ascribe to Colebrooke the taking of any undue liberties with his authorities.

By far the most serious error, however, underlying all these and other similar calculations, yet remains to be pointed out. They assume unquestioningly two things respecting the ancient Hindus of the period represented by the Jyotisha: 1st, that they had a precise determination of the limits of their asterisms; and 2nd, that these limits precisely coincided with those of the later system. Now we have no good reason for supposing either the one or the other of these things to be true. We must look upon the asterisms as having been, in their inception, simply a series of twenty-seven constellations bordering upon the moon's track, selected, in view of their distribution and their conspicuousness combined, to mark the successive daily steps of her progress through the heavens. In idea, they divided her path into so many equal portions; but it was in the nature of things impossible practically to realize this idea. No Hindu of the olden time, however skilful, could have determined for himself, or pointed out to others, where was the precise end of any one twenty-seventh and the beginning of the next. Indeed, the very attempt to do so belongs to an era of scientific impulses, instruments, and methods, whereof we discern no trace in India until it has felt the influence of Greece. The asterismal "portions" of the ancient system were nothing more than parts of the moon's path, as nearly equal as the unassisted eye could measure them, lying adjacent to the asterisms which marked and denominated them; he who employed them knew well enough that the "beginning of Dhanishṭhá" and the "middle of Áśleshá" were, by the theory of the method of division, opposite points in the sky; but he could not have found either point, reckoning by equal twenty-sevenths from a definite initial point, otherwise than in a rudely approximative way.

But again, even if we suppose the limits of the ancient system of division to have been capable of as exact definition as those of the modern, we have no right to take for granted that the two would coincide. The starting-point of the later division is determined by the position of the vernal equinox in the sixth century of our era—

a point which had a value at a period when the modern science was assuming its shape, but was of no particular account to the ancient science. The considerations have yet to be discovered and pointed out which should lead to the identification of any precise spot as the starting-place of the old asterismal division. And, if our view of the original character of the system, given above, be correct, such considerations will never be found; the limits of its asterisms will never admit of even a near determination. From the fact that Kṛttiká is the first asterism of its series, we can only infer that, at the time of its establishment, the vernal equinox was supposed to be in the vicinity of the Pleiades—we cannot even say whether within the limits of an arc of 13⅓° adjacent to that constellation.

When, then, we combine the two sources of uncertainty already set forth,—on the one hand, the inaccuracy of even the modern Hindu measurements, giving a range of possible error amounting to four centuries; and, on the other hand, our ignorance of the comparative situation of the ancient division-lines, and our presumption that there never were any such admitting of precise location,—it must appear evident that the attempt to point out with definiteness the points on the ecliptic to which the description of the Jyotisha shall be understood as applying is of the most hazardous character. But in estimating the value of the Jyotisha datum, we need farther to take into account the difficulty of the observation it records. The place of the equinox has to be determined by indirect and roundabout methods, by observations and combinations and inferences which lie quite out of the power of men unskilled in astronomical science—which, in the hands of any people that preceded the Greeks, would not be likely to come very near the truth. We are far, as yet, from fully understanding the early astronomy of India: but nothing that we know of the dispositions and capacities of either the ancient or modern Hindus, or of the astronomical work which they have done, gives us reason to believe that they would have clearly grasped the conditions of the problem here in question, and solved it successfully. We must even regard it as for the present doubtful whether they solved it at all; whether they did not get the observation, and even derive the asterisms themselves, from some other people.

Making due allowance for this additional source of doubt, we shall see clearly that no definite date, and especially no date applicable to a determination of the chronology of ancient Hindu literature, can be extracted from the record we are discussing. It is difficult to make a valuation in figures of elements so indefinite;

but we should say that a thousand years would be a period rather too short than too long to cover all the uncertainties involved.

As is pointed out by Sir T. E. Colebrooke in the note already referred to, the author has, in other of his writings, recognized the uncertain character of the astronomical data afforded by the ancient Hindu works, and the impossibility of deriving exact dates from them. Had his design in publishing his Essays been to make anything more than a collection and unaltered reprint of them, he would probably have guarded, by a note at this point, against too strict a construction of his statement, or too confident an inference from it.

It remains only to apologize for the extreme length to which this note has been allowed to extend itself—a length excusable only by the interest of the subject discussed, and the intricacy of the conditions involved. Some of the points here touched upon are more fully treated in the paper by Prof. Whitney in vol. i. of the Journ. Roy. As. Soc., already more than once referred to. For the asterismal system and its relations, see also the Essay "On the Indian and Arabian Divisions of the Zodiac," in the next volume: and, among later discussions, especially Biot's Recherches sur l'Astronomie Indienne et l'Astronomie Chinoise (Paris, 1862; made up of articles originally published in the Journal des Savants for 1839–40, 1859–1861); Prof. Whitney's notes to the eighth chapter of the translation of the Súrya Siddhánta, published by the American Oriental Society (their Journal, vol. vi., 1860), and his articles in a later volume of the Society's Journal (vol. viii., 1866); and Weber's articles on the Vedic notices of the *nakshatras*, in the Berlin Academy's Transactions for 1860–61.

P. 99, l. 25. The Ráma-Tápaníya Upanishad is published, translated, and commented by Weber, in Trans. Berlin Acad. for 1864, p. 271 sq. The Gopála-Tápaníya is published, with Viśveśvara's commentary, in the Bibl. Indica (Calcutta, 1870).

P. 99, l. 29. For the summary referred to, see Weber, as above, p. 286.

P. 100, l. 4. Weber (as above, p. 271) calls the *tápaníya* Upanishads "the latest runners which have attached themselves as parasites to the branches of the Veda-tree." But he pronounces the *Nṛsiṅha-tápaníya*, the oldest of them, to be at least as early as the seventh century of our era. As to the age of the worship of Ráma, see the same authority, at p. 275 sq.

P. 100, l. 18. For the character of the religion represented in the earliest parts of the Vedas, see previous notes: thus, for their monotheism, the note to p. 24, l. 25; for the worship of stars and planets, the note to p. 25, marg. note [1]. Of the grand triad of

gods of the later religion, Brahman is no divinity in the Veda; Vishṇu is not at all prominent; the name Śiva is not known, and Rudra, the nearest correspondent of the modern Śiva, is of quite a different character from the latter. See Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts, vols. iv. v., and the same scholar's articles on the Vedic Theogony and Mythology, in Journ. Roy. As. Soc. vols. i. ii.

P. 101, l. 13. Respecting the Átmabodha or Átmaprabodha Upanishad, see Weber's Ind. Stud. vol. ii. p. 8 sq.

P. 101, note *. The Sundarí Upanishad is identified by Weber with the Tripurá; see his Ráma-tápaníya Upanishad, as above, p. 272.

P. 102, end. As was altogether natural in the case of one who was the first investigator in so wide and difficult a field, and hence compelled to rely in part upon Hindu commentators and Hindu assistants, Colebrooke failed to classify distinctly in his own mind the enormous mass of works included under the name *Veda*, and to apprehend the relative value of the different parts of it; he therefore did not fully appreciate the transcendent importance of the original hymn-collections (especially the Rig-Veda), the nuclei about which the whole literature had grown up, as containing the germs of the whole after-development of Indian religion and polity, which are unintelligible without their aid—as, moreover, illustrating a phase of human history of a rare and most instructive primitiveness, and as casting light upon the mythologies of other races, proved by the evidence of language to belong to the same great family. Had it been otherwise, he would have been careful not to put into his closing paragraph words which sound so much like a discouragement to other scholars from following where he had led the way; he would rather have earnestly commended to them the diligent study of works which constitute, in their bearing upon the history both of India and of Europe, the most interesting and repaying portion of all the Hindu literature.

III.

ON THE DUTIES OF A FAITHFUL HINDU WIDOW.[1]

[From the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. iv. pp. 209—219. *Calcutta*, 1795. 4to.]

[114] While the light which the labours of the Asiatic Society have thrown on the sciences and religion of the Hindus has drawn the attention of the literary world to that subject, the hint thrown out by the President for rejecting the authority of every publication preceding the translation of the *Gitá* does not appear to have made sufficient impression. Several late compilations in Europe betray great want of judgment in the selection of authorities; and their motley dress of true and false colours tends to perpetuate error; for this reason it seems necessary on every topic to revert to original authorities, for the purpose of cancelling error or verifying facts already published; and this object will no way be more readily attained than by the communication of detached essays on each topic, as it may present itself to the Orientalist in the progress of his researches.

From this or any other motive for indulgence, should the following authorities from Sanskrit books be thought worthy of a place in the next volume of the Society's Transactions, I shall be rewarded for the pains taken in collecting them.

[1] [On this paper, cf. Prof. Wilson's Essay on the supposed Vaidik authority for the burning of Hindu widows, and Raja Rádhákánt Deb's remarks, originally published in the Journ. R.A.S., vols. xvi., xvii.; and republished in Wilson's works, vol. ii. pp. 270–309; Prof. Roth, Zeitschr. d. D. M. G., vol. viii.; Prof. Max Müller, *ibid.* vol. ix. Cf. also Dr. Hall, Journ. R.A.S., 1867, and Prof. Müller, *Chips*, vol. ii. (2nd ed.), p. 35.]

'Having first bathed, the widow, dressed in two clean gar-'ments, and holding some *kuśa* grass, sips water from the 'palm of her hand. Bearing *kuśa* and *tila*[1] on her hand, she 'looks towards the east or north, while the *Bráh*[115]*maṇa* 'utters the mystic word *Om*. Bowing to Náráyaṇa, she next 'declares:[2] "On this month, so named in such a *paksha*, on 'such a *tithi*, I (naming herself and her family[3]) that I may 'meet Arundhatí[4] and reside in *Swarga;* that the years of 'my stay may be numerous as the hairs on the human body; 'that I may enjoy with my husband the felicity of heaven, 'and sanctify my paternal and maternal progenitors, and the 'ancestry of my husband's father; that landed by the *Ap-'saraśas*, I may be happy with my lord, through the reigns 'of fourteen *Indras;* that expiation be made for my husband's 'offences, whether he has killed a *Bráhmaṇa*, broken the 'ties of gratitude, or murdered his friend, thus I ascend my 'husband's burning pile. I call on you, ye guardians of the 'eight regions of the world; Sun and Moon! Air, Fire, 'Ether,[5] Earth, and Water! My own soul! Yama! 'Day, Night, and Twilight! And thou, Conscience, bear 'witness: I follow my husband's corpse on the funeral pile."'[6]

[116] 'Having repeated the *Sankalpa*, she walks thrice 'round the pile; and the *Bráhmaṇa* utters the following '*mantras*:

[1] *Sesamum.* [2] This declaration is called the *Sankalpa.*

[3] *Gotra*, the family or race. Four great families of *Bráhmaṇas* are now extant, and have branched into many distinct races. Since the memorable massacre of the *Kshatriyas*, by Paraśu-Ráma, the *Kshatriyas* describe themselves from the same *Gotras* as the *Bráhmaṇas.* [For the Gotras, cf. Müller's *Ancient Sansk. Lit.* pp. 379–388.]

[4] Wife of *Vasishṭha.* [5] *Ákáśa.*

[6] In several publications the woman has been described as placing herself on the pile before it be lighted; but the ritual quoted is conformable to the text of the *Bhágavata.*

"When the corpse is about to be consumed in the *sahoṭaja*, the faithful wife who stood without, rushes on the fire."—Nárada to Yudhishṭhira, announcing the death and funeral of Dhṛitaráshṭra. See *Bhágavata*, book i., ch. 13.

The *sahoṭaja* is a cabin of grass or leaves, sometimes erected on the funeral pile. "The shed on the funeral pile of a *Muni* is [called] *parṇoṭaja* and *sahoṭaja*." See the vocabulary entitled *Hárávalí.*

'"*Om!* Let these women, not to be widowed, good wives, 'adorned with collyrium, holding clarified butter, consign 'themselves to the fire. Immortal, not childless, nor hus- 'bandless, well adorned with gems, let them pass into fire, 'whose original element is water." (From the *Rigveda.*)[1]

'"*Om!* Let these faithful wives, pure, beautiful, commit 'themselves to the fire, with their husband's corpse."

(A *Pauránika mantra.*)

'With this benediction, and uttering the mystic *Namo* '*Namaḥ*, she ascends the flaming pile.'

While the prescribed ceremonies are performed by the widow, the son, or other near kinsman, of the deceased, applies the first torch, with the forms directed for funeral rites in the *Gṛihya*,[2] by which his tribe is governed.

The *Sankalpa* is evidently formed on the words of Angiras:

"The wife who commits herself to the flames with her hus- "band's corpse shall equal Arundhatí, and reside in *Swarga;*

"Accompanying her husband, she shall reside so long in "*Swarga* as are the thirty-five millions of hairs on the human "body.

"As the snake-catcher forcibly drags the serpent from his "earth, so, bearing her husband [from hell], with him she "shall enjoy heavenly bliss.

"Dying with her husband, she sanctifies her maternal and "paternal ancestors; and the ancestry of him to whom she "gave her virginity.

[117] "Such a wife, adoring her husband, in celestial "felicity with him, greatest, most admired,[3] with him shall "enjoy the delights of heaven, while fourteen Indras reign.

[1] [On this memorable verse, cf. the authorities previously mentioned, and also Bábú Rájendralála Mitra, Journ. B.A.S., 1870, pp. 257–262.]

[2] Extracts or compilations from the sacred books, containing the particular forms for religious ceremonies, to be observed by the race or family for whom that portion of the sacred writings has been adopted, which composes their *Gṛihya*.

[3] The word in the text is expounded "lauded by the choirs of heaven, *Gandharvas*," etc.

"Though her husband had killed a *Bráhmaṇa*,[1] broken the "ties of gratitude, or murdered his friend, she expiates the "crime." (Angiras.)

The *mantras* are adopted on the authority of the *Brahma-puráṇa*.

"While the pile is preparing, tell the faithful wife of the "greatest duty of woman; *she is loyal and pure who burns "herself with her husband's corpse.* Hearing this, fortified "[in her resolution], and full of affection, she completes the "*Pitṛimedha-yága*[2] and ascends to *Swarga*."

(*Brahma-puráṇa.*)

It is held to be the duty of a widow to burn herself with her husband's corpse; but she has the alternative,

"On the death of her husband, to live as *Brahmachárini*, or "commit herself to the flames." (Vishṇu.)

The austerity intended consists in chastity, and in acts of piety and mortification.

"The use of *támbúla*, dress, and feeding off vessels of tuten-"ague is forbidden to the *Yati*,[3] the *Brahmachári*, and the "*widow*." (Prachetas.)

"The widow shall never exceed one meal a day, nor sleep "on a bed; if she do so, her husband falls from *Swarga*.

[118] "She shall eat no other than simple food, and[4] shall "daily offer the *tarpaṇa* of *kuśa*, *tila*, and water.[5]

"In *Vaiśákha*, *Kártika*, and *Mágha*, she shall exceed the "usual duties of ablution, alms, and pilgrimage, and often use "the name of God [in prayer]." (The *Smṛiti*.)

[1] The commentators are at the pains of showing that this expiation must refer to a crime committed in a former existence; for funeral rites are refused to the murderer of a *Bráhmaṇa*.

[2] Act of burning herself with her husband.

[3] *Sannyási*.

[4] If she has no male descendants. See *Madana-párijáta*.

[5] Oblations for the manes of ancestors to the third degree, though not exclusively; for the prayer includes a general petition for remoter ancestors. Yet daily oblations (*Vaiśvadeva*) are separately offered for ancestors beyond the third degree.

After undertaking the duty of a *Satí*, should the widow recede, she incurs the penalties of defilement.

"If the woman, regretting life, recede from the pile, she is "defiled; but may be purified by observing the fast called "*Prájápatya*."[1] (Ápastamba.)

Though an alternative be allowed, the Hindu legislators have shown themselves disposed to encourage widows to burn themselves with their husband's corpse.

Hárita thus defines a loyal wife: "She, whose sympathy "feels the pains and joys of her husband; who mourns and "pines in his absence, and dies when he dies, is a good and "loyal wife." (Hárita.)

"Always revere a loyal wife, as you venerate the *Devatás;* "for, by her virtues, the prince's empire may extend over the "three worlds." (*Matsya-puráṇa.*)

"Though the husband died unhappy by the disobedience of "his wife; if from motives of love, disgust [of the world], fear "[of living unprotected], or sorrow, she commit herself to the "flames, she is entitled to veneration." (*Mahábhárata.*)

Obsequies for suicides are forbidden; but the *Ṛigveda* [119] expressly declares, that "the loyal wife [who burns herself], "shall not be deemed a suicide. When a mourning of three "days has been completed, the *Śráddha* is to be performed."[2] This appears from the prayer for the occasion, directed in the *Ṛigveda.*

Regularly the chief mourner for the husband and for the wife would in many cases be distinct persons: but the *Bhavishya-puráṇa* provides, that "When the widow consigns herself "to the same pile with the corpse of the deceased, whoever

[1] It extends to twelve days; the first three, a spare meal may be taken once in each day; the next three, one in each night; the succeeding three days, nothing may be eaten but what is given unsolicited; and the last three days are a rigid fast.

[2] The shortness of the mourning is honourable: the longest mourning is for the lowest tribe. [The words in the text in inverted commas are not a direct quotation from the *Ṛigveda*, but the whole passage after the word 'forbidden' is a quotation from the *Brahma-puráṇa*. See Dr. Hall, J.R.A.S., 1867, p. 191.]

"performs the *Kriyá* for her husband shall perform it for "her."

"As to the ceremonies from the lighting of the funeral pile "to the *Pinḍa;* whoever lights the pile shall also offer the "*Pinḍa.*" (*Váyu-puráṇa.*)

In certain circumstances the widow is disqualified for this act of a *Sati.*

"She who has an infant child, or is pregnant, or whose "pregnancy is doubtful, or who is unclean, may not, O prin- "cess, ascend the funeral pile.

"So said Nárada to the mother of Sagara."

"The mother of an infant shall not relinquish the care of "her child to ascend the pile; nor shall one who is unclean "[from a periodical cause], or whose time for purification "after child-birth is not passed, nor shall one who is preg- "nant, commit herself to the flames.[1] But the mother of an "infant may, if the care of the child can be otherwise pro- "vided." (Vṛihaspati.)

[120] In the event of a *Bráhmaṇa* dying in a distant country, his widow is not permitted to burn herself.

"A *Viprá* or *Bráhmaṇí* may not ascend a second pile."

(Gotama.)

But with other castes, this proof of fidelity is not precluded by the remote decease of the husband, and is called *Anugamana.*

"The widow, on the news of her husband's dying in a "distant country, should expeditiously burn herself: so shall "she obtain perfection." (Vyása.)

"Should the husband die on a journey, holding his sandals "to her breast, let her pass into the flames."

(*Brahma-puráṇa.*)

The expression is not understood of sandals exclusively; for Uśanas or Śukra declares:

[1] It has been erroneously asserted, that a wife, pregnant at the time of her husband's death, may burn herself after delivery. Hindu authorities positively contradict it. In addition to the text it may be remarked, that it is a maxim, "What was prevented in its season, may not afterwards be resumed."

"Except a *Viprá*, the widow may take anything that be-
"longed to her husband, and ascend the pile.

"But a *Viprá* may not ascend a second pile; this practice
"belongs to other tribes." (Śukra.)

In two of the excepted cases, a latitude is allowed for a widow desirous of offering this token of loyalty, by postponing the obsequies of the deceased: for Vyása directs that, "If the "loyal wife be distant less than the journey of a day, and "desire to die with her husband, his corpse shall not be burnt "until she arrive." And the *Bhavishya-puráṇa* permits that "the corpse be kept one night, if the third day of her uncleanness had expired when her husband died."

With respect to a circumstance of time,[1] which might on some occasions be objected, the commentators obviate the difficulty, by arguing from several texts, "that to die [121] "with or after [her husband], is for a widow *naimittika*[2] "and *kámya*,[3] and consequently allowable in the intercala "month;" for Daksha teaches, that "whenever an act be- "*naimittika* and *kámya* is in hand, it is then to be perfor- "without consulting season." They are at the trouble of removing another difficulty:

"Dhṛitaráshṭra, in the state of *Samádhi*, quitted his ter-
"restrial form to proceed to the *Mukti*, or beatitude, which "awaited him. When the leaves and wood were lighted to "consume the corpse, his wife Gándhárí was seen to pass into "the flames. Now also, a husband dying at *Káśi* and attain-
"ing *Mukti*, it becomes his widow to follow the corpse in "the flames."

It were superfluous to pursue commentators through all their frivolous distinctions and laborious illustrations on [illegible] difficulties.

All the ceremonies essential to this awful rite are in[illegible]ded

[1] Occasional observances are omitted on intercalary days.
[2] Eventual; incumbent when a certain event happens.
[3] Optional; done for its reward.

in the instructions already quoted. But many practices have been introduced, though not sanctioned by any ritual. A widow who declares her resolution of burning herself with the corpse, is required to give a token of her fortitude: and it is acknowledged, that one who receded after the ceremony commenced would be compelled by her relations to complete the sacrifice. This may explain circumstances described by some who have witnessed the melancholy scene.

Other ceremonies noticed in the relations of persons who have been present on such occasions are directed in several rituals:

"Adorned with all jewels, decked with *minium* and other "customary ornaments, with the box of *minium* in her hand, "[122] having made *pújá* or adoration to the *Devatás*, thus "reflecting that *this life is nought: my lord and master to me "was all*,—she walks round the burning pile. She bestows "jewels on the *Bráhmaṇas*, comforts her relations, and shows "her friends the attentions of civility: while calling the Sun "and Elements to witness, she distributes *minium* at pleasure; "and having repeated the *Sankalpa*, proceeds into the flames. "There embracing the corpse, she abandons herself to the "fire, calling *Satya! Satya! Satya!*"

The by-standers throw on butter and wood: for this they are taught that they acquire merit exceeding ten million fold the merit of an *Áśwamedha*, or other great sacrifice. Even those who join the procession from the house of the deceased to the funeral pile, for every step are rewarded as for an *Áśwamedha*. Such *indulgences* are promised by grave authors: they are quoted in this place only as they seem to authorize an inference, that happily the martyrs of this superstition have never been numerous. It is certain that the instances of the widow's sacrifices are now rare: on this it is only necessary to appeal to the recollection of every person residing in India, how few instances have actually occurred within his knowledge. And, had they ever been frequent, superstition would hardly have promised its indulgences to spectators.

IV.

ON THE RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES OF THE HINDUS, AND OF THE BRAHMANS ESPECIALLY.

ESSAY I.[1]

[From the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. v. pp. 345—368. *Calcutta*, 1798. 4to.]

[123] The civil law of the Hindus containing frequent allusions to their religious rites, I was led, among other pursuits connected with a late undertaking, to peruse several treatises on this subject, and to translate from the Sanskrit some entire tracts, and parts of others. From these sources of information, upon a subject on which the Hindus are by no means communicative, I intend to lay before the Society, in this and subsequent essays, an abridged explanation of the ceremonies, and verbal translations of the prayers used at rites, which a Hindu is bound constantly to perform. In other branches of this inquiry, the Society may expect valuable communications from our colleague, Mr. W. C. Blaquiere, who is engaged in similar researches. That part of the subject to which I have confined my inquiries will be also found

[1] [This paper is chiefly compiled from Halâyudha's *Brâhmaṇa-sarvasva*, but these ceremonies and customs are best studied in the more ancient *Gṛihya-sûtras*, such as that of Âśwalâyana, edited and translated by Stenzler, and also edited with commentary in the Bibl. Ind. Cf. Müller's *Anc. Sansk. Lit.* pp. 133, 200–205. I have cursorily compared the present Essay with MS. 1401 in the India Office Library.]

to contain curious matter, which I shall now set forth without comment, reserving for a subsequent essay the observations which are suggested by a review of these religious practices.

A *Bráhmaṇa* rising from sleep, is enjoined, under the penalty of losing the benefit of all rites performed by him, to rub his teeth with a proper withe, or a twig of the race-[124]miferous fig-tree, pronouncing to himself this prayer: "Attend, lord of the forest; Soma, king of herbs and plants, "has approached thee: mayest thou and he cleanse my mouth "with glory and good auspices, that I may eat abundant "food." The following prayer is also used upon this occasion: "Lord of the forest! grant me life, strength, glory, "splendour, offspring, cattle, abundant wealth, virtue, know-"ledge, and intelligence." But if a proper withe cannot be found, or on certain days, when the use of it is forbidden (that is, on the day of the conjunction, and on the first, sixth, and ninth days of each lunar fortnight), he must rinse his mouth twelve times with water.

Having carefully thrown away the twig which has been used, in a place free from impurities, he should proceed to bathe, standing in a river, or in other water. The duty of bathing in the morning, and at noon, if the man be a householder, and in the evening also, if he belong to an order of devotion, is inculcated by pronouncing the strict observance of it no less efficacious than a rigid penance, in expiating sins, especially the early bath in the months of *Mágha, Phálguna,* and *Kárttika:* and the bath being particularly enjoined as a salutary ablution, he is permitted to bathe in his own house, but without prayers, if the weather, or his own infirmities, prevent his going forth: or he may abridge the ceremonies, and use fewer prayers, if a religious duty, or urgent business, require his early attendance. The regular bath consists of ablutions followed by worship, and by the inaudible recitation of the *Gáyatrí* with the names of the worlds. First sipping water, and sprinkling some before him, the priest recites the

three subjoined prayers, while he performs an ablution, by throwing water eight times on his head, or towards the sky, and concludes it by casting water on the ground, to destroy the demons who wage war with the gods. 1st. "O waters! "since ye afford [125] delight, grant us present happiness, "and the rapturous sight of the Supreme God." 2nd. "Like "tender mothers, make us here partakers of your most aus- "picious essence." 3rd. "We become contented with your "essence, with which ye satisfy the universe. Waters! grant "it unto us."[1] (Or, as otherwise expounded, the third text may signify, 'Eagerly do we approach your essence, which 'supports the universal abode. Waters! grant it unto us.') In the *Agni-purâṇa*, the ablution is otherwise directed: "At "twilight, let a man attentively recite the prayers addressed "to water, and perform an ablution, by throwing water on the "crown of his head, on the earth, towards the sky; again "towards the sky, on the earth, on the crown of his head, on "the earth, again on the crown of his head, and lastly on "the earth." Immediately after this ablution, he should sip water without swallowing it, silently praying in these words: "Lord of sacrifice! thy heart is in the midst of the waters of "the ocean; may salutary herbs and waters pervade thee. "With sacrificial hymns and humble salutation we invite thy "presence; may this ablution be efficacious."[2] Or he may sip water while he utters inaudibly the mysterious names of the seven worlds. Thrice plunging into water, he must each time repeat the expiatory text[3] which recites the creation; and having thus completed his ablution, he puts on his mantle after washing it, and sits down to worship the rising sun.

This ceremony is begun by his tying the lock of hair on the crown of his head, while he recites the *Gâyatrî*, holding much *kuśa* grass in his left, and three blades of the same grass in his right hand; or wearing a ring of grass on the third finger

[1] [Rig V. x. 9. 1–3.] [2] [Vâjasaneyi Sanh. viii. 25.]
[3] [The Agha-marshaṇa, see *infra*.]

of the same hand. Thrice sipping water with the same text preceded by the mysterious names of worlds, and each time rubbing his hands as if washing them; and finally, touching with his wet hand, his feet, head, breast, [126] eyes, ears, nose, and navel, or his breast, navel, and both shoulders only (according to another rule), he should again sip water three times, pronouncing to himself the expiatory text which recites the creation. If he happen to sneeze or spit, he must not immediately sip water, but first touch his right ear, in compliance with the maxim, 'after sneezing, spitting, blowing 'his nose, sleeping, putting on apparel, or dropping tears, a 'man should not immediately sip water, but first touch his 'right ear.' "Fire," says Parásara, "water, the *Vedas*, the "sun, moon, and air, all reside in the right ears of *Bráhmaṇas*. "*Gangá* is in their right ears, sacrificial fire in their nostrils; "at the moment when both are touched, impurity vanishes." This, by the by, will explain the practice of suspending the end of the sacerdotal string from over the right ear, to purify that string from the defilement which follows an evacuation of urine. The sipping of water is a requisite introduction of all rites; without it, says the *Śámba-puráṇa*, all acts of religion are vain. Having therefore sipped water as above mentioned, and passed his hand filled with water briskly round his neck while he recites this prayer, "May the waters "preserve me!" the priest closes his eyes, and meditates in silence, figuring to himself that "Brahmá, with four faces and "a red complexion, resides in his navel; Vishṇu, with four "arms and a black complexion, in his heart; and Śiva, with "five faces and a white complexion, in his forehead." The priest afterwards meditates the holiest of texts during three suppressions of breath. Closing the left nostril with the two longest fingers of his right hand, he draws his breath through the right nostril, and then closing that nostril likewise with his thumb, holds his breath while he meditates the text: he then raises both fingers off the left nostril, and emits the

breath he had suppressed. While he holds his [127] breath, he must, on this occasion, repeat to himself the *Gáyatrí* with the mysterious names of the worlds, the triliteral monosyllable, and the sacred text of Brahma. A suppression of breath, so explained by the ancient legislator, Yájnavalkya,[1] consequently implies the following meditation: "*Om!* Earth! Sky! "Heaven! Middle region! Place of births! Mansion of the "blessed! Abode of truth! We meditate on the adorable light "of the resplendent generator, which governs our intellects; "which is water, lustre, savour, immortal faculty of thought, "Brahma, earth, sky, and heaven." According to the commentary, of which a copious extract shall be subjoined, the text thus recited signifies, "That effulgent power which "governs our intellects is the primitive element of water, "the lustre of gems and other glittering substances, the "savour of trees and herbs, the thinking soul of living beings: "it is the creator, preserver, and destroyer; the sun, and "every other deity, and all which moves, or which is fixed "in the three worlds, named, earth, sky, and heaven. The "supreme Brahma, so manifested, illumines the seven worlds; "may he unite my soul to his own radiance (that is, to his "own soul, which resides effulgent in the seventh world, or "mansion of truth)." On another occasion, the concluding prayer, which is the *Gáyatrí* of Brahma, is omitted, and the names of the three lower worlds only are premised. Thus recited, the *Gáyatrí*, properly so called, bears the following import: "On that effulgent power, which is Brahma himself, "and is called the light of the radiant sun, do I meditate, "governed by the mysterious light which resides within me "for the purpose of thought; that very light is the earth, the "subtile ether, and all which exists within the created sphere;

[1] [He is generally quoted, as here, under the name Yogi-yájnavalkya, and the work alluded to is no doubt the *Yájnavalkya-gítá*, cf. Hall, *Bibliographical Index*, p. 14, Aufrecht, *Bodl. Catal.* p. 87 *b*. Where the Dharmaśástra is referred to, it is simply cited as Yájnavalkya, as *e.g.* i. 19 in MS. fol. 63 *a*.]

"it is the threefold world, containing all which is fixed or "moveable: it exists internally in my heart, externally in "[128] the orb of the sun; being one and the same with that "effulgent power, I myself am an irradiated manifestation of "the supreme Brahma." With such reflections, says the commentator, should the text be inaudibly recited.

These expositions are justified by a very ample commentary, in which numerous authorities are cited; and to which the commentator has added many passages from ancient lawyers, and from mythological poems, showing the efficacy of these prayers in expiating sin. As the foregoing explanations of the text are founded chiefly on the gloss of an ancient philosopher and legislator, Yájnavalkya, the following extract will consist of little more than a verbal translation of his metrical gloss.

"The parent of all beings produced all states of existence, "for he generates and preserves all creatures: therefore is he "called the generator. Because he shines and sports, because "he loves and irradiates, therefore is he called resplendent or "divine, and is praised by all deities. We meditate on the "light, which, existing in our minds, continually governs "our intellects in the pursuits of virtue, wealth, love, and "beatitude. Because the being who shines with seven rays, "assuming the forms of time and of fire, matures productions, "is resplendent, illumines all, and finally destroys the uni- "verse, therefore he, who naturally shines with seven rays, "is called light or the effulgent power. The first syllable "denotes that he illumines worlds; the second consonant im- "plies that he colours all creatures; the last syllable signifies "that he moves without ceasing. From his cherishing all, he "is called the irradiating preserver."

Although it appears from the terms of the text, ("Light of "the Generator or Sun,") that the sun and the light spoken of are distinct, yet, in meditating this sublime text, they are undistinguished; that light is the sun, and the sun [129]

is light; they are identical: "The same effulgent and irra-
"diating power which animates living beings as their soul,
"exists in the sky as the male being residing in the midst of
"the sun." There is consequently no distinction; but that effulgence which exists in the heart, governing the intellects of animals, must alone be meditated, as one and the same, however, with the luminous power residing in the orb of the sun.

"That which is in the sun, and thus called light or efful-
"gent power, is adorable, and must be worshipped by them
"who dread successive births and deaths, and who eagerly
"desire beatitude. The being who may be seen in the solar
"orb, must be contemplated by the understanding, to obtain
"exemption from successive births and deaths and various
"pains."

The prayer is preceded by the names of the seven worlds, as epithets of it, to denote its efficacy; signifying, that this light pervades and illumines the seven worlds, which, "situ-
"ated one above the other, are the seven mansions of all
"beings: they are called the seven abodes, self-existent in
"a former period, renovated in this. These seven mysterious
"words are celebrated as the names of the seven worlds. The
"place where all beings, whether fixed or moveable, exist,
"is called Earth, which is the first world. That in which
"beings exist a second time, but without sensation, again to
"become sensible at the close of the period appointed for
"the duration of the present universe, is the World of Re-
"existence. The abode of the good, where cold, heat, and
"light, are perpetually produced, is named Heaven. The
"intermediate region between the upper and lower worlds,
"is denominated the Middle World. The heaven, where
"animals, destroyed in a general conflagration at the close
"of the appointed period, are born again, is thence called the
"World of Births. That in [130] which Sanaka, and other
"sons of Brahmá, justified by austere devotion, reside, ex-

"empt from all dominion, is thence named the Mansion of "the Blessed. Truth, the seventh world, and the abode of "Brahma, is placed on the summit above other worlds; it "is attained by true knowledge, by the regular discharge of "duties, and by veracity: once attained, it is never lost. "Truth is, indeed, the seventh world, therefore called the "Sublime Abode."

The names of the worlds are preceded by the triliteral monosyllable, to obviate the evil consequence announced by Manu, "A *Bráhmaṇa*, beginning and ending a lecture of the "*Veda* (or the recital of any holy strain), must always pro- "nounce to himself the syllable *om*: for unless the syllable *om* "precede, his learning will slip away from him; and unless it "follow, nothing will be long retained." Or that syllable is prefixed to the several names of worlds, denoting that the seven worlds are manifestations of the power signified by that syllable. "As the leaf of the *palásá*," says Yájnavalkya, "is supported by a single pedicle, so is this universe upheld "by the syllable *om*, a symbol of the supreme Brahma." "All rites ordained in the *Veda*, oblations to fire, and solemn "sacrifices, pass away; but that which passeth not away," says Manu, "is declared to be the syllable *om*, thence called "*akshara*, since it is a symbol of God, the lord of created "beings." (Manu, chap. ii. v. 74, 84.)

The concluding prayer is subjoined, to teach the various manifestations of that light, which is the sun himself. It is Brahma, the supreme soul. "The sun," says Yájnavalkya, "is Brahma: this is a certain truth, revealed in the sacred "*Upanishads*, and in various *Śákhás* of the *Vedas*."[1] So the *Bhavishya-puráṇa*, speaking of the sun: "Because there is "none greater he, nor has been, nor will be, therefore he is "celebrated as the supreme soul in all the *Vedas*."

[131] That greatest of lights which exists in the sun,

[1] [Ádityo Brahma ityeshá nishṭhá hyupanishatsu cha, Chhandoge vṛihadáraṇyo taittiríye tathaiva cha. India Off. Libr. MS.]

exists also as the principle of life in the hearts of all beings. It shines externally in the sky, internally in the heart: it is found in fire and in flame. This principle of life, which is acknowledged by the virtuous as existing in the heart and in the sky, shines externally in the ethereal region, manifested in the form of the sun. It is also made apparent in the lustre of gems, stones, and metals; and in the taste of trees, plants, and herbs. That is, the irradiating being, who is a form of Brahma, is manifested in all moving beings (gods, demons, men, serpents, beasts, birds, insects, and the rest) by their locomotion; and in some fixed substances, such as stones, gems, and metals, by their lustre; in others, such as trees, plants, and herbs, by their savour. Every thing which moves or which is fixed, is pervaded by that light, which in all moving things exists as the supreme soul, and as the immortal thinking faculty of beings which have the power of motion. Thus the venerable commentator[1] says, "In the midst of the "sun stands the moon, in the midst of the moon is fire, in the "midst of light is truth, in the midst of truth is the unperish-"able being." And again, "God is the unperishable being "residing in the sacred abode: the thinking soul is light "alone; it shines with unborrowed splendour." This thinking soul, called the immortal principle, is a manifestation of that irradiating power who is the supreme soul.

This universe, consisting of three worlds, was produced from water. "He first, with a thought, created the waters, "and placed in them a productive seed." (Manu, chap. i. v. 8.) Water, which is the element whence the three worlds proceeded, is that light which is also the efficient cause of creation, duration, and destruction, manifested with these powers, in the form of Brahmá, Vishṇu, and Rudra: to denote this, "earth, sky, and heaven," are subjoined as epithets [132] of light. These terms bear allusion also to the three qualities of truth, passion, and darkness, corresponding with

[1] [Yogi-yájnavalkya.]

the three manifestations of power, as creator, preserver, and destroyer; hence it is also intimated, that the irradiating being is manifested as Brahmá, Vishṇu, and Rudra, who are respectively endued with the qualities of truth, passion, and darkness. The meaning is, that this irradiating being, who is the supreme Brahma manifested in three forms or powers, is the efficient cause of the creation of the universe, of its duration and destruction. So in the *Bhavishya-puráṇa*, Kṛishṇa says, "The sun is the god of perception, the eye of "the universe, the cause of day: there is none greater than "he among the immortal powers. From him this universe "proceeded, and in him it will reach annihilation; he is time "measured by instants," etc. Thus the universe, consisting of three worlds, containing all which is fixed or moveable, is the irradiating being; and he is the creator of that universe, the preserver and destroyer of it. Consequently nothing can exist, which is not that irradiating power.

These extracts from two very copious commentaries will sufficiently explain the texts which are meditated while the breath is held as above mentioned. Immediately after these suppressions of breath, the priest should sip water, reciting the following prayer: "May the sun, sacrifice, the regent of "the firmament, and other deities who preside over sacrifice, "defend me from the sin arising from the imperfect perfor- "mance of a religious ceremony. Whatever sin I have com- "mitted by night, in thought, word or deed, be that cancelled "by day. Whatever sin be in me, may that be far removed. "I offer this water to the sun, whose light irradiates my "heart, who sprung from the immortal essence. Be this ob- "lation efficacious." He should next make three ablutions with the prayers: "Waters! since ye [133] afford delight," etc., at the same time throwing water eight times on his head, or towards the sky, and once on the ground as before; and again make similar ablutions with the following prayer: "As "a tired man leaves drops of sweat at the foot of a tree; as he

"who bathes is cleansed from all foulness; as an oblation is "sanctified by holy grass; so may this water purify me from "sin:"[1] and another ablution with the expiatory text which rehearses the creation. He should next fill the palm of his hand with water, and presenting it to his nose, inhale the fluid by one nostril, and retaining it for a while, exhale it through the other, and throw away the water towards the north-east quarter. This is considered as an internal ablution, which washes away sins. He concludes by sipping water with the following prayer: "Water! thou dost penetrate "all beings; thou dost reach the deep recesses of the moun- "tains; thou art the mouth of the universe; thou art sacrifice; "thou art the mystic word *vashaṭ;* thou art light, taste, and "the immortal fluid."

After these ceremonies he proceeds to worship the sun, standing on one foot, and resting the other against his ankle or heel, looking towards the east, and holding his hands open before him in a hollow form. In this posture he pronounces to himself the following prayers. 1st. "The rays of light "announce the splendid fiery sun, beautifully rising to illu- "mine the universe."[2] 2nd. "He rises, wonderful, the eye "of the sun, of water, and of fire, collective power of gods; he "fills heaven, earth, and sky, with his luminous net; he is "the soul of all which is fixed or locomotive."[3] 3rd. "That "eye, supremely beneficial, rises pure from the east; may "we see him a hundred years; may we live a hundred "years; may we hear a hundred years."[4] 4th. "May we, "preserved by the divine power, contemplating heaven above "the region of darkness, approach the deity, [134] most "splendid of luminaries."[5] The following prayer may be also subjoined: "Thou art self-existent, thou art the most "excellent ray; thou givest effulgence: grant it unto me."[6]

[1] [Vâjasaneyi Sanh. xx. 20.]
[2] [Rig. V. i. 50, 1.] [3] [Ib. i. 115, 1.]
[4] [Ib. vii. 66, 16, but with the variations of V. S. xxxvi. 24.]
[5] [Vâj. S. xx. 21.] [6] [Vâj. S. ii. 26.]

This is explained as an allusion to the seven rays of the sun, four of which are supposed to point towards the four quarters, one upwards, one downwards; and the seventh, which is centrical, is the most excellent of all, and is here addressed in a prayer, which is explained as signifying, "May the "supreme ruler, who generates all things, whose luminous "ray is self-existent, who is the sublime cause of light, from "whom worlds receive illumination, be favourable to us." After presenting an oblation to the sun, in the mode to be forthwith explained, the *Gáyatrí* must be next invoked, in these words: "Thou art light; thou art seed; thou art im- "mortal life; thou art called effulgent: beloved by the gods, "defamed by none, thou art the holiest sacrifice." And it should be afterwards recited measure by measure; then the two first measures as one hemistich, and the third measure as the other; and, lastly, the three measures without interruption. The same text is then invoked in these words: "Divine text, who dost grant our best wishes, whose name "is trisyllable, whose import is the power of the Supreme "Being; come, thou mother of the *Vedas*, who didst spring "from Brahma, be constant here." The *Gáyatrí* is then pronounced inaudibly with the triliteral monosyllable and the names of the three lower worlds, a hundred or a thousand times, or as often as may be practicable, counting the repetitions on a rosary of gems set in gold, or of wild grains. For this purpose, the seeds of the *putrajíva*, vulgarly named *pitonhiá*, are declared preferable. The following prayers from the *Vishṇu-puráṇa* conclude these repetitions:[1] "Salutation to

[1] I omit the very tedious detail respecting sins expiated by a set number of repetitions; but in one instance, as an atonement for unwarily eating or drinking what is forbidden, it is directed, that eight hundred repetitions of the *Gáyatrí* should be preceded by three suppressions of breath, touching water during the recital of the following text: "The bull roars; he has four horns, three feet, two "heads, seven hands, and is bound by a threefold ligature: he is the mighty re- "splendent being, and pervades mortal men." [Rig V. iv. 58, 3.] The bull is Religious Duty personified. His four horns are the *Brahman*, or superintending priest; the *Udgátri* or chanter of the *Sámaveda*; the *Hotri*, or reader of the

"the sun; to that lumi[135]nary, O Brahma, who is the light "of the pervader, the pure generator of the universe, the cause "of efficacious rites." 2nd. "I bow to the great cause of "day (whose emblem is a full-blown flower of the *yavá* tree), "the mighty luminary sprung from Kaśyapa, the foe of dark- "ness, the destroyer of every sin." Or the priest walks a turn through the south, rehearsing a short text: "I follow "the course of the sun;"[1] which is thus explained, "As the "sun in his course moves round the world by the way of the "south, so do I, following that luminary, obtain the benefit "arising from a journey round the earth by the way of the "south."

The oblation above mentioned, and which is called *argha*, consists of *tila*, flowers, barley, water, and red-sanders-wood, in a clean copper vessel, made in the shape of a boat; this the priest places on his head, and thus presents it with the following text: "He who travels the appointed path (namely, the "sun) is present in that pure orb of fire, and in the ethereal "region; he is the sacrificer at religious rites, and he sits in "the sacred close; never remaining a single day in the same "spot, yet present in every house, in the heart of every human "being, in the most holy mansion, in [136] the subtile ether; "produced in water, in earth, in the abode of truth, and in "the stony mountains, he is that which is both minute and "vast." This text is explained as signifying, that the sun is a manifestation of the Supreme Being, present everywhere,

Rigveda, who performs the essential part of a religious ceremony; and the *Adhwaryu*, who sits in the sacred close, and chants the *Yajurveda*. His three feet are the three *Vedas*. Oblations and sacrifices are his two heads, roaring stupendously. His seven hands are the *Hotṛi*, *Maitrávaruṇa*, *Bráhmaṇáchhansí*, *Grávastut*, *Achháváka*, *Neshṭṛi*, and *Potṛi*; names by which officiating priests are designated at certain solemn rites. The threefold ligature by which he is bound, is worshipped in the morning, at noon, and in the evening. [Rather, 'the three oblations at morn, noon, and evening, are his three ligatures.' Prátaḥsavana-madhyáhnasavanáparáhṇasavana-savanais tribhir baddhaḥ, MS. For this and other explanations cf. Yáska, *Nirukta*, xiii. 7; Sáyaṇa, *Rig V.* iv. 58, 3; Mahídhara, *Váj. Sanh.* xvii. 91.]

[1] [Váj. S. ii. 26.]

produced everywhere, pervading every place and thing. The oblation is concluded by worshipping the sun with the subjoined text: "His rays, the efficient causes of knowledge, "irradiating worlds, appear like sacrificial fires."

Preparatory to any act of religion, ablutions must be again performed in the form prescribed for the mid-day bath; the practice of bathing at noon is likewise enjoined as requisite to cleanliness, conducive to health, and efficacious in removing spiritual as well as corporeal defilements: it must, nevertheless, be omitted by one who is afflicted with disease; and a healthy person is forbidden to bathe immediately after a meal, and without laying aside his jewels and other ornaments. If there be no impediment, such as those now mentioned or formerly noticed in speaking of early ablutions, he may bathe with water drawn from a well, from a fountain, or from the bason of a cataract; but he should prefer water which lies above ground, choosing a stream rather than stagnant water, a river in preference to a small brook, a holy stream before a vulgar river; and, above all, the water of the Ganges. In treating of the bath, authors distinguish various ablutions, properly and improperly so called; such as rubbing the body with ashes, which is named a bath sacred to fire; plunging into water, a bath sacred to the regent of this element; ablutions accompanied by the prayers, "O waters! since ye afford delight," etc., which constitute the holy bath; standing in dust raised by the treading of cows, a bath denominated from wind or air; standing in the rain during daylight, a bath named from the sky or atmosphere. The ablutions, [137] or bath, properly so called, are performed with the following ceremonies.

After bathing and cleansing his person, and pronouncing as a vow, "I will now perform ablutions," he who bathes should invoke the holy rivers: "O Gangá, Yamunú, Saraswatí, Śata-"dru, Marudvidhá and Jíyíkíyá! hear my prayers; for my "sake be included in this small quantity of water with the

"holy streams of Parushṭí, Asikní, and Vitastá."[1] He should also utter the *radical prayer*, consisting of the words, "Salutation to *Náráyaṇa*." Upon this occasion a prayer extracted from the *Padma-puráṇa* is often used with this salutation, called the *radical text;* and the ceremony is at once concluded by taking up earth, and pronouncing the subjoined prayer: "Earth, supporter of all things, trampled by horses, traversed "by cars, trodden by Vishṇu! whatever sin has been com- "mitted by me, do thou, who art upheld by the hundred- "armed Kṛishṇa, incarnate in the shape of a boar, ascend my "limbs and remove every such sin."

The text extracted from the *Padma-puráṇa* follows: "Thou "didst spring from the foot of Vishṇu, daughter of Vishṇu, "honoured by him; therefore preserve us from sin, protecting "us from the day of our birth, even unto death. The regent "of air has named thirty-five millions of holy places in the "sky, on earth, and in the space between; they are all com- "prised in thee, daughter of Jahnu. Thou art called she who "promotes growth; among the gods thou art named the lotos; "able, wife of Pṛithu, bird, body of the universe, wife of "Śiva, nectar, female cherisher of science, cheerful, favouring "worlds, merciful, daughter of Jahnu, consoler, giver of con- "solation. *Gangá,* who flows through the three worlds, will "be near unto him who pronounces these pure titles during "his ablutions."

[138] When the ceremony is preferred in its full detail, the regular prayer is a text of the *Veda*.[2] "Thrice did "Vishṇu step, and at three strides traversed the universe: "happily was his foot placed on this dusty earth. Be this "oblation efficacious!" By this prayer is meant, "may the "earth thus taken up, purify me." Cow-dung is next em-

[1] [This seems to be a corrupted version of Ṛig V. x. 75, 5. "Gangá, Yamuná, Saraswatí, S'utudrí, with the Parushṇí, receive graciously this my hymn; Marudvṛidhá, hear with the Asikní and the Vitastá; Árjíkíyá, hear with the Sushomá."]

[2] [Vájasaneyi-sanhitá, v. 15. Ṛig Veda, i. 22, 17.]

ployed, with a prayer importing, "Since I take up cow-dung, "invoking thereon the goddess of abundance, may I obtain "prosperity!" The literal sense is this: "I here invoke that "goddess of abundance, who is the vehicle of smell, who is "irresistible, ever white, present in this cow-dung, mistress of "all beings, greatest of elements, ruling all the senses." Water is afterwards held up in the hollow of both hands joined, while the prayer denominated from the regent of water is pronounced: "Because Varuṇa, king of waters, spread a "road for the sun, therefore do I follow that route. Oh! he "made that road in untrodden space to receive the foot-"steps of the sun. It is he who restrains the heart-rending "wicked."[1] The sense is, "Varuṇa, king of waters, who "curbs the wicked, made an expanded road in the ethereal "region to receive the rays of the sun; I therefore follow that "route." Next, previous to swimming, a short prayer must "be meditated: "Salutation to the regent of water! past are "the fetters of Varuṇa." This is explained as importing, that the displeasure of Varuṇa at a man's traversing the waters, which are his fetters, is averted by salutation: swimming is therefore preceded by this address. The priest should next recite the invocation of holy rivers, and thrice throw water on his head from the hollow of both hands joined, repeating three several texts. 1st. "Waters! remove "this sin, whatever it be, which is in me; whether I have "done anything malicious towards others, or cursed them in "my heart, or spoken falsehoods."[2] 2nd. "Waters! mothers "of worlds! purify us; [139] cleanse us by the sprinkled "fluid, ye who purify through libations; for ye, divine waters, "do remove every sin."[3] 3rd. "As a tired man leaves drops "of sweat at the foot of a tree," etc. Again, swimming, and making a circuit through the south, this prayer should be recited: "May divine waters be auspicious to us for accumu-

[1] [Rig V. i. 24, 8.]
[2] [Rig V. i. 23, 22.]
[3] [Rig V. x. 17, 10, Vâj. S. iv. 2.]

"lation, for gain, and for refreshing draughts: may they listen "to us, that we may be associated with good auspices."[1] "Next reciting the following prayer, the priest should thrice plunge into water: "O consummation of solemn "rites! who dost purify when performed by the most grievous "offenders; thou dost invite the basest criminals to purifi- "cation; thou dost expiate the most heinous crimes. I atone "for sins towards the gods, by gratifying them with oblations "and sacrifice; I expiate sins towards mortals, by employing "mortal men to officiate at sacraments. Therefore defend me "from the pernicious sin of offending the gods."[2]

Water must be next sipped with the prayer, "Lord of sac- "rifice, thy heart is in the midst of the waters of the ocean," etc., and the invocation of holy rivers is again recited. The priest must thrice throw up water with the three prayers: "O, waters, since ye afford delight," etc.; and again with the three subjoined prayers: 1st. "May the Lord of thought "purify me with an uncut blade of *kuśa* grass and with the "rays of the sun. Lord of purity, may I obtain that coveted "innocence which is the wish of thee, who art satisfied by this "oblation of water; and of me, who am purified by this holy "grass."[3] 2nd. "May the Lord of speech purify me," etc. 3rd. "May the resplendent sun purify me," etc. Thrice plunging into water, the priest should as often repeat the grand expiatory text,[4] of which Yájnavalkya says, "It

[1] [Rig V. x. 9, 4.] [2] [Váj. S. iii. 48.] [3] [Váj. S. iv. 4.]

[4] [The Aghamarshaṇa is the 190th hymn of the tenth maṇḍala of the Ṛig Veda; it is ascribed to a ṛishi of that name, the son of Maduchchhandas. In the S'ankara-dig-vijaya, ch. 43, we have the following mystical explanation of the hymn, attributed to S'ankara. "From the kindled thought-absorption of the Supreme (*i.e.* when become multicolor by the access of ignorance), were born the great principle, etc., and the personified totality of all things (Viráj); then was born night, then the river-absorbing sea. From the river-absorbing sea was born the year; this lord of everything that winketh, the Creator, appointing days and nights, made the sun and moon as before (sc. in earlier æons), and the sky, and the earth, and the firmament, and then heaven." Sáyaṇa explains the first verse, "truth of thought and truth of speech were born from Brahma's kindled thought-absorption; from him was born night and the sea of waters." In the rest the two explanations agree.]

"comprises the principles of things, and the elements, the "existence of the [chaotic] mass, the production and de- "struction of worlds." [140] This serves as a key to explain the meaning of the text, which, being considered as the essence of the *Vedas*, is most mysterious. The author before me seems to undertake the explanation of it with great awe, and intimates, that he has no other key to its meaning, nor the aid of earlier commentaries.[1] 'The Supreme 'Being alone existed: afterwards there was universal dark- 'ness: next, the watery ocean was produced by the diffusion 'of virtue: then did the creator, lord of the universe, rise 'out of the ocean, and successively frame the sun and moon, 'which govern day and night, whence proceeds the revolution 'of years; and after them he framed heaven and earth, the 'space between, and the celestial region.' The terms, with which the text begins, both signify truth; but are here explained as denoting the supreme Brahma, on the authority of a text quoted from the *Veda:* "Brahma is truth, the one "immutable being. He is truth and everlasting knowledge." 'During the period of general annihilation,' says the commentator, 'the Supreme Being alone existed. Afterwards, 'during that period, night was produced; in other words, 'there was universal darkness.' "This universe existed only "in darkness, imperceptible, undefinable, undiscoverable by "reason, and undiscovered by revelation, as if it were wholly "immersed in sleep." (Manu, ch. i. v. 5). Next, when the creation began, the ocean was produced by an unseen power universally diffused: that is, the element of water was first reproduced, as the means of the creation. "He first, with a "thought, created the waters," etc. (Manu, ch. i. v. 8.)

[1] [MS. "Asyághamarshaṇamaṇtrasya vyákhyáyáṁ hṛidi prakampo jáyate, yataḥ sarvavedasárabhúto 'tyantaguptaścháyaṁ mantraḥ. Asya padapáṭhamátram cha násti bráhmaṇaniruktádikam apyasya násti. Itthaṁ etadíyavyákhyánugaṇam kamapyupáyaṁ aprápya yad etad asya swakapolamátreṇa vyákhyánam ácharaṇíyam tad atisáhasam." The hymn is found in the Pada text, but undivided.]

Then did the creator, who is lord of the universe, rise out of the waters. 'The Lord of the universe, annihilated by 'the general destruction, revived with his own creation of 'the three worlds.' Heaven is here explained, the expanse of the sky above the region of the stars. The celestial region is the middle world and heavens [141] above. The author before me has added numerous quotations on the sublimity and efficacy of this text, which Manu compares with the sacrifice of a horse, in respect of its power to obliterate sins.[1]

After bathing, while he repeats this prayer, the priest should again plunge into water, thrice repeating the text, "As a tired man leaves drops of sweat at the foot of a tree," etc. Afterwards, to atone for greater offences, he should meditate the *Gáyatrí*, etc., during three suppressions of breath. He must also recite it measure by measure, hemistich by hemistich; and, lastly, the entire text, without any pause. As an expiation of the sin of eating with men of very low tribes, or of coveting or accepting what should not be received, a man should plunge into water, at the same time reciting a prayer which will be quoted on another occasion. One who has drunk spirituous liquors should traverse water up to his throat, and drink as much expressed juice of the moon-plant as he can take up in the hollow of both hands, while he meditates the triliteral monosyllable, and then plunge into water, reciting the subjoined prayer: "O, Rudra! hurt not our off-"spring and descendants; abridge not the period of our lives; "destroy not our cows; kill not our horses; slay not our "proud and irritable folks; because, holding oblations, we "always pray to thee!"[2]

Having finished his ablutions, and coming out of the water, putting on his apparel after cleansing it, having washed his hands and feet, and having sipped water, the priest sits down to worship in the same mode which was directed after the early bath; substituting, however, the following prayer, in

[1] [xi. 260.] [2] [Rig V. i. 114, 8.]

lieu of that which begins with the words, "May the sun, "sacrifice," etc., "May the waters purify the earth, that "she, being cleansed, may purify me. May the lord of holy "knowledge purify her, that she, being [142] cleansed by "holiness, may purify me. May the waters free me from "every defilement, whatever be my uncleanness, whether I have "eaten prohibited food, done forbidden acts, or accepted the "gifts of dishonest men." Another difference between worship at noon and in the morning, consists in standing before the sun with uplifted arms instead of joining the hands in a hollow form. In all other respects the form of adoration is similar.

Having concluded this ceremony, and walked in a round beginning through the south, and saluted the sun, the priest may proceed to study a portion of the *Veda*. Turning his face towards the east, with his right hand towards the south, and his left hand towards the north, sitting down with *kuśa* grass before him, holding two sacred blades of grass on the tips of his left fingers, and placing his right hand thereon with the palm turned upwards, and having thus meditated the *Gáyatrí*, the priest should recite the proper text on commencing the lecture, and read as much of the *Vedas* as may be practicable for him; continuing the practice daily until he have read through the whole of the *Vedas*, and then recommencing the course.

Prayer on beginning a lecture of the *Rigveda*: "I praise "the blazing fire, which is first placed at religious rites, "which effects the ceremony for the benefit of the votary, "which performs the essential part of the rite, which is the "most liberal giver of gems."

On beginning a lecture of the *Yajurveda*: "I gather thee, "O branch of the *Veda*,[1] for the sake of rain; I pluck thee for "the sake of strength. Calves! ye are like unto air; (that "is, as wind supplies the world by means of rain, so do ye "supply sacrifices by the milking of cows). May the lumi-

[1] [Or rather 'O branch of the palás'a tree.']

"nous generator of worlds make you attain success in the "best of sacraments."

On beginning a lecture of the *Sámaveda*: "Regent of [143] "fire, who dost effect all religious ceremonies, approach to "taste my offering, thou who art praised for the sake of "oblations. Sit down on this grass."[1]

The text which is repeated on commencing a lecture of the *Atharvaveda* has been already quoted on another occasion: "May divine waters be auspicious to us," etc.

In this manner should a lecture of the *Vedas*, or of the *Vedángas*, of the sacred poems and mythological history, of law, and other branches of sacred literature, be conducted. The priest should next proceed to offer barley, *tila*, and water to the manes. Turning his face towards the east, wearing the sacrificial cord on his left shoulder, he should sit down, and spread *kuśa* grass before him, with the tips pointing towards the east. Taking grains of barley in his right hand, he should invoke the gods. "O, assembled gods! hear my call, "sit down on this grass." Then throwing away some grains of barley, and putting one hand over the other, he should pray in these words: "Gods! who reside in the ethereal "region, in the world near us, and in heaven above; ye, "whose tongues are flame, and who save all them who duly "perform the sacraments, hear my call; sit down on this "grass, and be cheerful."[2] Spreading the *kuśa* grass, the tips of which must point towards the east, and placing his left hand thereon and his right hand above the left, he must offer grains of barley and water from the tips of his fingers (which are parts dedicated to the gods), holding three straight blades of grass so that the tips be towards his thumb, and repeating this prayer: "May the gods be satisfied; may the holy "verses, the scriptures, the devout sages, the sacred poems, "the teachers of them, and the celestial quiristers, be satis-

[1] [These are the opening passages of the respective Vedas.]
[2] [Vâj. S. xxxiii. 53.]

"fied; may other instructors, human beings, minutes of time, "moments, instants measured by the twinkling of an eye, "hours, days, fortnights, months, seasons, and years, with "[144] all their component parts, be satisfied herewith."[1] Next, wearing the sacrificial thread round his neck and turning towards the north, he should offer *tila*, or grains of barley with water, from the middle of his hand (which is a part dedicated to human beings), holding in it *kuśa* grass, the middle of which must rest on the palm of his hand: this oblation he presents on grass, the tips of which are pointed towards the north; and with it he pronounces these words: "May Sanaka be satisfied; may Sanandana, Sanátana, Kapila, "Ásuri, Vodhu, and Panchaśikha, be satisfied herewith."[2] Placing the thread on his right shoulder, and turning towards the south, he must offer *tila* and water from the root of his thumb (which is a part sacred to the progenitors of mankind), holding bent grass thereon: this oblation he should present upon a vessel of rhinoceros' horn placed on grass, the tips of which are pointed towards the south; and with it he says, "May fire, which receives oblations presented to our fore-"fathers, be satisfied herewith; may the moon, the judge of "departed souls, the sun, the progenitors who are purified by "fire, those who are named from their drinking the juice of "the moon-plant, and those who are denominated from sitting "on holy grass, be satisfied herewith!" He must then make a similar oblation, saying, "May Nárásarya, Párásarya, Śuka, "Śákalya, Yájnavalkya, Játúkarṇa, Kátyáyana, Ápastamba, "Baudháyana, Váchakuṭí,[3] Vaijavápí, Húhú, Lokákshí,[4] "Maitráyaní, and Aindráyaṇí, be satisfied herewith."[5] He afterwards offers three oblations of water mixed with *tila*

[1] The verb is repeated with each term, "May the holy verses be satisfied; may the *Vedas* be satisfied," etc.

[2] [Cf. the lines cited by Gauḍapáda at the beginning of his Comm. on the Sánkhya-kárikā.]

[3] Perhaps this should be read Váchaknaví, a name of Gárgí, cf. the St. Petersburg Dict. *sub. v.*] [4] [More commonly Laugákshi.]

[5] [For some of these names cf. Müller's *Sanskrit Liter.* pp. 42, 205.]

from the hollow of both hands joined, and this he repeats fourteen times with the different titles of Yama, [145] which are considered as fourteen distinct forms of the same deity. "Salutation to Yama; salutation to Dharmarája, or the king "of duties; to death; to Antaka, or the destroyer; to Vaivas- "wata, or the child of the sun; to time; to the slayer of "all beings; to Audumbara, or Yama, springing out of the "racemiferous fig-tree; to him who reduces all things to "ashes; to the dark-blue deity; to him who resides in the "supreme abode; to him whose belly is like that of a wolf; "to the variegated being; to the wonderful inflictor of pains." Taking up grains of *tila*, and throwing them away, while he pronounces this address to fire: "Eagerly we place and sup- "port thee; eagerly we give thee fuel; do thou fondly invite "the progenitors, who love thee, to taste this pious obla- "tion:"[1] let him invoke the progenitors of mankind in these words: "May our progenitors, who are worthy of drinking "the juice of the moon-plant, and they who are purified by "fire, approach us through the paths which are travelled by "gods; and, pleased with the food presented at this sacra- "ment, may they ask for more, and preserve us from evil."[2] He should then offer a triple oblation of water with both hands, reciting the following text, and saying, "I offer this "*tila* and water to my father, such a one sprung from such a "family." He must offer similar oblations to his paternal grandfather, and great-grandfather; and another set of similar oblations to his maternal grandfather, and to the father and grandfather of that ancestor: a similar oblation must be pre- sented to his mother, and single oblations to his paternal grandmother and great-grandmother: three more oblations are presented, each to three persons, paternal uncle, brother, son, grandson, daughter's son, son-in-law, maternal uncle, sister's son, father's sister's son, mother's sister, and other relations. The text alluded to bears this meaning: "Waters,

[1] [Rig V. x. 16, 12.] [2] [Vâj. Sanh. xix. 58.]

"be the [146] food of our progenitors: satisfy my parents, ye "who convey nourishment, which is the drink of immortality, "the fluid of libations, the milky liquor, the confined and "promised food of the manes."[1]

The ceremony may be concluded with three voluntary oblations: the first presented like the oblations to deities, looking towards the east, and with the sacrificial cord placed on his left shoulder; the second, like that offered to progenitors, looking towards the south, and with the string passed over his right shoulder. The prayers which accompany these offerings are subjoined: 1st. "May the gods, demons, benevolent genii, "huge serpents, heavenly quiristers, fierce giants, bloodthirsty "savages, unmelodious guardians of the celestial treasure, suc- "cessful genii, spirits called *Kushmáṇḍa*, trees, and all animals "which move in air or in water, which live on earth, and feed "abroad; may all these quickly obtain contentment, through "the water presented by me." 2nd. "To satisfy them who "are detained in all the hells and places of torment, this water "is presented by me." 3rd. "May those who are, and those "who are not, of kin to me, and those who were allied to "me in a former existence, and all who desire oblations of "water from me, obtain perfect contentment." The first text, which is taken from the *Sámaveda*, differs a little from the *Yajurveda*:[2] "Gods, benevolent genii, huge serpents, nymphs, "demons, wicked beings, snakes, birds of mighty wing, trees, "giants, and all who traverse the ethereal region, genii who "cherish science, animals that live in water or traverse the "atmosphere, creatures that have no abode, and all living "animals which exist in sin, or in the practice of virtue; to "satisfy them is this water presented by me." Afterwards the [147] priest should wring his lower garment, pronouncing this text: "May those who have been born in my family,

[1] See a remark on this passage below, page 170, note. [Váj. S. ii. 34.]

[2] [Neither of these hymns occurs in the Sanhitá text, as is shown by the mention of such non-vedic beings as Kushmáṇḍas and Vidyádharas ("genii who cherish science"). Haláyudha gives the first version.]

"and have died, leaving no son nor kinsman bearing the "same name, be contented with this water which I present by "wringing it from my vesture.". Then placing his sacrificial cord on his left shoulder, sipping water, and raising up his arms, let him contemplate the sun, reciting a prayer inserted above: "He who travels the appointed path," etc. The priest should afterwards present an oblation of water to the sun, pronouncing the text of the *Vishṇu-puráṇa* which has been already cited, "Salutation to the sun," etc. He then concludes the whole ceremony by worshipping the sun with a prayer above quoted: "Thou art self-existent," etc.; by making a circuit through the south, while he pronounces, "I "follow the course of the sun;" and by offering water from the hollow of his hand, while he salutes the regents of space and other Deities; "Salutation to space; to the regents of "space, to Brahmá, to the earth, to salutary herbs, to fire, to "speech, to the lord of speech, to the pervader, and to the "mighty Deity."

V.

ON THE RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES OF THE HINDUS, AND OF THE BRAHMANS ESPECIALLY.

ESSAY II.

[From the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. vii. pp. 232—285. *Calcutta*, 1801. 4to.]

[148] A FORMER essay on this subject[1] described the daily ablutions performed with prayers and acts of religion by every *Bráhman*. His next daily duty is the performance of the five great sacraments. The first, consisting in the study of the *Veda*, has been already noticed; the sacraments of the manes, of deities, and of spirits, slightly touched upon in the first essay, will be made the subject of the present one; and the hospitable reception of guests will be followed in the next by a description of the various ceremonies which must be celebrated at different periods, from the birth to the marriage of a Hindu.

The sacrament of deities consists in oblations to fire with prayers addressed to various divinities; and it is exclusive of the offerings of perfumes and blossoms before idols. It does not fall within my present plan to describe the manner in which the several sects of Hindus[2] adore their gods, or the images of them; and I shall therefore restrict myself to ex-

[1] Ante, p. 141.

[2] See note A, at the end of the present Essay.

plain the oblations to fire, and then proceed to describe [149] funeral rites and commemorative obsequies, together with the daily offerings of food and water, to the manes of ançestors.

I am guided by the author now before me[1] in premising the ceremony of consecrating the fire, and of hallowing the sacrificial implements; "because this ceremony is, as it were, the "groundwork of all religious acts."

First, the priest smears with cow-dung a level piece of ground four cubits square, free from all impurities, and sheltered by a shed. Having bathed and sipped water, he sits down with his face towards the east, and places a vessel of water with *kuśa* grass[2] on his left; then, dropping his right knee, and resting on the span of his left hand, he draws with a root of *kuśa* grass a line, one span or twelve fingers long, and directed towards the east. From the nearest extremity of this line he draws another at right angles to it, twenty-one fingers long, and directed towards the north. Upon this line he draws three others, parallel to the first, equal to it in length, and distant seven fingers from each other. The first line is really, or figuratively, made a yellow line, and is sacred to the earth; the second is red, and sacred to fire; the third black, and sacred to Brahmá the creator; the fourth blue, and [150] sacred to Indra the regent of the firmament; the fifth white, and sacred to Soma. He next gathers up the dust from the edges of these lines, and throws it away towards the north-east, saying, "What was [herein] bad, is cast away:" and he concludes by sprinkling water on the several lines.

[1] In the former essay, my chief guide was Halâyudha, who has given very perspicuous explanations of the *mantras* (or prayers used at religious ceremonies) in several treatises, particularly in one entitled *Brâhmaṇa-sarvasva*. In the present essay, I likewise use a ritual composed by Bhavadeva for the use of *Sâmavedi* priests, and a commentary on the *mantras* by Guṇavishṇu, as also the *Âchârachandrikâ* (a treatise on religious ceremonies observed by *S'ûdras*, but including many of those performed by other classes), and the *Âchârâdarśa*, a treatise on daily duties.

[2] *Poa Cynosuroides*, Kœnig. On the new moon of *Bhâdra*, a sufficient quantity of this sort of grass is provided for use during the whole year.

Having thus prepared the ground for the reception of the sacrificial fire, he takes a lighted ember out of the covered vessel which contains the fire, and throws it away, saying, "I "dismiss far away carnivorous fire; may it go to the realm of "Yama, bearing sin [hence]." He then places the fire before him, saying, "Earth! Sky! Heaven!" and adding, "this "other [harmless] fire alone remains here; well knowing [its "office], may it convey my oblation to the Gods." He then denominates the fire according to the purpose for which he prepares it, saying, "Fire! thou art named so and so;" and he concludes this part of the ceremony by silently burning a log of wood, one span long and smeared with clarified butter.

He next proceeds to place the *Brahmá* or superintending priest. Upon very solemn occasions, a learned *Bráhmaṇa* does actually discharge the functions of superintending priest; but, in general, a bundle containing fifty blades of *kuśa* grass is placed to represent the *Brahmá*. The officiating priest takes up the vessel of water, and walks round the fire keeping his right side turned towards it: he then pours water near it, directing the stream towards the east; he spreads *kuśa* grass thereon; and crossing his right knee over his left without sitting down, he takes up a single blade of grass between the thumb and ring-finger of his left hand, and throws it away towards the south-west corner of the shed, saying, "What "was herein bad is cast away." Next, touching the water, resting the sole of his right foot on his left ankle, and sprinkling the grass with water, he places the [151] *Brahmá* on it, saying, "Sit on [this] seat until [thy] fee [be paid thee]." The officiating priest then returns by the same road by which he went round the fire; and sitting down again with his face towards the east, names the earth inaudibly.

If any profane word have been spoken during the preceding ceremony, atonement must be now made by pronouncing this text: "Thrice did Vishṇu step, and at three strides traversed "the universe: happily was his foot placed on the dusty

"[earth]." The meaning is, since the earth has been purified by the contact of Vishṇu's foot, may she (the earth so purified) atone for any profane word spoken during this ceremony.

If it be intended to make oblations of rice mixed with milk, curds, and butter, this too is the proper time for mixing them; and the priest afterwards proceeds to name the earth in the following prayer, which he pronounces with downcast look, resting both hands on the ground: "We adore this "earth, this auspicious and most excellent earth: do thou, O "fire! resist [our] enemies. Thou dost take [on thee] the "power [and office] of other [deities]."

With blades of *kuśa* grass held in his right hand, he must next strew leaves of the same grass on three sides of the fire, arranging them regularly, so that the tip of one row shall cover the roots of the other. He begins with the eastern side, and at three times strews grass there, to cover the whole space from north to south; and in like manner distributes grass on the southern and western sides. He then blesses the ten regions of space; and rising a little, puts some wood[1] on the fire with a ladle-full of clarified [152] butter, while he meditates in silence on Brahmá, the lord of creatures.

The priest then takes up two leaves of *kuśa* grass, and with another blade of the same grass cuts off the length of a span, saying, "Pure leaves! be sacred to Vishṇu;" and throws them into a vessel of copper or other metal. Again he takes two leaves of grass, and holding the tips between the thumb and ring-finger of his right hand, and the roots between the thumb and ring-finger of his left, and crossing his right hand over his left, he takes up clarified butter on the curvature of the grass, and thus silently casts some into the fire three several times He then sprinkles both the leaves with water, and throws them away. He afterwards sprinkles with water

[1] The fuel used at sacrifices must be wood of the racemiferous fig-tree, the leafy Butea, or the Catechu Mimosa. It should seem, however, that the prickly Adenanthera, or even the Mango, may be used. The wood is cut into small logs, a span long, and not thicker than a man's fist.

the vessel containing clarified butter, and puts it on the fire, and takes it off again, three times, and thus concludes the ceremony of hallowing the butter; during the course of which, while he holds the leaves of grass in both hands, he recites this prayer: "May the divine generator [Vishṇu] purify "thee by means of [this] faultless pure leaf; and may the "sun do so, by means of [his] rays of light: be this oblation "efficacious."

The priest must next hallow the wooden ladle by thrice turning therein his fore-finger and thumb, describing with their tips the figure of 7 in the inside, and the figure of 9 on the outside of the bowl of the ladle. Then dropping his right knee, he sprinkles water from the palms of his hands on the whole southern side of the fire, from west to east, saying, "Aditi! [mother of the Gods!] grant me thy approbation." He does the same on the whole western side, from south to north, saying, "Anumati![1] grant me thy approbation;" and on the northern side, saying, "Saraswatí! grant me thy "approbation." And lastly [153] he sprinkles water all round the fire, while he pronounces this text, "Generous "sun! approve this rite; approve the performer of it, that "he may share its reward. May the celestial luminary, "which purifies the intellectual soul, purify our minds. May "the lord of speech make our prayers acceptable."

Holding *kuśa* grass in both hands, he then recites an expiatory prayer, which will be inserted in another place; and throwing away the grass, he thus finishes the hallowing of the sacrificial implements: a ceremony which necessarily precedes all other religious rites.

He next makes oblations to fire, with such ceremonies and in such form as are adapted to the religious rite which is intended to be subsequently performed. The sacrifice, with the three mysterious words, usually precedes and follows the particular sacrifice which is suited to the occasion; being most

[1] The moon wanting a digit of full.

generally practised, it will be the most proper specimen of the form in which oblations are made.

Having silently burnt a log of wood smeared with clarified butter, the priest makes three oblations, by pouring each time a ladle-full of butter on the fire, saying, "Earth! be this "oblation efficacious:" "Sky! be this oblation efficacious:" "Heaven! be this oblation efficacious." On some occasions he makes a fourth offering in a similar mode, saying, "Earth! "Sky! Heaven! be this oblation efficacious." If it be requisite to offer a mixture of rice, milk, curds, and butter, this is now done; and the oblations, accompanied with the names of the three worlds, are repeated.

As another instance of oblations to fire, the sacrifice to the nine planets may deserve notice. This consists of nine oblations of clarified butter with the following prayers:[1]

1. "The divine sun approaches with his golden car, re- "turning alternately with the shades of night, rousing [154] "mortal and immortal beings, and surveying worlds: May "this oblation to the solar planet be efficacious."

2. "Gods! produce that [Moon] which has no foe; which "is the son of the solar orb, and became the offspring of space, "for the benefit of this world;[2] produce it for the advance- "ment of knowledge, for protection from danger, for vast supre- "macy, for empire, and for the sake of Indra's organs of "sense: May this oblation to the lunar planet be efficacious."

3. "This gem of the sky, whose head resembles fire, is the "lord of waters, and replenishes the seeds of the earth: May "this oblation to the planet Mars be efficacious."

4. "Be roused, O fire! and thou, [O Budha!] perfect this

[1] [These prayers, without the final application, are found in Vâj. S.]

[2] According to one legend, a ray of the sun, called *sushumṇa*, became the moon; according to another, a flash of light from the eye of Atri was received by space, a goddess; she conceived and bore Soma, who is therefore called a son of Atri. This legend may be found in the *Harivansa*. [Sect. xxv. Calcutta ed. vol. iv. p. 490.] Kâlidâsa alludes to it in the *Raghuvansa* (b. 2, v. 75), comparing Sudakshiṇâ, when she conceived Raghu, to the via lactea receiving the luminary which sprung from the eye of Atri.

"sacrificial rite, and associate with us; let this votary and all "the Gods sit in this most excellent assembly: May this "oblation to the planet Mercury be efficacious."

5. "O Vṛihaspati, sprung from eternal truth, confer on us "abundantly that various wealth which the most venerable "of beings may revere; which shines gloriously amongst all "people; which serves to defray sacrifices; which is preserved "by strength: May this oblation to the planet Jupiter be "efficacious."

6. "The lord of creatures drank the invigorating essence "distilled from food; he drank milk and the juice of the "moon-plant. By means of scripture, which is truth itself, "this beverage, thus quaffed, became a prolific essence, the "eternal organ of universal perception, Indra's organs of "[155] sense, the milk of immortality, and honey to the "manes of ancestors: May this oblation to the planet Venus "be efficacious."

7. "May divine waters be auspicious to us for accumula- "tion, for gain, and for refreshing draughts; may they listen "to us, that we may be associated with good auspices: May "this oblation to the planet Saturn be efficacious."

8. "O Dúrvá,[1] which dost germinate at every knot, at "every joint, multiply us through a hundred, through a "thousand descents: May this oblation to the planet of "the ascending node be efficacious."

9. "Be thou produced by dwellers in this world, to give "knowledge to ignorant mortals, and wealth to the indigent, "or beauty to the ugly: May this oblation to the planet of "the descending node be efficacious."

I now proceed to the promised description of funeral rites,[2] abridging the detail of ceremonies as delivered in rituals, omitting local variations noticed by authors who have treated

[1] *Agrostis linearis.* Kœnig.

[2] [Cf. Roth, 'die Todtenbestattung im Indischen Alterthum' in the Journal of the German Or. Soc. vol. viii., and Müller, 'die Todtenbestattung bei den Brahmanen' from Ás'waláyana's Grihya-sútras, *ibid.* vol. ix.]

of this subject, and commonly neglecting the superstitious reasons given by them for the very numerous ceremonies which they direct to be performed in honour of persons recently deceased, or of ancestors long since defunct.

A dying man, when no hopes of his surviving remain, should be laid upon a bed of *kuśa* grass, either in the house or out of it, if he be a *Śúdra*, but in the open air if he belong to another tribe. When he is at the point of death, donations of cattle, land, gold, silver, or other things, according to his ability, should be made by him; or if he be too weak, by another person in his name. His head should be sprinkled with water drawn from the Ganges, and smeared with clay brought from the same [156] river. A *śálagráma*[1] stone ought to be placed near the dying man; holy strains from the *Veda* or from sacred poems should be repeated aloud in his ears, and leaves of holy basil must be scattered over his head.

When he expires, the corpse must be washed, perfumed, and decked with wreaths of flowers; a bit of tutanag, another of gold, a gem of any sort, and a piece of coral, should be put into the mouth of the corpse, and bits of gold in both nostrils, both eyes, and both ears. A cloth perfumed with fragrant oil must be thrown over the corpse, which the nearest relations of the deceased must then carry with modest deportment to some holy spot in the forest, or near water. The corpse must be preceded by fire, and by food carried in an unbaked earthen vessel; and rituals direct, that it shall be accompanied by music of all sorts, drums, cymbals, and wind and stringed

[1] The *śálagrámas* are black stones found in a part of the Gaṇḍakí river, within the limits of Nepál. They are mostly round, and are commonly perforated in one or more places by worms, or, as the Hindus believe, by Vishṇu in the shape of a reptile. According to the number of perforations and of spiral curves in each, the stone is supposed to contain Vishṇu in various characters. For example, such a stone perforated in one place only, with four spiral curves in the perforation, and with marks resembling a cow's foot, and a long wreath of flowers, contains Lakshmí-náráyaṇa. In like manner stones are found in the Narmadá, near Onkár mándáttá, which are considered as types of S'iva, and are called *Bánling*. The *śálagráma* is found upon trial not to be calcareous: it strikes fire with steel, and scarcely at all effervesces with acids.

instruments. This practice seems to be now disused in most provinces of Hindustán; but the necessity of throwing a cloth over the corpse, however poor the relations of the deceased may be, is enforced by the strictest injunctions: it is generally the perquisite of the priest who officiates at the funeral.[1]

[157] The corpse is carried out by the southern gate of the town, if the deceased were a *Śúdra;* by the western, if he were a *Bráhmaṇa;* by the northern, if he belonged to the military class; and by the eastern portal, if he sprung from the mercantile tribe. Should the road pass through any inhabited place, a circuit must be made to avoid it; and when the procession has reached its destination, after once halting by the way, the corpse must be gently laid, with the head towards the south, on a bed of *kuśa,* the tips whereof are pointed southward. The sons or other relations of the deceased having bathed in their clothes, must next prepare the funeral pile with a sufficient quantity of fuel, on a clean spot of ground, after marking lines thereon to consecrate it, in a mode similar to that which is practised in preparing a fire for sacrifices and oblations. They must afterwards wash the corpse, meditating on Gayá and other sacred places, holy mountains, the field of the Kurus, the rivers Gangá, Yamunú, Kauśikí, Chandrabhágá, Bhadrávakáśá, Gaṇḍakí, Sarayú, and Narmadá; Vaiṇava, Varáha, and Piṇḍáraka, and all other holy places on the face of the earth, as well as the four oceans themselves.

Some of these ceremonies are only observed at the obsequies of a priest who maintained a consecrated fire; his funeral pile must be lighted from that fire: but at the obsequies of other persons, the carrying of food to be left by the way, and the consecration of the spot whereon the funeral pile is raised, must be omitted, and any unpolluted fire may be used: it is

[1] In most parts of India the priests who officiate at funerals are held in disesteem; they are distinguished by various appellations, as *Mahábráhman*, etc.—See Digest of Hindu Law, vol. ii. p. 175. (Octavo edit. vol. ii. p. 61.)

only necessary to avoid taking it from another funeral pile, or from the abode of an outcast, of a man belonging to the tribe of executioners, of a woman who has lately borne a child, or of any person who is unclean.

After washing the corpse, clothing it in clean apparel, and rubbing it with perfumes, such as sandal-wood, saffron, [158] or aloe-wood, the relations of the deceased place the corpse supine with its head towards the north (or resupine, if it be the body of a woman), on the funeral pile, which is previously decorated with strung and unstrung flowers. A cloth must be thrown over it, and a relation of the deceased taking up a lighted brand, must invoke the holy places above mentioned, and say, "May the Gods with flaming mouths burn this corpse!" He then walks thrice round the pile with his right hand towards it, and shifts the sacrificial cord to his right shoulder. Then looking towards the south, and dropping his left knee to the ground, he applies the fire to the pile near the head of the corpse, saying, "*Namo! namaḥ!*" while the attending priests recite the following prayer: "Fire! thou "wert lighted by him—may he therefore be reproduced from "thee that he may attain the region of celestial bliss. May "this offering be auspicious." This, it may be remarked, supposes the funeral pile to be lighted from the sacrificial fire kept up by the deceased; the same prayer is, however, used at the funeral of a man who had no consecrated hearth.

The fire must be so managed that some bones may remain for the subsequent ceremony of gathering the ashes. While the pile is burning, the relations of the deceased take up seven pieces of wood a span long, and cut them severally with an axe over the fire-brands (after walking each time round the funeral pile), and then throw the pieces over their shoulders upon the fire, saying, "Salutation to thee who dost consume flesh."

The body of a young child under two years old must not be burnt, but buried. It is decked with wreaths of fragrant

flowers, and carried out by the relations, who bury it in a clean spot, saying, "*Namo! namaḥ!*" while a priest chants the song of Yama: "The offspring of the sun, day after day "fetching cows, horses, human beings, and [159] cattle, is no "more satiated therewith than a drunkard with wine."

When funeral rites are performed for a person who died in a foreign country, or whose bones cannot be found, a figure is made with three hundred and sixty leaves of the Butea, or as many woollen threads, distributed so as to represent the several parts of the human body according to a fancied analogy of numbers; round the whole must be tied a thong of leather from the hide of a black antelope, and over that a woollen thread; it is then smeared with barley-meal mixed with water, and must be burnt as an emblem of the corpse.

After the body of the deceased has been burnt in the mode above mentioned, all who have touched or followed the corpse must walk round the pile, keeping their left hands towards it, and taking care not to look at the fire. They then walk in procession, according to seniority, to a river or other running water, and after washing and again putting on their apparel, they advance into the stream. They then ask the deceased's brother-in-law, or some other person able to give the proper answer, "Shall we present water?" If the deceased were a hundred years old, the answer must be simply, "Do so:" but if he were not so aged, the reply is, "Do so, but do not "repeat the oblation." Upon this, they all shift the sacerdotal string to the right shoulder, and looking towards the south, and being clad in a single garment without a mantle, they stir the water with the ring-finger of the left hand, saying, "Waters, purify us." With the same finger of the right hand they throw up some water towards the south, and after plunging once under the surface of the river, they rub themselves with their hands. An oblation of water must be next presented from the joined palms of the hands, naming the deceased and the family from which he sprung, and saying,

"May this oblation reach [160] thee." If it be intended to show particular honour to the deceased, three offerings of water may be thus made.

After finishing the usual libations of water to satisfy the manes of the deceased, they quit the river and shift their wet clothes for other apparel; they then sip water without swallowing it, and sitting down on the soft turf, alleviate their sorrow by the recital of the following or other suitable moral sentences, refraining at the same time from tears and lamentation.

1. "Foolish is he who seeks permanence in the human "state, unsolid like the stem of the plantain tree, transient "like the foam of the sea."

2. "When a body, formed of five elements to receive the "reward of deeds done in its own former person, reverts to "its five original principles, what room is there for regret?"

3. "The earth is perishable; the ocean, the Gods them-"selves pass away: how should not that bubble, mortal man, "meet destruction?"

4. "All that is low must finally perish; all that is elevated "must ultimately fall; all compound bodies must end in dis-"solution, and life is concluded with death."

5. "Unwillingly do the manes of the deceased taste the "tears and rheum shed by their kinsmen; then do not wail, "but diligently perform the obsequies of the dead."[1]

At night, if the corpse were burnt by day; or in the daytime, if the ceremony were not completed until night; or in case of exigency, whenever the priest approves, the nearest relation of the deceased takes up water in a new earthen jar, and returns to the town preceded by a person bearing a staff,[2] and attended by the rest walking in pro[161]cession, and led

[1] The recital of these verses is specially directed by Yájnavalkya, B. 3, v. 7, etc. [Vv. 1, 2, 3, 5 are found in Yájn. iii. 8–11. The fourth verse occurs in the Mahábhárata, Rámáyaṇa, and Panchatantra, see Böhtlingk's *Indische Sprüche*, 3217.]

[2] The purpose of his carrying a staff is to scare evil spirits and ghosts.

by the youngest. Going to the door of his own house, or to a place of worship, or to some spot near water, he prepares the ground for the oblation of a funeral cake, by raising a small altar of earth, and marking lines on it as is practised for other oblations. Then, taking a brush of *kuśa* grass in his right hand, he washes therewith the ground, over which *kuśa* grass is spread, saying, "Such a one! (naming the deceased, "and the family from which he sprung) may this oblation be "acceptable to thee." Next, making a ball of three handfuls of boiled rice mixed with *tila*,[1] fruits of various sorts, honey, milk, butter, and similar things, such as sugar, roots, pot-herbs, etc. (or if that be impracticable, with *tila* at least), he presents it on the spot he had purified, naming the deceased, and saying, "May this first funeral cake, which shall restore "thy head, be acceptable to thee." Again purifying the spot in the same manner as before, and with the same words addressed to the deceased, he silently puts fragrant flowers, resin, a lighted lamp, betel-leaves, and similar things, on the funeral cake, and then presents a woollen yarn, naming the deceased, and saying, "May this apparel, made of woollen "yarn, be acceptable to thee." He next offers an earthen vessel full of *tila* and water near the funeral cake, and says, "May this vessel of *tila* and water be acceptable to thee."

It is customary to set apart on a leaf some food for the crows, after which the cake and other things which have been offered must be thrown into the water. This part of the ceremony is then concluded by wiping the ground, and offering thereon a lamp, water, and wreaths of flowers, naming the deceased with each oblation, and saying, "May this be "acceptable to thee."

In the evening of the same day, water and milk must be [162] suspended in earthen vessels before the door, in honour of the deceased, with this address to him, "Such a one de-"ceased! bathe here; drink this:" and the same ceremony

[1] *Sesamum Indicum*, Linn.

may be repeated every evening until the period of mourning expire.

When the persons who attended the funeral return home and approach the house-door (before the ceremony of suspending water and milk, but after the other rites above mentioned), they each bite three leaves of *nimba*[1] between their teeth, sip water, and touch a branch of *śamí*[2] with their right hands, while the priest says, "May the *śamí* tree atone for sins." Each mourner then touches fire, while the priest says, "May "fire grant us happiness;" and standing between a bull and a goat, touches both those animals, while the priest recites an appropriate prayer.[3] Then, after touching the tip of a blade of *dúrvá* grass, a piece of coral, some clarified butter, water, cow-dung, and white mustard-seed, or rubbing his head and limbs with the butter and mustard-seed, each man stands on a stone, while the priest says for him, "May I be firm like "this stone;" and thus he enters his house.

During ten days, funeral cakes, together with libations of water and *tila*, must be offered as on the first day; augmenting, however, the number each time, so that ten cakes, and as many libations of water and *tila*, be offered on the tenth day; and with this further difference, that the address varies each time. On the second day the prayer is, "May this second "cake, which shall restore thy ears, eyes, and nose, be accept-"able;" on the third day, "this [163] third cake, which "shall restore thy throat, arms, and breast;" on the fourth, "thy navel and organs of excretion;" on the fifth, "thy "knees, legs, and feet;" on the sixth, "all thy vitals;" on the seventh, "all thy veins;" on the eighth, "thy teeth, "nails, and hair;" on the ninth, "thy manly strength;" on the tenth, "May this tenth cake, which shall fully satisfy the "hunger and thirst of thy renewed body, be acceptable to

[1] *Melia Azadirachta*, Linn.

[2] *Adenanthera aculeata*, or *Prosopis aculeata*.

[3] I must for the present omit it, because it is not exhibited at full length in any work I have yet consulted.

"thee." During this period, a pebble wrapt up in a fragment of the deceased's shroud is worn by the heir suspended on his neck. To that pebble, as a type of the deceased, the funeral cakes are offered. The same vessel in which the first oblation was made must be used throughout the period of mourning; this vessel, therefore, is also carried by the heir in the fragment of the shroud. He uses that slip of cloth taken from the winding-sheet as a sacrificial cord, and makes the oblations every day on the same spot; should either the vessel or the pebble be lost by any accident, the offerings must be recommenced.

If the mourning last three days only, ten funeral cakes must be nevertheless offered, three on the first and third days, and four on the second; if it lasts no more than one day, the ten oblations must be made at once.

All the kinsmen of the deceased, within the sixth degree of consanguinity, should fast for three days and nights, or one at the least; however, if that be impracticable, they may eat a single meal at night, purchasing the food ready prepared, but on no account preparing victuals at home. So long as the mourning lasts, the nearest relations of the deceased must not exceed one daily meal, nor eat flesh-meat, nor any food seasoned with factitious salt; they must use a plate made of the leaves of any tree but the plantain, or else take their food from the hands of some other persons; they must not handle a knife, or any other implement made [164] of iron, nor sleep upon a bedstead, nor adorn their persons, but remain squalid, and refrain from perfumes and other gratifications; they must likewise omit the daily ceremonies of ablution and divine worship. On the third and fifth days, as also on the seventh and ninth, the kinsmen assemble, bathe in the open air, offer *tila* and water to the deceased, and take a repast together; they place lamps at cross roads, and in their own houses, and likewise on the way to the cemetery, and they observe vigils in honour of the deceased.

On the last day of mourning, or earlier in those countries where the obsequies are expedited on the second or third day, the nearest kinsman of the deceased gathers his ashes after offering a *śrádddha* singly for him.

In the first place, the kinsman smears with cow-dung the spot where the oblation is to be presented; and after washing his hands and feet, sipping water, and taking up *kuśa* grass in his hand, he sits down on a cushion pointed towards the south and placed upon a blade of *kuśa* grass, the tip of which must also point towards the south. He then places near him a bundle of *kuśa* grass, consecrated by pronouncing the word *namaḥ!* or else prepares a fire for oblations; then lighting a lamp with clarified butter or with oil of sesamum, and arranging the food and other things intended to be offered, he must sprinkle himself with water, meditating on Vishṇu surnamed the lotos-eyed, or revolving in his mind this verse, "Whether "pure or defiled, or wherever he may have gone, he who re- "members the being whose eyes are like the lotos, shall be "pure externally and internally." Shifting the sacerdotal cord on his right shoulder, he takes up a brush of *kuśa* grass, and presents water together with *tila* and with blossoms, naming the deceased and the family from which he sprung, and saying, "May this water for ablutions be acceptable to "thee." [165] Then saying, "May this be right," he pronounces a vow or solemn declaration. "This day I will offer "on a bundle of *kuśa* grass [or, if such be the custom, "on "fire"] a *śrádddha* for a single person, with unboiled food, "together with clarified butter and with water, preparatory to "the gathering of the bones of such a one deceased." The priests answering "do so," he says "*namo! namaḥ!*" while the priests meditate the *Gáyatrí*, and thrice repeat, "Salutation to the Gods, to the manes of ancestors, and to mighty saints; to Swáhá [goddess of fire]; to *Swadhá* [the food of "the manes]: salutation unto them for ever and ever."

He then presents a cushion made of *kuśa* grass, naming the

deceased, and saying, "May this be acceptable unto thee;" and afterwards distributes meal of sesamum, while the priests recite, "May the demons and fierce giants that sit on this "consecrated spot be dispersed: and the bloodthirsty savages "that inhabit the earth, may they go to any other place to "which their inclinations may lead them."

Placing an oval vessel with its narrowest end towards the south, he takes up two blades of grass, and breaking off a span's length, throws them into the vessel: and after sprinkling them with water, makes a libation, while the priests say, "May divine waters be auspicious to us for accumulation, for "gain, and for refreshing draughts; may they listen to us, "and grant that we may be associated with good auspices." He then throws in *tila*, while the priests say, "Thou art *tila*, "sacred to Soma; framed by the divinity, thou dost produce "celestial bliss [for him that makes oblations]; mixed with "water, mayest thou long satisfy our ancestors with the food "of the manes: be this oblation efficacious." He afterwards silently casts into the vessel perfumes, flowers, and *dúrvá* grass. Then taking up the vessel with his left hand, putting two blades of [166] grass on the cushion with their tips pointed to the north, he must pour the water from the *argha* thereon. The priests meantime recite, "The waters "in heaven, in the atmosphere, and on the earth, have been "united [by their sweetness] with milk: may those silver "waters, worthy of oblation, be auspicious, salutary, and "exhilarating to us; and be happily offered: may this ob-"lation be efficacious." He adds "*namah*," and pours out the water, naming the deceased, and saying, "May this *argha* "be acceptable unto thee." Then oversetting the vessel, and arranging in due order the unboiled rice, condiments, clarified butter, and other requisites, he scatters *tila*, while the priests recite, "Thrice did Vishṇu step," etc. He next offers the rice, clarified butter, water, and condiments, while he touches the vessel with his left hand, and names the deceased, saying,

"May this raw food, with clarified butter and condiments, "together with water, be acceptable unto thee." After the priests have repeated the *Gáyatrí*, preceded by the names of the worlds, he pours honey or sugar upon the rice, while they recite this prayer: "May the winds blow sweet, the rivers flow "sweet, and salutary herbs be sweet, unto us; may night be "sweet, may the mornings pass sweetly; may the soil of the "earth, and heaven, parent [of all productions], be sweet unto "us; may [Soma] king of herbs and trees be sweet; may the "sun be sweet, may kine be sweet unto us."[1] He then says, "*Namo! namaḥ!*" while the priests recite, "Whatever may "be deficient in this food, whatever may be imperfect in this "rite, whatever may be wanting in its form, may all that "become faultless."

He should then feed the *Bráhmaṇas* whom he has assembled, either silently distributing food among them, or adding a respectful invitation to them to eat. When he has given them water to rinse their mouths, he may consider the deceased as fed through their intervention. The priests [167] again recite the *Gáyatrí* and the prayer, "May the "winds blow sweet," etc., and add the subjoined prayers, which should be followed by the music of flageolets, lutes, drums, etc.

1. "The embodied spirit, which hath a thousand heads, a "thousand eyes, a thousand feet, stands in the human breast, "while he totally pervades the earth." 2. "That being is "this universe, and all that has been or will be; he is that "which grows by nourishment, and he is the distributor of "immortality." 3. "Such is his greatness; and therefore is "he the most excellent embodied spirit: the elements of the "universe are one portion of him; and three portions of him "are immortality in heaven." 4. "That threefold being "rose above [this world]; and the single portion of him re- "mained in this universe, which consists of what does, and

[1] [Rig V. i. 90, 6–8; Vâj. S. xiii. 27–29.]

"what does not, taste [the reward of good and bad actions]: "again he pervaded the universe." 5. "From him sprung "Viráj;[1] from whom [the first] man was produced: and he, "being successively reproduced, peopled the earth." 6. From "that single portion, surnamed the universal sacrifice, was the "holy oblation of butter and curds produced; and this did "frame all cattle, wild or domestic, which are governed by "instinct." 7. "From that universal sacrifice were produced "the strains of the *Ṛich* and *Sáman;* from him the sacred "metres sprung; from him did the *Yajus* proceed." 8. "From him were produced horses and all beasts that "have two rows of teeth; from him sprung cows; from him "proceeded goats and sheep." 9. "Him the Gods, the "demigods named *Sádhya*, and the holy sages, consecrated[2] "as a victim on sacred grass; and thus performed a solemn "act of religion." 10. "Into how many portions did they "divide this being whom they immolated? what did his "mouth be[168]come? what are his arms, his thighs, and "his feet now called?" 11. "His mouth became a priest; "his arm was made a soldier; his thigh was transformed into "a husbandman; from his feet sprung the servile man." 12. "The moon was produced from his mind; the sun sprung "from his eye; air and breath proceeded from his ear; and "fire rose from his mouth." 13. "The subtile element was "produced from his navel; the sky from his head; the earth "from his feet; and space from his ear: thus did he frame "worlds." 14. "In that solemn sacrifice which the Gods "performed with him as a victim, spring was the butter, "summer the fuel, and sultry weather the oblation." 15. "Seven were the moats [surrounding the altar]; thrice seven "were the logs of holy fuel; at that sacrifice which the Gods "performed, binding this being as the victim." 16. "By "that sacrifice the Gods worshipped this victim: such were

[1] See translation of Manu, ch. i. v. 32.

[2] Literally, "immolated;" but the commentator says, "consecrated."

"primeval duties; and thus did they attain heaven, where "former Gods and mighty demigods abide."[1]

Next spreading *kuśa* grass near the fragments of the repast, and taking some unboiled rice with *tila* and clarified butter, he must distribute it on the grass, while the priests recite for him these prayers: "May those in my family who have been "burnt by fire, or who are alive and yet unburnt, be satisfied "with this food presented on the ground, and proceed con- "tented towards the supreme path [of eternal bliss]. May "those who have no father nor mother, nor kinsman, nor food, "nor supply of nourishment, be contented with this food "offered on the ground, and attain, like it, a happy abode." He then gives the *Bráhmaṇas* [169] water to rinse their mouths; and the priests once more recite the *Gáyatrí* and the prayer, "May the winds blow sweet," etc.

Then taking in his left hand another vessel containing *tila* blossoms and water, and in his right a brush made of *kuśa* grass, he sprinkles water over the grass spread on the consecrated spot, naming the deceased, and saying, "May this "ablution be acceptable to thee:" he afterwards takes a cake or ball of food mixed with clarified butter, and presents it, saying, "May this cake be acceptable to thee;" and deals out the food with this prayer: "Ancestors, rejoice; take your "respective shares, and be strong as bulls." Then walking round by the left to the northern side of the consecrated spot, and meditating, "Ancestors, be glad; take your re- "spective shares, and be strong as bulls," he returns by the same road, and again sprinkles water on the ground to wash the oblation, saying, "May this ablution be acceptable to thee."

[1] I think it unnecessary to quote from the commentary the explanation of this curious passage of the *Veda* as it is there given, because it does not really elucidate the sense; the allegory is, for the most part, sufficiently obvious. Other prayers may be also recited on the same occasion: it would be tedious to insert them all in this place. [Cf. note *infra*, p. [309]. On this hymn cf. also Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. i. p. 8–15, where a fresh translation and the various readings from the other *Vedas* are given.]

Next, touching his hip with his elbow, or else his right side, and having sipped water, he must make six libations of water with the hollow palms of his hands, saying, "Salutation unto 'thee, O deceased, and unto the saddening [hot] season; "salutation unto thee, O deceased, and unto the month of "*tapas* [or dewy season]; salutation unto thee, O deceased, "and unto that [season] which abounds with water; saluta- "tion unto thee, O deceased, and to the nectar [of blossoms]; "salutation unto thee, O deceased, and to the terrible and "angry [season]; salutation unto thee, O deceased, and to "female fire [or the sultry season]."[1]

He next offers a thread on the funeral cake, holding the wet brush in his hand, naming the deceased, and saying, "May this raiment be acceptable to thee;" the [170] priests add, "Fathers, this apparel is offered unto you." He then silently strews perfumes, blossoms, resin, and betel-leaves on the funeral cake, and places a lighted lamp on it. He sprinkles water on the bundle of grass, saying, "May the "waters be auspicious;" and offers rice, adding, "May the "blossoms be sweet, may the rice be harmless;" and then pours water on it, naming the deceased, and saying, "May "this food and drink be acceptable unto thee." In the next place he strews grass over the funeral cake and sprinkles water on it, reciting this prayer, "Waters! ye are the food of our "progenitors; satisfy my parents, ye who convey nourish- "ment, which is ambrosia, butter, milk, cattle, and distilled liquor."[2] Lastly, he smells some of the food, and poises in

[1] See note B, at the end of the present Essay. [Cf. Váj. S. ii. 32 (*káṇwa*).]

[2] The former translation of this text (in the first Essay on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, *ante*, p. 164) was erroneous in several places; and I still am not perfectly confident that I rightly understand it. The term (*kílála*) which the commentator explains as signifying cattle, literally means "fit to be tied to a pole or stake." The reading of the next term was erroneous. I read and translated *parišruta* for *parisruta*; "promised" instead of "distilled." The commentator explains it as signifying the nourishment of progenitors. [The lines occur in the Vájasaneyi-sanhitá, ii. 34. Mahídhara explains the latter half as "ye who convey the distilled essence—the sweetness of food, butter, and milk,—which abolishes death and stops all bonds." He tries to explain *kílála* by a

his hand the funeral cakes, saying, "May this ball be whole-"some food;" and concludes by paying the officiating priest his fee, with a formal declaration, "I do give this fee (con-"sisting of so much money) to such a one (a priest sprung "from such a family, and who uses such a *Veda* and such a "*śákhá* of it), for the purpose of fully completing the ob-"sequies this day performed by me in honour of one person "singly, preparatory to the gathering of the bones of such a "one, deceased."

After the priest has thrice said, "Salutation to the Gods, "to progenitors, to mighty saints," etc., he dismisses him; lights a lamp in honour of the deceased; meditates on Hari with undiverted attention; casts the food and other things used at the obsequies into the fire; and then pro[171]ceeds to the cemetery for the purpose of gathering the ashes of the deceased.

The son or nearest relation of the defunct, accompanied by his kinsmen, and clothed in clean apparel, repairs to the cemetery, carrying eight vessels filled with various flowers, roots, and similar things. When arrived there, he does honour to the place by presenting an *argha*, with perfumes, blossoms, fragrant resins, a lamp, etc. Some of his kinsmen invoke the deities of the cemetery, when the *argha* is presented; others, when flowers are offered; others again, when food, fragrant resins, a lighted lamp, water, wreaths of flowers, and rice are offered, saying, "Salutation to the deities whose "mouths are devouring fire." He advances to the northern gate[1] or extremity of the funeral pile, sits down there, and presents two vessels as an oblation to spirits, with this prayer, "May the adorable and eternal Gods, who are present in this "cemetery, accept from us this eight-fold unperishable obla-

forced etymology as *sarvabandha-nivartaka*. The St. Petersburg Dict. renders it "ein süsser trank," as, indeed, Mahidhara himself allows it to be in his explanation of iii. 43.]

[1] The practice of enclosing the funeral pile with temporary walls is almost universally disused.

"tion: may they convoy the deceased to pleasing and eternal "abodes, and grant to us life, health, and perfect ease. This "eight-fold oblation is offered to Śiva and other deities: "salutation unto them." Then walking round the spot with his right side towards it, he successively places two other vessels, containing eight different things, at each of the three other gates or sides of the enclosure which surrounds the funeral pile; and he presents these oblations with the same formality as before, sprinkles them with milk, and adds, "May Śiva and the other deities depart to their respective abodes." He then shifts the sacerdotal string to his right shoulder, turns his face towards the south, silently sprinkles the bones and ashes with cow's milk, and, using a branch of *śamí* and [172] another of *paláśa*[1] instead of tongs, first draws out from the ashes the bones of the head, and afterwards the other bones successively, sprinkles them with perfumed liquids and with clarified butter made of cow's milk, and puts them into a casket made of the leaves of the *paláśa*: this he places in a new earthen vessel, covers it with a lid, and ties it up with thread. Choosing some clean spot where encroachments of the river are not to be apprehended, he digs a very deep hole, and spreads *kuśa* grass at the bottom of it, and over the grass a piece of yellow cloth; he places thereon the earthen vessel containing the bones of the deceased, covers it with a lump of mud, together with thorns, moss and mud, and plants a tree in the excavation, or raises a mound of masonry, or makes a pond, or erects a standard. He, and the rest of the kinsmen, then bathe in their clothes. At a subsequent time, the son or other near relation fills up the excavation and levels the ground; he throws the ashes of the funeral pile into the water, cleans the spot with cow-dung and water, presents oblations to Śiva and other deities in the manner before mentioned, dismisses those deities, and casts the oblation into water. To cover the spot where the funeral pile

[1] *Butea frondosa*, Linn.; and *superba*, Roxb.

stood, a tree should be planted, or a mound of masonry be raised, or a pond be dug, or a standard be erected.[1] Again, at a subsequent time, [173] the son, or other near relation, carries the bones, which were so buried, to the river Ganges: he bathes there, rubs the vessel with the five productions of kine, puts gold, honey, clarified butter and *tila* on the vessel, and looking towards the south, and advancing into the river, with these words, "Be there salutation unto justice," throws the vessel into the waters of the Ganges, saying, "May he (the deceased) be pleased with me." Again bathing, he stands upright, and contemplates the sun; then sipping water, and taking up *kuśa* grass, *tila*, and water, pays the priests their fees.

So long as mourning lasts after gathering the ashes, the near relations of the deceased continue to offer water with the same formalities and prayers as above mentioned, and to refrain from factitious salt, butter, etc. On the last day of mourning, the nearest relation puts on neat apparel, and

[1] This does not appear to be very universally practised; but a monument is always erected on the spot where a woman has burnt herself with her husband's corpse, or where any person has died a legal voluntary death. A mausoleum is, however, often built in honour of a Hindu prince or noble; it is called in the Hindustání language, a *chhatrí;* and the practice of consecrating a temple in honour of the deceased is still more common, especially in the centrical parts of India. I shall take some future occasion to resume a subject alluded to in this note; but in the mean time it may be fit to remark, that legal suicide was formerly common among the Hindus, and is not now very rare, although instances of men's burning themselves have not perhaps lately occurred so often as their drowning themselves in holy rivers. The blind father and mother of the young anchorite, whom Daśaratha slew by mistake, burnt themselves with the corpse of their son. [Cf. *infra*, vol. ii. p. 116.] The scholiast of the *Raghuvanśa*, in which poem, as well as in the Rámáyaṇa, this story is beautifully told, quotes a text of law to prove that suicide is in such instances legal. I cannot refrain from also mentioning, that instances are not unfrequent where persons afflicted with loathsome and incurable diseases have caused themselves to be buried alive. I hope soon to be the channel of communicating to the Asiatic Society a very remarkable case of a leper rescued from a premature grave, and radically cured of his distemper. I must also take this occasion of announcing a very singular practice which prevails among the lowest tribes of the inhabitants of Berar and Gondwana. Suicide is not unfrequently vowed by such persons in return for boons solicited from idols; and to fulfil his vow, the successful votary throws himself from a precipice named Kalabhairava, situated in the mountains between the Táptí and Narmadá rivers. The annual fair held near that spot at the beginning of spring usually witnesses eight or ten victims of this superstition.

causes his house and furniture to be cleaned; he then goes out of the town, and after offering the tenth funeral cake in [174] the manner before described, he makes ten libations of water from the palms of his hands, causes the hair of his head and body to be shaved, and his nails to be cut, and gives the barbers the clothes which were worn at the funeral of the deceased, and adds some other remuneration. He then anoints his head and limbs down to his feet with oil of sesamum, rubs all his limbs with meal of sesamum, and his head with the ground pods of white mustard; he bathes, sips water, touches and blesses various auspicious things, such as stones, clarified butter, leaves of *nimba*, white mustard, *dúrvá* grass, coral, a cow, gold, curds, honey, a mirror, and a conch, and also touches a bambu staff. He now returns purified to his home, and thus completes the first obsequies of the deceased.

The second series of obsequies, commencing on the day after the period of mourning has elapsed, is opened by a lustration termed the consolatory ceremony, the description of which must be here abridged, for want of a commentary to explain all the prayers that are recited at this religious rite; for the same reason, an account of the ceremonies attending the consecration and dismissal of a bull in honour of the deceased, must for the present be postponed.

The lustration consists in the consecration of four vessels of water, and sprinkling therewith the house, the furniture, and the persons belonging to the family. After lighting a fire, and blessing the attendant *Bráhmaṇas*, the priest fills four vessels with water, and putting his hand into the first, meditates the *Gáyatrí*, before and after reciting the following prayers:

1. "May generous waters be auspicious to us, for gain and "for refreshing draughts; may they approach towards us, "that we may be associated with good auspices." 2. "Earth, "afford us ease, be free from thorns, be habitable; widely "extended as thou art, pro[175]cure us happiness." 3. "O

"waters! since ye afford delight, grant us food, and the rap-
"turous sight [of the Supreme Being]." 4. "Like tender
"mothers, make us here partakers of your most auspicious
"essence."[1]

Putting his hand into the second vessel, the priest meditates the *Gáyatrí* and the four prayers above quoted, adding some others, and concluding this second consecration of water by once more meditating the *Gáyatrí*.

Then taking a lump of sugar and a copper vessel in his left hand, biting the sugar and spitting it out again, the priest sips water; afterwards putting his hand into the third vessel, he meditates the *Gáyatrí* and the four prayers above cited, interposing this, "May Indra and Varuṇa [the regents of the "sky and of the ocean] accept our oblations and grant us "happiness; may Indra and the cherishing sun grant us "happiness in the distribution of food; may Indra and the "moon grant us the happiness of attaining the road to celes-"tial bliss and the association of good auspices." The priest adds, 1. "[2]May we sufficiently attain your essence with "which you satisfy the universe. Waters! grant it to us." 2. "May heaven be our comfort; may the sky, earth, water, "salutary herbs, trees, the assembled gods, the creator, and "the universe, be our comfort; may that comfort obviate "diffi[176]culties, and become to us the means of attaining "our wishes." 3. "Make me perfect in [my own person, and "in the persons of all who are] connected with me; may all "beings view me with the [benevolent] eye of the sun: I view "all beings with the solar eye; let us view each other with

[1] The translation of several among these prayers is a little varied from a former version of them (in the First Essay on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, *ante*, pp. 142, 143), to conform with the different expositions given in different places by the commentators I have consulted. For the same purpose, I shall here subjoin another version of the *Gáyatrí*: "Earth! Sky! Heaven! Let us meditate "on [these and on] the most excellent light and power of that generous, sportive, "and resplendent Sun, [praying that] it may guide our intellects." A paraphrase of this very important text may be found in the prĕface to the translation of Manu, p. xviii. See also the Essay on the *Vedas*, *ante*, p. 26.

[2] [Váj. S. xxxvi. 16–24.]

"the [benevolent] solar eye." 4. "Make me perfect in my "own person, and in the persons of all who are allied to me: "may I live long in thy sight; long may I live in thy sight." 5. "Salutation to thee [O fire!] who dost seize oblations, "to thee who dost shine, to thee who dost scintillate; may "thy flames burn our foes; mayest thou, the purifier, be "auspicious unto us." 6. "Salutation to thee, manifested "in lightning; salutation to thee, manifested in thunder; "salutation to thee, O God! for thou dost endeavour to be-"stow celestial bliss." 7. "Since thou dost seek to awe the "wicked [only], make us fearless; grant happiness to our "progeny, and courage to our cattle." 8. "May water and "herbs be friendly to us; may they be inimical to him who "hates us, and whom we hate." 9. "May we see a hundred "years that pure eye, which rises from the east, and benefits "the Gods; may we live a hundred years; may we speak a "hundred years; may we be free from distress a hundred "years, and again a hundred years." After another prayer, the priest again meditates the *Gáyatri*, and thus concludes the third consecration. He then hallows the fourth vessel of water in a similar manner, with a repetition of the prayer, "May the earth be our comfort," etc., and with some others, which must be here omitted for the reason before mentioned.[1]

[177] Though it be not positively enjoined, it is customary, immediately after this lustration, to give away a vessel of *tila*, and also a cow, for the sake of securing the passage of the deceased over the *Vaitaraṇi*, or river of hell; whence the cow so given is called *Vaitaraṇi-dhenu*. Afterwards a bed with its furniture is brought, and the giver sits down near the

[1] At most religious ceremonies, and especially at the deprecatory rites, the prayers directed in the several *Vedas*, and in the various *śákhás* of them, differ much. Those which are translated in the present and former essays are mostly taken from the *Yajurveda*, and may be used by any *Bráhman*, instead of the prayers directed in the particular *Veda*, by which he should regularly be guided. The subject of lustrations is curious; they are performed with various ceremonies, to avert calamities or to obviate disappointments. Should other engagements permit it, this topic will be treated in a future essay.

Brâhmaṇa who has been invited to receive the present; after saying, "Salutation to this bed with its furniture, salutation "to this priest to whom it is given," he pays due honour to the *Brâhmaṇa* in the usual form of hospitality. He then pours water into his hand, saying, "I give thee this bed with "its furniture;" the priest replies, "Give it." Upon this he sprinkles it with water, and taking up *kuśa* grass, *tila*, and water, delivers them to the priest, pouring the water into his hand, with a formal declaration of the gift and its purpose; and again delivers a bit of gold with *kuśa* grass, etc., making a similar formal declaration. 1. "This day, I, being desirous "of obtaining celestial bliss for such a one defunct, do give "unto thee, such a one, a *Brâhmaṇa*, descended from such "a family, to whom due honour has been shown, this bed "and furniture, which has been duly honoured, and which is "sacred to Vishṇu." 2. "This day I give unto thee (so and "so) this gold, sacred to fire, as a sacerdotal fee, for the sake "of confirming the donation I have made of this bed and "furniture." The *Brâhmaṇa* both times replies, "Be it "well." Then lying upon the bed, and touching it with the upper part of his middle-finger, he meditates the [178] *Gâyatrî* with suitable prayers, adding, "This bed is sacred to "Vishṇu."

With the same ceremonies, and with similar formal declarations, he next gives away to a *Brâhmaṇa* (or more commonly, in both instances, to a married couple) a golden image of the deceased, or else a golden idol, or both, with clothes and various sorts of fruit. 'Afterwards he distributes other pre-'sents among *Brâhmaṇas*, for the greater honour of the 'deceased; making donations of land, and giving a chair or 'stool, clothes, water, food, betel-leaf, a lamp, gold, silver, a 'parasol, an orchard of fruit-trees, wreaths of flowers, a pair 'of shoes, another bed, another milch cow, and any other 'presents he may choose to give, such as an elephant, a horse, 'a carriage, a slave, a house, and so forth.'

It is hardly necessary to remark on this quotation, that none but very rich or superstitious persons make these ample donations, which are not positively enjoined, though strenuously recommended.

There is some difference in the religious formalities with which various things are given or accepted, on this or on any other occasion. In the formal declaration, too, a different tutelary Deity is named, and a different object is specified; but, in other respects, the form of the declaration is similar, whatever be the occasion on which the gift is made.

In making a donation of land, the donor sits down with his face to the east, opposite to the person to whom he gives it. The donor says, "Salutation to this land with its produce; "salutation to this priest, to whom I give it." Then, after showing him honour in the usual form, he pours water into his hand, saying, "I give thee this land with its produce." The other replies, "Give it." Upon which he sprinkles the place with water; and taking up [179] water, with holy basil and *kuśa* grass, he pours the water into the other's hand, making a formal declaration of the donation and the motive of it. He then delivers a bit of gold, with *kuśa* grass, etc., declaring his purpose in giving it, as a sacerdotal fee, to consolidate the donation of land. The other accepts the gift by a verbal acknowledgment, and meditates the *Gáyatrí* with some other prayers.

A chair or stool is accepted by sitting down on it; clothes, by putting them on; a parasol, by holding the handle of it; shoes or sandals, by standing on them; and a couch, by lying on it. In these and other donations there is no variation in the prayers; but the gift of a milch cow is made with other texts, which the donor recites standing near the cow, and making a libation of water from the palms of his hands after the recital of each prayer. The gift is accepted by holding the animal's tail.

1. "May the Goddess, who is the Lakshmí of all beings

"and resides among the Gods, assume the shape of a milch "cow and procure me comfort." 2. "May the Goddess who "is Rudráṇí in a corporeal form, and who is the beloved of "Śiva, assume the shape of a milch cow and procure me com- "fort." 3. "May she, who is Lakshmí reposing on the "bosom of Vishṇu; she, who is the Lakshmí of the regent "of riches; she, who is the Lakshmí of kings, be a boon- "granting cow to me." 4. "May she, who is the Lak- "shmí of Brahmá; she, who is Swáhá, the wife of fire; "she, who is the exerted power of the sun, moon, and stars, "assume the shape of a milch cow for [my] prosperity." 5. "Since thou art *Swadhá* [the food] of them, who are chief "among the manes of ancestors, and Swáhá [the consuming "power] of them, who eat solemn sacrifices; therefore, being "the cow that expiates every sin, procure me comfort." 6. "I invoke the Goddess who is endowed with the attri- "butes of all the [180] Gods, who confers all happiness, "who bestows [abodes in] all the worlds for the sake of "all people." 7. "I pray to that auspicious Goddess for "immortality and happiness."

The remaining ceremonies, omitting for the present the consecration of a bull, consist chiefly in the obsequies called *śráddhas.* The first set of funeral ceremonies is adapted to effect, by means of oblations, the reimbodying of the soul of the deceased, after burning his corpse. The apparent scope of the second set is to raise his shade from this world (where it would else, according to the notions of the Hindus, continue to roam among demons and evil spirits) up to heaven, and there deify him, as it were, among the manes of departed ancestors. For this end, a *śráddha* should regularly be offered to the deceased on the day after mourning expires; twelve other *śráddhas* singly to the deceased in twelve successive months; similar obsequies at the end of the third fortnight, and also in the sixth month, and in the twelfth; and the oblation called *Sapiṇḍana,* on the first anniversary of his

decease. In most provinces the periods for these sixteen ceremonies, and for the concluding obsequies entitled *Sapiṇḍana*, are anticipated, and the whole is completed on the second or third day; after which they are again performed at the proper times, but in honour of the whole set of progenitors instead of the deceased singly. The obsequies intended to raise the shade of the deceased to heaven are thus completed. Afterwards a *śrádddha* is annually offered to him on the anniversary of his decease.

The form of the various *śrádddhas* (for they are numerous [1]) is so nearly the same, that it will be only necessary [181] to describe that which is performed in honour of progenitors in general; and at which three funeral cakes are offered to three paternal ancestors; as many to three maternal forefathers, and two to the *Viśvedeváḥ* or assembled Gods. A *śrádddha* in honour of one person singly has been already noticed.

After smearing the place with cow-dung, a square altar of sand is raised on it, one or two fingers high, and a span nearly in each direction. (It must be triangular at the obsequies of one recently defunct.) The person who performs the ceremony, first washes his hands and feet, sips water, and puts a ring of *kuśa* grass on the ring-finger of each hand. He sits

[1] In a work entitled *Nirṇaya-sindhu* I find authority for classing obsequies under twelve heads. 1. Daily obsequies, either with food or with water only, in honour of ancestors in general, but excluding the *Viśvedeváḥ*. 2. Obsequies for a special cause; that is, in honour of a kinsman recently defunct. 3. Voluntary obsequies, performed by way of supererogation, for the greater benefit of the deceased. 4. Obsequies for increase of prosperity, performed upon any accession of wealth or prosperity, and upon other joyful occasions. 5. A *śrádddha* intended to introduce the shade of a deceased kinsman to the rest of the manes. 6. Obsequies performed on appointed days, such as that of new moon, full moon, sun's passage into a new sign, etc. 7. A *śrádddha* to sanctify the food at an entertainment given to a company of reverend persons. 8. One performed when stated numbers of priests are fed at the cost of a person who needs purification from some defilement. 9. A *śrádddha* preparatory to the celebration of any solemn rite, and considered as a part of such rite. 10. *Śrádddhas* in honour of deities. 11. Oblations of clarified butter, previous to the undertaking of a distant journey. 12. A *śrádddha* to sanctify a meal of flesh-meat prepared simply for the sake of nourishment.

down on a cushion of *kuśa* grass, or of other materials, placed upon a blade of such grass. He lights a lamp, reciting a prayer, which will be cited on another occasion. He places the implements and materials in regular order, and sprinkles water on himself and all around, meditating on Vishṇu surnamed the lotos-eyed, and revolving in his mind the couplet, "Whether pure or defiled," etc. He now shifts the sacerdotal thread to [182] his right shoulder, and solemnly declares his intention of performing *a śrāddha*, and the motive of it. He thrice meditates the *Gáyatrí*, and pronounces the salutation to superior beings, "Salutation to the Gods, to the manes "of ancestors," etc.

After this preparation he proceeds to invite and to welcome the assembled Gods and the manes. First, he places two little cushions of *kuśa* grass on one side of the altar for the *Viśvedeváḥ*, and six in front of it for the *Pitṛis*. Each cushion should consist of three blades of grass folded up. After strewing *kuśa* grass on those cushions, he asks, "Shall "I invoke the assembled Gods?" Being told "Do so," he thus invokes them: "Assembled Gods! hear my invocation; "come and sit down on this holy grass." After scattering barley on the same spot, he meditates this prayer, "Assembled Gods! listen to my invocation, ye, who reside in "the sky; and ye who abide near us [on earth], or [far off] "in heaven; ye, whose tongues are fire; and ye, who defend "the funeral sacrifice, sit on this grass and be cheerful."[1] He then invites the manes of ancestors with similar invocations: "O fire! zealously we support thee; zealously we feed thee "with fuel; eagerly do thou call our willing ancestors to taste "our oblation. May our progenitors, who eat the moon-"plant, who are sanctified by holy fires, come by paths, which "Gods travel.[2] Satisfied with ancestral food at this solemn "sacrifice, may they applaud and guard us." He next wel-

[1] [Vâj. S. xxxiii. 53.]

[2] The *Via Lactea* seems to be meant by the path of the Gods. [V. S. xix. 70, 58.]

comes the Gods and manes with oblations of water, etc., in vessels made of leaves.[1] Two are presented to the *Viśwedeváḥ*, and three to paternal ancestors, and as many [183] to maternal forefathers. *Kuśa* grass is put into each vessel and water sprinkled on it, while the prayer, "May divine waters be "auspicious to us," etc., is recited. Barley is thrown into the vessels intended for the Gods, and *tila* into those intended for the manes of ancestors, with these prayers,—1. "Barley, thou "art the separator,[2] separate [us] from our natural enemies "and from our malicious foes." 2. "Thou art *tila*, sacred to "Soma," etc. At a *śráddha* for increase of prosperity, which is performed on many occasions as a preparative for a solemn act of religion, barley is thrown into the vessels instead of *tila*, and the last prayer is thus varied: "Thou art barley, "sacred to Soma: framed by the divinity, thou dost produce "celestial bliss; mixt with water, mayest thou long satisfy "with nourishment my several progenitors, whose mouths are "full of blessings." The vessels are successively taken up, repeating each time a prayer before cited: "The waters in "heaven, in the atmosphere, and on the earth, have been "united with milk," etc. The *kuśa* grass that lay on the vessels is put into a *Bráhmaṇa's* hand, and that which was under it is held by the person who performs the *śráddha*, in his own hand; and through it he successively pours the water out of each vessel on the *Bráhmaṇa's* hand. He then piles up the empty vessels in three sets, and reverses them, saying, while he oversets the first, "Thou art a mansion for ancestors."

At the last obsequies for one recently deceased, and which are named the *Sapiṇḍana*, the following prayer is recited when the vessel which has been offered to him is piled up with the rest: "May the mansion of those pro[184]genitors, who have "reached a common abode, and who have accordant minds, "foster him; may the blessed sacrifice, sacred to the Gods,

[1] Plantain leaves; or else leaves of the *Butea frondosa*, or of the *Bassia latifolia*.

[2] *Yava* signifies barley; in this text it also signifies separator, being derived from *yu*, to unmix. Many of the prayers contain similar quibbles. [Váj. S. v. 26.]

"be his."[1] The subjoined prayer likewise is peculiar to the *Sapiṇḍana:* "By [the intercession of] those souls who are "mine by affinity, who are animated [shades], who have "reached a common abode, who have accordant minds, may "prosperity be mine in this world for a hundred years."[2]

The person who performs the *śráddha* next takes up food smeared with clarified butter, and makes two oblations to fire, reciting these prayers: 1. "May this oblation to fire, which "conveys offerings to the manes, be efficacious." 2. "May "this oblation to the moon, wherein the progenitors of man-"kind abide, be efficacious."

Bráhmaṇas should be fed with the residue of the oblation; it is accordingly consecrated for that purpose by the following prayer: "The vessel that holds thee is the earth; its lid is "the sky; I offer this residue of an oblation, similar to am-"brosia, in the undefiled mouth of a priest: may this oblation "be efficacious." The performer of the *śráddha* then points with his thumb towards the food, saying, "Thrice did Vishṇu "step," etc. He adds, "May the demons and giants that sit "on this consecrated spot be dispersed." He meditates the *Gáyatrí* with the names of the worlds, and sweetens the food with honey or sugar, saying, "May winds blow sweet," etc. He then distributes the food among *Bráhmaṇas;* and when they have eaten and have acknowledged that they are satisfied, he gives them water to rinse their mouths.

He now proceeds to offer the funeral cakes, consisting of balls or lumps of food mixed with clarified butter. He offers three to the paternal forefathers, as many to the maternal ancestors, and two to the *Viśwedeváḥ.* The prayers ("An-"cestors! rejoice, take your respective shares," [185] etc.) and the form of the oblation have been already mentioned. It is only necessary to add in this place, that he wipes his hand with *kuśa* grass in honour of remoter ancestors, who thus become partakers of the oblations.

[1] [Váj. S. xix. 45.] [2] [Váj. S. xix. 46.]

In the next place, he makes six libations of water from the palms of his hands, with the salutation to the seasons: "Salutation unto you, O fathers, and unto the saddening "season," etc. By this prayer the manes of ancestors are doubly saluted; for the *Veda* declares, "The six seasons are "the progenitors of mankind."

A thread is placed on each funeral cake, to serve as apparel for the manes, and each time the same words are repeated, "Fathers! this apparel is offered unto you." Flowers, perfumes, and similar things are added at pleasure; but water must be sprinkled on each cake, with the prayer, "Waters, "ye are the food of our progenitors," etc.

The performer of the *śráddha* then takes up the middle cake and smells to it; or his wife eats it if they be solicitous for male offspring. In this case the following prayer must be recited: "Grant, O progenitors, the conception of a male "child, [long lived and healthy, like] the lotos and garland "[or twins, that sprung from Aświní]; so that, at this season, "there may be a person [to fulfil the wishes of the Gods, of "the manes, and of human beings]."[1] He then takes up the cakes successively, smells to them, throws them into a vessel, and gives away the food to a mendicant priest or to a cow, or else casts it into the waters. He then dismisses the manes, saying, "Fathers, to whom food belongs, guard our food and "the other things offered by us; venerable and immortal as "ye are and conversant with holy truths. Quaff the sweet "essence of it, be cheerful, and depart contented by the paths "which Gods travel."[2] Lastly, he walks round the spot and leaves it, saying, "May the benefit of this oblation [186] "accrue to me repeatedly; may the Goddess of the earth, and "the Goddess of the sky, whose form is the universe, visit me "[with present and future happiness]. Father and mother! "revisit me [when I again celebrate obsequies]. Soma, king of "the manes! visit me for the sake of [conferring] immortality."

[1] [Vâj. S. ii. 33.]

[2] [Vâj. S. ix. 18, 19.]

A *śráddha* is thus performed, with an oblation of three funeral cakes only to three male paternal ancestors, on some occasions; or with as many funeral oblations to three maternal ancestors, on others. Sometimes separate oblations are also presented to the wives of the paternal ancestors; at other times, similar offerings are likewise made to the wives of three maternal ancestors. Thus, at the monthly *śráddhas* celebrated on the day of new moon, six funeral cakes are offered to three paternal and as many maternal male ancestors with their wives: on most other occasions separate oblations are presented to the female ancestors. At the obsequies celebrated in the first half of *A'świna*, on the day entitled *Mahálayá*, funeral cakes are separately offered to every deceased friend and near relation: thus, immediately after the oblations to ancestors, a cake is presented to a deceased wife, then to a son or daughter, to a brother or sister, to an uncle or aunt, to a father-in-law, to a preceptor, and lastly to a friend. The same is observed at the obsequies performed on the day of an eclipse, or upon a pilgrimage to any holy spot, and especially to Gayá.

Formal obsequies are performed no less than ninety-six times in every year; namely, on the day of new moon, and on the dates of the fourteen *Manwantaras* and of four *Yugádyás;* that is, on the anniversaries of the accession of fourteen Manus and of the commencement of four ages: also throughout the whole first fortnight of *A'świna*, thence called *pitṛipaksha*, and whenever the sun enters a new sign, [187] and especially when he reaches the equinox or either solstice; and, in certain circumstances, when the moon arrives at *Vyatipáta*, one of the twenty-seven *yogas* or astrological divisions of the zodiac. The eighth of *Pausha*, called *Aindrí*, the eighth of *Mágha* (when flesh-meat should be offered), and the ninth of the same month, together with additional obsequies on some of these dates and on a few others, complete the number above mentioned. Different authorities do not, however, concur

exactly in the number, or in the particular days, when the *śráddhas* should be solemnized.

Besides these formal obsequies, a daily *śráddha* is likewise performed. It consists in dropping food into the hands of a *Bráhmaṇa* after offering it to six ancestors by name, with the usual preparatory vow and prayers, and with the formality of placing three blades of grass as a seat for each ancestor; but using a single prayer only for the invocation of the manes, and omitting the ceremony of welcoming them with an *argha*. Libations of water are also made in honour of progenitors, as noticed in the former essay on daily ablutions.

The obsequies for increase of prosperity, or as the same term (*Vṛiddhi-śráddha*) may signify, the obsequies performed on an accession of prosperity,[1] are celebrated previously to the sacrifice of a victim and to the solemnization of a marriage, or of any of the ceremonies which, according to the notions of the Hindus, contribute to the regeneration of a twice-born man, that is, of a *Bráhmaṇa, Kshatriya,* or *Vaiśya*. This *śráddha* is likewise performed at the commencement and close of a solemn fast.

It should be observed respecting the practice of giving food to priests at all these obsequies, that *Bráhmaṇas* ge-[188] nerally give it to one or more of their own relations. A stranger, unless indigent, would be very unwilling to accept the food, or to attend at a *śráddha* for the purpose of eating it. The use of flesh-meat is positively enjoined to Hindus at certain obsequies (see Manu, c. iii. v. 124), and recommended at all (Manu, c. iii. v. 268, etc.); but the precepts of their lawgivers on the subject are by some deemed obsolete in the present age, and are evaded by others, who acknowledge the cogency of these laws. These commonly make a vow to abstain from flesh-meat, and consider that vow as more binding than the precepts here alluded to. Others, again, not only

[1] Sometimes named *Nándí-mukha*, from a word which occurs in the prayer peculiar to this *śráddha*.

eat meat at obsequies and solemn sacrifices, but make it their common diet, in direct breach of the institutes of their religion. (See Manu, c. 5, v. 31, etc.)

Bráhmaṇas who maintain a perpetual fire, which all who devote themselves to the priesthood ought to do, perform the daily ceremonies of religion in their full detail. Others, who are engaged in worldly pursuits, and even some who follow the regular profession of the sacerdotal tribe, abridge these rites. They comprise all the daily sacraments in one ceremony, called *Vaiśwadeva*, which is celebrated in the forenoon, and by some in the evening likewise. It consists in oblations to the Gods, to the manes, and to the spirits, out of the food prepared for the daily meal; and in a gift of a part of it to guests.

Sitting down on a clean spot of ground, the *Bráhmaṇa* places a vessel containing fire on his right hand, and hallows it by throwing away a lighted piece of *kuśa* grass, saying, "I "dismiss far away carnivorous fire," etc. He then places it on the consecrated spot, reciting the prayer with which the household and sacrificial fires should be lighted by the attrition of wood: "Fires! [this wood] is thy origin, which is "attainable in all seasons; whence [189] being produced, "thou dost shine. Knowing this, seize on it, and afterwards "augment our wealth."

He then lays *kuśa* grass on the eastern side of the fire with its tips pointed towards the north, reciting the first verse of the *Ṛigveda*, with which also it is usual to commence the daily lecture of that *Veda*: "I praise divine fire, primevally "consecrated, the efficient performer of a solemn ceremony, "the chief agent of a sacrifice, the most liberal giver of gems."

He next spreads *kuśa* grass on the southern side of the fire with its tips pointed towards the east, reciting the introduction of the *Yajurveda*, with which also a daily lecture of the *Yajus* is always begun. 1. "I gather thee for the sake of "rain." [He breaks off a branch of a tree, or is supposed to

do so, with these words.] 2. "I pluck thee for the sake of "strength." [He pulls down the branch he had broken.] 3. "Ye are like unto air." [He touches young calves with the branch he had plucked.] 4. "May the liberal generator "[of worlds] make you happily reach this most excellent "sacrament." [He is here supposed to touch the milch cows with the same branch.]

He then spreads *kuśa* grass on the western side with the tips pointed to the north, reciting the prayer which precedes a lecture of the *Sámaveda:* "Fire! approach to taste [my "offering]; thou, who art praised for the gift of oblations. "Sit down on this grass, thou, who art the complete per- "former of the solemn sacrifice."

In like manner he spreads *kuśa* grass on the northern side with the tips pointed to the east, reciting the prayer which precedes a lecture of the *Atharvan:* "May divine waters be "auspicious to us," etc.

Exciting the fire and sprinkling water on it, he must offer with his hands food smeared with clarified butter, three several times saying, "Earth, Sky, Heaven!" [190] He then makes five similar oblations to the regent of fire; to the god of medicine; to the assembled deities; to the lord of created beings; and, lastly, to the Creator of the universe. He concludes the sacrament of the Gods with six oblations, reciting six prayers. 1. "Fire! thou dost expiate a sin "against the Gods [arising from any failure in divine wor- "ship]: may this oblation be efficacious." 2. "Thou dost "expiate a sin against man [arising from a failure in hos- "pitality]." 3. "Thou dost expiate a sin against the manes "[from a failure in the performance of obsequies]." 4. "Thou "dost expiate a sin against my own soul [arising from any "blameable act]." 5. "Thou dost expiate repeated sins." 6. "Thou dost expiate every sin I have committed, whether "wilfully or unintentionally: may this oblation be efficacious."

He then worships fire, making an oblation to it with this

prayer: "Fire! seven are thy fuels; seven thy tongues; seven "thy holy sages; seven thy beloved abodes; seven ways do "seven sacrificers worship thee. Thy sources are seven. Be "content with this clarified butter. May this oblation be "efficacious."[1]

[191] About this time he extinguishes the *Rakshoghna*, or lamp lighted previously to the presenting of oblations to the Gods and to the manes. It was lighted for the purpose of repelling evil spirits, and is now extinguished with this text: "In solemn acts of religion, whatever fails through the negli- "gence of those who perform the ceremony, may be perfected "solely through meditation on Vishṇu."

The *Bráhmaṇa* should next offer the residue of the oblation to spirits, going round to the different places where such oblations ought to be made, sweeping each spot with his hand, sprinkling water on it, and placing there lumps of food. Near the spot where the vessel of water stands he presents three such oblations, saying, "Salutation to rain; to water; to the "earth." At both doors of his house he makes offerings to Dhátṛi and Vidhátṛi, or Brahmá, the protector and creator. Towards the eight principal points of the compass he places offerings, severally adding salutation to them and to the regents of them. In the middle of the house he presents oblations, with salutation to Brahmá, to the sky, and to the sun. Afterwards he offers similar oblations to all the Gods;

[1] The commentator enumerates the seven tongues of fire, *Pravaha*, *Avaha*, *Udvaha*, *Samvaha*, *Vivaha*, *Parivaha*, *Nivaha* (or else *Anuvaha*); all of which imply the power of conveying oblations to the deities to whom offerings are made. The seven holy sages and sacrificers are the *Hotṛi*, *Maitrávaruṇa*, *Bráhmaṇáchhansi*, *Achhávaka*, *Potṛi*, *Neshṭṛi*, and *Agnidhra*; that is, the seven officiating priests at very solemn sacrifices. They worship fire seven ways by the *Agnishṭoma* and other sacrifices. The seven abodes are the names of the seven worlds: and fire is called in the *Veda*, *saptachitika*, which seems to allude to seven consecrated hearths. In the sixteen verses called *Paurusha*, which have been already quoted, the names of the seven worlds, thrice repeated, are understood to be meant by the thrice seven fuels: and the seven oceans are the seven moats surrounding the altar. Fire, like the sun itself, is supposed to emit seven rays: this perhaps may account for the number seven being so often repeated. [Yáj. S. xvii. 79.]

to all beings; to twilight; and to the lord of all beings. He then shifts the sacrificial cord, and looking towards the south, and dropping one knee, he presents an oblation to the manes of ancestors, saying, "Salutation to progenitors: may this "ancestral food be acceptable." This ceremony is not constantly practised, though directed in some rituals; but the residue of the oblation to the Gods must be left on a clean spot of ground as an oblation to all beings, intended, however, for dogs and crows in particular. It is presented with the following prayer, which is taken from the *Puránas:* "May "Gods, men, cattle, birds, demigods, benevolent genii, ser "pents, demons, departed spirits, bloodthirsty [192] savages, "trees, and all who desire food given by me;" 2. "May "reptiles, insects, flies, and all hungry beings, or spirits con- "cerned in this rite, obtain contentment from this food left for "them by me, and may they become happy;" 3. "May they, "who have neither mother, nor father, nor kinsman, nor food, "nor means of obtaining it, be satisfied with that which is "offered by me on this spot for their contentment, and be "cheerful." Or the following prayer may be used: "To "animals who night and day roam in search of food offered to "the spirits, he who desires nourishment, should give some- "thing: may the lord of nourishment grant it unto me."

He concludes by performing a lustration similar to that which has been already noticed, but much shorter. After thus completing the other sacraments, the householder should present food to his guests; that is, to any person who claims his hospitality. When he has thus allotted out of the food prepared for his own repast, one portion to the Gods, a second to progenitors, a third to all beings, and a fourth to his guests, he and his family may then, and not before, consume the remaining portion of the food. Whenever a spiritual preceptor, a devotee or an officiating priest, a bridegroom, or a particular friend, comes as a guest, he is received with honours, which will be described among the nuptial ceremonies. In the en-

tertainment of other guests no religious rites are performed, nor any prayers recited.

The householder is enjoined to give daily alms; but no particular time is prescribed for the distribution of them; he is simply directed to give food to religious mendicants whenever they come to his door; but especially if they come at the time when food is ready for his own meal. On the authority of the *Puráṇas*, it is also a common practice to feed a cow before the householder breaks his own [193] fast.[1] He either presents grass, water, and corn to her with this text, "Daughter of Surabhí, framed of five elements, auspicious, "pure, holy, sprung from the sun, accept this food given by "me; salutation unto thee:" or else he conducts the kine to grass, saying, "May cows, who are mothers of the three "worlds and daughters of Surabhí, and who are beneficent, "pure, and holy, accept the food given by me."

Some *Bráhmaṇas* do still further abridge the compendious ceremony called *Vaiśwadeva*. They offer perfumes and flowers to fire; and make five oblations, out of the food prepared for their own use, to Brahmá, to the lord of created beings, to the household fire, to Kaśyapa, and to Anumati, dropping each oblation on fire, or on water, or on the ground, with the usual addition, "May this oblation be efficacious." They then make offerings to all beings, by placing a few lumps of food at the door, or on a quadrangular spot near the fire, with

[1] The adoration of a cow is not uncommon. This worship consists in presenting flowers to her, washing her feet, etc. It is entirely different from the practice here noticed. Both seem to be founded on the superstitious notion, that the favour of Surabhí (the boon-granting cow) may be gained by showing kindness to her offspring. The story of Vasishṭha's cow, Nandiní, attended by the king Dilípa for the sake of obtaining a boon through her means, is a pretty fable grounded on this notion. It is beautifully told by Káḷidása in the *Raghuwanśa*. I cannot refrain from mentioning another fable of a cow named Bahulá, whose expostulations with a tiger, pleading to him to spare her life, form the only admired passage in the *Itihásas*, or collection of stories supposed to be related by Bhímasena [Bhíshma?], while he lay at the point of death wounded with innumerable arrows. The fourth day of *Aświna* is sacred to this cow, and named from her *Bahulá-chaturthí*. Images of her and of her calf are worshipped; and the extract from the *Itihásas* is on that day read with great solemnity. [Anfr. *Cat.* p. 5, *b*.]

a salutation to Dhátṛi, etc., and they immediately proceed to their own repast.

Here too, as in every other matter relating to private [194] morals, the Hindu legislators and the authors of the *Puráṇas* have heaped together a multitude of precepts, mostly trivial, and not unfrequently absurd. Some of them relate to diet; they prohibit many sorts of food altogether, and forbid the constant use of others: some regard the acceptance of food, which must on no account be received if it be given with one hand, nor without a leaf or dish; some again prescribe the hour at which the two daily meals which are allowed should be eaten (namely, in the forenoon and in the evening); others enumerate the places (a boat, for example) where a Hindu must not eat, and specify the persons (his sons and the inmates of his house) with whom he should eat, and those (his wife, for instance) with whom he should not. The lawgivers have been no less particular in directing the posture in which the Hindu must sit; the quarter towards which he ought to look, and the precautions he should take to insulate himself, as it were, during his meal, lest he be contaminated by the touch of some undetected sinner, who may be present. To explain even in a cursory manner the objects of all these, would be tedious; but the mode in which a Hindu takes his repast, conformably with such injunctions as are most cogent, may be briefly stated, and with this I shall close the present essay.

After washing his hands and feet, and sipping water without swallowing it, he sits down on a stool or cushion (but not on a couch nor on a bed) before his plate, which must be placed on a clean spot of ground that has been wiped and smoothed in a quadrangular form, if he be a *Bráhmaṇa;* a triangular one, if he be a *Kshatriya;* circular, if he be a *Vaiśya;* and in the shape of a crescent, if he belong to the fourth tribe. When the food is first brought in, he is required to bow to it, raising both hands in the form of humble salutation to his forehead; and he should add, "May this be always ours:"

that is, may food never [195] be deficient. When he has sitten down, he should lift the plate with his left hand and bless the food, saying, "Thou art invigorating." He sets it down, naming the three worlds. Or if the food be handed to him, he says, "May heaven give thee," and then accepts it with these words, "The earth accepts thee." Before he begins eating, he must move his hand round the plate, to insulate it, or his own person rather, from the rest of the company. He next offers five lumps of food to Yama by five different titles; he sips and swallows water; he makes five oblations to breath by five distinct names, *Práṇa*, *Vyána*, *Apána*, *Samána*, and *Udána;* and lastly, he wets both eyes. He then eats his repast in silence, lifting the food with all the fingers of his right hand, and afterwards again sips water, saying, "Ambro-"sial fluid! thou art the couch of Vishṇu and of food."

NOTES.

(A.)[1]

[196] That Hindus belong to various sects is universally known; but their characteristic differences are not perhaps so generally understood. Five great sects exclusively worship a single deity; one recognizes the five divinities which are adored by the other sects respectively, but the followers of this comprehensive scheme mostly select one object of daily devotion, and pay adoration to other deities on particular occasions only. Even they deny the charge of polytheism, and repel the imputation of idolatry; they justify the practice of adoring the images of celestial spirits, by arguments similar to those which have been elsewhere employed in defence of angel and image worship. If the doctrines of the *Veda*, and even those of the *Puráṇas*, be closely examined, the Hindu theology will

[1] [For further information see Wilson's 'Religious Sects of the Hindús' (Works, vol. i.).]

be found consistent with monotheism, though it contain the seeds of polytheism and idolatry. I shall take some future occasion of enlarging on this topic: I have here only to remark, that modern Hindus seem to misunderstand the numerous texts, which declare the unity of the godhead, and the identity of Vishṇu, Śiva, the Sun, etc. Their theologists have entered into vain disputes on the question, which among the attributes of God shall be deemed characteristic and pre-eminent. Śankara-áchárya, the celebrated commentator on the *Veda*, contended for the attributes of Śiva, and founded or confirmed the sect of *Śaivas*, who worship Mahádeva as the supreme being, and deny the independent existence of Vishṇu and other deities. Mádhava[1]-áchárya and Vallabha-áchárya have in like manner established the sect of *Vaishṇavas*, who adore Vishṇu as God. The *Sauras* (less numerous than the two sects above mentioned) worship the Sun, and acknowledge no other divinity. The [197] *Gáṇapatyas* adore Gaṇeśa, as uniting in his person all the attributes of the deity.

Before I notice the fifth sect, I must remind the reader that the Hindu mythology has personified the abstract and active powers of the divinity, and has ascribed sexes to these mythological personages. The *Śakti*, or energy of an attribute of God, is female, and is fabled as the consort of that personified attribute. The *Śakti* of Śiva, whose emblem is the phallus, is herself typified by the female organ. This the *Śáktas* worship; some figuratively, others literally.

Vopadeva, the real author of the *Śrí Bhágavata*,[2] has endeavoured to reconcile all the sects of Hindus by reviving the doctrines of Vyása. He recognizes all the deities, but as subordinate to the supreme being, or rather as attributes or manifestations of God. A new sect has been thus formed, and is denominated from that modern *Puráṇa*. But the numerous followers of it do not seem to have well apprehended

[1] [Rather Madhwa or Madhu, cf. Wilson's *Hindú Sects*, Works, i. 139-150.]
[2] [Cf. Wilson's Preface to the transl. of the Vishṇu Puráṇa, pp. xlv.-li.]

the doctrines they profess: they incline much to real polytheism, but do at least reject the derogatory notions of the divinity, which the other sects seem to have adopted.

The *Vaishṇavas*, though nominally worshippers of Vishṇu, are in fact votaries of deified heroes. The *Gokulasthas* (one branch of this sect) adore Kṛishṇa, while the *Rámánujas* worship Rámachandra. Both have again branched into three sects. One consists of the exclusive worshippers of Kṛishṇa, and these only are deemed true and orthodox *Vaishṇavas;* another joins his favourite Rádhá with the hero. A third, called *Rádhávallabhí*, adores Rádhá only, considering her as the active power of Vishṇu. The followers of these last-mentioned sects have adopted the singular practice of presenting to their own wives the oblations intended for the goddess; and those among them who [198] follow the left-handed path (there is in most sects a right-handed or decent path, and a left-handed or indecent mode of worship), require their wives to be naked when attending them at their devotions.

Among the *Rámánujas*, some worship Ráma only; others Sítá; and others both Ráma and Sítá. None of them practise any indecent mode of worship; and they all, like the *Gokulasthas*, as well as the followers of the *Bhágavata*, delineate on their foreheads a double upright line with chalk, or with sandal-wood, and a red circlet with red sanders, or with turmeric and lime; but the *Rámánujas* add an upright red line in the middle of the double white one.

The *Śaivas* are all worshippers of Śiva and Bhaváni conjointly, and they adore the *linga* or compound type of this god and goddess, as the Vaishṇavas do the image of Lakshmínáráyaṇa. There are no exclusive worshippers of Śiva besides the sect of naked gymnosophists called *Lingis;* and the exclusive adorers of the goddess are the *Śáktas*. In this last-mentioned sect, as in most others, there is a right-handed and decent path, and a left-handed and indecent mode of worship: but the indecent worship of this sect is most grossly so, and

consists of unbridled debauchery with wine and women. This profligate sect is supposed to be numerous though unavowed.[1] In most parts of India, if not in all, they are held in deserved detestation; and even the decent *Śáktas* do not make public profession of their tenets, nor wear on their foreheads the mark of the sect, lest they should be suspected of belonging to the other branch of it. The sacrifice of cattle before idols is peculiar to this sect.

The *Śaivas* and *Śáktas* delineate on their foreheads three horizontal lines with ashes obtained, if possible, from the [199] hearth on which a consecrated fire is perpetually maintained; they add a red circlet, which the *Śaivas* make with red sanders, and which the *Śáktas*, when they avow themselves, mark either with saffron or with turmeric and borax.

The *Sauras* are true worshippers of the sun; some of them, it seems, adore the dormant and active energies of the planet conjointly. This sect, which is not very numerous, is distinguished by the use of red sanders for the horizontal triple line, as well as for the circlet on their foreheads.

The *Gáṇapatyas* have branched into two sects;[2] the one worships Śuddha Gaṇapati, the other Uchchhishṭa Gaṇapati. The followers of the latter sect pronounce their prayers with their mouths full of victuals (whence the denomination of the deity worshipped by them).[3] The *Gáṇapatyas* are distinguished by the use of red minium for the circlet on their foreheads. The family of *Bráhmaṇas*, residing at Chinchwer near Púná, and enjoying the privilege of an hereditary incarnation of Gaṇeśa from father to son, probably belongs to this sect. We may hope for more information on this curious

[1] They are avowed in some provinces. [Cf. Wilson, *Hindú Sects*, pp. 240–262.]

[2] [In the Śankara-digvijaya, §§ 15–18, we have six sects of the Gáṇapatyas, who are described as respectively worshipping Mahá-gaṇapati, Haridrá-gaṇapati, Uchchhishṭa-gaṇapati, Navaníta-gaṇapati, Swarṇa-gaṇapati, and Santána-gaṇapati.]

[3] [The pseudo-Ánandagiri explains the name *uchchhishṭa* ('left food, remainder') as derived from the fact that both the sections into which this sect was divided, the exoteric and the esoteric or Hairamba, alike followed the left-handed path.]

instance of priestcraft and credulity, from the inquiries made on the spot by the gentlemen of the embassy from Bombay, who lately visited that place.[1]

Before I conclude this note (concerning which it should be remarked, that the information here collected rests chiefly on the authority of verbal communications), I must add, that the left-handed path or indecent worship of the several sects, especially that of the *Śáktas*, is founded on the *Tantras*, which are, for this reason, held in disesteem. I was misinformed when I described them as constituting a branch of literature highly esteemed though much neglected. (As. Res. vol. v. p. 54.)[2] The reverse would have been more exact.[3]

(B.)

[200] This prayer, when used upon other occasions, is thus varied, "Salutation unto you, O fathers, and unto the "saddening season," etc. The six seasons, in the order in which they are here named, are the hot, dewy, rainy, flowery, frosty, and sultry seasons. One is indicated in this passage by the name of the month with which it begins; and a text of the *Veda*, alluded to by the late Sir William Jones, in his observations on the lunar year of the Hindus (As. Res. vol. iii. p. 258), specifies *Tapas* and *Tapasya*, the lunar (not the solar) *Mágha* and *Phálguna*, as corresponding with *Śiśira;* that is, with the dewy season. The text in question shall be subjoined to this note, because it may serve to prove that the *Veda*, from which it is extracted (Ápastamba's copy of the *Yajurveda* usually denominated the black *Yajus*), cannot be much older than the observation of the colures recorded by

[1] [*Asiatic Researches*, vii. pp. 383–397.] [2] [*Infra*, vol. ii. p. 158.]

[3] [For an account of the Tantras see an interesting review of the first edition of the Prâṇatoshiṇí, in the 'Friend of India' (quarterly series), vol. iii. pp. 611–631, Serampore, 1825, and Aufrecht, *Bodl. Catal.* pp. 88–110; cf. also the *Prâṇatoshiṇí*, 2nd ed. Calcutta, 1859.]

Parásara (see As. Res. vol. ii. p. 268 and 393), which must have been made nearly 1391 years before the Christian era (As. Res. vol. v. p. 288). According to the *Veda*, the lunar *Madhu* and *Mádhava*, or *Chaitra* and *Vaiśákha*, correspond with *Vasanta* or the spring. Now the lunar *Chaitra*, here meant, is the primary lunar month, beginning from the conjunction which precedes full moon in or near *Chitrá*, and ending with the conjunction which follows it. *Vaiśákha* does in like manner extend from the conjunction which precedes full moon in or near *Viśákhá* to that which follows it. The five *nakshatras*, *Hasta*, *Chitrá*, *Swáti*, *Viśákhá* and *Anurádhá*, comprise all the asterisms in which the full moons of *Chaitra* and *Vaiśákha* can happen; and these lunar months may therefore fluctuate between the first degree of *Uttara Phalguní* and the last of *Jyeshṭhá*. Consequently the season of *Vasanta* might begin at soonest when the sun was in the [201] middle of *Púrva Bhádrapada*, or it might end at latest when the sun was in the middle of *Mṛigaśiras*. It appears, then, that the limits of *Vasanta* are Pisces and Taurus; that is *Mína* and *Vṛisha*. (This corresponds with a text which I shall forthwith quote from a very ancient Hindu author.) Now if the place of the equinox did then correspond with the position assigned by Parásara to the colures, *Vasanta* might end at the soonest seven or eight days after the equinox, or at latest thirty-eight or thirty-nine days; and on a medium (that is when the full moon happened in the middle of *Chitrá*), twenty-two or twenty-three days after the vernal equinox. This agrees exactly with the real course of the seasons; for the rains do generally begin a week before the summer solstice, but their commencement does vary, in different years, about a fortnight on either side of that period. It seems therefore a probable inference, that such was the position of the equinox when the calendar of months and seasons was adjusted as described in this passage of the *Veda*. Hence I infer the probability, that the *Vedas* were not arranged in their present form earlier than

the fourteenth century before the Christian era. This, it must be acknowledged, is vague and conjectural; but, if the *Vedas* were compiled in India so early as the commencement of the astronomical *Kali yuga*, the seasons must have then corresponded with other months; and the passage of the *Veda*, which shall be forthwith cited, must have disagreed with the natural course of the seasons at the very time it was written.

I shall now quote the passage so often alluded to in this note.[1] "*Madhuś cha Mádhavaś cha Vásantikáv ṛitú; Śukraś "cha Śuchiś cha graishmáv ṛitú; Nabhaś cha Nabhasyaś cha "várshikáv ṛitú; Ishaś chorjaś cha śáradáv ṛitú; Sahaś cha "Sahasyaś cha haimantikáv ṛitú; Tapaś cha Tapasyaś cha "śaiśiráv ṛitú.*" '*Madhu* [202] and *Mádhava* are the two 'portions of the season *Vasanta* (or the spring); *Śukra* and '*Śuchi*, of *grishma* (or the hot season); *Nabhas* and *Nabhasya*, 'of *varsha* (or the rainy season); *Ijas* and *Ujas*,[2] of *śarad* (or 'the sultry season); and *Sahas* and *Sahasya*, of *hemanta* (or 'the frosty season); and *Tapas* and *Tapasya*, of *śiśira* (or the 'dewy season).'

All authors agree that *Madhu* signifies the month of *Chaitra*; *Mádhava* the month of *Vaiśákha*, and so forth. These names are so explained in dictionaries and by astronomical writers, as well as by the commentators on this and other passages, where these names of the months are employed. The author now before me (Divákara-bhaṭṭa) expressly says, that this text of the *Veda* relates to the order of the seasons according to the lunar months. He proves it by quoting a text of the *Taittiriya Yajurveda*, and afterwards cites the following passage from Baudháyana respecting the seasons measured by solar-sidereal time, "*Mina-Meshayor Mesha-Vṛishabhayor vá "vasantaḥ*," etc. "*Vasanta* corresponds with *Mina* and "*Mesha*, or with *Mesha* and *Vṛisha*," etc. It should be observed, that the secondary lunar month, which begins and ends with full-moon, cannot be here meant; because this

[1] [Taitt. S. iv. 4. 11. 1.]

[2] [Rather '*Isha* and *U'rja*.']

mode of reckoning has never been universal, and the use of it is limited to countries situated to the northward of the Vindhya range of hills, as I learn from the following passage of the *Trikáṇḍa-maṇḍana*: "The lunar month also is of two "sorts, commencing either with the light fortnight or with the "dark one. Some do not admit the month which begins with "the dark fortnight; and even by them who do, it is not "admitted on the south of the Vindhya mountains." [1]

[1] [On this note cf. pp. 99, 126-131.]

VI.

ON THE RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES OF THE HINDUS, AND OF THE BRAHMANS ESPECIALLY.

ESSAY III.

[From the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. vii. pp. 288—311. *Calcutta*, 1801. 4to.]

[203] HOSPITALITY has been already mentioned in the preceding Essay, as one of the five great sacraments which constitute the daily duty of a Hindu. The formal reception of such guests as are entitled to peculiar honour was reserved for the subject of the present tract. The religious rites, intermixed with acts of courtesy, which are practised by way of formal hospitality, are nearly the same, whether it be high rank, a venerable profession, or cordial friendship, which entitles the guest to be welcomed with distinction. They chiefly consist in presenting to him a stool to sit on, water for ablutions, and honey mixed with other food for refreshment. It seems to have been anciently the custom to slay a cow on this occasion; and a guest was therefore called *goghna*, or cow-killer.[1] Imperfect traces of this custom remain in the hospitable ceremonies which I shall now describe from the ritual of *Bráhmaṇas* who use the *Sámaveda*. As the marriage ceremony opens with the solemn reception of the bridegroom by the father of the bride, this part of the nuptial solemnity

[1] [Cf. Páṇini, iii. 4, 73.]

may be fitly chosen as an example of hospitable rites. It will furnish occasion too for proceeding to describe the whole of the marriage ceremony.[1]

[204] Having previously performed the obsequies of ancestors, as is usual upon any accession of good fortune, the father of the bride sits down to await the bridegroom's arrival, in the apartment prepared for the purpose; and at the time chosen for it, according to the rules of astrology. The jewels and other presents intended for him are placed there; a cow is tied on the northern side of the apartment; and a stool or cushion, and other furniture for the reception of the guest, are arranged in order. On his approach, the bride's father rises to welcome him, and recites the following prayer, while the bridegroom stands before him: "May she [who supplies ob-"lations for] religious worship, who constantly follows her calf, "and who was the milch cow when Yama was [the votary], "abound with milk, and fulfil our wishes, year after year."

This prayer is seemingly intended for the consecration of the cow, which is let loose in a subsequent stage of the ceremony, instead of slaying her, as appears to have been anciently the custom. The commentator, whose gloss has been followed in this version of the text, introduces it by the remark, that a guest entitled to honourable reception is a spiritual preceptor, a priest, an ascetic, a prince, a bridegroom, a friend, or in short any one, to welcome whose arrival a cow must be tied for the purpose of slaying her, whence a guest is denominated *goghna*, or cow-killer. The prayer seems to contain an allusion, which I cannot better explain than by quoting a passage from Kálidása's poem entitled *Raghuvanśa*, where Vasishṭha informs the king Dilípa that the cow Surabhí, who was offended by his neglect, cannot be now appeased by courtesy shown to herself, because she remains in a place inaccessible to him: "Prachetas is performing a tedious sacrifice; to supply the

[1] [For a fuller account of the old marriage ceremonies see Dr. E. Haas in *Ind. Studien*, vol. v. pp. 267–412.]

"oblations of which, Surabhí now abides in the infernal "region, whose gates are guarded by huge serpents."

[205] After the prayer above mentioned has been meditated, the bridegroom sits down on a stool or cushion, which is presented to him. He first recites a text of the *Yajurveda*: "I step on this for the sake of food and other benefits, on this "variously splendid footstool." The bride's father presents to him a cushion made of twenty leaves of *kuśa* grass, holding it up with both hands, and exclaiming, "The cushion! the "cushion! the cushion!" The bridegroom replies, "I accept "the cushion," and, taking it, places it on the ground under his feet, while he recites the following prayer: "May those "plants over which Soma presides, and which are variously "dispersed on the earth, incessantly grant me happiness while "this cushion is placed under my feet." Another is presented to him, which he accepts in the same manner, saying, "May "those numerous plants over which Soma presides, and which "are salutary a hundred different ways, incessantly grant me "happiness while I sit on this cushion." Instead of these prayers, which are peculiar to the *Bráhmaṇas* that use the *Sámaveda*, the following text is commonly recited: "I obscure "my rivals, as the sun does other luminaries; I tread on this, "as the type of him who injures me."

The bride's father next offers a vessel of water, thrice exclaiming, "Water for ablutions!" The bridegroom declares his acceptance of it, and looks into the vessel, saying, "Gene-"rous water! I view thee; return in the form of fertilizing "rain from him, from whom thou dost proceed:" that is, from the sun; for it is acknowledged, says the commentator, that rain proceeds from vapours raised by the heat of the sun. The bridegroom takes up water in the palms of both hands joined together, and throws it on his left foot, saying, "I "wash my left foot, and fix prosperity in this realm:" he also throws water on his other foot, saying, "I wash my right "foot, and introduce pros[206]perity into this realm:" and

he then throws water on both feet, saying, "I wash first one "and then the other, and lastly both feet, that the realm may "thrive and intrepidity be gained." The following is the text of the *Yajus*, which is generally used instead of the preceding prayers: "Thou dost afford various elegance; I accept "thee, who dost so: afford it for the ablution of my feet."

An *arghya* (that is, water, rice, and *dúrvá* grass, in a conch, or in a vessel shaped like one, or rather like a boat) is next presented to the bridegroom in a similar manner, and accepted by him with equal formality. He pours the water on his own head, saying, "Thou art the splendour of food; through thee "may I become glorious." This prayer is taken from the *Yajus;* but the followers of that *Veda* use different texts, accepting the *arghya* with this prayer, "Ye are waters (*ap*); "through you may I obtain (*áp*) all my wishes:" and pouring out the water with this text, "I dismiss you to the ocean; "return to your source, harmless unto me, most excellent "waters! but my beverage is not poured forth."

A vessel of water is then offered by the bride's father, who thrice exclaims, "Take water to be sipped:" the bridegroom accepts it, saying, "Thou art glorious, grant me glory;" or else, "Conduct me to glory, endue me with splendour, render "me dear to all people, make me owner of cattle, and preserve "me unhurt in all my limbs."

The bride's father fills a vessel with honey, curds, and clarified butter; he covers it with another vessel, and presents it to the bridegroom, exclaiming three times, "Take the "*madhuparka*." The bridegroom accepts it, places it on the ground, and looks into it, saying, "Thou art glorious; may "I become so." He tastes the food three times, saying, "Thou art the sustenance of the glorious; thou art the "nourishment of the splendid: thou art the food of the [207] "fortunate; grant me prosperity." He then silently eats until he be satisfied.

Although these texts be taken from the *Yajus*, yet other

prayers from the same *Veda* are used by the sects which follow it. While looking into the vessel, the bridegroom says, "I view thee with the eye of the sun [who draws unto him-"self what he contemplates]." On accepting the *madhu-parka* the bridegroom says, "I take thee with the assent of "the generous sun; with the arms of both sons of *Aśvini;* "with the hands of the cherishing luminary." He mixes it, saying, "May I mix thee, O venerable present! and remove "whatever might be hurtful in the eating of thee." He tastes it three times, saying, "May I eat that sweet, best, and "nourishing form of honey; which is the sweet, best, and "nourishing form of honey; and may I thus become ex-"cellent, sweet-tempered, and well nourished by food." After eating until he be satisfied, and after sipping water, he touches his mouth and other parts of his body with his hand, saying, "May there be speech in my mouth, breath in my nostrils, "sight in my eye-balls, hearing in my ears, strength in my "arms, firmness in my thighs; may my limbs and members "remain unhurt together with my soul."

Presents suitable to the rank of the parties are then presented to the guest. At the marriage ceremony, too, the bride is formally given by her father to the bridegroom, in this stage of the solemnity according to some rituals, but later according to others. The hospitable rites are then concluded by letting loose the cow at the intercession of the guest. A barber who attends for that purpose, exclaims, "The cow! "the cow!" Upon which the guest pronounces this text: "Release the cow from the fetters of Varuṇa. May she "subdue my foe: may she destroy the enemies of both him "(the host) [and me]. Dismiss [208] the cow, that she "may eat grass and drink water." When the cow has been released the guest thus addresses her: "I have earnestly "entreated this prudent person [*or, according to another inter-"pretation of the text,* each docile person], saying, kill not the "innocent harmless cow, who is mother of Rudras, daughter of

"Vasus, sister of Ádityas, and the source of ambrosia." In the *Yajurveda* the following prayer is added to this text: "May she expiate my sins and his (naming the host). Re- "lease her that she may graze." It is evident that the guest's intercessions imply a practice, become obsolete, of slaying a cow for the purposes of hospitality.

While the bridegroom is welcomed with these ceremonies, or more properly before his arrival, the bride bathes during the recital of the following texts. Three vessels of water are severally poured on her head, with three different prayers. 1. "Love! I know thy name. Thou art called an intoxicating "beverage. Bring [the bridegroom] happily. For thee was "framed the inebriating draught. Fire! thy best origin is "here. Through devotion wert thou created. May this obla- "tion be efficacious." 2. "Damsel! I anoint this thy genera- "tive organ with honey, because it is the second mouth of the "Creator: by that thou subduest all males, though unsubdued; "by that thou art lively, and dost hold dominion. May this "oblation be efficacious." 3. "May the primeval ruling "sages, who framed the female organ, as a fire that consumeth "flesh, and thereby framed a procreating juice, grant the pro- "lific power, that proceeds from the three-horned [bull] and "from the sun. May this oblation be efficacious." To eluci- date the first of these texts the commentator cites the following passage: "The sage Vasishṭha, the regent of the moon, the "ruler of heaven, the preceptor of the Gods, and the great "forefather of all beings, however [209] old in the practice of "devotion and old by the progress of age, were deluded by "women. Liquors distilled from sugar, from grain, and from "the blossoms of Bassia, are three sorts of intoxicating drinks: "the fourth is woman, by whom this world is deluded. One "who contemplates a beautiful woman becomes intoxicated, "and so does he who quaffs an inebriating beverage: woman "is called an inebriating draught, because she intoxicates by "her looks." To explain the second text, the same author

quotes a passage of the *Veda*, intimating that Brahmá has two mouths; one containing all holiness, the other allotted for the production of all beings: 'for they are created from his mouth.'

After the bridegroom has tasted the *Madhuparka* presented to him, as above mentioned, the bride's right hand is placed on his, both having been previously rubbed with turmeric or some other auspicious drug. A matron must bind both hands with *kuśa* grass amidst the sound of cheerful music. To this part of the ceremony the author of the poem entitled *Naishadhiya* has very prettily alluded, in describing the marriage of Nala and Damayantí (b. xvi. v. 13 and 14): 'As he tasted the 'Madhuparka, which was presented to him, those spectators 'who had foresight reflected, "He has begun the ceremonies '"of an auspicious day, because he will quaff the honey of '"Bhaimí's lip. The bridegroom's hand exults in the '"slaughter of foes; the bride's hand has purloined its '"beauty from the lotos; it is for that reason probably that, '"in this well-governed realm of Vidarbha, both [guilty] '"hands are fast bound with strong *kuśa*."'

The bride's father, bidding the attendant priests begin their acclamations, such as "happy day! auspicious be it! pro-"sperity attend! blessings!" etc., takes a vessel of water containing *tila*[1] and *kuśa*[2] grass, and pours it on [210] the hands of the bride and bridegroom, after uttering the words, "*Om tat sat!*" "God the existent!" and after repeating at full length the names and designations of the bridegroom, of the bride, and of himself; and then solemnly declaring, "I "give unto thee this damsel adorned with jewels and protected "by the lord of creatures." The bridegroom replies, "Well "be it!" The bride's father afterwards gives him a piece of gold, saying, "I this day give thee this gold, as a fee for the "purpose of completing the solemn donation made by me." The bridegroom again says, "Well be it!" and then recites

[1] *Sesamum Indicum.* [2] *Poa cynosuroides.*

this text:[1] "Who gave *her*? to whom did he give *her*? Love "(or free consent) gave *her*. To love he gave *her*. Love was "the giver. Love was the taker. Love! may this be thine! "With love may I enjoy *her*!" The close of the text is thus varied in the *Sámaveda*: "Love has pervaded the ocean. "With love I accept *her*. Love! may this be thine." In the common rituals another prayer is directed to be likewise recited immediately after thus formally accepting the bride: "May the ethereal element give thee. May earth accept thee."

Being thus affianced, the bride and bridegroom then walk forth, while he thus addresses her: "May the regents of space, "may air, the sun, and fire, dispel that anxiety which thou "feelest in thy mind, and turn thy heart to me." He proceeds thus, while they look at each other: "Be gentle in thy aspect "and loyal to thy husband; be fortunate in cattle, amiable in "thy mind, and beautiful in thy person; be mother of valiant "sons; be fond of delights; be cheerful, and bring prosperity "to our bipeds and quadrupeds. First [in a former birth] "Soma received thee; the sun next obtained thee; [in succes- "sive transmigrations] the regent of fire was thy third "husband: thy fourth is a human being. Soma [211] gave "her to the sun; the sun gave her to the regent of fire; fire "gave her to me; with her he has given me wealth and male "offspring. May she, a most auspicious cause of prosperity, "never desert me," etc.[2]

It should seem that, according to these rituals, the bridegroom gives a waistcloth and mantle to the bride before he is affianced to her; and the ceremony of tying the skirts of their mantles precedes that of her father's solemnly bestowing her on the bridegroom. But the ritual of the *Sámavedi* priests makes the gift of the damsel precede the tying of the knot;

[1] [Váj. S. vii. 48.]

[2] I omit the remainder of the text, which it would be indecorous to translate into a modern language. The literal sense of it is here subjoined in a Latin version: "Illa redamans accipito fascinum meum, quod ego peramans intromittam in eam, multæ quâ illecebræ sistunt." [Rig V. x. 85. 44, 40, 41. For the last verse cf. *ib.* 37.]

and, inconsistently enough, directs the mantles to be tied before the bridegroom has clothed the bride. After the donation has been accepted as above mentioned, the bride's father should tie a knot in the bridegroom's mantle over the presents given with the bride, while the affianced pair are looking at each other. The cow is then released in the manner before described; a libation of water is made; and the bride's father meditates the *Gáyatrí*, and ties a knot with the skirts of the bride's and bridegroom's mantles, after saying, "Ye must be "inseparably united in matters of duty, wealth, and love." The bridegroom afterwards clothes the bride with the following ceremonies.

He goes to the principal apartment of the house, prepares a sacrificial fire in the usual mode, and hallows the implements of sacrifice. A friend of the bridegroom walks round the fire, bearing a jar of water, and stops on the south side of it: another does the same, and places himself on the right hand of the first. The bridegroom then casts [212] four double handfuls of rice, mixed with leaves of *śamí*,[1] into a flat basket: near it he places a stone and mullar, after formally touching them, and then entering the house, he causes the bride to be clothed with a new waistcloth and scarf, while he recites the subjoined prayers: "May those generous women who spun "and wound the thread, and who wove the warp and weft of "this cloth, generously clothe thee to old age: long-lived "woman! put on this raiment." "Clothe her: invest her "with apparel: prolong her life to great age. Mayest thou "live a hundred years. As long as thou livest, amiable "woman! revere [that is, carefully preserve] beauty and "wealth." The first of these prayers is nearly the same with that which is used by the followers of the *Yajus*, when the scarf is put on the bride's shoulder. It is preceded by a different one, which is recited while the waistcloth is wrapped round her: "Mayest thou reach old age: Put on this raiment.

[1] *Adenanthera aculeata.*

"Be lovely: be chaste. Live a hundred years. Invite [that "is, preserve and obtain] beauty, wealth, and male offspring. "Damsel! put on this apparel." Afterwards the following prayer is recited: "May the assembled gods unite our hearts. "May the waters unite them. May air unite us. May the "creator unite us. May the god of love unite us."

But, according to the followers of the *Sámaveda*, the bridegroom, immediately after the scarf has been placed on the bride's shoulder, conducts her towards the sacrificial fire, saying, "Soma [the regent of the moon] gave her to the "sun:[1] the sun gave her to the regent of fire: fire has given "her to me, and with her, wealth and male offspring." The bride then goes to the western side of the fire and [213] recites the following prayer, while she steps on a mat made of *Viraṇa* grass[2] and covered with silk: "May our lord assign "me the path by which I may reach the abode of my lord." She sits down on the edge of the mat; and the bridegroom offers six oblations of clarified butter, reciting the following prayers, while the bride touches his shoulder with her right hand. 1. "May fire come, first among the gods; may it "rescue her offspring from the fetters of death; may Varuṇa, "king [of waters], grant that this woman should never be- "moan a calamity befalling her children." 2. "May the "domestic perpetual fire guard her; may it render her pro- "geny long-lived; may she never be widowed; may she be "mother of surviving children; may she experience the joy "of having male offspring." 3. "May heaven protect thy "back; may air, and the two sons of Aświní, protect thy "thighs; may the sun protect thy children while sucking "thy breast; and Vṛihaspati protect them until they wear "clothes; and afterwards may the assembled gods protect "them." 4. "May no lamentation arise at night in thy abode;

[1] Guṇavishṇu here explains *Gandharba* by the word *Áditya*, which may signify the sun, or a deity in general.

[2] *Andropogon aromaticum* or *muricatum*.

"may crying women enter other houses than thine; mayest "thou never admit sorrow to thy breast; mayest thou prosper "in thy husband's house, blest with his survival, and viewing "cheerful children." 5. "I lift barrenness, the death of "children, sin, and every other evil, as I would lift a chaplet "off thy head; and I consign the fetters [of premature death] "to thy foes." 6. "May death depart from me, and im- "mortality come; may [Yama], the child of the sun, render "me fearless. Death! follow a different path from that by "which we proceed, and from that which the gods travel. To "thee who seest and who hearest, I call, saying, hurt not "our offspring, nor our progenitors. [214] And may this "oblation be efficacious." The bridegroom then presents oblations, naming the three worlds, separately and conjointly, and offers either four or five oblations to fire and to the moon. The bride and bridegroom then rise up, and he passes from her left side to her right, and makes her join her hands in a hollow form.

The rice,[1] which had been put into a basket, is then taken up, and the stone is placed before the bride, who treads upon it with the point of her right foot, while the bridegroom recites this prayer: "Ascend this stone; be firm like this stone; "distress my foe, and be not subservient to my enemies." The bridegroom then pours a ladleful of clarified butter on her hands; another person gives her the rice, and two other ladlefuls of butter are poured over it. She then separates her hands, and lets fall the rice on the fire, while the following text is recited: "This woman, casting the rice into the fire, "says, May my lord be long lived, may we live a hundred "years, and may all my kinsmen prosper: be this oblation "efficacious." Afterwards the bridegroom walks round the fire, preceded by the bride, and reciting this text: "The girl

[1] From this use of raw rice at the nuptial ceremony, arises the custom of presenting rice, tinged with turmeric, by way of invitation to guests whose company is requested at a wedding.

"goes from her parents to her husband's abode, having strictly "observed abstinence [for three days from factitious salt, etc.]. "Damsel! by means of thee we repress foes, like a stream of "water." The bride again treads on the stone, and makes another oblation of rice, while the subjoined prayer is recited: "The damsel has worshipped the generous sun and the regent "of fire; may he and the generous sun liberate her and me "from this [family]; be this oblation efficacious." They afterwards walk round the fire as before. Four or five other oblations are made with the same [215] ceremonies and prayers, varying only the title of the sun, who is here called *Púshan*, but was entitled *Aryaman* in the preceding prayer. The bridegroom then pours rice out of the basket into the fire, after pouring one or two ladlefuls of butter on the edge of the basket; with this offering he simply says, "May this oblation to fire be efficacious."

The oblations and prayers directed by the *Yajurveda*, previous to this period of the solemnity, are very different from those which have been here inserted from the *Sámaveda;* and some of the ceremonies, which will be subsequently noticed, are anticipated by the priests, who follow the *Yajus*.

Twelve oblations are made with as many prayers. 1. "May "this oblation be efficacious, and happily conveyed to that "being who is fire in the form of a celestial quirister, who is "accompanied by truth, and whose abode is truth; may he "cherish our holy knowledge and our valour." 2. "Efficacious "be this oblation to those delightful plants, which are the "nymphs of that being who is fire in the form of a celestial "quirister, who is accompanied by truth, and whose abode is "truth." 3 and 4. The foregoing prayers are thus varied: "To that being who is the sun, in the form of a celestial "quirister, and who consists wholly of the *Sámaveda*." "Those "enlivening rays, which are the nymphs of that sun." 5 and 6. "That being who is the moon in the form of a celestial "quirister, and who is a ray of the sun, and named *Sush-*

"*maṇa.*" "Those asterisms which are the nymphs of the "moon, and are called *Bhekuri.*"[1] 7 and 8. "That being who "is air, constantly [216] moving and travelling every where." "Those waters which are the nymphs of air, and are termed "invigorating." 9 and 10. "That being who is the solemn "sacrifice in the form of a celestial quirister; who cherishes all "beings, and whose pace is elegant." "Those sacrificial "fees, which are the nymphs of the solemn sacrifice, and "are named thanksgivings." 11 and 12. "That being who "is mind in the form of a celestial quirister, who is the "supreme ruler of creatures, and who is the fabricator of "the universe." "Those holy strains (*Ṛich* and *Sáman*) who "are the nymphs of mind, and are named the means of attain- "ing wishes."

Thirteen oblations are next presented, during the recital of as many portions of a single text. "May the supreme ruler "of creatures, who is glorious in his victories over [hostile] "armies, grant victory to Indra, the regent of rain. All "creatures humbly bow to him; for he is terrible: to him are "oblations due. May he grant me victory, knowledge, reflec- "tion, regard, self-rule, skill, understanding, power, [returns "of] the conjunction and opposition of the sun and moon, "and holy texts (*Vṛihat* and *Rathantara*)."[2]

Eighteen oblations are then offered, while as many texts are meditated; they differ only in the name of the deity that is invoked. 1. "May fire, lord of [living] beings, protect "me in respect of holiness, valour, and prayer, and in regard "to ancient privileges, to this solemn rite, and to this invoca- "tion of deities." 2. "May Indra, lord or regent of the "eldest (that is, of the best of beings) protect me," etc. 3.

[1] This term is not expounded by the commentator. *Bha* signifies an asterism: but the meaning of the compound term is not obvious. *Sushmaṇa* bears some affinity to *Sushumṇa*, mentioned in a former essay; but neither of these names is explained in the commentaries which I have consulted. [The Váj. S. xviii. 40 reads *Sushumṇaḥ; Bhekurayaḥ* is explained by the Comm. as 'the enlighteners,' i.e. the moon-beams.]

[2] Texts of the *Sámaveda* so named.

"Yama, lord of the earth." 4. "Air, lord of the sky." 5. "The sun, lord of heaven." 6. "The moon, lord of stars." 7. "Vṛihaspati, lord [that is, preceptor] of Brahmá [and "other deities]." 8. "Mi[217]tra (the sun), lord of true "beings." 9. "Varuṇa, lord of waters." 10. "The ocean, "lord of rivers." 11. "Food, lord of tributary powers." 12. "Soma (the moon), lord of plants." 13. "Savitṛi (the "generative sun), lord of pregnant females." 14. "Rudra "(Śiva), lord of [deities, that bear the shape of] cattle." 15. "The fabricator of the universe, lord of forms." 16. "Vishṇu, "lord of mountains." 17. "Winds (*Maruts*), lords of (*gaṇas*) "sets of divinities." 18. "Fathers, grandfathers, remoter "ancestors, more distant progenitors, their parents, and grand-"sires."

Oblations are afterwards made, with prayers corresponding to those which have been already cited from the *Sámaveda*. 1. "May fire come, first among the gods," etc. 2. "May the "domestic perpetual fire guard her," etc. 3. "Fire, who dost "protect such as perform sacrifices! grant us all blessings in "heaven and on earth: grant unto us that various and ex-"cellent wealth, which is produced on this earth and in "heaven." 4. "O best of luminaries! Come, show us an easy "path, that our lives may be uninjured. May death depart from "me, and immortality come. May the child of the sun render "me fearless." 5. "Death! follow a different path," etc.

The bride offers the oblations of rice mixed with leaves of *śamí*,[1] letting fall the offerings on the fire in the manner before mentioned, and with the same prayers, but recited in a reversed order and a little varied. 1. "The damsel has "worshipped the generous sun in the form of fire; may that "generous sun never separate her from this husband." 2. "This woman, casting the rice into the fire, says, May my "lord be long-lived; may my kinsmen reach old age." 3. "I cast this rice into the fire, that it may become a [218]

[1] *Adenanthera aculeata.*

"cause of thy prosperity: may fire assent to my union with "thee."[1]

According to the followers of the *Yajurveda*, the bridegroom now takes the bride's right hand, reciting a text which will be subsequently quoted. The bride then steps on a stone while this text is recited: "Ascend this stone: be firm like "this stone. Subdue such as entertain hostile designs against "me, and repel them." The following hymn is then chanted. "Charming Saraswatí, swift as a mare! whom I celebrate in "face of this universe, protect this [solemn rite]. O thou! "in whom the elements were produced, in whom this universe "was framed, I now will sing that hymn [the nuptial text] "which constitutes the highest glory of women." The bride and bridegroom afterwards walk round the fire, while the following text is recited: "Fire! thou didst first espouse this "female sun (this woman, beautiful like the sun); now let "a human being again espouse her by thy means. Give "her, O fire! with offspring, to a [human] husband." The remainder of the rice is then dropped into the fire as an oblation to the god of love.

The next ceremony is the bride's stepping seven steps. It is the most material of all the nuptial rites; for the marriage is complete and irrevocable, so soon as she has taken the seventh step, and not sooner. She is conducted by the bridegroom, and directed by him to step successively into seven circles while the following texts are uttered: 1. "May Vishṇu cause "thee to take one step for the sake of obtaining food." 2. "May Vishṇu cause thee to take one step for the sake of "obtaining strength." 3. "Three steps for the sake of solemn "acts of religion." 4. "Four steps for the sake of obtaining "happiness." 5. "Five [219] steps for the sake of cattle." 6. "Six steps for the sake of increase of wealth." 7. "Seven "steps for the sake of obtaining priests to perform sacri-

[1] This version is conformable to a different commentary from that which was followed in the former translation.

"fices."[1] The bridegroom then addresses the bride, "Having "completed seven steps, be my companion. May I become "thy associate. May none interrupt thy association with me. "May such as are disposed to promote our happiness, confirm "thy association with me." The bridegroom then addresses the spectators: "This woman is auspicious: approach and "view her; and having conferred [by your good wishes] "auspicious fortune on her, depart to your respective abodes."

Then the bridegroom's friend, who stood near the fire bearing a jar of water, advances to the spot where the seventh step was completed, and pours water on the bridegroom's head, and afterwards on the bride's, while a prayer above mentioned is recited: "May waters and all the Gods cleanse "our hearts; may air do so; may the creator do so; may the "divine instructress unite our hearts."[2]

The bridegroom then puts his left hand under the bride's hands, which are joined together in a hollow form, and taking her right hand in his, recites the six following texts: 1. "I "take thy hand for the sake of good fortune, that thou "mayest become old with me, thy husband: may the gene- "rous, mighty, and prolific sun render thee a matron, that I "may be a householder." 2. "Be gentle in thy aspect and "loyal to thy husband; be fortunate in cattle, amiable in thy "mind, and beautiful in thy person; be mother of surviving "sons; be assiduous at the [five] sacraments; be cheerful; and "bring prosperity to our [220] bipeds and quadrupeds." 3. "May the lord of creatures grant us progeny, even unto old "age; may the sun render that progeny conspicuous. Aus- "picious deities have given thee to me: enter thy husband's "abode, and bring health to our bipeds and quadrupeds." 4. "O Indra, who pourest forth rain! render this woman "fortunate and the mother of children: grant her ten sons;

[1] In the *Vajurveda* the texts are varied, so that the third step is for increase of wealth, and the sixth for obtaining happy seasons.

[2] It is here translated according to the gloss of Guṇavishṇu; in the former version I followed the commentary of Halâyudha.

"give her eleven protectors." 5. "Be submissive to thy "husband's father, to his mother, to his sister, and to his "brothers." 6. "Give thy heart to my religious duties: "may thy mind follow mine; be thou consentient to my "speech. May Vṛihaspati unite thee unto me."

The followers of the *Yajurveda* enlarge the first prayer and omit the rest, some of which, however, they employ at other periods of the solemnity. "I take thy hand for the sake of "good fortune, that thou mayest become [illegible]d with me, thy "husband; may the deities, namely, the divine sun (*Aryaman*), and the prolific being (*Savitṛi*), and the god of love, "give thee as a matron unto me, that I may be a householder. "I need the goddess of prosperity. Thou art she. Thou art "the goddess of prosperity. I need her. I am the *Sáman* "[*veda*]: thou art the *Ṛich* [*veda*]. I am the sky: thou art "the earth. Come; let us marry: let us hold conjugal intercourse: let us procreate offspring: let us obtain sons. May "they reach old age. May we, being affectionate, glorious, "and well disposed, see during a hundred years, live a "hundred years, and hear a hundred years."

According to the ritual, which conforms to the *Sámaveda*, the bridegroom sits down near the fire with the bride, and finishes this part of the ceremony by making oblations, while he names the three worlds severally and conjointly. The taking of the bride's hand in marriage is thus completed. In the evening of the same day, so soon as the stars appear, [221] the bride sits down on a bull's hide, which must be of a red colour, and must be placed with the neck towards the east and the hair upwards. The bridegroom sits down near her, makes oblations while he names the three worlds as usual, and then makes six oblations with the following prayers, and each time pours the remainder of the clarified butter on the bride's head. 1. "I obviate by this full oblation all ill marks "in the lines [of thy hands], in thy eye-lashes, and in the "spots [on thy body]." 2. "I obviate by this full oblation

"all the ill marks in thy hair; and whatever is sinful in thy "looking, or in thy crying." 3. "I obviate by this full ob- "lation all that may be sinful in thy temper, in thy speaking, "and in thy laughing." 4. "I obviate by this full oblation "all the ill marks in thy teeth, and in the dark intervals "between them; in thy hands, and in thy feet." 5. "I "obviate by this full oblation all the ill marks on thy thighs, "on thy privy part, on thy haunches, and on the lineaments "of thy figure." 6. "Whatever natural or accidental evil "marks were on all thy limbs, I have obviated all such marks "by these full oblations of clarified butter. May this oblation "be efficacious."

The bride and bridegroom rise up; and he shows her the polar star, reciting the following text: "Heaven is stable; the "earth is stable; this universe is stable; these mountains are "stable; may this woman be stable in her husband's family."[1] The bride salutes the bridegroom, naming herself and family, and adding a respectful interjection. The bridegroom replies, "Be long-lived and happy." Matrons then pour water, mixed with leaves, upon the bride and bridegroom, out of jars which had been previously placed on an altar prepared for the purpose; and the bridegroom again makes oblations with the names of the worlds, by way of closing this part of the ceremony.

[222] The bridegroom afterwards eats food prepared without factitious salt. During this meal he recites the following prayers: 1. "I bind with the fetters of food thy heart and "mind to the gem [of my soul]; I bind them with nourish- "ment, which is the thread of life; I bind them with the knot "of truth." 2. "May that heart, which is yours, become "my heart; and this heart, which is mine, become thy heart." 3. "Since food is the bond of life, I bind thee therewith." The remainder of the food must be then given to the bride.

During the three subsequent days the married couple must

[1] *Dhruva*, the pole, also signifies stable fixed steady, firm.

abstain from factitious salt, live chastely and austerely, and sleep on the ground. On the following day, that is, on the fourth exclusively,[1] the bridegroom conducts the bride to his own house on a carriage or other suitable conveyance. He recites the following text when she ascends the carriage: "O "wife of the sun! ascend this vehicle resembling the beautiful "blossoms of the cotton-tree[2] and butea,[3] tinged with various "tints and coloured like gold, well constructed, furnished "with good wheels, and the source of ambrosia [that is, of "blessings]: bring happiness to thy husband." Proceeding with his bride, he, or some other person for him, recites the following text on their coming to a cross road: "May robbers, "who infest the road, remain ignorant [of this journey]; may "the married [223] couple reach a place of security and diffi- "cult access, by easy roads; and may foes keep aloof."

Alighting from the carriage, the bridegroom leads the bride into the house, chanting the hymn called *Vámadevya*. Matrons welcome the bride, and make her sit down on a bull's hide of the same colour, and placed in the same manner as before. The bridegroom then recites the following prayer: "May kine here produce numerous young; may horses and "human beings do so; and may the deity sit h by whose "favour sacrifices are accomplished with gifts a thousand fold."

The women then place a young child in the bride's lap; they put roots of lotos, or else fruit of different kinds, in his hand. The bridegroom takes up the child, and then prepares a sacrificial fire in the usual manner, and makes eight oblations with the following prayers, preceded and followed by

[1] The Musulmans of India do not scruple to borrow from the Hindus superstitious ceremonies that are celebrated with festivity. They take an active part in the gambols of the *Holi*, and even solicit the favours of the Indian Plutus, at the *Díwali*. The bridal procession, on the fourth day, with all the sports and gambols of the *Chauthí* (*Chaturthí*), is evidently copied from the similar customs of the Hindus. In Bengal the Musulmans have even adopted the premature marriage of infant brides and bridegrooms.

[2] *Bombax heptaphyllum.*

[3] *Butea frondosa.*

the usual oblations to the three worlds. 1. "May there be "cheerfulness here." 2. "May thine own [kindred] be kind "here." 3. "May there be pleasure here." 4. "Sport thou "here." 5. "May there be kindness here with me." 6. "May thine own [kindred] be here, benevolent towards me." 7. "May there be here delight towards me." 8. "Be thou "here joyous towards me." The bride then salutes her father-in-law and the other relatives of her husband.

Afterwards the bridegroom prepares another sacrificial fire, and sits down with the bride on his right hand. He makes twenty oblations with the following prayers, preceded and followed as usual by oblations to the three worlds. The remainder of each ladleful is thrown into a jar of water, which is afterwards poured on the bride's head. 1. "Fire, expiator "of evil! thou dost atone evils for the gods themselves. I, a "priest, approach thee, desirous of soliciting thee to remove "any sinful taint in the beauty of this woman." 2. "Air, "expiator of evil!" etc. 3. "Moon, [224] expiator of evil!" etc. 4. "Sun, expiator of evil!" etc. 5. "Fire, air, moon, "and sun, expiators of evil! ye do atone evils for the gods. I, "a priest, approach thee, desirous of soliciting thee to remove "any sinful taint in the beauty of this woman." 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. "soliciting thee to remove any thing in her person which "might destroy her husband." 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, "any "thing in her person which might make her negligent of "cattle."

The priests who use the *Yajurveda* make only five oblations with as many prayers addressed to fire, air, the sun, the moon, and the *Gandharba* or celestial quirister; praying them to remove any thing in the person of the bride which might be injurious to her husband, to her offspring, to cattle, to the household, and to honour and glory. The following text is recited while the water is poured on the bride's head: "That "blameable portion of thy person which would have been "injurious to thy husband, thy offspring, thy cattle, thy

"household, and thy honour, I render destructive of para-
"mours: may thy body [thus cleared from evil] reach old
"age with me." The bride is then fed with food prepared in a cauldron, and the following text is recited: "I unite thy "breath with my breath; thy bones with my bones; thy flesh "with my flesh; and thy skin with my skin."

The ceremonies of which the nuptial solemnity consists may be here recapitulated. The bridegroom goes in procession to the house where the bride's father resides, and is there welcomed as a guest. The bride is given to him by her father in the form usual at every solemn donation, and their hands are bound together with grass. He clothes the bride with an upper and lower garment, and the skirts of her mantle and his are tied together. The bridegroom makes oblations to fire, and the bride drops rice on it as an oblation. The bridegroom solemnly takes her hand in [225] marriage. She treads on a stone and mullar. They walk round the fire. The bride steps seven times, conducted by the bridegroom, and he then dismisses the spectators, the marriage being now complete and irrevocable. In the evening of the same day the bride sits down on a bull's hide, and the bridegroom points out to her the polar star as an emblem of stability. They then partake of a meal. The bridegroom remains three days at the house of the bride's father: on the fourth day he conducts her to his own house in solemn procession. She is there welcomed by his kindred; and the solemnity ends with oblations to fire.

Among Hindus, a girl is married before the age of puberty. The law even censures the delay of her marriage beyond the tenth year. For this reason, and because the bridegroom too may be an infant, it is rare that a marriage should be consummated until long after its solemnization. The recital of prayers on this occasion constitutes it a religious ceremony; and it is the first of those that are performed for the purpose of expiating the sinful taint which a child is supposed to con-

tract in the womb of his mother. They shall be described in a future essay.

On the practice of immature nuptials, a subject suggested in the preceding paragraph, it may be remarked, that it arises from a laudable motive; from a sense of duty incumbent on a father, who considers as a debt the obligation of providing a suitable match for his daughter. This notion, which is strongly inculcated by Hindu legislators, is forcibly impressed on the minds of parents. But in their zeal to dispose of a daughter in marriage, they do not perhaps sufficiently consult her domestic felicity. By the death of an infant husband, she is condemned to virgin widowhood for the period of her life. If both survive, the habitual bickerings of their infancy are prolonged in perpetual discord.

[226] Numerous restrictions in the assortment of matches impose on parents this necessity of embracing the earliest opportunity of affiancing their children to fit companions. The intermarriages of different classes, formerly permitted with certain limitations, are now wholly forbidden. The prohibited degrees extend to the sixth of affinity; and even the bearing of the same family name is a sufficient cause of impediment.

To conclude the subject of nuptials, I shall only add, that eight forms are noticed by Hindu legislators. (Manu, c. iii.) But one only, which has been here described from the Indian rituals, is now used.[1]

[1] [Some additional information regarding the modern religious ceremonies and social customs of the Hindus, especially in Bengal, may be found in Ward's well-known work, vols. ii., iii.]

VII.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS.

PART I.[1]

[From the *Transactions* of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. pp. 19–43.]

INTRODUCTION.

[227] The Hindus, as is well known, possess various ancient systems of philosophy, which they consider to be orthodox, as consistent with the theology and metaphysics of the *Vedas;* and have likewise preserved divers systems deemed heretical, as incompatible with the doctrines of their holy books.

The two *Mímánsás* (for there are two schools of metaphysics under this title) are emphatically orthodox. The prior one (*púrva*), which has Jaimini for its founder, teaches the art of reasoning, with the express view of aiding the interpretation of the *Vedas.* The latter (*uttara*), commonly called *Vedánta*, and attributed to Vyása, deduces from the text of the Indian scriptures a refined psychology, which goes to a denial of a material world.

The *Nyáya*, of which Gotama is the acknowledged author, furnishes a philosophical arrangement, with strict rules of reasoning, not unaptly compared to the dialectics of the Aristotelian school. Another course of philosophy connected with it bears the denomination of *Vaiśeshika.* Its reputed

[1] Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, June 21, 1823.

author is Kaṇáda; who, like Democritus, maintained the doctrine of atoms.

[228] A different philosophical system, partly heterodox, and partly conformable to the established Hindu creed, is the *Sánkhya:* of which also, as of the preceding, there are two schools; one usually known by that name; the other commonly termed *Yoga*. A succinct exposition of the *Sánkhya* doctrines is the design of the present essay: they are selected for that purpose, on account of the strong affinity which they manifestly bear to the metaphysical opinions of the sects of Jina and Buddha.

Though not strictly orthodox, both *Sánkhyas* and the *Vaiśeshika*, as well as the *Nyáya*, are respected and studied by very rigid adherents of the *Vedas*, who are taught, however, to reject so much as disagrees, and treasure up what is consonant to their scriptures. "In Kaṇáda's doctrine, in the "*Sánkhya*, and in the *Yoga*, that part which is inconsistent with "the *Vedas*, is to be rejected by those who strictly adhere to "revelation. In Jaimini's doctrine, and in Vyása's, there is "nothing whatsoever at variance with scripture."[1]

Heretical treatises of philosophy are very numerous: among which that of Chárváka, which exhibits the doctrine of the *Jaina* sect,[2] is most conspicuous; and next to it, the *Páśupata*.

To them, and to the orthodox systems before mentioned, it is not intended here to advert, further than as they are noticed by writers on the *Sánkhya*, citing opinions of other schools of philosophy, in course of commenting on the text which they are engaged in expounding. It is not my present purpose to exhibit a contrasted view of the tenets of different philosophical schools, but to present to this Society a summary of the doctrine of a single sect; which will serve, however, to elucidate that of several more.

[1] Quotation in Vijnána-Bhikshu's *Kapila-bháshya*. [Hall's ed. p. 4.]

[2] [The Chárvákas are rather materialists, see *Sarva-darśana-sangraha*, § 1. Cf. p. [402] *infra*.]

[229] Of other philosophical sects, the received doctrines in detail may be best reserved for separate notice, in distinct essays to be hereafter submitted to the Society. I must be clearly understood, however, not to pledge myself definitively for that task.

I proceed without further preface to the immediate subject of the present essay.

A system of philosophy, in which precision of reckoning is observed in the enumeration of its principles, is denominated *Sánkhya;* a term which has been understood to signify *numeral*, agreeably to the usual acceptation of *sankhyá*, number: and hence its analogy to the Pythagorean philosophy has been presumed.[1] But the name may be taken to imply, that its doctrine is founded in the exercise of judgment: for the word from which it is derived signifies reasoning or deliberation;[2] and that interpretation of its import is countenanced by a passage of the *Bhárata*,[3] where it is said of this sect of philosophers: "They exercise judgment (*sankhyá*), and "discuss nature and [other] twenty-four principles, and there- "fore are called *Sánkhya*."

The commentator who has furnished this quotation, expounds *sankhyá*, as here importing 'the discovery of soul by 'means of right discrimination.'[4]

The reputed founder of this sect of metaphysical philosophy was Kapila; an ancient sage, concerning whose origin and adventures the mythological fables, which occupy the place of history with the Hindus, are recounted variously. In Gaudapáda's commentary[5] on the *Sánkhya-kárikā*, he is asserted to have been a son of Brahmá; being one of the seven great *Ṛishis*, or saints, named in *Puráṇas* or theogonies as the

[1] [Sir W. Jones's 'Disc. on the Philosophy of the Asiaticks,' *Works*, iii. 236 (8vo. ed.).]

[2] *Am. Kosh.* 1, 1, 4, 11.

[3] [Mahábh. xii. 11409–10.]

[4] *Kapila-bháshya* [pr. ed. p. 8. For other explanations of the term see Hall's Preface to the *Sánkhya-sára*, p. 3.]

[5] [Wilson's ed., p. 1.]

offspring of that deity.[1] His two most [230] distinguished disciples, Ásuri[2] and Panchaśikha,[3] are there exalted to the same rank and divine origin with himself. Another commentator maintains that Kapila was an incarnation of Vishṇu. It had been affirmed by a writer on the *Vedánta*, upon the authority of a passage quoted by him, wherein Kapila, the founder of the *Sánkhya* sect, is identified with Agni (fire), that he was an incarnation, not of Vishṇu, but of Agni. The commentator is not content with the fiery origin conceded to the author. He denies the existence of more than one Kapila; and insists, that the founder of this sect was an incarnation of Vishṇu, born as the son of Devahúti.[4]

In fact, the word *kapila*, besides its ordinary signification of tawny colour, bears likewise that of fire: and upon this ambiguity of sense many legends in the Indian theogonies, concerning the saint of the name, have been grounded; a sample of which will be found quoted by Col. Wilford, in the Asiatic Researches.[5]

A passage which is cited in the commentaries of Gauḍapáda and Váchaspati on the *Kárikâ*, assigns to Kapila intuitive knowledge and innate virtue, with transcendent power and other perfections born with him at the earliest creation:[6] and this is taken by those scholiasts as relating to the founder of the *Sánkhya* sect. But another commentator of the *Kárikâ*, Rámakṛishṇa, who belongs to the theistical branch of this sect, affirms that the passage in question concerns *Í'śwara*, or God, acknowledged by that school.

[1] [Not the ordinary seven 'mind-born Ṛishis,' but another group composed of Sanaka, Sananda (or Sanandana), Sanátana, Ásuri, Kapila, Voḍhu, and Panchaśíkha. Cf. supra, p. 162. Sanandana is quoted *Sút.* vi. 69.]

[2] [I have here and elsewhere corrected Asuri to A'suri.]

[3] [Panchaśikha is called the disciple of A'suri, *Mahábh.* xii. 7890, *Sánkhya K.* 70. But cf. Hall, *Sánkhya-sára*, pref. p. 22.]

[4] Vijnána in *Kap.-bhásh.* [p. 232-3. The quotation comes from *Bhág. Puráṇa*, iii. 24. 36.]

[5] Vol. iii. p. 355.

[6] [He is said to have been born "*dharma-jnána-vairágyaiśwarya-sampannaḥ*," cf Gauḍapáda and Váchaspati (*Kár.* 43); both probably refer to the mention of the rishi Kapila in the S'wetáśwatara Upanishad, v. 2.]

A text quoted in Vyása's commentary on Patanjali's *Yoga-śástra*,[1] and referred by the annotator Váchaspati, as well as a modern scholiast of the *Yoga-śástra*, Nágojí, to Pancha-[231] śikha the disciple of Ásuri, describes Kapila as an incarnation of the Deity: "The holy and first wise one, entering a mind "by himself framed, and becoming the mighty sage (Kapila), "compassionately revealed this science to Ásuri."[2]

It may be questioned whether Kapila be not altogether a mythological personage, to whom the true author of the doctrine, whoever he was, thought fit to ascribe it.

A collection of *sútras*, or succinct aphorisms, in six lectures, attributed to Kapila himself, is extant under the title of *Sánkhya-pravachana*.[3] As an ancient work (whoever may have been really its author), it must doubtless have been expounded by early scholiasts. But the only commentary,[4] which can at present be referred to by name is the *Kapila-bháshya;* or, as the author himself cites it in his other works, *Sánkhya-bháshya*. The title at full length, in the epigraph of the book, is *Kapila-sánkhya-pravachana-śástra-bháshya*.[5] It is by Vijnána-bhikshu, a mendicant ascetic (as his designation imports), who composed a separate treatise on the attainment of beatitude in this life, entitled *Sánkhya-sára*,[6] and wrote many other works; particularly the *Yoga-várttika*, consisting of scholia on Patanjali's *Yoga-śástra*, and the *Brahma-mímánsá-bháshya*, which is a commentary on a treatise of *Vedánti* philosophy.

It appears from the preface of the *Kapila-bháshya*, that a more compendious tract, in the same form of *sútras* or

[1] Patanj. *Sánkh.-prav.* 1, 25.

[2] *Panch.-sútra*, quoted in Vyása's *bháshya*.

[3] [Translated by Ballantyne, with extracts from the Commentaries, Benares, 1852–1856, and again Calcutta, 1865.]

[4] [There is also a commentary by Aniruddha, who probably preceded Vijnána-bhikshu, as the latter seems to refer to him.]

[5] [Edited by Dr. Hall, Calcutta, 1856. A previous edition had appeared at Serampore in 1821; and a new edition has been lately published at Calcutta.]

[6] [Edited by Dr. Hall, Calcutta, 1862. It gives a sketch of the whole system.]

aphorisms, bears the title of *Tattwa-samása*, and is ascribed to the same author, Kapila. The scholiast intimates that both are of equal authority, and in no respect discordant; one being a summary of the greater work, or else this an amplification of the conciser one. The latter was probably [232] the case; for there is much repetition in the *Sánkhya-pravachana*.

It is avowedly not the earliest treatise on this branch of philosophy: since it contains references to former authorities for particulars which are but briefly hinted in the *sútras*;[1] and it quotes some by name, and among them Panchaśikha,[2] the disciple of the reputed author's pupil: an anachronism which appears decisive.

The title of *Sánkhya-pravachana* seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali's *Yoga-śástra*.

If the authority of the scholiast of Kapila may be trusted,[3] the *Tattwa-samása* is the proper text of the *Sánkhya*; and its doctrine is more fully, but separately set forth, by the two ampler treatises, entitled *Sánkhya-pravachana*, which contain a fuller exposition of what had been there succinctly delivered; Patanjali's work supplying the deficiency of Kapila's, and declaring the existence of God, which for argument's sake, and not absolutely and unreservedly, he had denied.

Of the six lectures or chapters into which the *sútras* are distributed, the three first comprise an exposition of the whole *Sánkhya* doctrine. The fourth contains illustrative comparisons, with reference to fables and tales. The fifth is controversial, confuting opinions of other sects; which is the case also with part of the first. The sixth and last treats of the most important parts of the doctrine, enlarging upon topics before touched.

[1] *Kap.* 3, 39 [38, pr. ed.].
[2] *Kap.* 6 [vi. 68. There is a second reference in v. 32].
[3] [*Sankhya Pr. Bhashya*, pp. 7, 110.]

The *Káriká*, which will be forthwith mentioned as the text book or standard authority of the *Sánkhya*, has an allusion to the contents of the fourth and fifth chapters, professing to be a complete treatise of the science, exclusive [233] of illustrative tales and controversial disquisitions.[1] The author must have had before him the same collection of *sútras*, or one similarly arranged. His scholiast[2] expressly refers to the numbers of the chapters.

Whether the *Tattwa-samása*[3] of Kapila be extant, or whether the *sútras* of Panchaśikha be so, is not certain. The latter are frequently cited, and by modern authors on the *Sánkhya*: whence a presumption, that they may be yet forthcoming.[4]

The best text of the *Sánkhya* is a short treatise in verse, which is denominated *Káriká*,[5] as memorial verses of other sciences likewise are. The acknowledged author is Iśwara-kṛishṇa, described in the concluding lines or epigraph of the work itself, as having received the doctrine, through a succession of intermediate instructors, from Panchaśikha, by whom it was first promulgated, and who was himself instructed by Ásuri, the disciple of Kapila.[6]

This brief tract, containing seventy-two stanzas in *áryá* metre, has been expounded in numerous commentaries.

One of these is the work of Gaudapáda, the celebrated scholiast of the *Upanishads* of the *Vedas*, and preceptor of Govinda, who was preceptor of Śankara-áchárya, author likewise of numerous treatises on divers branches of theological philosophy. It is entitled *Sánkhya-bháshya*.[7]

[1] *Kár.* 72.

[2] Náráyaṇa-tirtha.

[3] [The 22 or 25 articles of the *Tattwa-samása* are given in Hall's Pref. to the *Sánkhya-sára*, p. 42. The Comm. on them, the *Sánkhya-krama-dípiká*, was edited and translated by Ballantyne in 1850.]

[4] [Dr. Hall has collected in his preface to the *Sánkhya-sára*, pp. 22–25, all the passages which he could find quoted from Panchas'ikha.]

[5] [Edited and translated by Lassen, Bonn, 1832. Mr. Colebrooke's translation is given at the end of this Essay.]

[6] *Kár.* 70 and 71.

[7] [Edited and translated by Wilson, 1837.]

Another, denominated *Sánkhya-chandriká*, is by Náráyaṇa-tírtha, who seems from his designation to have been an ascetic. He was author likewise of a gloss on the *Yoga-śástra*, as appears from his own references to it.

A third commentary, under the title of *Sánkhya-tattwa-kaumudí*, or more simply *Tattwa-kaumudí*[1] (for so it is cited by later commentators), is by Váchaspati-miśra, a native of Tirhút, author of similar works on various other [234] philosophical systems. It appears from the multiplicity of its copies, which are unusually frequent, to be the most approved gloss on the text.

One more commentary, bearing the analogous but simpler title of *Sánkhya-kaumudí*, is by Ráma-kṛishṇa-bhaṭṭáchárya, a learned and not ancient writer of Bengal; who has for the most part followed preceding commentators, borrowing frequently from Náráyaṇa-tírtha, though taking the title of his commentary from Váchaspati's.

The scholiasts of the *Káriká* have, in more than one place, noticed the text of the *sútras:* thus formally admitting the authority of the aphorisms. The excellence of the memorial verses (*Káriká*), with the gloss of Gauḍapáda and that of Váchaspati-miśra, has been the occasion of both collections of aphorisms (*Tattwa-samása* and *Sánkhya-pravachana*) falling into comparative neglect. They are superseded for a text book of the sect by Íśwara-kṛishṇa's clearer and more compendious work. Both *sútras* and *káriká* may be considered to be genuine and authoritative expositions of the doctrine; and the more especially, as they do not, upon any material point, appear to disagree.

The several works before mentioned are the principal works in which the *Sánkhya* philosophy may be now studied. Others,[2] which are cited by scholiasts, may possibly be yet

[1] [Printed at Calcutta, Samvat 1905, and again A.D. 1871 with a gloss by Táránátha-tarkaváchaspati.]

[2] [For a complete list of Sánkhya works see Hall's Preface to the *Sánkhya-sára*, pp. 39–50.]

forthcoming. But they are at least scarce, and no sufficient account of them can be given upon the strength of a few scattered quotations. Among them, however, may be named the *Rájavárttika*, to which reference is made, as to a work held in much estimation, and which appears to comprise annotations on the *sútras;* and the *Sangraha*, which is cited for parallel passages explanatory of the text, being an abridged exposition of the same doctrines, in the form of a select compilation.

[235] Concerning the presumable antiquity of either Kapila's aphorisms or Íśwara-kṛishṇa's memorial couplets, I shall here only remark, that notices of them, with quotations from both, do occur in philosophical treatises of other schools, whereby their authenticity is so far established.[1]

Besides the *Sánkhya* of Kapila and his followers, another system, bearing the same denomination, but more usually termed the *Yoga-śástra* or *Yoga-sútra*, as before remarked, is ascribed to a mythological being, Patanjali, the supposed author of the great grammatical commentary emphatically named the *Mahábháshya;* and likewise of a celebrated medical treatise termed *Charaka*[2] and other distinguished performances.

The collection of *Yoga-sútras*, bearing the common title of *Sánkhya-pravachana*, is distributed into four chapters or quarters (*páda*): the first, on contemplation (*samádhi*); the second, on the means of its attainment; the third, on the

[1] [Dr. Hall states in his Preface to the *Sánkhya-sára*, p. 8, that "the *sútras* are nowhere cited by S'ankara-áchárya, by Váchaspati-miśra, or by any other writer of considerable antiquity, or even in the *Sarva-darśana-sangraha*, which is dated so low as the fourteenth century," and he would assign to them a modern date. In p. 12 he gives a list of the curious similarities between the language of some of the *sútras* and that of the *Káriká*. I do not know the oldest reference to the *sútras;* the earliest reference to the *Káriká* which I have found is in S'ankara's Comm. on the *Vedánta S.* i. 4, 11.]

[2] [An incarnation of the serpent S'esha is sometimes said to have been the author of *Charaka*, but I do not remember to have seen him identified with Patanjali. Patanjali, however, is mentioned as a medical writer. See Weber, *Berlin Catalogue*, No. 974.]

exercise of transcendent power (*vibhúti*); the fourth, on abstraction or spiritual insulation (*kaivalya*).

An ancient commentary on this fanatical work is forthcoming, entitled *Pátanjala-bháshya*. It is attributed to Veda-vyása, the compiler of the Indian scriptures and founder of the *Vedánti* school of philosophy. Váchaspati-miśra has furnished scholia on both text and gloss. This scholiast has been already noticed as an eminent interpreter of the *Kárikà*: and the same remark is here applicable, that the multiplicity of copies indicates the estimation in which his gloss is held above other scholia.

Another commentary is by Vijnána-bhikshu before mentioned. He refers to it in his other works under the name of *Yoga-várttika*. It probably is extant; for quotations from it occur in modern compilations.

A third commentary, denominated *Rája-mártaṇḍa*, is ascribed in its preface and epigraph to Raṇa-ranga [236] malla, surnamed Bhoja-rája or Bhoja-pati, sovereign of Dhárá, and therefore called *Dháreśvara*. It was probably composed at his court, under his auspices; and his name has been affixed to it in compliment to him, as is no uncommon practice. It is a succinct and lucid exposition of the text.[1]

An ampler commentary by a modern Maháráṣhṭríya Bráhman, named Nágojí-bhaṭṭa Upádhyáya, bears the title of *Patanjali-sútra-vritti*. It is very copious and very clear.[2]

The tenets of the two schools of the *Sánkhya* are on many, not to say most, points, that are treated in both, the same; differing however upon one, which is the most important of all: the proof of existence of supreme God.

The one school (Patanjali's) recognizing God is therefore denominated theistical (*Seśvara-sánkhya*). The other (Kapila's)

[1] [The *Yoga-sútras* were partly translated by Ballantyne, with extracts from this Commentary. The translation has been completed in 'The Paṇḍit.']

[2] [For a fuller list of works on the Yoga see Hall's *Bibliographical Index*, pp. 9–19.]

is atheistical (*Nirîśwara-sánkhya*), as the sects of Jina and Buddha in effect are, acknowledging no creator of the universe nor supreme ruling providence. The gods of Kapila are beings superior to man; but, like him, subject to change and transmigration.

A third school, denominated *Paurâṇika-sánkhya*, considers nature as an illusion; conforming upon most other points to the doctrine of Patanjali, and upon many to that of Kapila. In several of the *Puráṇas*, as the *Matsya*, *Kúrma* and *Vishṇu*, in particular, the cosmogony, which is an essential part of an Indian theogony, is delivered consonantly to this system. That which is found at the beginning of Manu's institutes of law is not irreconcileable to it.[1]

Doctrine of the Sánkhya.

[237] The professed design of all the schools of the *Sánkhya*, theistical, atheistical, and mythological, as of other Indian systems of philosophy, is to teach the means by which eternal beatitude may be attained after death, if not before it.

In a passage of the *Vedas* it is said, "Soul is to be known, "it is to be discriminated from nature: thus it does not come "again; it does not come again."[2] Consonantly to this and to numberless other passages of a like import, the whole scope of the *Vedánta* is to teach a doctrine, by the knowledge of which an exemption from metempsychosis shall be attainable; and to inculcate that as the grand object to be sought, by means indicated.

Even in the aphorisms of the *Nyáya*[3] the same is proposed as the reward of a thorough acquaintance with that philosophical arrangement.

[1] Manu, 1. 14—19.
[2] Gaud. on *Kár.* [Rather Comm. on *Tattwa-kaum.* 2.]
[3] *Got.-sútr.* [i. 1.]

In like manner the Grecian philosophers, and Pythagoras and Plato in particular, taught that "the end of philosophy "is to free the mind from incumbrances which hinder its pro- "gress towards perfection, and to raise it to the contemplation "of immutable truth," and "to disengage it from all animal "passions, that it may rise above sensible objects to the con- "templation of the world of intelligence."[1]

In all systems of the *Sánkhya* the same purpose is propounded. "Future pain," says Patanjali, "is to be prevented. "A clear knowledge of discriminate truth is the way of its "prevention."[2]

It is true knowledge, as Kapila and his followers insist,[3] that alone can secure entire and permanent deliverance from [238] evil: whereas temporal means, whether for exciting pleasure or for relieving mental and bodily sufferance, are insufficient to that end; and the spiritual resources of practical religion are imperfect, since sacrifice, the most efficacious of observances, is attended with the slaughter of animals, and consequently is not innocent and pure; and the heavenly meed of pious acts is transitory.[4]

In support of these positions, passages are cited from the *Vedas* declaring in express terms the attainment of celestial bliss by celebration of sacrifices: "Whoever performs an "*aśwamedha* (or immolation of a horse) conquers all worlds; "overcomes death; expiates sin; atones for sacrilege."[5] In another place, Indra and the rest of the subordinate deities are introduced exulting on their acquisition of bliss. "We have "drunk the juice of asclepias,[6] and are become immortal; we "have attained effulgence; we have learned divine truths. How "can a foe harm us? How can age affect the immortality of

[1] Enfield's Hist. of Phil., i. 382 and 233.
[2] *Pat.* 2. 16. and 26.
[3] *Kap.* 1. 1. *Kár.* 1.
[4] *Kár.* 1.
[5] [Cf. *Taittiríya Sanh.* v. 3. 12. 2.]
[6] *Soma*, the moon-plant: *Asclepias acida.*

"a deathless being?"[1] Yet it appears in divers parts of the Indian scriptures, that, according to Hindu theology, even those deities, though termed immortal, have but a definite duration of life, perishing with the whole world at its periodical dissolution. "Many thousands of Indras and of other "gods have passed away in successive periods, overcome by "time; for time is hard to overcome."[2]

Complete and perpetual exemption from every sort of ill is the beatitude which is proposed for attainment by acquisition of perfect knowledge. "Absolute prevention of all three "sorts of pain," as an aphorism of the *Sánkhya* intimates, "is the highest purpose of soul."[3] Those three sorts are evil proceeding from self, from external beings, or from divine causes: the first is either bodily, as disease of [239] various kinds; or mental, as cupidity, anger, and other passions: the two remaining sorts arise from external sources; one excited by some mundane being; the other, by the agency of a being of a superior order, or produced by a fortuitous cause.

True and perfect knowledge, by which deliverance from evil of every kind is attainable, consists in rightly discriminating the principles, perceptible and imperceptible, of the material world, from the sensitive and cognitive principle which is the immaterial soul. Thus the *Kárikâ* premises, that "the inquiry "concerns means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for "pain is embarrassment. Nor is the inquiry superfluous, "because obvious means of alleviation exist; for absolute and "final relief is not thereby accomplished. The revealed mode "is, like the temporal one, ineffectual: for it is impure; and "it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. "A method, different from both, is preferable; consisting in a "discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of "the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul."[4]

[1] Gaud. on *Kár.* 2. [*Rig. V.* viii. 48. 3;—*amṛita* is properly an epithet, "O immortal one! sc. Soma."] [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Sán.-prav.* 1. 1.

[4] *Kár.* 1 and 2 with Scholia. [Nature is imperceptible, but the principles 2–24 are perceptible to higher beings, if not to man.]

The revealed mode, to which allusion is here made, is not theological doctrine with the knowledge of first principles, insuring exemption from transmigration; but performance of religious ceremonies enjoined in the practical *Vedas*, and especially the immolation of victims, for which a heavenly reward, a place among the Gods, is promised.

It is not pure, observes the scholiast, for it is attended with the slaughter of animals, which if not sinful in such cases, is, to say the least, not harmless. The merit of it, therefore, is of a mixed nature. A particular precept expresses, "slay "the consecrated victim:" but a general maxim ordains, "hurt no sentient being." It is defective, since even the Gods, Indra and the rest, perish at the [240] appointed period. It is in other respects excessive, since the felicity of one is a source of unhappiness to another.

Visible and temporal means, to which likewise reference is made in the text, are medicine and other remedies for bodily ailment; diversion alleviating mental ills; a guard against external injury; charms for defence from accidents. Such expedients do not utterly preclude sufferance. But true knowledge, say Indian philosophers, does so; and they undertake to teach the means of its attainment.

By three kinds of evidence, exclusive of intuition, which belongs to beings of a superior order, demonstration is arrived at, and certainty is attained, by mankind: namely, perception, inference, and affirmation.[1] All authorities among the *Sánkhyas* (Patanjali and Kapila, as well as their respective followers) concur in asserting these. Other sources of knowledge, admitted in different systems of philosophy, are reducible to these three. Comparison, or analogy, which the logicians of Gotama's school add to that enumeration, and tradition and other arguments, which Jaimini[2] maintains (*viz.*

[1] *Kár.* 4. *Pat.* 1, 7. *Kap.* 1 [87].

[2] [For the six pramáṇas of Jaimini's school, cf. *infra*, pp. [303], [304]. Those named in the text are taken from an obscure and probably corrupt passage of Gauḍapáda's Comm.]

capacity, aspect, and privation of four sorts, antecedent, reciprocal, absolute, and total), are all comprehended therein. Other philosophers, who recognize fewer sources of knowledge, as Chárváka, who acknowledges perception only, and the *Vaiśeshikas*, who disallow tradition, are rejected as insufficient authorities.[1]

Inference is of three sorts, equally admitted by the schools of the *Sánkhya* and Gotama's *Nyáya*, and in all distinguished by the same denominations. The consideration of them more properly belongs to the dialectic philosophy than to this, and may therefore be postponed. It will be here sufficient to state the simplest explanation furnished by scholiasts of the *Kárikà* and *Sútras*, without going into the differences which occur in their expositions.

[241] One sort, then, is the inference of an effect from a cause; the second is that of a cause from an effect; the third is deduced from a relation other than that of cause and effect. Examples of them are,—1st. Rain anticipated from a cloud seen gathering. 2nd. Fire concluded on a hill, whence smoke ascends. 3rd. A flower's appropriate colour presumed where its peculiar scent is noticed; or motion of the moon's orb, deduced from observation of it in different aspects; or saltness of the sea, concluded from that of a sample of sea-water; or bloom surmised on mangoe-trees in general, when an individual mangoe-tree is found in blossom.[2]

In regard to the third kind of evidence, tradition or right affirmation,[3] explained as intending true revelation,[4] commentators understand it to mean the *Vedas* or sacred writ, including the recollections of those gifted mortals, who remember passages of their former lives, and call to mind events which occurred to them in other worlds; and excluding, on the other hand, pretended revelations of impostors and barbarians.

[1] Comm. on *Kár.* 5. [The various pramáṇas or sources of knowledge are also discussed in pp. [266], [304], [330], and [403.]

[2] [Cf. Wilson's *Sánkhya Kár.* p. 22.] [3] *Pat.* 1, 7. [4] *Kár.* 4 and 5.

In a dialogue cited from the *Vedas*, one of the interlocutors, the holy Jaigíshavya, asserts his presence, and consequent recollection of occurrences, through ten renovations of the universe (*Mahásarga*).[1]

In a more extended sense, this third kind of evidence is the affirmation of any truth, and comprises every mode of oral information or verbal communication whence knowledge of a truth may be drawn.

From these three sources, by the right exercise of judgment and due application of reasoning, true knowledge is derived, consisting in a discriminative acquaintance with principles; which, in the *Sánkhya* system, are reckoned to be not less than twenty-five; *viz.*

[242] 1. Nature, *Prakṛiti* or *Múla-prakṛiti*, the root or plastic origin of all: termed *Pradhána*, the chief one: the universal, material cause; identified by the cosmogony of the *Puráṇas* (in several of which the *Sánkhya* philosophy is followed) with *Máyá* or illusion; and, by mythologists, with *Bráhmí*, the power or energy of Brahmá. It is eternal matter, undiscrete; undistinguishable, as destitute of parts; inferrible, from its effects: being productive, but no production.

2. Intelligence, called *Buddhi* and *Mahat* or the great one: the first production of nature, increate, prolific; being itself productive of other principles. It is identified by the mythological *Sánkhya* with the Hindu triad of Gods. A very remarkable passage of the *Matsya-puráṇa* cited in the *Sánkhya-sára*, after declaring that the *great* principle is produced "from modified nature," proceeds to affirm, "that the *great* "one becomes distinctly known as three Gods, through the "influence of the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and "darkness; 'being one person, and three Gods,' (*ekà múrtis* "*trayo devàḥ*), namely, Brahmá, Vishṇu, and Maheśwara.

[1] [Váchaspati-misra quotes this from a dialogue between Avadya (Avatya?) and Jaigíshavya.]

"In the aggregate it is the deity; but, distributive, it appertains to individual beings."

3. Consciousness, termed *Ahankára*, or more properly egotism, which is the literal sense of the term. The peculiar and appropriate function of it is (*abhimána*) selfish conviction; a belief that, in perception and meditation, "I" am concerned; that the objects of sense concern ME; in short, that I AM. It proceeds from the intellectual principle, and is productive of those which follow.

4—8. Five subtile particles, rudiments, or atoms, denominated *Tanmátra;* perceptible to beings of a superior order, but unapprehended by the grosser senses of mankind: derived from the conscious principle, and themselves productive of the five grosser elements, earth, water, fire, air, and space.

[243] 9—19. Eleven organs of sense and action, which also are productions of the conscious principle. Ten are external: *viz.* five of sense, and five of action. The eleventh is internal, an organ both of sense and of action, termed *manas* or mind. The five instruments of sensation are, the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. The five instruments of action are, 1st, voice, or the organ of speech; 2nd, the hands; 3rd, the feet; 4th, the excretory termination of the intestines; 5th, the organ of generation. Mind, serving both for sense and action, is an organ by affinity, being cognate with the rest.

These eleven organs, with the two principles of intelligence and consciousness, are thirteen instruments of knowledge: three internal and ten external, likened to three warders and ten gates.[1]

An external sense perceives; the internal one examines; consciousness makes the selfish application; and intellect resolves: an external organ executes.

20—24. Five elements, produced from the five elementary particles or rudiments. 1st. A diffused, etherial fluid (*ákáśa*),

[1] *Kár.* 32—35.

occupying space: it has the property of audibleness, being the vehicle of sound, derived from the sonorous rudiment or etherial atom. 2nd. Air, which is endued with the properties of audibleness and tangibility, being sensible to hearing and touch; derived from the tangible rudiment or aerial atom. 3rd. Fire, which is invested with the properties of audibleness, tangibility, and colour; sensible to hearing, touch, and sight: derived from the colouring rudiment or igneous atom. 4th. Water, which possesses the properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour, and savour; being sensible to hearing, touch, sight, and taste: derived from the savoury rudiment or aqueous atom. 5th. Earth, which unites the [244] properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour, savour, and odour; being sensible to hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell: derived from the odorous rudiment or terrene atom.

25. Soul, termed *Purusha*, *Pumas*,[1] or *Átman*; which is neither produced nor productive. It is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, immaterial.

The theistical *Sánkhya* recognizes the same principles; understanding, however, by *Purusha*, not individual soul alone, but likewise God (*Íśwara*), the ruler of the world.

These twenty-five principles are summarily contrasted in the *Káriká*. "Nature, root of all, is no production. Seven "principles, the GREAT or intellectual one, etc., are productions "and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). "Soul is neither a production nor productive."[2]

To this passage a close resemblance will be remarked in one which occurs at the beginning of Erigena's treatise De Divisione Naturæ, where he distinguishes these four: "That which "creates and is not created; that which is created and creates; "that which is created and creates not; and that which neither "creates nor is created."[3]

In several of the *Upanishads* of the *Vedas* a similar distri-

[1] [*Puns?*]
[2] *Kár.* 3.
[3] J. Scoti Erigenæ *de div. nat. lib.* 5.

bution is affirmed, *viz.* "eight productive principles and sixteen "productions."[1]

It is for contemplation of nature, and for abstraction from it, that union of soul with nature takes place, as the halt and the blind join for conveyance and for guidance (one bearing and directed; the other borne and directing).[2] By that union of soul and nature, creation, consisting in the development of intellect and the rest of the principles, is effected.[3]

The soul's wish is fruition or liberation. For either pur-[245] pose, it is in the first place invested with a subtile person, towards the formation of which the evolution of principles proceeds no further than the elementary rudiments.[4] This is composed then of intellect, consciousness, and mind, as well as the rest of the organs and instruments of life, conjoined with particles, or elementary rudiments, of five sorts: thus seventeen principles enter into its composition.[5]

This person or subtile frame, termed *linga*, *linga-śarira*, or *súkshma-śarira*, is primeval, produced from original nature at the earliest or initial development of principles.[6] It is unconfined; too subtile for restraint or hindrance (and thence termed *átiváhika*, surpassing the wind in swiftness); incapable of enjoyment until it be invested with a grosser body, affected nevertheless by sentiments.

[1] *Garbha*, *Praśna*, and *Maitreya Upanishads*. [The S'wetáśwatara Upanishad is the most direct attempt to reconcile the Sánkhya and the Vedánta.]

[2] ["Nature, as the object to be experienced, depends on Soul the experiencer, and Soul looks to liberation, as it seeks to throw off the three kinds of pain which, though really apart from it, have come to it by its falling under the shadow of intellect through not recognizing its own distinction therefrom" (*Sarva-darś.-sang.*). Bondage, etc., reside in the Intellect, and are only *reflected* in Soul through its proximity. See *Sánkhya-prav.-bháshya*, i. 58.]

[3] [It is this peculiar idea of individual creation which gives to the Sánkhya an apparent resemblance to Berkeley's theory. Every individual soul has been from all eternity in continual connection with Nature, and repeated creations have resulted from this connection. Each soul thus keeps on creating its own world. The material universe, however, has an existence other than that which it possesses from its connection with any particular soul, inasmuch as Hiranyagarbha, the personified sum of existence, may be said to sum up in his ideal creation the separate sub-creations of all inferior beings.]

[4] *Kár.* 40. [5] *Kap.* 3. 9. [6] [It is of atomic size, *Kap.* 3. 14.]

This is termed the rudimental creation (*tanmátra-sarga*).

The notion of an animated atom seems to be a compromise between the refined dogma of an immaterial soul, and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter.

The grosser body, with which a soul clad in its subtile person is invested for the purpose of fruition, is composed of the five elements; or of four, excluding the etherial, according to some authorities; or of one, earth alone, according to others.[1] That grosser body, propagated by generation, is perishable. The subtile person is more durable, transmigrating through successive bodies, which it assumes, as a mimic shifts his disguises to represent various characters.

According to Kapila,[2] as he is interpreted by his scholiast, there is intermediately a corporeal frame composed of the five elements, but tenuous or refined. It is termed [246] *anushṭhána-śarira*,[3] and is the vehicle of the subtile person.

It is this, rather than the subtile person itself, which in Patanjali's *Yoga-śástra* is conceived to extend, like the flame of a lamp over its wick, to a small distance above the skull.

The corporeal creation (*bhautika-sarga*), consisting of souls invested with gross bodies, comprises eight orders of superior beings and five of inferior; which, together with man, who forms a class apart, constitute fourteen orders of beings, distributed in three worlds or classes.

The eight superior orders of beings bear appellations familiar to Hindu theology; *Brahmá*, *Prajápatis*, *Indras*, *Pitṛis*, *Gandharvas*, *Yakshas*, *Rákshasas*, and *Piśáchas;* gods or demigods, demons and evil spirits.

The inferior orders of beings are quadrupeds, distinguished in two orders;[4] birds; reptiles, fishes, and insects; vegetables and unorganic substances.

[1] *Kap.* 3. 17–19. [2] *Kap.* 3. 11, 12. [Cf. Wilson's *Sánkhya K.* p. 134.]
[3] [*Adhishṭhána-śarira?*] [4] [Domestic and wild animals.]

Above is the abode of goodness, peopled by beings of superior orders; virtue prevails there, and consequent bliss, imperfect however, inasmuch as it is transient. Beneath is the abode of darkness or illusion, where beings of an inferior order dwell; stolidity or dulness is there prevalent. Between is the human world, where foulness or passion predominates, attended with continual misery.

Throughout these worlds, sentient soul experiences ill arising from decay and death, until it be finally liberated from its union with person.

Besides the grosser corporeal creation and the subtile or personal, all belonging to the material world, the *Sánkhya* distinguishes an intellectual creation (*pratyaya-sarga* or *bhâva-sarga*), consisting of the affections of intellect, its sentiments or faculties, which are enumerated in four [247] classes, as obstructing, disabling, contenting, or perfecting the understanding, and amount to fifty.

Obstructions of the intellect are error, conceit, passion, hatred, fear: which are severally denominated obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom, and utter darkness. These again are subdivided into sixty-two sorts; error comprising eight species; illusion, as many; extreme illusion, ten; gloom, eighteen; and utter darkness, the same number.

Error, or obscurity, mistakes irrational nature, intellect, consciousness, or any one of the five elementary atoms, for the soul, and imagines liberation to consist in absorption into one of those eight prolific principles.

Conceit, termed illusion, imagines transcendent power, in any of its eight modes, to be deliverance from evil. Thus beings of a superior order, as Indra and the rest of the gods, who possess transcendent power of every sort, conceive it to be perpetual, and believe themselves immortal.

Passion, called extreme illusion, concerns the five objects of sense, sound, tact, colour, savour, and odour; reckoned to be twice as many, as different to man and to superior beings.

Envy or hatred, denominated gloom, relates to the same ten objects of sense, and to eight-fold transcendent power, furnishing the means of their enjoyment.

Fear, named utter darkness, regards the same eighteen subjects, and consists in the dread of ill attendant on their loss by death or by deprivation of power.

Disability of intellect, which constitutes the second class, comprising twenty-eight species, arises from defect or injury of organs, which are eleven: and to these eleven sorts are added the contraries of the two next classes, containing the one nine, and the other eight species, making a total of twenty-eight. Deafness, blindness, deprivation of taste, [248] want of smell, numbedness, dumbness, handlessness, lameness, costiveness, impotence, and madness, are disabilities preventing performance of functions.

Content or acquiescence, which forms the third class, is either internal or external: the one four-fold, the other five-fold; viz. *internal*, 1st. Concerning nature; as, an opinion that a discriminative knowledge of nature is a modification of that principle itself, with a consequent expectation of deliverance by the act of nature. 2nd. Concerning the proximate cause; as a belief that ascetic observances suffice to ensure liberation. 3rd. Concerning time; as a fancy that deliverance will come in course, without study. 4th. Concerning luck; as a supposition that its attainment depends on destiny. *External* acquiescence relates to abstinence from enjoyment upon temporal motives: namely, 1st, aversion from the trouble of acquisition; or, 2nd, from that of preservation; and, 3rd, reluctance to incur loss consequent on use; or, 4th, evil attending on fruition; or, 5th, offence of hurting objects by the enjoyment of them.

The perfecting of the intellect is the fourth class, and comprises eight species. Perfection consists in the prevention of evil; and this being three-fold, its prevention is so likewise; as is the consequent perfection of the understanding. This is

direct. The remaining five species are indirect, *viz.* reasoning; oral instruction; study; amicable intercourse; and purity, internal and external (or according to another interpretation, liberality). They are means of arriving at perfection.

The *Sánkhya*, as other Indian systems of philosophy, is much engaged with the consideration of what is termed the three qualities (*guṇa*): if indeed quality be here the proper import of the term; for the scholiast of Kapila understands it as meaning, not quality or accident, but substance, [249] a modification of nature, fettering the soul; conformably with another acceptation of *guṇa*, signifying a cord.[1]

The first, and highest, is goodness (*sattwa*). It is alleviating, enlightening, attended with pleasure and happiness; and virtue predominates in it. In fire it is prevalent; wherefore flame ascends, and sparks fly upwards. In man, when it abounds, as it does in beings of a superior order, it is the cause of virtue.

The second and middlemost is foulness or passion (*rajas* or *tejas*). It is active, urgent, and variable; attended with evil and misery. In air it predominates; wherefore wind moves transversely. In living beings it is the cause of vice.

The third and lowest is darkness (*tamas*). It is heavy and obstructive; attended with sorrow, dulness, and illusion. In earth and water it predominates, wherefore they fall or tend downwards. In living beings it is the cause of stolidity.

These three qualities are not mere accidents of nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition.[2] "We "speak of the qualities of nature as we do of the trees of "a forest," say the *Sánkhyas*.[3] In the *Vedas* they are pronounced to be successive modifications, one of the other: "All "was darkness: commanded to change, darkness took the

[1] Vijnán. on *Kap.* 1. 60. [Hall's ed. p. 45.]

[2] [Nature is described as the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*; production takes place as soon as any one predominates. *Sút.* vi. 42.]

[3] *Sánkhya-sára* [Hall's ed. p. 12].

"taint of foulness; and this, again commanded, assumed the "form of goodness."[1]

They co-operate for a purpose, by union of opposites: as a lamp, which is composed of oil, a wick, and flame,[2] substances inimical and contrary.

Taking the three qualities by which nature is modified, for principles or categories, the number, before enumerated, is raised to twenty-eight; as is by some authorities maintained.[3]

[250] To the intellect appertain eight modes, effects, or properties: four partaking of goodness; namely, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power; and four which are the reverse of those, and partake of darkness, *viz.* sin, error, incontinency, and powerlessness.

Virtue here intends moral or religious merit. Knowledge is either exterior or interior; that is, temporal or spiritual. Interior or spiritual knowledge discriminates soul from nature, and operates its deliverance from evil. Exterior or temporal knowledge comprehends holy writ, and every science but self-knowledge.

Dispassion likewise is either exterior or interior; as proceeding from a temporal motive, aversion from trouble: or a spiritual impulse, the conviction that nature is a dream, a mere juggle and illusion.

Power is eight-fold: consisting in the faculty of shrinking into a minute form, to which every thing is pervious; or enlarging to a gigantic body; or assuming levity (rising along a sunbeam to the solar orb); or possessing unlimited reach of organs (as touching the moon with the tip of a finger); or irresistible will (for instance, sinking into the earth, as easily as in water); dominion over all beings animate or inanimate; faculty of changing the course of nature; ability to accomplish every thing desired.

The notion, that such transcendent power is attainable by

[1] [Maitri Upanishad, v. 2.] [2] *Kár.* 13.
[3] Vijnána-bhikshu in *Sánkhya-sára* and *Kapila-bháshya.*

man in this life, is not peculiar to the *Sánkhya* sect: it is generally prevalent among the Hindus, and amounts to a belief of magic. A *Yogí*, imagined to have acquired such faculties, is, to vulgar apprehension, a sorcerer, and is so represented in many a drama and popular tale.

One of the four chapters of Patanjali's *Yoga-śástra* (the third), relates almost exclusively to this subject, from which it takes its title. It is full of directions for bodily and mental exercises, consisting of intensely profound me [251] ditation on special topics, accompanied by suppression of breath and restraint of the senses, while steadily maintaining prescribed postures. By such exercises, the adept acquires the knowledge of every thing past and future, remote or hidden; he divines the thoughts of others; gains the strength of an elephant, the courage of a lion, and the swiftness of the wind; flies in the air, floats in water, dives into the earth, contemplates all worlds at one glance, and performs other strange feats.

But neither power, however transcendent, nor dispassion, nor virtue, however meritorious, suffices for the attainment of beatitude. It serves but to prepare the soul for that absorbed contemplation, by which the great purpose of deliverance is to be accomplished.

The promptest mode of attaining beatitude through absorbed contemplation, is devotion to GOD; consisting in repeated muttering of his mystical name, the syllable *om*, at the same time meditating its signification. It is this which constitutes efficacious devotion; whereby the deity, propitiated, confers on the votary the boon that is sought; precluding all impediments, and effecting the attainment of an inward sentiment that prepares the soul for liberation.

"GOD, Íśwara, the supreme ruler," according to Patanjali,[1] "is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls; unaffected by "the ills with which they are beset; unconcerned with good "or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or

[1] *Yoga-śástra* 1. 23—24 and 26—29.

"passing thoughts. In him is the utmost omniscience.[1] He "is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning "(the deities of mythology); himself infinite, unlimited by "time."

Kapila, on the other hand, denies an Íśwara, ruler of the world by volition: alleging that there is no proof of [252] God's existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed.[2] He acknowledges, indeed, a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute; source of all individual intelligences, and origin of other existences successively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, "that "the truth of such an Íśwara is demonstrated:"[3] the creator of worlds, in such sense of creation: for "the existence of "effects," he says, "is dependent upon consciousness, not upon "Íśwara;" and "all else is from the great principle, intellect."[4] Yet that being is finite; having a beginning and an end; dating from the grand development of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an infinite being, creator and guide of the universe by volition, Kapila positively disavows.[5] "Detached from nature, un- "affected therefore by consciousness and the rest of nature's "trammels, he could have no inducement to creation; fettered "by nature, he could not be capable of creation. Guidance "requires proximity, as the iron is attracted by the magnet; "and, in like manner, it is by proximity that living souls "govern individual bodies, enlightened by animation as hot "iron is by heat."

Passages of admitted authority, in which God is named, relate, according to Kapila and his followers, either to a liber-

[1] [Rather, "in him the germ of the omniscient becomes infinite." The Yoga considers this to be the proof of a Supreme Being; we see that other properties capable of degrees reach their limit somewhere, as smallness in an atom and magnitude in the ether, so knowledge, which in other beings is less or more, must reach its extreme limit somewhere, i.e. in God. For the Nyáya proof of God's existence see Kusumánjali, v. 1.]

[2] *Kap.* 1. 92—99; 3. 55—57; 5. 2—12; and 6. 64—69.

[3] *Kap.* 3. 57. [4] *Kap.* 6. 64 and 66. [5] *Kap.* 1. [94, 96, 97, 99.]

ated soul or to a mythological deity, or that superior not supreme being whom mythology places in the midst of the mundane egg.

Such is the essential and characteristic difference of Kapila's and Patanjali's, the atheistical and deistical, *Sánkhyas*.

In less momentous matters they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exer- [253] cises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patanjali's *Yoga-śástra* is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions.

The manner in which a knowledge of those principles or categories that are recognized by the *Sánkhyas* may be acquired, is set forth in the *Káriká:* "Sensible objects become "known by perception. It is by inference or reasoning, that "acquaintance with things transcending the senses is attained: "and a truth, which is neither to be directly perceived nor to "be inferred by reasoning, is deduced from revelation. For "various causes, things may be imperceptible or unperceived; "distance, nearness, minuteness; confusion, concealment; "predominance of other matters; defect of organs or inatten- "tion. It is owing to the subtlety of nature, not to the non- "existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended "by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and "the rest of the derivative principles are effects; whence it is "concluded as their cause; in some respects analogous, but in "others dissimilar."[1]

"Effect subsists antecedently to the operation of cause:"[2]

[1] *Kár.* 6. 8.

[2] ["The Saugatas (or Buddhists) say that the existent is produced from the non-existent; the followers of the Nyáya that the (as yet) non-existent is produced from the existent; the Vedántins that the whole creation is an illusion from the existent,

a maxim not unlike that ancient one, that "nothing comes of "nothing;" for it is the material, not the efficient, cause, which is here spoken of.

The reasons alleged by the *Sánkhyas*[1] are, that "what exists "not, can by no operation of a cause be brought into existence:" that is, effects are educts, rather than products. Oil is in the seed of sesamum before it is ex[254]pressed; rice is in the husk before it is peeled; milk is in the udder before it is drawn. "Materials, too, are selected, which are apt for the purpose:" milk, not water, is taken to make curds. "Every thing is not "by every means possible:" cloth, not earthen ware, may be made with yarn. "What is capable, does that to which it is "competent:" a potter does not weave cloth, but makes a jar, from a lump of clay, with a wheel and other implements. "The nature of cause and effect is the same:" a piece of cloth does not essentially differ from the yarn of which it is wove; as an ox does from a horse: barley, not rice or peas, grows out of barley-corns.

"There is a general cause, which is undistinguishable."[2] This position is supported by divers arguments. "Specific "objects are finite;" they are multitudinous and not universal: there must then be a single all-pervading cause. Another argument is drawn from affinity: "homogeneousness indicates "a cause." An earthen jar implies a lump of clay of which it is made; a golden coronet presumes a mass of gold of which it was fabricated: seeing a rigidly abstemious novice, it is readily concluded, says the scholiast, that his parents are of the sacerdotal tribe. There must then be a cause bearing affinity to effects which are seen. Another reason is "existence "of effects through energy:" there must be a cause adequate to the effects. A potter is capable of fabricating pottery: he makes a pot, not a car, nor a piece of cloth. The main argu-

and not a real thing; the Sánkhyas that the existent is produced from the existent." —*Sarva-darś.-sang.*]

[1] *Kár.* 9. [2] *Kár.* 15. 16.

ment of the *Sánkhyas* on this point is "the parting or issuing "of effects from cause, and the re-union of the universe." A type of this is the tortoise, which puts forth its limbs, and again retracts them within its shell. So, at the general destruction or consummation of all things, taking place at an appointed period, the five elements, earth, water, fire, air, and ether, [255] constituting the three worlds, are withdrawn in the inverse order of that in which they proceeded from the primary principles, returning step by step to their first cause, the *chief* and undistinguishable one, which is nature.

It operates by means of the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness. It does so by mixture; as the confluence of three streams forms one river; for example, the Ganges: or as threads interwoven constitute a piece of cloth: and as a picture is a result of the union of pigments. It operates "by modification" too: as water, dropped from a cloud, absorbed by the roots of plants, and carried into the fruit, acquires special flavour, so are different objects diversified by the influence of the several qualities respectively. Thus, from one *chief* cause, which is nature, spring three dissimilar worlds, observes the scholiast, peopled by gods enjoying bliss, by men suffering pain, by inferior animals affected with dulness. It is owing to prevalence of particular qualities. In the gods, goodness prevails, and foulness and darkness are foreign; and therefore are the gods supremely happy. In man, foulness is prevalent, and goodness and darkness are strangers; wherefore man is eminently wretched. In animals, darkness predominates, and goodness and foulness are wanting; and therefore are animals extremely dull.

The existence of soul is demonstrated by several arguments:[1] "The assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use;" as a bed is for a sleeper, a chair for a sitter: that other, who uses it, must be a sensitive being; and the sensitive being is soul. The converse of sensible objects endued with the three quali-

[1] *Kár.* 17.

ties, goodness, foulness, and darkness, indiscriminate, common, inanimate, and prolific, must exist, devoid of qualities, discriminate, and so forth: that is soul. "There must be super-"intendence;" [256] as there is a charioteer to a car: the superintendent of inanimate matter is soul. "There must be "one to enjoy" what is formed for enjoyment: a spectator, a witness of it: that spectator is soul. "There is a tendency "to abstraction:" the wise and unwise alike desire a termination of vicissitude: holy writ and mighty sages tend to that consummation; the final and absolute extinction of every sort of pain: there must then be a being capable of abstraction, essentially unconnected with pleasure, pain, and illusion: and that being is soul.

There is not one soul to all bodies, as a string on which pearls are strung; but a separate soul for each particular body. "Multitude of souls" is proved by the following arguments.[1] "Birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted sever-"ally:" if one soul animated all bodies, one being born, all would be born; one dying, all would die; one being blind, or deaf, or dumb, all would be blind, or deaf, or dumb; one seeing, all would see; one hearing, all would hear; one speaking, all would speak. Birth is the union of soul with instruments, namely, intellect, consciousness, mind and corporeal organs; it is not a modification of soul, for soul is unalterable. Death is its abandonment of them; not an extinction of it, for it is unperishable. Soul then is multitudinous. "Occupations "are not at one time universally the same:" if one soul animated all beings, then all bodies would be stirred by the same influence, but it is not so: some are engaged in virtue, others occupied with vice; some restraining passions, others yielding to them; some involved in error, others seeking knowledge. Souls therefore are numerous. "Qualities affect "differently;" one is happy; another miserable; and again, another stupid. The gods are ever happy; man, [257] un-

[1] *Kár.* 18.

happy; inferior animals, dull. Were there but one soul, all would be alike.

The attributes of the several principles, material and immaterial, discrete and undiscrete, perceptible and imperceptible, are compared and contrasted. "A discrete principle," as is affirmed by the *Sánkhyas*,[1] "is causable;" it is uneternal, "inconstant," one while apparent, at another time evanescent: it is "unpervading," not entering into all; for effect is possessed with its cause, not cause with its effect: it is acted upon, and "mutable," changing from one body to another: it is "multitudinous;" for there are so many minds, intellects, etc., as there are souls animating bodies: it is "supported," resting upon its cause: it is involvable, "merging" one into another, and implying one the other; it is "conjunct," consisting of parts or qualities; as sound, taste, smell, etc.: it is "governed," or dependent on another's will.

"The undiscrete principle" is in all these respects the reverse: it is causeless, eternal, all pervading, immutable, or unacted upon; single, as being the one cause of three orders of beings; unsupported (relying but on itself); uninvolvable (not merging or implying); unconjunct; consisting of no parts; self-ruled.

Discrete principles, as well as the undiscrete one, have the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness: the one (nature) having them in its own right, as its form or properties; the rest, because they are its effects: as black yarn makes black cloth. They are undiscriminating or "indiscriminate;" not distinguishing quality from quality, and confounding nature with qualities: for nature is not distinct from itself, nor are qualities separate from it. They are "objects" of apprehension and enjoyment for every [258] soul, external to discriminative knowledge, but subjects of it. They are "common," like an utensil, or like a harlot. They are "irrational" or unsentient; unaware of pain or pleasure: from an insensible

[1] *Kár.* 10, 11.

lump of clay comes an insensible earthen pot. They are "prolific;" one producing or generating another: nature producing intellect, and intellect generating consciousness, and so forth.

Soul, on the contrary, is devoid of qualities; it is discriminative; it is no object of enjoyment; it is several or peculiar; it is sensitive, aware of pain and pleasure; unprolific, for nothing is generated by it.

In these respects it differs from all the other principles. On certain points it conforms with the undiscrete principle, and differs from the discrete: in one regard it agrees with these and disagrees with the other: for it is not single, but on the contrary multitudinous; and it is causeless, eternal, pervading, immutable, unsupported, unmerging or unimplying, unconjunct (consisting of no parts), self-governed.

The attributes of the perceptible, discrete principles and of the undiscrete, indefinite one, are considered to be proved[1] by the influence of the three qualities in one instance, and their absence in the converse; and by conformity of cause and effect: an argument much and frequently relied upon. It concerns the material, not the efficient, cause.

From the contrast between soul and the other principles, it follows, as the *Kárikâ*[2] affirms, "that soul is witness, by-"stander, spectator, solitary and passive. Therefore, by reason "of union with it, insensible body seems sensible: and, though "the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the "agent."

"Though inanimate, nature performs the office of preparing "the soul for its deliverance, in like manner as it is [259] a "function of milk, an unintelligent substance, to nourish the "calf."[3]

Nature is likened to a female dancer, exhibiting herself to soul as to an audience, and is reproached with shamelessness for repeatedly exposing herself to the rude gaze of the spec-

[1] *Kár.* 14. [2] *Kár.* 19. 20. [3] *Kár.* 57.

tator. "She desists, however, when she has sufficiently shewn "herself. She does so, because she has been seen; he desists, "because he has seen her. There is no further use for the "world:"[1] yet the connexion of soul and nature still subsists.

By attainment of spiritual knowledge through the study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, single truth is learned: so the *Kárikâ* declares[2] that "neither I AM, nor is "aught MINE, nor do I exist."

All which passes in consciousness, in intellect is reflected by the soul, as an image which sullies not the crystal, but appertains not to it. "Possessed of this self-knowledge, soul "contemplates at ease nature thereby debarred from prolific "change, and precluded therefore from every other form and "effect of intellect, but that spiritual saving knowledge."[3]

"Yet soul remains awhile invested with body; as the potter's "wheel continues whirling after the pot has been fashioned, by "force of the impulse previously given to it. When separa- "tion of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length "takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is abso- "lute and final deliverance accomplished."[4]

"[5]Thus," concludes the *Kárikâ*, "this abstruse knowledge, "adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, dura- [260] "tion, and termination of beings are considered, has "been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint. The sage "compassionately taught it to Ásuri, who communicated it to "Panchaśikha, and by him it was promulgated to mankind."[6]

[1] *Kár.* 59, 61, 66. [2] *Kár.* 64. [3] *Kár.* 65.
[4] *Kár.* 67, 68. [5] *Kár.* 69, 70.
[6] [For further information on the Sánkhya philosophy see Ballantyne's translation of the *Sútras*, Wilson's edition of the *Sánkhya-kárikâ*, Hall's *Rational Refutation*, sect. i., and Banerjea's *Dialogues*.]

Translation of the Sánkhya-kárikâ.[1]

I.—The inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment: nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.

II.—The revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.

III.—Nature, the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the Great or intellectual one, etc., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

IV.—Perception, inference, and right affirmation, are admitted to be threefold proof; for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof that belief of that which is to be proven results.

V.—Perception is ascertainment of particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. Right affirmation is true revelation.

VI.—Sensible objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained: and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.

VII.—From various causes things may be imperceptible (or

[1] [This translation was originally prepared for the Oriental Translation Society, and it was afterwards published in 1837 with Wilson's translation of Gaudapáda's Commentary. It is inserted here to complete Mr. Colebrooke's view of the Sánkhya philosophy.]

unperceived); excessive distance, (extreme) nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects, predominance of other matters, and intermixture with the like.

VIII.—It is owing to the subtilty (of nature), not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative principles are effects; (whence it is concluded as their cause) in some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar.

IX.—Effect subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause); for what exists not, can by no operation of cause be brought into existence. Materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose: every thing is not by every means possible: what is capable, does that to which it is competent; and like is produced from like.

X.—A discrete principle is causable, it is inconstant, unpervading, mutable, multitudinous, supporting, mergent, conjunct, governed. The undiscrete one is the reverse.

XI.—A discrete principle, as well as the chief (or undiscrete) one, has the three qualities: it is indiscriminative, objective, common, irrational, prolific. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse.

XII.—The qualities respectively consist in pleasure, pain, and dulness; are adapted to manifestation, activity, and restraint; mutually domineer; rest on each other; produce each other; consort together; and are reciprocally present.

XIII.—Goodness is considered to be alleviating and enlightening: foulness, urgent and versatile: darkness, heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp, they co-operate for a purpose (by union of contraries).

XIV.—Indiscriminativeness and the rest (of the properties of a discrete principle) are proved by the influence of the three qualities, and the absence thereof in the reverse. The undiscrete principle, moreover (as well as the influence of the three

qualities), is demonstrated by effect possessing the properties of its cause (and by the absence of contrariety).

XV.—Since specific objects are finite; since there is homogeneousness; since effects exist through energy; since there is a parting (or issue) of effects from cause, and a reunion of the universe,—

XVI.—There is a general cause, which is undiscrete. It operates by means of the three qualities, and by mixture, by modification, as water; for different objects are diversified by influence of the several qualities respectively.

XVII.—Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use; since the converse of that which has the three qualities, with other properties (before mentioned), must exist; since there must be superintendence; since there must be one to enjoy; since there is a tendency to abstraction; therefore, soul is.

XVIII.—Since birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally; since occupations are not at once universal; and since qualities affect variously; multitude of souls is demonstrated.

XIX.—And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows, that soul is witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, and passive.

XX.—Therefore, by reason of union with it, insensible body seems sensible; and though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent.

XXI.—For the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction, the union of both takes place, as of the halt and blind. By that union a creation is framed.

XXII.—From nature issues the great one; thence egotism; and from this the sixteenfold set: from five among the sixteen proceed five elements.

XXIII.—Ascertainment is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power are its faculties, partaking of goodness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse.

XXIV.—Consciousness is egotism. Thence proceeds a two-

fold creation. The elevenfold set is one: the five elemental rudiments are the other.

XXV.—From consciousness, affected by goodness, proceeds the good elevenfold set: from it, as a dark origin of being, come elementary particles: both issue from that principle affected by foulness.[1]

XXVI.—Intellectual organs are, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin: those of action are, the voice, hands, feet, the excretory organ, and that of generation.

XXVII.—(In this set is) mind, which is both (an organ of sensation and of action). It ponders, and it is an organ as being cognate with the rest. They are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities.

XXVIII.—The function of five, in respect to colour and the rest, is observation only. Speech, handling, treading, excretion, and generation are the functions of five (other organs).

XXIX.—Of the three (internal instruments) the functions are their respective characteristics: these are peculiar to each. The common function of the three instruments is breath and the rest of the five vital airs.

XXX.—Of all four the functions are instantaneous, as well as gradual, in regard to sensible objects. The function of the three (interior) is, in respect of an unseen one, preceded by that of the fourth.

XXXI.—The instruments perform their respective functions, incited by mutual invitation. The soul's purpose is the motive: an instrument is wrought by none.

XXXII.—Instrument is of thirteen sorts. It compasses, maintains, and manifests: what is to be done by it is tenfold, to be compassed, to be maintained, to be manifested.

XXXIII.—Internal instruments are three; external ten, to make known objects to those three. The external organs minister at time present: the internal do so at any time.

[1] [For some valuable remarks on this stanza cf. Hall's Preface to his edition of the *Sánkhya-sára*, p. 30.]

XXXIV.—Among these organs the five intellectual concern objects specific and unspecific. Speech concerns sound. The rest regard all five objects.

XXXV.—Since intellect, with the (other two) internal instruments, adverts to every object, therefore those three instruments are warders, and the rest are gates.

XXXVI.—These characteristically differing from each other, and variously affected by qualities, present to the intellect the soul's whole purpose, enlightening it as a lamp.

XXXVII.—Since it is intellect which accomplishes soul's fruition of all which is to be enjoyed, it is that, again, which discriminates the subtile difference between the chief principle (*pradhána*) and soul.

XXXVIII.—The elementary particles are unspecific: from these five proceed the five elements, which are termed specific; for they are soothing, terrific, or stupefying.

XXXIX.—Subtile (bodies), and such as spring from father and mother, together with the great elements, are three sorts of specific objects. Among these, the subtile bodies are lasting; such as issue from father and mother are perishable.

XL.—(Subtile body), primæval, unconfined, material, composed of intellect, with other subtile principles, migrates, else unenjoying: invested with dispositions, mergent.

XLI.—As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, etc., so neither does subtile person subsist supportless, without specific (or unspecific) particles.

XLII.—For the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it), like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature's influence.

XLIII.—Essential dispositions are innate. Incidental, as virtue and the rest, are considered appurtenant to the instrument. The uterine germ (flesh and blood) and the rest belong to the effect (that is, to the body).

XLIV.—By virtue is ascent to a region above; by vice,

descent to a region below: by knowledge is deliverance; by the reverse, bondage.

XLV.—By dispassion is absorption into nature; by foul passion, migration; by power unimpedim. nt; by the reverse, the contrary.

XLVI.—This is an intellectual creation, termed obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. By disparity of influence of qualities the sorts of it are fifty.

XLVII.—There are five distinctions of obstruction; and, from defect of instruments, twenty-eight of disability: acquiescence is ninefold; perfectness eightfold.

XLVIII.—The distinctions of obscurity are eightfold, as also those of illusion; extreme illusion is tenfold; gloom is eighteenfold, and so is utter darkness.

XLIX.—Depravity of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the intellect, are pronounced to be disability. The injuries of intellect are seventeen, by inversion of acquiescence and perfectness.

L.—Nine sorts of acquiescence are propounded; four internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to luck; five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of) objects.

LI.—Reasoning, hearing, study, prevention of pain of three sorts, intercourse of friends, and purity (or gift) are perfections (or means thereof). The fore-mentioned three are curbs of perfectness.

LII.—Without dispositions there would be no subtile person: without person there would be no pause of dispositions: wherefore a twofold creation is presented, one termed personal, the other intellectual.

LIII.—The divine kind is of eight sorts; the grovelling is fivefold: mankind is single in its class. This, briefly, is the world of living beings.

LIV.—Above, there is prevalence of goodness: below, the creation is full of darkness: in the midst is the predominance of foulness, from Brahmá to a stock.

LV.—There does sentient soul experience pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its person: wherefore pain is of the essence (of bodily existence).

LVI.—This evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively; done for another's sake as for self.

LVII.—As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent (substance), to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief (principle) to liberate the soul.

LVIII.—As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does the undiscrete (principle) to liberate the soul.

LIX.—As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul.

LX.—Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.

LXI.—Nothing, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature: once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul.

LXII.—Verily not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates; but nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates.

LXIII.—By seven modes nature binds herself by herself: by one, she releases (herself), for the soul's wish.

LXIV.—So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist.

LXV.—Possessed of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms.

LXVI.—He desists, because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.

LXVII.—By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and

the rest become causeless; yet soul remains a while invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it.

LXVIII.—When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.

LXIX.—This abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint.

LXX.—This great purifying (doctrine) the sage compassionately imparted to Ásuri, Ásuri taught it to Panchaśikha, by whom it was extensively propagated.

LXXI.—Received by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in Áryá metre by the piously-disposed Íśwara-kṛishṇa, having thoroughly investigated demonstrated truth.

LXXII.—The subjects which are treated in seventy couplets are those of the whole science, comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversial questions.

VIII.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS.

PART II.[1]

[From the *Transactions* of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. pp. 92–118.]

[261] In the preceding essay, the *Sánkhya*, theistical as well as atheistical, was examined. The subject of the present essay will be the dialectic philosophy of Gotama,[2] and atomical of Kaṇáda,[3] respectively called *Nyáya*[4] "reasoning," and *Vaiśeshika* "particular." The first, as its title implies, is chiefly occupied with the metaphysics of logic; the second with physics: that is, with "particulars" or sensible objects; and hence its name.[5] They may be taken generally as parts

[1] Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, Feb. 21, 1824.

[2] [Gotama (or, as the name is often written, Gautama) is sometimes called the son of Utathya (Manu, iii. 16), but in *Mahábh.* i. 4194 he is said to have been the son of Dírghatamas and the grandson of Utathya. He is also called Akshapáda, or Akshacharaṇa; hence Madhava speaks of his system as the Akshapáda-darśana (*Sarva-dars'.-sang.* xi.), and his followers are called Ákshapádáḥ.]

[3] [Another name for Kaṇáda is Káśyapa (see S'ankara-miśra's *Upaskára*, pp. 160, 161; cf. also St. Petersb. Dict. *sub. v.*). He is also called Kaṇabhaksha or Kaṇabhuj, see *infra*, p. [329]; in the *Sarva-darśana-sangraha* his system is spoken of as the Aulúkyadarśana, and his followers are called Aulúkyáḥ in Hemachandra's *Abhidhánachintámaṇi*.]

[4] [*Nyáya* is derived from *ni* + *i*, "that by which we enter into a thing and draw conclusions," cf. *Siddh. Kaum.* ii. 457.]

[5] [Or rather from the peculiar category *viśesha*.]

of one system, supplying each other's deficiencies;[1] commonly agreeing upon such points as are treated by both, yet on some differing, and therefore giving origin to two schools, the *Naiyáyika* and *Vaiśeshika*.

From these have branched various subordinate schools of philosophy; which, in the ardour of scholastic disputation, have disagreed on matters of doctrine or of interpretation. The ordinary distinction between them is that of ancients and moderns; besides appellations derived from the names of their favourite authors, as will be more particularly noticed in another place.

The text of Gotama[2] is a collection of *sútras* or succinct aphorisms, in five books or "lectures," each divided [262] into two "days" or diurnal lessons; and these again subdivided into sections or articles, termed *prakaraṇas*, as relating to distinct topics. It is a maxim, that a section is not to consist of so little as a single *sútra;* and to make good the rule, some stress is occasionally put upon the text, either splitting an aphorism or associating it incongruously.

Kaṇáda's collection of *sútras* is comprised in ten lectures, similarly divided into two daily lessons, and these into *prakaraṇas*, or sections, containing two or more *sútras* relative to the same topic.[3]

[1] [Thus the *Bhásháparichheda*, the great modern text-book of logic in India, is founded on both systems, though the Vaiśeshika preponderates. Vátsyáyana, in his ancient *Nyáya-bháshya*, i. 9, after discussing the twelve "matters to be proven" in the Nyáya, adds: "There is also another set of matters to be proven, substance, quality, action, community, difference, and intimate relation; and the former division is not to be considered as exhaustive by itself. From the right knowledge of this arises supreme bliss, and from the false knowledge thereof arises mundane existence,—thus has it been declared by the Vaiśeshika school." The Comm. on the *Bhásháparichh.*.remarks that "these categories are received among the Vaiśeshikáḥ, and not opposed to those of the followers of the Nyáya." It is not always easy to discriminate accurately between the exact tenets of the Nyáya and the Vaiśeshika, especially in the later schools.]

[2] [The Nyáya Sútras were printed at Calcutta in 1828 with Viśwanatha-bhaṭṭáchárya's Commentary, and a translation of the first four books by Ballantyne, with extracts from the Comm., was published at Benares in 1850–54.]

[3] [The Vaiśeshika Sútras were edited in the Bibl. Ind. (Calcutta, 1861) with

Like the text of other sciences among the Hindus, the *sútras* of Gotama and of Kaṇáda have been explained and annotated by a triple set of commentaries, under the usual titles of *Bháshya*, *Várttika* and *Tíká*. These (the *Bháshya* especially) are repeatedly cited by modern commentators, as well as by writers of separate treatises; but (so far as has come under my immediate notice) without naming the authors; and I cannot adventure, having no present opportunity of consulting the original scholia in a collective form, to assign them to their proper authors, from recollection of former researches.[1]

They are of high authority, and probably of great antiquity; and it frequently becomes a question with the later commenta-

S'ankara-miśra's Comm. and a gloss by the editor, Paṇḍit Jayanáráyaṇa-tarka-panchánana. Prof. Max Müller wrote a paper on the system in the Zeitschrift d. D. Morgenl. Gesell. vi. pp. 1–34 (cf. also his appendix on 'Indian Logic' in Archbishop Thomson's 'Laws of Thought,' 1853); and Röer gave a German translation of the Sútras with extracts from the Comm. *ibid.* xxi. pp. 309–420, xxii. pp. 383–442. Mr. Gough has published an English translation with similar extracts in 'The Paṇḍit,' Benares, 1869–72.]

[1] [We are now enabled to fill up this blank. The original commentary on the Nyáya Sútras, the *Nyáya-bháshya*, was written by Pakshila-swámin, also called Vátsyáyana; this was edited in the Bibl. Ind. by Paṇḍit Jayanáráyaṇa-tarka-panchánana (Calcutta, 1865). We have next the *Nyáya-várttika*, a Commentary on the *Bháshya*, which was written by Uddyotakara-áchárya, to clear away the erroneous interpretations of Dinnága and others (cf. Weber, Zeitschr. d. D. M. G. xxii. 727). I have never seen more than the first three *sútras*, entitled *Nyáya-trisútri-várttika*, but it is quoted on ii. 33 by Viśwanátha. Uddyotakara is mentioned in Subandhu's *Vásavadattá* (p. 235, Calc. ed.), which Dr. Hall has proved, in the preface to his edition of that work, to be fully 1200 years old. Váchaspati-miśra wrote a commentary on the *Várttika* in his *Nyáya-várttika-tátparya-tíká*, and this in its turn has been commented upon by Udayana-áchárya in his *Nyáya-várttika-tátparya-pariśuddhi*. I have endeavoured to prove, in the preface to my translation of the *Kusumánjali*, that Váchaspati-miśra probably lived in the tenth, and Udayana in the twelfth, century. The Vaiśeshika Sútras were annotated by Praśastapáda in the *Praśastapáda-bháshya* or *Dravya-bháshya*, first mentioned by Dr. Hall in his Bibliographical Index (S'ankara-miśra cites him as Prásastadevácháryа); and the same writer (p. 65) mentions three glosses on this work, two anonymous, and one, the *Kiraṇávalí*, by Udayana-áchárya, of which only two books were completed by the author. The *Kiraṇávalí* in its turn has been commented upon by Vardhamána-upádhyáya in his *Kiraṇávalí-prakáśa*. S'ankara-miśra also often mentions a *Vrittikára* (as p. 161, 411, etc.) as an ancient authority. But this Vaiśeshika series has not obtained the same universal acceptance as the Naiyáyika. S'ankara-miśra, the author of the printed Commentary, is a very recent author, as he quotes Jagadíśa's *Anumána-mayúkha*, pp. 154, 392.]

tors, whether a particular passage is to be taken for a *sútra* and part of the text, or for a gloss of the ancient scholiast.

Commentaries which are now at hand, and which have been consulted in the course of preparing the present treatise, are the *Várttika-tátparya-parišuddhi* of the celebrated Udayana-áchárya, and the *Várttika-tátparya-ṭiká* of the no less celebrated Váchaspati-miśra. The more modern scholia of Viśwanátha upon Gotama's text, and Śankara-miśra upon Kaṇáda's, are those to which most frequent reference has been made for the present purpose.

[263] Separate treatises of distinguished authors teach, and amply discuss, the elements of the science. Such are the *Nyáya-lilávati* of Ballabha-áchárya,[1] following chiefly Kaṇáda's system.

An easier, and more concise introduction than these abstruse and voluminous works afford, is found requisite to the initiatory study of the science. One of the most approved elementary treatises is the *Tarka-bháshá* of Keśava-miśra, author of many other tracts. Though adapted to the comprehension of the learner without the aid of a gloss, it has nevertheless employed the labour of many commentators, expounding and illustrating it. Among others may be named, in order of seniority, Govardhana-miśra in the *Tarka-bháshá-prakáśa;* Gauríkánta[2] (author likewise of the *Sadyukti-muktávali*) in the *Bhávárthadípiká;* Mádhavadeva (author of the *Nyáyasára*) in the *Tarka-bháshá-sára-manjari;* besides Rámalinga-kṛiti in the *Nyáya-sangraha*, whose relative antiquity is less certain; and Balibhadra,[3] who is known to me only from Gauríkánta's citations.

Another compendious introduction to the study of Indian

[1] [Mentioned in Dr. Hall's Bibl. Index "as an elementary treatise on the Vaiśeshika philosophy by Vallabha-nyáyáchárya," and as containing 2700 *ślokas*.]

[2] [Dr. Hall calls him Gauríkánta-sárvabhauma-bhaṭṭáchárya (Bibl. Index, p. 23).]

[3] [Dr. Hall (Bibl. Index, p. 23) considers this to be Balabhadra-miśra, the author of the *Tarka-bháshá-prakáśiká*. He was the father of Govardhana-miśra, and "the father and son, it appears, went over precisely the same ground."]

logic is the *Padártha-dípiká*[1] by Koṇḍa-bhaṭṭa, a noted grammarian, author of the *Vaiyákaraṇa-bhúshaṇa*, on the philosophy of grammatical structure. It does not appear to have had any commentator, and it needs none.

Metrical treatises, or memorial verses, comprising the elements of the science, bear the ordinary denomination of *Káriká*. A work of this description is the *Kusumánjali*,[2] with its commentary, by Náráyaṇa-tírtha; another, which likewise is expounded by its author, is the *Nyáya-sankshepa* of Govinda-bhaṭṭáchárya.

Elementary works only have been here spoken of.[3] Distinct treatises on divers branches of the whole subject, and on various emergent topics, are innumerable. No depart-[264] ment of science or literature has more engaged the attention of the Hindus than the *Nyáya*;[4] and the fruit of their lucubra-

[1] [This is a Vaiśeshika work.]

[2] [This work, with its Commentary by Haridása-bhaṭṭáchárya, was printed in Calcutta in 1847 and 1859, and was also reprinted and translated by the present editor (Calcutta, 1864). It is not, however, a treatise on the elements of logic, but an attempt to prove the existence of a Supreme Being on the principles of the Nyáya. Dr. Hall (Bibl. Index, pp. 82-84) mentions several other Commentaries and secondary glosses.]

[3] [To these may be added the *Tarka-sangraha*, edited and translated by Ballantyne at Benares in 1848, and again in 1852; and the *Bháshá-parichheda*, with its Comm. the *Siddhánta-muktávalí*, by Viśwanátha-panchánana, printed at Calcutta in 1827 and 1870, and also by Röer in 1850 with an English translation of the text and part of the Comm.; there is also a very useful Bengali commentary upon it by Káśínátha-tarkapanchánana, printed in Calcutta in 1821. Ballantyne commenced a translation in 1851, but only a small portion was published.]

[4] [One of the most celebrated of the mediæval logicians was Gangeśa-upádhyáya of Mithilá, who wrote a large treatise called the *Chintámaṇi*, in four sections, on perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. It is this work which furnished the text-book for the celebrated Nuddea school of Bengal, which has produced the following writers. The school was founded by Raghunátha-śiromaṇi, who, according to tradition, was a fellow-student, under Vásudeva-sárvabhauma, with Raghunandana and the religious reformer Chaitanya, whose birth is fixed A.D. 1489; he wrote a Commentary entitled *Dídhiti*, on the first two sections. Mathuránátha-tarkavágíśa wrote a gloss on the *Dídhiti*, and also an original Comm. on part of Gangeśa's work. Jagadíśa-tarkálankára wrote a Comm. on the *Dídhiti* as well as many other works, especially the *Śabda-śakti-prakáśiká*. Gadádhara-bhaṭṭáchárya also wrote a Comm. on the *Dídhiti*, as well as a series of works on the abstrusest points of the modern logic. A good specimen of the subtilties introduced by this school is found in the discussion on *vyápti* in the

tions has been an infinity of volumes, among which are compositions of very celebrated schoolmen.[1]

The order observed, both by Gotama and by Kaṇáda, in delivering the precepts of the science which they engage to unfold, is that which has been intimated in a passage of the *Vedas* cited in the *Bháshya*, as requisite steps of instruction and study: *viz.* enunciation, definition, and investigation.[2] Enunciation (*uddeśa*) is the mention of a thing by its name; that is, by a term signifying it, as taught by revelation: for language is considered to have been revealed to man. Definition (*lakshaṇa*) sets forth a peculiar property, constituting the essential character of a thing. Investigation (*parikshá*) consists in disquisition upon the pertinence and sufficiency of the definition. Consonantly to this, the teachers of philosophy premise the terms of the science, proceed to the definitions, and then pass on to the examination of subjects so premised.

In a logical arrangement the "predicaments" (*padárthа*), or "objects of proof," are six, as they are enumerated by Kaṇáda;[3] *viz.* substance, quality, action, community, particularity, and aggregation or intimate relation: to which a seventh is added by other authors; privation or negation.[4] Thus augmented, they compose a two-fold arrangement, positive and negative (*bhára* and *abhára*); the first comprising six, the latter one.[5]

The *Bauddhas*, or followers of Buddha, are said to identify the predicaments with knowledge (*jnána*); and according to the *Vedántis*, who are pantheists, the predicaments are identified with the universal being (*Brahma*) in whom all exists.[6]

Siddhánta-muktávali, pp. 61–67, where the author follows the doctrine of Raghunátha-śiromaṇi.]

[1] [Cf. Hall's *Bibliographical Index*.]

[2] [This passage is probably only an observation by the author of the *Nyáya-bhásхya*, p. 9 (*trividhá chásya śástrasya pravṛittiḥ, uddeśo lakshaṇam parikshá cheti*); it is alluded to in Viśwanátha's *Vṛitti*, p. 4, l. 9, S'ankara-miśra's *Upaskára*, p. 3, l. 3, and Mádhava's *S'arva-darśana-sang.* p. 104, l. 21 (cf. also Madhusúdana in *Ind. Stud.* i. p. 18, l. 26).]

[3] *K.* 1. 3.

[4] *Tark. Bhásh.* 1.

[5] *Pad. Dip.* 1.

[6] *Tark. Bhásh.* and *N. Sang.* 2. 4.

[265] Other categories are alleged by different authorities; as power or energy (*śakti*); similarity or resemblance (*sádṛiśya*); and many more. But the logicians of this school acknowledge but six, or at most seven, above mentioned.

Gotama enumerates sixteen heads or topics: among which, proof or evidence, and that which is to be proven, are chief; and the rest are subsidiary or accessory, as contributing to knowledge and ascertainment of truth. Disputation being contemplated in this arrangement, several among these heads relate to controversial discussion. They are,—1st, proof; 2nd, that which is to be known and proven; 3rd, doubt; 4th, motive; 5th, instance; 6th, demonstrated truth; 7th, member of a regular argument or syllogism; 8th, reasoning by reduction to absurdity; 9th, determination or ascertainment; 10th, thesis or disquisition; 11th, controversy; 12th, objection; 13th, fallacious reason; 14th, perversion; 15th, futility; 16th, confutation.[1]

The difference between these two arrangements is not considered to amount to discrepancy. They are held to be reconcileable: the one more ample, the other more succinct; but both leading to like results.

The *Sánkhya* philosophy, as shown in a former essay,[2] affirms two eternal principles, soul and matter; (for *prakṛiti* or nature, abstracted from modifications, is no other than matter): and reckoning, with these two permanent principles, such as are transient, they enumerate twenty-five.

The *Nyáya*, as well as the *Sánkhya*, concur with other schools of psychology in promising beatitude, or (*niḥśreyas*) final excellence; and (*moksha*) deliverance from evil, for the reward of a thorough knowledge of the principles which they teach; that is, of truth; meaning the conviction of the soul's eternal existence separable from body.

[1] G. 1. [The 11th and 12th in the above list might be better rendered 'wrangling' (*jalpa*), and 'cavilling' (*vitaṇḍá*); and the 16th is rather 'unfitness to be argued with' (*nigraha-sthána*).]

[2] Ante, p. 254, etc.

[266] Soul then, as the *Bháshya* affirms, is that which is to be known and proven. Gotama, however, enumerates under this head, besides soul, its associate body, the external senses, things or the objects of sense (that is, the elements; and his followers here take occasion to introduce Kaṇáda's six categories), intellect or understanding, mind or the internal organ, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit or consequence of deeds, pain or physical evil, and lastly, liberation; making, together with soul, twelve (*prameya*) objects of proof, being topics of knowledge requisite for deliverance.

I. Evidence or proof (*pramáṇa*) by which those objects are known and demonstrated, is of four kinds: perception; inference of three sorts (consequent, antecedent, and analogous); comparison; and affirmation (comprehending tradition, as well as revelation). Inference *à priori* concludes an effect from its cause; inference *à posteriori* deduces a cause from its effect: another ground of inference is analogy. Or one sort is direct and affirmative; another indirect or negative; and the third is both direct and indirect.[1]

Proof (*pramáṇa*) is defined to be the efficient or especial cause of actual knowledge: and this intends right notion (*anubhava*); exclusive, consequently, of wrong notion, as error, doubt, and reduction to absurdity, and likewise exclusive of memory: for notion (*anubhava*) is knowledge other than remembrance.

Cause (*káraṇa*) is that which is efficacious, necessarily preceding an effect that cannot else be: and conversely, effect (*kárya*) is that which necessarily ensues and could not else be.

For the relation of cause and effect, and for distinguishing different sorts of cause, connexion (*sambandha*) or relation, in general, must be considered. It is two-fold: simple conjunction (*sanyoga*), and aggregation or intimate [267] and constant

[1] [*Púrravat, śeshavat, sámányato dṛishṭam*, cf. *Sánkhya-kár.* 5; *Nyáya-sút.* i. 5; *Sánkhya-sút.* i. 103 (Comm.). The terms are the same in the two systems, but they are explained somewhat differently.]

relation (*samaváya*); the latter being the connexion of things, whereof one, so long as they coexist, continues united with the other: for example, parts and that which is composed of them, as yarn and cloth; for so long as the yarn subsists the cloth remains. Here the connexion of the yarn and cloth is intimate relation; but that of the loom is simple conjunction. Consonantly to this distinction, cause is intimate or direct, producing aggregation or an intimately relative effect, as clay of pottery, or yarn of cloth: or it is mediate or indirect, being proximate to the aggregating cause, as conjunction of yarn, serving for the production of cloth: or thirdly, it is neither direct nor indirect; but instrumental or concomitant, as the loom. Of positive things there must be three causes, and the most efficacious is termed the chief or especial cause:[1] of negative there is but one, which is the third above mentioned.

This would be the place for an ample discussion of the several sorts of proof above mentioned. But they are topics embracing too great a scope of disquisition in the Hindu philosophy, to be adequately considered within the limits of the present essay. The subject, therefore, is reserved for future consideration, in a connected view of it, with relation to the various Indian systems of philosophizing, after they shall have been severally examined.[2]

II. 1. The first and most important of twelve objects of evidence or matters to be proven, enumerated by Gotama, is soul.[3] It is the site of knowledge or sentiment: distinct from body and from the senses; different for each individual coexistent person; infinite; eternal; perceived by the mental organ; and demonstrated by its peculiar attributes, intellect, etc. For knowledge, desire, aversion, voli[268]tion, pain and

[1] [*i.e.* the instrumental cause (*nimitta* or *karaṇa*). I may here add that the Hindus usually give 'the two halves' as the intimate cause of the pot, their 'conjunction' as the non-intimate or mediate, and 'the potter's stick' as the instrumental. So for 'desire' (*ichchhá*) the intimate cause is 'soul,'—the non-intimate is 'the conjunction of soul and its internal organ, mind,'—the instrumental is 'knowledge.']

[2] [*Vid.* p. 253.]

[3] G. 1. 1. 3. 2, and 3. 1. 1–5. *Tark. Bhásh.* 2. 1.

pleasure, severally and collectively, argue the existence of soul: since these are not universal attributes, as number, quantity, etc., common to all substances; but are peculiar and characteristic qualities, apprehended exclusively by one organ, as colour and other peculiar qualities are; yet belonging not to apparent substances, as earth, and the rest; and arguing therefore a distinct substratum, other than space, time and mind, to which universal, not peculiar, qualities appertain. That distinct substance, which is the substratum of those peculiar qualities, is the soul.

This concerns the living soul (*jívátmá*), the animating spirit of individual person. Souls then, as is expressly affirmed, are numerous. But the supreme soul (*Paramátmá*) is one: the seat of eternal knowledge; demonstrated as the maker of all things.[1]

The individual soul is infinite; for whithersoever the body goes there the soul too is present. It experiences the fruit of its deeds; pain or pleasure. It is eternal, because it is infinite; for whatever is infinite is likewise eternal; as the etherial element (*ákáśa*).

Being a substance, though immaterial, as a substratum of qualities, it is placed in Kaṇáda's arrangement as one of nine substances which are there recognized.[2]

It has fourteen qualities: *viz.* number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and faculty of imagination.

2. The second among matters to be proven in Gotama's enumeration, is body. It is the site of effort, of organs of sensation, and of sentiment of pain or pleasure.[3]

It is an ultimate compound; the seat of soul's enjoy[269]ment. It is a whole, composed of parts; a framed substance, not inchoative: associated with which, soul experiences fruition;[4]

[1] *Pad. Dip.* 1, 8. [2] G. 1. [Kaṇ. i. 1. 5?] [3] G. 1. 1. 3. 3.

[4] [Each body is said to be formed, not merely by the natural causes, as parents, etc., but by the co-operation of the merit or demerit of the soul for whose experience it is produced. *Nyáya-sút.* iii. 132.]

that is, immediate presence of pain or of pleasure, in relation to itself.

It is the site of effort; not of motion simply, but of action tending to the attainment of what is pleasing, and to the removal of what is displeasing.[1]

It is earthly; for the qualities of earth are perceived in it: (namely, smell, colour, solidity, etc.): and it is expressly pronounced so by more than one passage of the *Vedas*. According to some opinions, it consists of three elements, earth, water, and light or heat; for the peculiar qualities of those elements are perceptible in it, since it has smell, clamminess, and warmth: or it consists of four, since there is inspiration as well as expiration of air: or of five, as indicated by odour, moisture, digestion, breath, and cavities.[2] Those opinions are controverted by the *Nyáya*. It consists not of five, nor of four elements: else, as Kaṇáda argues, it would be invisible; for the union of visible with invisible objects is so: instance wind. Nor does it consist of three visible elements, nor of two; for there is no intimate inchoative union of heterogeneous substances.[3] This last reason is alleged likewise by Kapila: heterogeneous materials cannot enter into the same composition.[4]

Besides human and other bodies of this world, all which are terrene, there are, in other worlds, aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies. In these, too, there is union with an element, for soul's fruition.[5]

Earthly body is two-fold; sexually bred, or not so bred: the first is either viviparous or oviparous: the second results from concurrence of particles by an unseen or predestined [270] cause, and peculiar disposition of atoms. That such beings are, is proved from authority of the *Vedas*, which reveal creation of gods and demi-gods.

[1] *Tark. Phásh.* and Com.
[2] G. 3. 1. 6. 1–5.
[3] Kaṇ. 4. 2. 1, and Com.
[4] Kap. 3, 17–19 and 5, 102.
[5] *Bháshya* on Got.

Or the distinction is between such as are propagated by sexes or are otherwise generated. The latter comprehends equivocal generation of worms, nits, maggots, gnats, and other vermin, considered to be bred in sweat or fermented filth; and germination of plants sprouting from the ground. Accordingly, the distinct sorts of body are five: 1st, ungenerated; 2nd, uterine or viviparous; 3rd, oviparous; 4th, engendered in filth; 5th, vegetative or germinating.[1]

3. Next, among objects of proof, are the organs of sensation. An organ of sense is defined as an instrument of knowledge, conjoined to the body and imperceptible to the senses.[2]

There are five external organs: smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing. They are not modifications of consciousness (as the *Sánkhyas* maintain), but material, constituted of the elements, earth, water, light, air, and ether, respectively.[3]

The pupil of the eye is not the organ of sight (as the *Bauddhas* affirm); nor is the outer ear, or opening of the auditory passage, the organ of hearing: but a ray of light, proceeding from the pupil of the eye towards the object viewed is the visual organ; and ether, contained in the cavity of the ear, and communicating by intermediate ether with the object heard, is the organ of hearing. That ray of light is not ordinarily visible: just as the effulgence of a torch is unseen in meridian sunshine. But, under particular circumstances, a glimpse of the visual ray is obtained. For instance, in the dark, the eye of a cat or other animal prowling at night.

[271] The organ of vision then is lucid; and, in like manner, the organ of hearing is etherial; and that of taste, aqueous (as saliva); and of feeling, aerial; and of smelling, earthly.

The site of the visual organ is the pupil of the eye: of the auditory organ, the orifice of the ear; of the olfactory organ, the nostril or tip of the nose; of the taste, the tip of the tongue; of the feeling, the skin.

[1] *Pad. Dip.* and Mádh. on Kes.
[2] *Tark. Bhásh.*
[3] Got. 1. 1. 3. 4–5, and 3. 1. 7, and 8.

Objects apprehended by the senses, are odour, flavour, colour, touch (or temperature), and sound; which are qualities appertaining to earth, water, light, air, and ether.[1]

The existence of organs of sense is proved by inference, from the fact of the apprehension of those objects: for apprehension implies an instrument to effect it, since it is an act, in like manner as the act of cutting implies an instrument, as an axe or a knife.

The organs are six, including an internal organ, termed *manas*, or mind: not five only, as the followers of Buddha maintain, disallowing an internal sense; nor so many as eleven, which the *Sánkhyas* affirm, comprehending with the senses the organs of action, which they reckon five.[2]

Mind is the instrument which effects the apprehension of pain, pleasure, or interior sensations; and, by its union with external senses, produces knowledge of exterior objects apprehended through them, as colour, etc., but not independently of those senses, for outward objects.

Its existence is proved by singleness of sensation: since various sensations do not arise at one time to the same soul. They only seem to do so when passing rapidly, though successively; as a firebrand, whirled with velocity, seems a ring of fire.

It is single; that is, for each soul, one: not so many minds as there are external senses. When it is conjoined [272] with any one of the outward organs, knowledge is received through that organ: when not so conjoined, none comes through that sense, but through any other with which it then is associated.[3]

It is not infinite, being imperceptible to the touch, like the etherial element, as the *Mímánsá* maintains;[4] but it is minutely small, as an atom. Were it infinite, it might be united with every thing at once, and all sensations might be contem-

[1] Got. 1. 1. 3. 6.
[2] Gau. on Kes.
[3] Got. 1. 1. 3. 8. and 3. 2. 6.
[4] *Pad. Dip.*

poraneous. It is imperceptible to sight, touch, and other senses, and is inferred from reasoning, as follows: There must be an instrument of apprehension of pain and pleasure, which instrument must be other than the sight, or any external sense; for pain and pleasure are experienced though sight be wanting. Such instrument of painful or pleasurable sensation is termed mind (*manas*).

It is eternal, and is distinct from soul as well as from body, with which it is merely conjoined.

It is reckoned by Kaṇáda among substances; and is the substratum of eight qualities, none of which are peculiar to it, being all common to other substances: *viz.* number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, subsequence, and faculty.[1]

4. Next in Gotama's arrangement are the (*artha*) objects of sense; that is, of the external senses: and he enumerates odour, taste, colour, feel, and sound, which are the peculiar qualities of earth, and the rest of the elements respectively.[2]

Under this head Keśava places the categories (*padártha*) of Kaṇáda, which are six; substance, quality, etc.

(I.) Substance is the intimate cause of an aggregate effect or product: it is the site of qualities and of action; or [273] that in which qualities abide, and in which action takes place.[3]

Nine are enumerated, and no more are recognized. Darkness has been alleged by some philosophers; but it is no substance; nor is body a distinct one; nor gold, which the *Mímánsakas* affirm to be a peculiar substance.

Those specified by Kaṇáda are:

(1.) Earth, which, besides qualities common to most substances (as number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, fluidity, and faculty of velocity and of elasticity), has colour, savour, odour, and feel, or temperature. Its distinguishing quality is smell; and it is

[1] Gau. on Kes'. [2] Got. 1. 1. 3. 5.
[3] Kaṇ. 1. 1. 4. 1. Kes'. and Com. *Pad. Dip.*

succinctly defined as a substance odorous.[1] In some instances, as in gems, the smell is latent; but it becomes manifest by calcination.

It is eternal, as atoms; or transient, as aggregates. In either, those characteristic qualities are transitory, and are maturative, as affected by light and heat: for by union with it, whether latent or manifest, former colour, taste, smell, and temperature are in earth of any sort annulled, and other colour, etc., introduced.

Aggregates or products are either organized bodies, or organs of perception, or unorganic masses.

Organized earthly bodies are of five sorts [see body]. The organ of smell is terreous. Unorganic masses are stones, lumps of clay, etc. The union of integrant parts is hard, soft, or cumulative, as stones, flowers, cotton, etc.

(2.) Water, which has the qualities of earth; excepting smell, and with the addition of viscidity. Odour, when observable in water, is adscititious, arising from mixture of earthy particles.

[274] The distinguishing quality of water is coolness. It is accordingly defined as a substance cool to the feel.

It is eternal, as atoms; transient, as aggregates. The qualities of the first are constant likewise; those of the latter inconstant.

Organic aqueous bodies are beings abiding in the realm of Varuṇa. The organ of taste is aqueous: witness the saliva. Unorganic waters are rivers, seas, rain, snow, hail, etc.

It is by some maintained, that hail is pure water rendered solid by supervention of an unseen virtue[2]: others imagine its solidity to be owing to mixture of earthy particles.

(3.) Light is coloured, and illumines other substances; and to the feel is hot: which is its distinguishing quality. It is defined as a substance hot to the feel. [Heat, then, and light, are identified as one substance.]

[1] Kaṇ. 2. 1. 1. 1.

[2] [*Adṛishṭa*, cf. *Kusumâñj.* i. 12.]

It has the qualities of earth, except smell, taste, and gravity. It is eternal, as atoms; not so, as aggregates.

Organic luminous bodies are beings abiding in the solar realm. The visual ray, which is the organ of sight, is lucid [see organs of perception]. Unorganic light is reckoned fourfold: earthy, celestial, alvine, and mineral. Another distinction concerns sight and feel; as light or heat may be either latent or manifest, in respect of both sight and feel, or differently in regard to either. Thus fire is both seen and felt; the heat of hot water is felt, but not seen; moonshine is seen, but not felt; the visual ray is neither seen nor felt. Terrestrious light is that, of which the fuel is earthy, as fire. Celestial is that, of which the fuel is watery, as lightning, and meteors of various sorts. Alvine is that, of which the fuel is both earthy and watery: it is intestinal, which digests food and drink. Mineral is that which is found in pits, as gold. For some maintain that gold is solid light; or, at least that the chief ingredient is light, [275] which is rendered solid by mixture with some particles of earth. Were it mere earth, it might be calcined by fire strongly urged. Its light is not latent, but overpowered by the colour of the earthy particles mixed with it. In the *Mímánsá*, however, it is reckoned a distinct substance, as before observed.

(4.) Air is a colourless substance, sensible to the feel; being temperate (neither hot, nor cold). Besides this its distinguishing quality, it has the same common qualities with light, except fluidity (that is number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, subsequence, and faculty of elasticity and velocity).

Its existence as a distinct substance is inferred from feeling. The wind, that blows, is apprehended as temperate, independently of the influence of light: and this temperature, which is a quality, implies a substratum; for it cannot subsist without one: that substratum is air; different from water, which is cold; and from light, which

is hot; and from earth, which is adventitiously warm by induction of light.

Air is either eternal as atoms, or transient as aggregates. Organic aerial bodies are beings inhabiting the atmosphere, and evil spirits (*Piśáchas*, etc.) who haunt the earth. The organ of touch is an aerial integument, or air diffused over the cuticle. Unorganic air is wind, which agitates trees and other tremulous objects. To these may be added, as a fourth kind of aerial aggregates, the breath and other vital airs.

(5.) Ether (*ákáśa*), which is a substance that has the quality of sound. Besides that its peculiar and distinguishing quality, it has number (*viz.* unity), quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction. It is infinite, one, and eternal.

The existence of an etherial element as a distinct sub-[276] stance is deduced, not from distinct perception, but from inference. Sound is a peculiar quality; for, like colour and other peculiar qualities, it is apprehended by only one external organ of such beings as men are: now a quality abides in a substance which is qualified; but neither soul, nor any one of the four elements, earth, water, light, and air, can be its substratum, for it is apprehended by the organ of hearing: the qualities of earth, and the rest are not apprehended by the hearing, but sound is; therefore it is not a quality of those substances; nor is it a quality of time, space, and mind; since it is a peculiar quality, and those three substances have none but such as are common to many: therefore a substratum, other than all these, is inferred; and that substratum is the etherial element. It is one; for there is no evidence of diversity; and its unity is congruous, as infinity accounts for ubiquity. It is infinite, because it is in effect found everywhere. It is eternal, because it is infinite.

It appears white, from connexion with a lucid white orb; as a rock-crystal appears red by association with a red object. The blue colour of a clear sky is derived, according to Patan-

jali,[1] from the southern peak of the great mountain Sumeru, which is composed of sapphire. On other sides of Sumeru the colour of the sky is different, being borrowed from the hue of the peak which overlooks that quarter. Others suppose that the black colour of the pupil of the eye is imparted to the sky (blue and black being reckoned tinges of the same colour), as a jaundiced eye sees every object yellow.

The organ of hearing is etherial, being a portion of ether (*ákáśa*) confined in the hollow of the ear, and (as affirmed by the author of the *Padártha-dípiká*) endued with a particular and unseen virtue. In the ear of a deaf man, the portion of ether which is there present is devoid of that [277] particular virtue, and therefore it is not a perfect and efficient auditory organ.

(6.) Time is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence, other than that of place. It is deduced from the notions of quick, slow, simultaneous, etc., and is marked by association of objects with the sun's revolutions.

Young is the reverse of old, as old is of young. This contrast, which does not concern place, is an effect, needing a cause other than place, etc. That cause is time.

It has the qualities of number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction. It is one, eternal, infinite.

Though one, it takes numerous designations; as past, present, and future, with reference to acts that are so.

(7.) Place, or space, is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence, other than that of time. It is deduced from the notions of *here* and *there*.

It has the same common qualities as time; and, like it, is one, eternal, infinite.

[1] [This reference to Patanjali is very curious; but no such name is given in S'ankara-miśra's Comm. on *Vaiśesh.-sútras*, ii. 1, 5, though he mentions the theory as held by some authors. If the name be not a mislection, it might throw some light on the Bátanjal or Bátankal quoted by Albírúní (cf. Sir H. Elliot's *Historians of India*, vol. ii. p. 6, Prof. Dowson's note), which is described as "a collection of all the sciences, and one of the most valuable works of the sages of Hind." Albírúní constantly quotes it on questions of chronology and geography.]

Though one, it receives various designations, as east, west, north, south, etc., by association with the sun's position.

(8.) Soul, though immaterial, is considered to be a substance, as a substratum of qualities. It is eighth in Kaṇáda's arrangement. In Gotama's it is first among things to be proven [see before].

(9.) Mind, according to Kaṇáda, is a ninth substance; and in Gotama's arrangement, it recurs in two places, as one of the twelve matters to be proven; and again, under the distinct head of organs of sensation, being reckoned an internal sense [see before].

Material substances are by Kaṇáda considered to be primarily atoms; and secondarily, aggregates. He maintains the eternity of atoms; and their existence and aggregation are explained as follows:[1]

[278] The mote, which is seen in a sunbeam, is the smallest perceptible quantity. Being a substance and an effect, it must be composed of what is less than itself: and this likewise is a substance and an effect; for the component part of a substance that has magnitude must be an effect. This again must be composed of what is smaller, and that smaller thing is an atom. It is simple and uncomposed; else the series would be endless: and, were it pursued indefinitely, there would be no difference of magnitude between a mustard-seed and a mountain, a gnat and an elephant, each alike containing an infinity of particles. The ultimate atom then is simple.

The first compound consists of two atoms: for one does not enter into composition; and there is no argument to prove, that more than two must, for inchoation, be united. The next consists of three double atoms; for, if only two were conjoined, magnitude would hardly ensue, since it must be produced either by size or number of particles; it cannot be their size, and therefore it must be their number. Nor is there any reason for assuming the union of four double atoms, since

[1] Kaṇ. 2. 2. 2. 1. Kes'. etc.

three suffice to originate magnitude.[1] The atom then is reckoned to be the sixth part of a mote visible in a sunbeam.[2]

Two earthly atoms, concurring by an unseen peculiar virtue, the creative will of GOD, or time, or other competent cause, constitute a double atom of earth; and, by concourse of three binary atoms, a tertiary atom is produced; and, by concourse of four triple atoms, a quaternary atom; and so on, to a gross, grosser, or grossest mass of earth: thus great earth is produced; and in like manner, great water, from aqueous atoms; great light, from luminous; and great air, from aerial. The qualities that belong to the effect are [279] those which appertained to the integrant part, or primary particle, as its material cause: and conversely, the qualities which belong to the cause are found in the effect.

The dissolution of substances proceeds inversely. In the integrant parts of an aggregate substance resulting from composition, as in the potsherds of an earthen jar, action is induced by pressure attended with velocity, or by simple pressure. Disjunction ensues; whereby the union, which was the cause of inchoation of members, is annulled; and the integral substance, consisting of those members, is resolved into its parts, and is destroyed; for it ceases to subsist as a whole.

(II.) Quality is closely united with substance; not, however, as an intimate cause of it, nor consisting in motion, but common; not a genus, yet appertaining to one. It is independent of conjunction and disjunction; not the cause of them, nor itself endued with qualities.[3]

Twenty-four are enumerated. Seventeen only are, indeed, specified in Kaṇáda's aphorisms;[4] but the rest are understood.

(1.) Colour. It is a peculiar quality to be apprehended only

[1] Kes'.

[2] *Pad. Dip.*

[3] [Kaṇáda's definition of a quality (i. 1. 16) is 'that which has substance as its substratum, is without qualities, is not a cause of conjunction or disjunction, as independent of them.']

[4] Kaṇ. 1. 1. 2. 2, and 1. 1. 4. 2.

by sight; and abides in three substances; earth, water, and light. It is a characteristic quality of the last; and, in that, is white and resplendent. In water, it is white, but without lustre. In the primary atoms of both it is perpetual; in their products, not so. In earth it is variable; and seven colours are distinguished: *viz.* white, yellow, green, red, black, tawny (or orange),[1] and variegated. The varieties of these seven colours are many, unenumerated. The six simple colours occur in the atoms of [280] earth; and the seven, including variegated, in its double atoms, and more complex forms. The colour of integrant parts is the cause of colour in the integral substance.

(2.) Savour. It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the organ of taste; and abides in two substances, earth and water. It is a characteristic quality of the last; and in it is sweet. It is perpetual in atoms of water; not so in aqueous products. In earth it is variable; and six sorts are distinguished: sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid, and saline.

(3.) Odour. It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the organ of smell; and abides in earth alone, being its distinguishing quality. In water, odour is adscititious, being induced by union with earthy particles; as a clear crystal appears red by association with a hollyhock, or other flower of that hue. In air also it is adscititious: thus a breeze, which has blown over blossoms, musk, camphor, or other scented substances, wafts fragrant particles of the blossoms, etc. The flowers are not torn, nor the musk diminished; because the parts are replaced by a reproductive unseen virtue. However, camphor and other volatile substances do waste.

Two sorts of odour are distinguished, fragrance and stench.

(4.) Feel, and especially temperature. It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the skin or organ of feeling.

[1] One commentator (Mádhavadeva) specifies blue in place of orange; another (Gaurikánta) omits both, reducing the colours to six.

It abides in four substances; earth, water, light, and air; and is a characteristic quality of the last.

Three sorts are distinguished, cold, hot, and temperate. In water, it is cold; in light, hot; in earth and in air, temperate. Divers other sorts, likewise, are noticed; as hard and soft, and diversified, etc.

These four qualities are latent in minute substances, as atoms and double atoms; manifest to perception in products [281] or aggregates of greater magnitude. A mote in a sunbeam may be seen, though not felt. The colour of the visual ray, or organ of sight, is ordinarily imperceptible.

(5.) Number. It is the reason of perceiving and reckoning one, two, or many, to the utmost limit of numeration. The notion of number is deduced from comparison.[1] Of two masses seen, this is one, and that is one: hence the notion of two, and so of more.[2]

It is an universal quality, common to all substances without exception.

It is considered to be of two sorts, unity and multitude; or of three, monad, duad, and multitude. Unity is either eternal or transient: eternal unity regards eternal things; that which is uneternal, concerns effects or transitory substances.

(6.) Quantity. It is the special cause of the use and perception of measure.

It is an universal quality, common to all substances.

[1] [*Apekshábuddhi*].

[2] [Mádhava thus describes the origin of the idea of duality (*dwitwa*) (*S. D. Sangr.* p. 107): "First there is the contact of the organ of sense with the object; then arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the distinguishing perception, *apekshábuddhi* (by which we apprehend 'this is one,' 'this is one,' etc.); then the production of duality in the object; then the knowledge of the abstract genus of duality (*dwitwatwa*); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it exists in the two things; then the conception, *sanskára* (*i.e.* the idea created by the soul's own energy out of the materials previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ mind)." (Cf. *Siddh.-muktáv.* p. 106.) All numbers, in fact, from duality upwards, are artificial,—*i.e.* they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things themselves,—each being one,—and they only become two, etc., by our choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.]

It is considered to be fourfold: great and small; long and short.

Extreme littleness and shortness are eternal; as mind, or as atoms, whether single or double, etc. Extreme length and greatness (termed infinite) are likewise eternal, as ether.

Within these extremes is inferior magnitude or finite quantity; which is uneternal. It is of various degrees in length and bulk, more or most; from the mote or tertiary atom, upwards, to any magnitude short of infinite.

The finite magnitude of products or effects results from number, size, or mass. Multitude of atoms, bulk of particles, and heap of component parts, constitute magnitude. The latter, or cumulation of particles, concerns a loose texture. The others, close or compact.

Infinity transcends the senses. An object may be too great, as it may be too small, to be distinguished.

[282] (7.) Individuality, severalty, or separateness, is a quality common to all substances.

It is of two sorts; individuality of one or of a pair; or it is manifold, as individuality of a triad, etc.. Simple individuality is eternal, in respect of eternal things; transient, in regard to such as are transitory. Individuality of a pair or triad, etc., is of course transitory: it results from comparison, as duad or triad does.

(8.) Conjunction is a transient connexion.

It is an universal quality incident to all substances and is transitory.

It implies two subjects, and is threefold: arising from the act of either or of both, or else from conjunction; being simple, or reciprocal, or mediate. The junction of a falcon perching, which is active, with the perch whereon it settles, which is passive, is conjunction arising from the act of one. Collision of fighting rams, or of wrestlers, is conjunction arising from the act of both. Contact of a finger with a tree occasions the conjunction of the body with the tree; and this is mediate.

(9.) Disjunction. It is the converse of conjunction; necessarily preceded by it, and, like it, implying two subjects. It is not the mere negation of conjunction, nor simply the dissolution of it.

The knowledge of this quality, as well as of its counterpart, is derived from perception.

It is an universal quality incident to all substances and is simple, reciprocal, or mediate. A falcon taking flight from a rock, is an instance of disjunction arising from the act of one of two subjects; the active from the inactive. The parting of combatants, rams or wrestlers, is an example of disjunction arising from the act of both. Disjunction of the body and the tree, resulting from the disunion of the finger and the tree, is mediate.[1]

[283] (10–11.) Priority and posteriority. These qualities, being contrasted and correlative, are considered together. They are of two sorts, concerning place and time. In respect of place, they are proximity and distance; in regard to time, youth and antiquity. The one concerns (*múrta*) definite bodies, consisting of circumscribed quantity; the other affects generated substances.

The knowledge of them is derived from comparison.

[1] [Mádhava quotes a proverbial *śloka*:

"Duality—the change produced (in the jar) by baking,—and disjunction produced by disjunction,—

Him whose mind vacillates not in regard to these three, they call a true *Vaiśeshika*."

For duality see *supra*. The other two subtile processes are described by him, pp. 108, 109; and in the *Siddh.-muktáv.* pp. 102–104, 112, 113. The former relates to the internal changes of the atoms, while a black pot gradually becomes red by heat,—the other to indirect or mediate disjunction, mentioned in the text. The *Vaiśeshikas* hold that when a pot is baked, the old black pot is destroyed, its several compounds of two or more atoms being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds, eventually produces a new red pot. The exceeding rapidity of the steps prevents the eye's detecting the change of the pots. (Might we not regard this as a vague anticipation of the molecular theory?) The followers of the *Nyáya* maintain that the fire penetrates into the different compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the old pot, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes not the pot, but its colour, etc.—it is still the same pot, only it is red, not black.]

Two masses being situated in one place, nearness is deduced from the conjunction of one with place as associated by comparison, referring primarily to the person of the spectator; or, secondarily, to other correlatives of place. Where least conjunction of conjunct things intervenes, it is nearness; where most does, it is remoteness. Thus Prayága is nearer to Mathurá than Káší, and Káší remoter from it than Prayága.

In like manner, one of two masses, not restricted to place, is young, as deduced from the association of the object with time, by comparison discriminating that which is connected with least time. Another is old, which is connected with most time. Here time is determined by revolutions of the sun.

(12.) Gravity is the peculiar cause of primary descent or falling.[1]

It affects earth and water. Gold is affected by this quality, by reason of earth contained in it.

In the absence of a countervailing cause, as adhesion, velocity, or some act of volition, descent results from this quality. Thus a cocoa-nut is withheld from falling by adhesion of the foot-stalk; but, this impediment ceasing on maturity of the fruit, it falls.

According to Udayana-áchárya, gravity is imperceptible, but to be inferred from the act of falling. Ballabha maintains, that it is perceived in the position of a thing descending to a lower situation.

Levity is not a distinct quality, but the negation of gravity.

(13.) Fluidity is the cause of original trickling.[2]

It affects earth, light, and water. It is natural and essential in water; adscititious in earth and light; being induced by exhibition of fire in molten substances, as lac, gold, etc.

Fluidity is perceptible by the external senses, sight and touch.

In hail and ice, fluidity essentially subsists; but is obstructed

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[1] *Tark. Bhásh.* and *Pad. Dip.*

[2] *Tark. Bhásh.* and *Pad. Dip.*

by an impediment arising from an unseen virtue which renders the water solid.

(14.) Viscidity is the quality of clamminess and cause of agglutination. It abides in water only. In oil, liquid butter, etc., it results from the watery parts of those liquids.[1]

(15.) Sound is a peculiar quality of the etherial element, and is to be apprehended by the hearing. It abides in that element exclusively, and is its characteristic quality. Two sorts are distinguished: articulate and musical.[2]

To account for sound originating in one place being heard in another, it is observed, that sound is propagated by undulation, wave after wave, radiating in every direction, from a centre, like the blossoms of a Nauclea. It is not the first, nor the intermediate wave, that is the sound heard, but the last which comes in contact with the organ of hearing; and therefore it is not quite correct to say, that a drum has been heard. Sound originates in conjunction, in disjunction, or in sound itself. The conjunction of cymbals, or that of a drum and stick, may serve to exemplify the [285] first. It is the instrumental cause. The rustling of leaves is an instance of disjunction being the cause of sound. In some cases, sound becomes the cause of sound. In all, the conformity of wind, or its calmness, is a concomitant cause: for an adverse wind obstructs it. The material cause is in every case the etherial fluid; and the conjunction of that with the sonorous subject is a concomitant cause.

The *Mímánsá* affirms the eternity of sound. This is contested by the *Naiyáyikas*, who maintain, that were it eternal, it could not be apprehended by human organs of sense.

(16—23.) The eight following qualities are perceptible by the mental organ, not by the external senses. They are qualities of the soul, not of material substances.

(16.) Intelligence (*buddhi*) is placed by Kaṇáda among

[1] *Ibid.* and *Siddh. Sang.*

[2] *Ibid.* and Gau., etc.

qualities; and by Gotama, fifth among objects of proof. It will be noticed in that place.

(17 and 18.) Pleasure and pain are among qualities enumerated by Kaṇáda. Pain or evil is placed by Gotama among objects of proof; where (under the head of deliverance) it will be further noticed, with its converse.

(19 and 20.) Desire and aversion are the two next in order among qualities. Desire is the wish of pleasure and of happiness, and of absence of pain. Passion is extreme desire; it is incident to man and inferior beings. The supreme being is devoid of passion. Neither does desire intend God's will, nor a saint's wish. Aversion is loathing or hatred.

(21.) Volition (*yatna*),[1] effort or exertion, is a determination to action productive of gratification. Desire is its occasion, and perception its reason. Two sorts of perceptible effort are distinguished: that proceeding from desire, seeking what is agreeable; and that which proceeds from aversion, shunning what is loathsome. Another species, which [286] escapes sensation or perception, but is inferred from analogy of spontaneous acts, comprises animal functions, having for a cause the vital unseen power.

Volition, desire, and intelligence, are in man transitory, variable, or inconstant. The will and intelligence of God are eternal, uniform, constant.

(22 and 23.) Virtue and vice (*Dharma* and *Adharma*), or moral merit and demerit, are the peculiar causes of pleasure and of pain respectively. The result of performing that which is enjoined, as sacrifice, etc., is virtue; the result of doing that which is forbidden, is vice. They are qualities of the soul; imperceptible, but inferred from reasoning.

The proof of them is deduced from transmigration. The

[1] [There is a useful technical verse, *Jnána-janyá bhaved ichchhá, ichchhá-janyá bhavet kṛitiḥ, Kṛiti-janyá bhavech-cheshṭá, cheshṭá-janyá bhavet kriyá. Kṛiti* here means *yatna* 'volition.' "From knowledge arises desire (βούλησις), from desire volition (προαίρεσις), from volition conscious effort (ὄρεξις), and from this action."]

body of an individual, with his limbs and organs of sense, is a result of a peculiar quality of his soul; since this is the cause of that individual's fruition, like a thing which is produced by his effort or volition. The peculiar quality of the soul, which does occasion its being invested with body, limbs, and organs, is virtue or vice: for body and the rest are not the result of effort and volition.[1]

(24.) The twenty-fourth and last quality is faculty (*sanskára*).[2] This comprehends three sorts.

Velocity (*vega*), which is the cause of action. It concerns matter only; and is a quality of the mental organ, and of the four grosser elements, earth, water, light, and air. It becomes manifest from the perception of motion.

Elasticity (*sthitisthápaka*) is a quality of particular tangible, terrene objects; and is the cause of that peculiar action, whereby an altered thing is restored to its pristine state, as a bow unbends and a strained branch resumes its former position. It is imperceptible; but is inferred from the fact of the restitution of a thing to its former condition.

[287] Imagination (*bhávaná*) is a peculiar quality of the soul, and is the cause of memory. It is a result of notion or recollection; and being excited, produces remembrance; and the exciting cause is the recurrence of an association; that is, of the sight or other perception of a like object.

(III.) The next head in Kaṇáda's arrangement, after quality, is action (*karman*).[3]

Action consists in motion, and, like quality, abides in substance alone. It affects a single, that is a finite substance, which is matter. It is the cause (not aggregative, but indirect) of disjunction, as of conjunction: that is, a fresh conjunction in one place, after annulment of a prior one in another, by means of disjunction. It is devoid of quality, and is transitory.

[1] *Tark. Bhásh.* [2] [Ballantyne, "the self-reproductive faculty."]

[3] ["Action is that which abides in one substance, is without qualities, and is the direct cause of conjunctions and disjunctions."—Kaṇ. i. 1. 17.]

Five sorts are enumerated: to cast upward; to cast downward; to push forward: to spread horizontally; and, fifthly, to go on: including many varieties under the last comprehensive head.

(IV.) Community (*sámánya*), or the condition of equal or like things, is the cause of the perception of conformity. It is eternal, single, concerning more than one thing, being a property common to several. It abides in substance, in quality, and in action.

Two degrees of it are distinguished: the highest, concerning numerous objects; the lowest, concerning few. The first is existence, a common property of all. The latter is the abstraction of an individual, varying with age, in dimensions, yet continuing identical. A third, or intermediate degree, is distinguished, comprehended in the first, and including the latter. These three degrees of community correspond nearly with genus, species, and individual.

In another view, community is two-fold: *viz.* genus (*játi*) and discriminative property (*upádhi*), or species.

The *Bauddhas* are cited as denying this category, and [288] maintaining that individuals only have existence, and that abstraction is false and deceptive. This, as well as other controverted points, will be further noticed at a future opportunity.

(V.) Difference (*viśesha*), or particularity, is the cause of perception of exclusion.[1] It affects a particular and single object, which is devoid of community. It abides in eternal substances. Such substances are mind, soul, time, place; and

[1] ['Particularity' is the individuality which characterizes eternal simple substances,—it is 'their ultimate and not further explicable difference.' "All compound substances from jars, etc., down to the combination of two atoms, are mutually separated by the difference of their component parts, but 'particularity' is the only mutual difference of atoms. This difference is differenced through itself only."—*Siddh.-muktáv.* Cf. S'ankara-miśra's Comm. on *Vaiś.-sú.* i. 2. 6. He remarks in his Comm. on iii. 1. 9, that "progressive decrease in size must have a limit somewhere,—hence we infer a substratum in which this limit is found, *i.e.* the atom."]

the etherial element; and the atoms of earth, water, light, and air.[1]

(VI.) The sixth and last of Kaṇáda's categories is aggregation (*samaváya*), or perpetual intimate relation. It has been already briefly noticed.

(VII.) To the six affirmative categories of Kaṇáda, succeeding writers add a seventh, which is negative.

Negation or privation (*abháva*) is of two sorts; universal and mutual. Universal negation comprehends three species, antecedent, emergent, and absolute.

Antecedent privation (*prágabháva*) is present negation of that which at a future time will be. It is negation in the material cause previous to the production of an effect; as, in yarn, prior to the fabrication of cloth, there is antecedent privation of the piece of cloth which is to be woven. It is without beginning, for it has not been produced; and has an end, for it will be terminated by the production of the effect.

Emergent privation is destruction (*dhwansa*), or cessation, of an effect. It is negation in the cause, subsequent to the production of the effect: as, in a broken jar, (smashed by the blow of a mallet) the negation of jar in the heap of potsherds. It has a commencement, but no end; for the destruction of the effect cannot be undone.

Absolute negation (*atyantábháva*) extends through all times, past, present, and future. It has neither beginning nor end. For example, fire in a lake, colour in air.[2]

[1] [It is singular that, though the tenet of *viśesha* has given its name to Kaṇáda's school, there is very little said about it in the *Sútras*. The word is only used in its technical meaning in i. 1. 4, 8; i. 2. 6; iv. 1. 4; vii. 1. 11.]

[2] [Another example would be the fact that there is no jar on the spot before me. There is on that spot an absolute non-existence of the jar, and even if a jar were moved there, the non-existence would not be destroyed but only transferred to the place where the jar was before. That which is absent is said to be the counter-entity or *pratiyogi* of the non-existence which is presumed, according to the ordinary rule, "*yasyábhávah sa eva pratiyogí, yathá ghaṭábhávasya pratiyogi ghaṭah.*]

[289] Mutual privation (*anyonyábhává*) is difference (*bheda*).[1] It is reciprocal negation of identity, essence, or respective peculiarity.

5. To return to Gotama's arrangement. The fifth place, next after objects of sense, is by him allotted to intelligence (*buddhi*), apprehension, knowledge, or conception; defined as that which manifests, or makes known, a matter.

It is twofold; notion and remembrance. Notion (*anubhava*) includes two sorts; right and wrong. Right notion (*pramá*) is such as is incontrovertible. It is derived from proof, and is consequently fourfold; *viz.* from perception, or inference, or comparison, or revelation: for example: 1st, a jar perceived by undisordered organs; 2nd, fire inferred from smoke; 3rd, a gayal[2] recognized from its resemblance to a cow; 4th, celestial happiness attainable through sacrifice, as inculcated by the *Vedas*.

Wrong notion deviates from truth, and is not derived from proof. It is threefold: doubt; premises liable to reduction to absurdity; and error (for example, mistaking mother-o'-pearl for silver).

Remembrance (*smaraṇa*), likewise, is either right or wrong. Both occur, and right remembrance especially, while awake. But, in sleep, remembrance is wrong.

6. The sixth place among objects of proof is allotted to mind. It has been already twice noticed; *viz.* among organs of sense, and again among substances.

7. Activity (*pravṛitti*) is next in order. It is determination, the result of passion,[3] and the cause of virtue and vice, or merit and demerit; according as the act is one enjoined or forbidden. It is oral, mental, or corporeal; not comprehend-

[1] [This is said to exist between two notions which have no property in common. Thus 'a jar is not cloth,'—here the counter-proposition would be one of identity, 'a jar is cloth.']

[2] *Bos gavæus* s. *frontalis*. As. Res. vol. viii. p. 487.

[3] [Rather the result of any one of the three 'faults' (*Bháshya*, i. 18). Oral activity initiates the utterances of the voice, mental the perceptions of the mind, and corporeal the gestures of the body.]

ing unconscious vital functions. It is the reason of all worldly proceedings.

8. From acts proceed faults[1] (*dosha*): including under [290] this designation, passion or extreme desire; aversion or loathing; and error or delusion (*moha*). The two first of these are reckoned by Kaṇáda among qualities.

9. Next in Gotama's arrangement is (*pretya-bháva*) the condition of the soul after death; which is transmigration: for the soul, being immortal, passes from a former body which perishes, to a new one which receives it. This is a reproduction (*punar-utpatti*).[2]

10. Retribution (*phala*) is the fruit accruing from faults which result from activity. It is a return of fruition (*punar-bhoga*), or experience of pleasure or pain, in association with body, mind, and senses.

11. Pain, or anguish, is the eleventh topic of matters to be proven.

12. Deliverance from pain is beatitude: it is absolute prevention of every sort of ill: reckoned, in this system of philosophy, to comprehend twenty-one varieties of evil, primary or secondary:[3] *viz.* 1, body; 2—7, the six organs of sense; 8—13, six objects (*vishaya*) of sensation; 14—19, six sorts of apprehension and intelligence (*buddhi*); 20, pain or anguish; 21, pleasure. For even this, being tainted with evil, is pain; as honey drugged with poison is reckoned among deleterious substances.

This liberation from ill is attained by soul, acquainted with

[1] [Or rather "faults are characterized as causing activity," *pravartaná-lakshaṇá doshá́ḥ* (Got. Sút. i. 18). "The wise man, according to Gotama, is he who avoids the three mistakes of having a liking for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of having a dislike for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of being stupidly indifferent, and thereupon acting; instead of being intelligently indifferent, and not acting at all." (Ballantyne).]

[2] [The *Bháshya* expressly adds that *punar* here implies continual repetition; *pretya-bháva* is eternal *a parte ante* and only ceases at final liberation. Cf. iii. 22.]

[3] [The primary or direct (*mukhya*) evil is 'pain,' but the others are secondary or indirect (*gauṇa*) evils, as being its causes.]

the truth (*tattwa*), by means of holy science; divested of passion through knowledge of the evil incident to objects; meditating on itself; and, by the maturity of self-knowledge, making its own essence present; relieved from impediments; not earning fresh merit or demerit, by deeds done with desire; discerning the previous burden of merit or demerit, by devout contemplation; and acquitting it through compressed endurance of its fruit; and thus (previous acts being annulled, and present body departed, and no future body accruing), there is no further connexion with the various sorts of [291] ill, since there is no cause for them.[1] This, then, is prevention of pain of every sort; it is deliverance and beatitude.

III. After proof and matter to be proven, Gotama proceeds to other categories, and assigns the next place to doubt (*sanśaya*).

It is the consideration of divers contrary matters in regard to one and the same thing; and is of three sorts, arising from common or from peculiar qualities, or merely from contradiction; discriminative marks being in all three cases unnoticed. Thus an object is observed, concerning which it becomes a question whether it be a man or a post: the limbs which would betoken the man, or the crooked trunk which would distinguish the post, being equally unperceived. Again, odour is a peculiar quality of earth: it belongs not to eternal substances, as the etherial element; nor to transient elements, as water: is then earth eternal or uneternal? So, one affirms that sound is eternal; another denies that position; and a third person doubts.

IV. Motive (*prayojana*) is that by which a person is actuated, or moved to action. It is the desire of attaining pleasure, or of shunning pain; or the wish of exemption from both; for such is the purpose or impulse of every one in a natural state of mind.[2]

[1] [Cf. *Rational Refutation*, sect. i. ch. 2. pp. 25–34.]
[2] Got. 1. 1. 4. 1-3.

V. Instance (*dṛishṭánta*) is, in a controversy, a topic on which both disputants consent. It is either concordant or discordant; direct or inverse: as the culinary hearth, for a direct instance of the argument of the presence of fire betokened by smoke; and a lake, for an inverse or contrary instance of the argument, where the indicating vapour is mist or fog.[1]

VI. Demonstrated truth (*siddhánta*) is of four sorts; *viz.* universally acknowledged; partially so; hypothetically; argumentatively (or, *e concessu*).[2]

[292] Thus, existence of substance, or of that to which properties appertain, is universally recognized, though the abstract notion of it may not be so; for the *Bauddhas* deny abstraction. Mind is by the *Naiyáyikas* considered to be an organ of perception, and so it is by the kindred sect of *Vaiśeshikas*. The eternity of sound is admitted in the *Mimánsá*, and denied in the *Nyáya*. Supposing the creation of the earth to be proved, omniscience of the creator follows. In Jaimini's disquisition on the eternity, or the transitoriness, of sound, it is said, granting sound to be a quality.[3]

On the appositeness of some of these examples, in the cases

[1] Got. 1. 1. 5. 1–6.

[2] Got. 1. 1. 6. 1, etc. [The fourth kind of siddhánta, *abhyupagama*, means rather 'implied dogma.' It is defined by Viśwanátha as "the assuming of a particular fact by the leader of a school, in the course of some of his arguments, though he nowhere definitely lays it down in his *sútras*." Thus the author of the *Nyáya Sútras* assumes that mind is an organ of sense (*indriya*) in his arguments in iii. 91–131, though he nowhere expressly asserts it. The explanation, however, given in the *Bháshya*, differs, as it often does, from that of the modern Nyáya.]

[3] [Cf. note, p. 330, where Colebrooke doubts where this is found. It appears to me, after comparing S'abara's Commentary on *Mimánsá Sút.* i. 1. 17, with that printed in Ballantyne's extract, that it must refer to one of the scholastic ways of explaining that argument of Jaimini's in favour of the eternity of sound against the Naiyáyikas. The latter held that sound could not be eternal, because it could be increased, as in the case of many voices. Jaimini (according to his Commentator) replies that, accepting the Naiyáyika doctrine that sound is a quality of the one all-pervading ether, it will then follow that it is without parts, and consequently sound cannot be increased, but only the *noise* which accompanies its manifestation.]

to which they are here applied, as instances of divers sorts of demonstration, there is a disagreement among commentators, which it is needless to go into.

VII. A regular argument, or complete syllogism (*nyáya*), consists of five members (*avayava*) or component parts.[1] 1st, the proposition (*pratijñá*);[2] 2nd, the reason (*hetu* or *apadeśa*); 3rd, the instance (*udáharaṇa* or *nidarśana*); 4th, the application (*upanaya*); 5th, the conclusion (*nigamana*).[3] Ex.

1. This hill is fiery:
2. For it smokes.
3. What smokes is fiery: as a culinary hearth.
4. Accordingly,[4] the hill is smoking:
5. Therefore it is fiery.

[1] [The *Bhdshya* mentions that some old teachers reckoned ten members.]

[2] [The later Vaiśeshikas call these five members *pratijñá*, *apadeśa*, *nidarśana*, *anusandhdna*, *pratyámnáya* (S'ankara M. on V.S. ix. 2, 2), but it is merely a difference of names.]

[3] [In the Nyáya the middle term of an affirmative argument is called *hetu* 'the reason,' *sádhana* 'the instrument of proof,' or *linga* 'the sign'; and the major term *sádhya*, or 'that which is to be established.' This last term is, however, sometimes used for the minor (cf. *Bháshya*, i. 36, *Vṛitti*, i. 37). The Vaiśeshika uses (besides *hetu* and *linga*) *apadeśa*, *pramáṇa*, and *karaṇa* (ix. 2, 4). The later school of logic adopted *paksha* for the minor term (or sometimes *vivádapadam* or *vimatam*), and developed the notion of *vyápti* 'pervadedness,' or 'the being invariably accompanied by some other thing.' (*Vyápti* is called *pratibandha* in the *Sánkhya Sút.* i. 100.) Thus the major term of an affirmative argument became the *vyápaka* or 'pervader' from its wider extension, the middle the *vyápya* or 'pervaded.' The argument, "the mountain has fire because it has smoke," is true, because smoke is always accompanied by fire; "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," is false, because fire is not thus always accompanied by smoke. The latter is a favourite instance of the *anaikánta* or *savyabhichára* fallacy.

There is an interesting passage in the *Muktávali*, p. 122, on the induction by which the *vyápti* or universal proposition is arrived at. It is to be tested by affirmative and negative induction (*anvayavyatirekau*), which correspond to the methods of Agreement and Difference in Mill's *Logic*, vol. i. p. 454, the great object being to discover, if possible, the relation of cause and effect between the two phenomena. This is well illustrated in the Comm. on the *Sánkhya Sút.* i. 40, "The two suggestors of the relation of cause and effect are, (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives,—that whenever the product exists, the material cause thereof exists; and (2) this concomitancy of negatives,—that whenever the material cause no longer exists, the product no longer exists." And so in vi. 15, liberation is proved to be the effect of discriminative knowledge, since wherever liberation takes place, this knowledge is; but where this knowledge is not, there is no liberation.]

[4] [*Tathá* 'so,' 'accordingly,' is used in an argument from an affirmative induc-

Some* confine the syllogism (*nyáya*) to three members; either the three first, or the three last. In this latter form it

tion,—it introduces an affirmative application, as in the argument in the text. We sometimes find an apparently negative form introduced by the words *na cháyam tathá*; but this, I think, was originally used only in cases of *samavyápti* (Sánkhya S. v. 29), where the middle and major terms are equipollent (ἀντιστρέφει). Thus the following examples of the two forms are given in the *Nyáya-bháshya*, i. 39; the former is the argument from an induction from similar instances (*udáharaṇa-sádharmyát*), the latter from an induction from dissimilar (*udáharaṇa-vaidharmyát*).

a. 1. Sound is non-eternal, (*anitya*,)
2. Because it is produced.
3. Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as pots, etc.
4. Sound is thus produced;
5. Therefore it is non-eternal.

b. 1. Sound is non-eternal,
2. Because it is produced.
3. Whatever is unproduced is eternal, as soul, etc.
4. But sound is not thus unproduced;
5. Therefore it is non-eternal. (Cf. *Bháshya*, p. 32.)

We should have expected the example of *b* to have run, "whatever is eternal is unproduced," but as the two terms 'eternal' and 'unproduced' are equipollent, there is no fault in the argument (see a similar example in *Sarva-darś.-sangraha*, p. 82, ll. 1, 2), and, with a slight alteration, it would run as Camestres.

This, however, as it stands, is not properly a negative argument, as it professes to lead to the same affirmative conclusion as the other (cf. *Bháshya*, i. 35, and *Nyáya S. Vṛitti*, i. 37). Vátsyáyana expressly leaves the point as an obscure question for future logicians to investigate, and they appear to have altered the form of the argument. They give a different form of the example, *yan naivam tan naivam*, which, however, though negative in its form, is still really affirmative in its effect. This form of the argument views the major premiss or example of the old affirmative syllogism from another side; it not only affirms that all smoke-possessing things have fire, but that no not-fiery things have smoke.

The author of the *Vṛitti* (i. 35) defines the affirmative example (*anvayi-udáharaṇa*) as "some familiar instance, which, through its having a characteristic [as smoke] which is invariably attended by that major term which is to be established [as fire], proves in consequence the existence, in the subject, of that major term." The negative example (*vyatireki-udáharaṇa*) is defined in i. 36, "The example, on the contrary, will be negative from its showing an absence (*i.e.* of the middle term), which always accompanies the absence (of the major term). He gives two examples of the latter (i. 36, 37).

1. This mountain has fire,
2. Because it has smoke.
3. Whatever is not so, is not so, as a lake (*i.e.* whatever has not fire has not smoke, or, in other words, the absence of smoke always accompanies the absence of fire). [All the paṇḍits read *yan naivam tan naivam*, in p. 30, 8.]
4. But this mountain is not thus possessed of the absence of smoke (*i.e.* it has that smoke whose absence always accompanies the absence of fire);
5. Therefore it has fire. [And

* The followers of the *Mímánsá*. *Pad. Dip.*

is quite regular. The recital joined with the instance is the major; the application is the minor; the conclusion follows.[1]

VIII. Next in this arrangement is (*tarka*) reduction to absurdity. It is a mode of reasoning, for the investigation [293] of truth, by deduction from wrong premises, to an inadmissible conclusion which is at variance with proof, whether actual perception or demonstrable inference. The conclusion

And again,

1. A living body has a soul,
2. Because it has vital air.
3. What is not so, is not so, as a jar (*i.e.* whatever has not a soul has not vital air, the vital air being, by *Vaiś. Sút.* iii. 2, 4, the sign of soul).
4. But a living body is not thus possessed of the absence of vital air;
5. Therefore it has a soul.

The *Vritti* expressly affirms that the conclusion of this apparently negative argument is affirmative; although it adds that some authors held that it should be in a negative form (i. 38), *i.e.* the conclusions of the two last arguments should be "therefore it has not the absence of fire," and "it has not the absence of soul." (Cf. the example in Ballantyne's *Tarka-sangraha*, p. 51, and also that in *Sarva D. S* p. 150, ll. 16, 17.)

The simplest form of the *vyatireki-anumána* or negative argument is that given in the *Siddhánta-muktávali*, p. 127, "The mountain has the absence of smoke from the absence of fire," in accordance with the principle *yo yasya vyápakaḥ tad-abhávas tad-abhávasya vyápyaḥ*, "when one thing invariably accompanies another (as fire smoke), the absence of the former is invariably accompanied by the absence of the latter."]

[1] [Ballantyne has shown that the longer five-membered syllogism of the Hindus is the rhetorical one, while the three-membered is the strictly logical, or, as it is expressed in the *Tarka-sangraha*, the former is "an inference for the sake of another," the latter is "an inference for oneself" (Cf. *Tattwachintámaṇi*, (*Anum. kh.*,) p. 54.) It will then take the form, "this mountain has fire, because it has fire-pervaded smoke," or rather, as it is more commonly expressed in Hindu books, it will be the enthymeme, "this mountain has fire, because it has smoke." This inference is said to be based on *parámarśa* 'consideration,' which is defined as "the perceiving that the subject possesses what is pervaded (or constantly accompanied) by some other thing,"—*i.e.* that this mountain has fire-pervaded smoke. The Vedántic work, *Vedánta-paribhásha* (p. 17), maintains that the shorter form is sufficient even in 'inference for another.' "Inference for the sake of another is produced by 'deduction' (*nyáya*), and 'deduction' is the combination of the members. But the members are here only three, the proposition, the reason, and the example, or the example, the application, and the conclusion,—and not five; as the other two members are superfluous, since these three sufficiently show the 'pervadedness' (*vyápti*) and the residence of the middle term in the subject." For the best account of Hindu logic, see Ballantyne's translation of the *Tarka-sangraha*. Röer's translation of the *Siddhánta-muktávali* is not equally trustworthy; but his remarks on the Hindu syllogism, Zeitsch. d. D. M. G. xxi. 367–378, are very useful.]

to which the premises would lead is inadmissible, as contrary to what is demonstrated, or as conceding what is disproved.

It is not to be confounded with doubt, to which there are two sides; but to this there is but one.

Five sorts are distinguished by the more ancient writers, to which the moderns have added six, or even seven more varieties. It is needless to enumerate them: one or two examples may suffice.

Ex. 1. Is this hill fiery, or not? On this question one delivers his opinion, that it is not fiery. The answer to him is, Were it not fiery, it would not smoke.

Ex. 2. If there be a jar in this place, it must look like the ground.

Fallacy of the same form, termed *tarkábhása*, comprises the like number of sorts and varieties.

The designations by which they are distinguished are familiar to the Indian scholastic disputation. It would be tedious to enumerate and explain them.

IX. Ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), or determination of truth, is the fruit of proof, the result of evidence and of reasoning, confuting objections and establishing the position in question.

X.—XII. Disputation (*kathá*) is conference or dialogue of interlocutors maintaining adverse positions, whether contending for victory, or seeking the truth. It comprises three of the categories.

X. One is (*jalpa*) debate of disputants contending for victory; each seeking to establish his own position and overthrow the opponent's.[1]

XI. Another is (*váda*) discourse, or interlocution of per-[294]sons communing on a topic in pursuit of truth, as preceptor and pupil together with fellow-students.

XII. The third is (*vitaṇḍá*) cavil, or controversy wherein the disputant seeks to confute his opponent without offering to support a position of his own.

[1] [XI. and X. should be transposed to agree with the order in the original.]

XIII. Next in Gotama's enumeration is fallacy, or, as it is termed, semblance of a reason (*hetwábhása*); it is the *non causa pro causa* of logicians. Five sorts are distinguished, embracing divers varieties or subdivisions. They need not be here set forth.

XIV. Fraud (*chhala*), or perversion and misconstruction, is of three sorts: 1st, verbal misconstruing of what is ambiguous; 2nd, perverting, in a literal sense, what is said in a metaphorical one; 3rd, generalizing what is particular.

XV. After all these is (*játi*) a futile answer, or self-confuting reply. No less than twenty-four sorts are enumerated.

XVI. The sixteenth, and last of Gotama's categories, is (*nigraha-sthána*) failure in argument, or (*parájaya-hetu*) reason of defeat. It is the termination of a controversy. Of this, likewise, no fewer than twenty-two distinctions are specified; which are here passed by, as the present essay has already been extended to too great a length.[1]

[1] [It is very difficult to determine in the history of Indian logic how far certain parts of the theory are due to the *Vaiśeshika*, as distinguished from the *Naiyáyika*, school. The *Vaiśeshika-sútras* discuss certain points of the theory (iii. § 1, and ix. § 2. 1, 2, 4, as well as incidentally elsewhere), but we nowhere find a complete view of the subject. The author appears to assume the *Nyáya's* analysis and some of its technical terms, and to confine himself to illustrating certain points. An alliance early took place between the *Nyáya* and the *Vaiśeshika* systems, and we find the later theory of the syllogism especially maintained in those books which, like the *Bhásha-parichheda* and its Commentary, adopt the *Vaiśeshika* and not the *Nyáya* categories. But this does not prove that these later views were originally *Vaiśeshika*. They are not found in the *Vaiśeshika-sútras*, except by implication; and S'ankara-miśra, in his Comm. on those *sútras*, frequently refers to the *Anumána-mayúkha*, a well-known work of the modern *Nyáya*, for a further account of obscure logical questions (as *e.g.* pp. 154, 161, 392), just as the author of the *Siddhánta-mukt.* devotes pages to maintaining the views as to the syllogism of the great *Naiyáyika* doctor, Raghunátha-śiromaṇi. The *Tarka-sangraha* is not a purely *Vaiśeshika* work, but is expressly written "to perfect the acquaintance of the young with the tenets of Kaṇáda and the *Nyáya*," and so too the *Bhásha-parichheda* and its commentary.]

IX.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS.

PART III.[1]

[From the *Transactions* of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. pp. 439–461.]

INTRODUCTION.

[295] Of the six systems of philosophy received among learned Hindus, four have been noticed in the preceding parts of this essay, *viz.* the theistical and atheistical *Sánkhyas*, the dialectic *Nyáya*, and the atomical *Vaiśeshika*. The prior or practical *Mímánsá* will be now considered; reserving the later or theological *Mímánsá*, usually named *Vedánta*, for a future disquisition, should it appear requisite to pursue the subject, much concerning it being already before the public.

The object of the *Mímánsá* is the interpretation of the *Vedas*. "Its purpose," says a commentator,[2] "is to determine "the sense of revelation." Its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty. Here *duty* intends sacrifices and other acts of religion ordained by the *Vedas*. The same term (*dharma*) likewise signifies *virtue*, or moral merit; and grammarians have distinguished its import according to the gender of the noun. In one (the masculine), it implies virtue; in the other

[1] Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, March 4th, 1826.

[2] Somanátha in the *Mayúkha*, 2. 1. 17.

(neuter), it means an act of devotion.[1] It is in the last-mentioned sense that the term is here employed; and its meaning is by commentators explained to be "the scope of an injunction; "the object of a command;[2] a purpose ordained by reve-[296] "lation with a view to a motive, such as sacrifice commanded by "the *Vedas*, for the attainment of bliss;"[3] and such indeed is the main scope of every disquisition.

The prior (*púrva*) *Mímánsá* then is *practical*, as relating to works (*karma*) or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends; and it is accordingly termed *Karma-mímánsá*, in contradistinction to the theological, which is named *Brahma-mímánsá*.

It is not directly a system of philosophy; nor chiefly so. But, in course of delivering canons of scriptural interpretation, it incidently touches upon philosophical topics; and scholastic disputants have elicited from its dogmas, principles of reasoning applicable to the prevailing points of controversy agitated by the Hindu schools of philosophy.

Writers on the Mímánsá.

The acknowledged founder of this school of scriptural interpretation is Jaimini. He is repeatedly named as an authority in the *sútras* which are ascribed to him. Other ancient writers on the same subject, who are occasionally quoted in those aphorisms, as Átreya, Bádari, Bádaráyaṇa,[4] Lábukáyana, Aitiśáyana, etc., are sometimes adduced there for authority, but oftener for correction and confutation.

It is no doubt possible, that the true author of a work may speak in it of himself by name, and in the third person. Nor,

[1] *Medini-kosha.* [This is not found in S'abara, but the quotation from the *Medini-kosha* is given in the commentary, from which Ballantyne published extracts in his *Aphorisms of the Mímánsá Philosophy.*]

[2] Pártha 1. 1. 2. *Didh.* ibid. [3] Apadeva; *Nyáya-prakás'a.*

[4] Author of the *Brahma-sútras.*

indeed, is that very unusual. A Hindu commentator will, however, say, as the scholiasts of Manu's and of Yájnavalkya's institutes of law do, that the oral instructions of the teacher were put in writing by some disciple; and, for this reason, the mention of him as of a third person is strictly proper.

[297] The *sútras*, or aphorisms, thus attributed to Jaimini, are arranged in twelve lectures, each subdivided into four chapters, except the third, sixth, and tenth lectures, which contain twice as many; making the entire number sixty chapters. These again are divided into sections, cases, or topics (*adhikaraṇas*), ordinarily comprising several *sútras*, but not uncommonly restricted to one; and instances may be noted where a single sentence is split into several *adhikaraṇas;* or, on the contrary, a single phrase variously interpreted becomes applicable to distinct cases; and *sútras*, united under the same head by one interpreter, are by another explained as constituting separate topics. The total number of *sútras* is 2652, and of *adhikaraṇas* 915, as numbered by Mádhava-áchárya.

Like the aphorisms of other Indian sciences, those *sútras* are extremely obscure; or without a gloss utterly unintelligible. They must have been from the first accompanied by an oral or written exposition; and an ancient scholiast (*Vṛittikára*) is quoted by the herd of commentators for subsidiary aphorisms, supplying the defect of the text, as well as for explanatory comments on it.

Besides the work of the old scholiast, which probably is not extant in a complete form, the *sútras* have, as usual, been elucidated by a perpetual commentary, and by corrective annotations on it.

The author of the extant commentary[1] is Śabara-swámí-bhaṭṭa, from whom it takes the name of *Śábara-bháshya*. He quotes occasionally the ancient scholiast, sometimes concurring with, sometimes dissenting from him.[2]

[1] [This has been edited in the Bibliotheca Indica by Paṇḍit Maheśa-chandra-nyáyaratna.]

[2] [Thus in his Comm. on i. 1. 5, he cites a different explanation by the

The annotations (*várttika*) are by Bhaṭṭa-kumárila-swámí, who is the great authority of the *Mímánsaka* school, in which he is emphatically designated by his title, *Bhaṭṭa*, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects Śabara's gloss, often delivers a different [298] interpretation, but in many instances passes entire sections without notice, as seeing no occasion for emendation or explanation of the commentary, which he must be considered therefore as tacitly ratifying. The ancient scholiast is sometimes cited by him, adopting or amending the scholia; and he criticises the text itself, and arrangement of Jaimini.

Next to him in celebrity is a writer usually cited under the title of *Guru*; more rarely under the designation of *Prabhákara*.[1] His work I have had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present essay,[2] and he is known to me chiefly from references and quotations; as in Mádhava's summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Kumárila's; and in the text and commentary of the *Sástra-dípiká*, where his positions are canvassed and compared with those of numerous other writers.[3]

'ancient scholiast' (*vrittikára*) on i. 1, 3, and he gives the substance of a long discussion by the same author. In p. 13, l. 8, this *Vrittikára* is named *Bhagaván Upavarsha*, and this very discussion is referred to, with the mention of the same author, in S'ankara's Commentary on the *Vedánta*, iii. 3, 53 (cf. S'abara, pp. 11, 18). For a further account of *Upavarsha*, see p. [332] *infra*.]

[1] Mádh. 1. 1. 3.

[2] [Dr. Hall saw a few scattered leaves of this work entitled *Bṛihatí* in the possession of a Brahman at Saugor, see *Bibl. Index*, p. 180. He informs me in a letter August 14, 1871, "the owner is since dead and his MSS. are dispersed."]

[3] [In the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, pp. 123–7, we have the first *sútra* ("now the desire to know duty is to be entertained") explained according to each school, in its bearing on the study of the *Mímánsá*. The followers of Kumárila maintain that the study of *Mímánsá* is 'enjoined,' as it helps the understanding of the *Veda*, and therefore comes under the general rule, 'the *Veda* is to be read.' Just as the absolute fruit produced by the great fortnightly sacrifices establishes the minor fruit of such ancillary rites as the shelling of the rice, etc., which are indispensable preliminaries thereto, so the absolute fruit arising from the performance of all the sacrifices similarly establishes the minor fruit of the rule for reading the *Veda* which is the only means of knowing how to perform them. The rule which enjoins it is not a direct *vidhi*, but a *niyama*,—the one enjoins what without it

Kumárila-bhaṭṭa figures greatly in the traditionary religious history of India. He was predecessor of Śankara-áchárya, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics, who reject the authority of the *Vedas*. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of *Buddha*, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy.[1] He does, indeed, take every occasion of controverting the authority and doctrine of Śákya or Buddha, as well as Arhat or Jina, together with obscurer heretics, Bodháyana and Maśaka;[2] and he denies them any consideration, even when they do concur upon any point with the *Vedas*.[3] The age of Kumárila, anterior to Śankara,[4] and corresponding with the period [299] of the persecution of the *Bauddhas*, goes back to an antiquity of much more than a thousand years. He is reputed to have been contemporary with Sudhanwá, but the chronology of that prince's reign is not accurately determined.[5]

Next in eminence among the commentators of the *Mimánsá* is Pártha-sárathi-miśra, who has professedly followed the guidance of Kumárila-bhaṭṭa. His commentary, entitled

never would have been performed, the other what without it would have been optional, and so might or might not have been performed.

The followers of Prabhákara maintain that the words 'the *Veda* is to be read' are not a *vidhi*, as they only enjoin what had been enjoined by other and prior rules, as those relating to the duty of a spiritual teacher to teach the *Veda* to his pupils. They would thus be an *anuváda* or 'supplementary repetition,' rather than a *vidhi* or 'authoritative injunction.' But Prabhákara also allows that from another point of view the study of the *Mimánsá* may be considered as 'enjoined,' since it resolves the doubts of the student as he practises that Veda-reading which is a necessary result of the Veda-teaching enjoined on the preceptor. Cf. *Nyáya-málá-vistara*, i. 1. 1.]

[1] Preface to Wilson's Dictionary, p. xix.

[2] [Baudháyana and Maśaka are the authors of two Kalpa-sútras belonging to the Black Yajur and Sáma Veda respectively. Cf. Müller's *Anc. Sansk. Lit.* pp. 97, 209.]

[3] *Mím.* 1. 3. 4.

[4] S'abara-swámí-áchárya is expressly named by S'ankara in his commentary on the latter *Mimánsá* (see *Brahma-sútra*, 3. 3. 53); and there are allusions to Kumárila-bhaṭṭa, if no direct mention of him.

[5] Preface to Wilson's Dictionary, p. xviii.

Śástra-dípiká, has been amply expounded in a gloss bearing the title of *Mayúkha-málá*, by Somanátha, a Kárṇáṭaka Bráhman, whose elder brother was high priest of the celebrated temple at Venkaṭádri (or Venkaṭagiri).[1] Pártha-sárathi is author likewise of the *Nyáya-ratna-málá* and other known works.

A compendious gloss on the text of Jaimini, following likewise the same guidance (that of Kumárila), is the *Bhaṭṭa-dípiká* of Khaṇḍa-deva, author of a separate and ampler treatise, entitled *Mímánsá-kaustubha*, to which he repeatedly refers for a fuller elucidation of matters briefly touched upon in his concise but instructive gloss. This work is posterior to that of Mádhava-áchárya, who is sometimes quoted in it, and to Pártha-sárathi, who is more frequently noticed.

The *Mímánsá-nyáya-viveka*[2] is another commentary by a distinguished author, Bhavanátha-miśra. I speak of this and of the foregoing as commentaries, because they follow the order of the text, recite one or more of the aphorisms from every section, and explain the subject, but without regularly expounding every word, as ordinary scholiasts, in a perpetual gloss.

Among numerous other commentaries on Jaimini's [300] text, the *Nyáyávali-didhiti* of Rághavánanda is not to be omitted. It contains an excellent interpretation of the *sútras*, which it expounds word by word, in the manner of a perpetual comment. It is brief, but clear; leaving nothing unexplained, and wandering into no digressions.

It results from the many revisions which the text and exposition of it have undergone, with amendments, one while arriving by a different process of reasoning at the same conclusion, another time varying the question and deducing from an unchanged text an altered argument for its solution, that

[1] 135 miles west from Madras. [But cf. Dr. Hall's *Bibl. Index*, p. 176.]

[2] [The copy in the Library of the Benares College bears the title *Mimánsá-naya-viveka*, see Dr. Hall's *Bibl. Index*, p. 179.]

the cases (*adhikaraṇas*) assume a very diversified aspect in the hands of the many interpreters of the *Mímánsá*.

A summary or paraphrase of Jaimini's doctrine was put into verse by an ancient author, whose memorial verses are frequently cited by the commentators of Jaimini, under the title of *Sangraha*.

Another metrical paraphrase is largely employed in the *Várttika*, or is a part of that work itself. An entire chapter occurs under the title of *Slóka-várttika*: other whole chapters of Kumárila's performance are exclusively in prose. In many, verse and prose are intermixed.

The most approved introduction to the study of the *Mímánsá* is the *Nyáya-málá-vistara* by Mádhava-áchárya.[1] It is in verse, attended with a commentary in prose by the same author. It follows the order of Jaimini's text; not by way of paraphrase, but as a summary (though the title rather implies amplification) of its purport, and of approved deductions from it; sometimes explaining separately the doctrine of *Bhaṭṭa* and of *Guru*, under each head; at other times that of the old scholiast; but more commonly confined to that of *Bhaṭṭa* alone; yet often furnishing more than one application for the same text, as *Bhaṭṭa* himself does.

[301] Mádhava-áchárya was both priest and minister, or civil as well as spiritual adviser of Bukka-ráya and Harihara, sovereigns of Vidyánagara on the Godávarí, as his father Máyana had been of their father and predecessor Sangama, who reigned over the whole peninsula of India.[2]

[1] [This has been edited with the Comm. by Prof. Goldstücker.]

[2] [The Ballála dynasty of Karṇáṭa was conquered by the Muhammadans A.D. 1310, in the reign of Alá-ud-dín Khiljí; but the country regained independence during the confusion of the later years of Muhammad Tughlak's reign, about 1344. A new dynasty succeeded to the old, and a new capital was founded at Vidyánagara or Vijayanagara. Local tradition ascribes the founding to two princes Bukkaráya and Harihara, with the aid of a learned Brahman, Mádhava Vidyáraṇya. The popular date for this event is 1258 of the S'álivábana era (A.D. 1336); but Wilson thinks that this is too soon. The earliest copper land-grant of Bukkaráya is dated A.D. 1370, the latest 1375 (cf. also vol. ii. p. 227); some traditions give thirty-four years for his reign, others only fourteen (Wilson's *Mackenzie Catal.* vol. i. pp.

Like the numerous other writings which bear his name, the *Nyáya-málá* was composed, not by himself, but by his directions, under the more immediate superintendence of his brother, Sáyaṇa-áchárya; and it appears from its preface to have been the next performance undertaken after the completion of their commentary on Parásara's institutes of law; and it suitably enough preceded the great commentary of the same authors on the whole of the *Vedas*.

According to history, confirmed by authentic inscriptions, Mádhava flourished towards the middle of the fourteenth century: the sovereigns whose confidence he enjoyed reigned from that time to the end of the century.

Analysis of the Mímánsá.

From this brief notice of the principal writers on the *Mímánsá*, I pass to the subject which has occupied them.

A complete *adhikaraṇa*, or case, consists of five members, *viz.* 1, the subject, or matter to be explained; 2, the doubt, or question arising upon that matter; 3, the first side (*púrva-paksha*) or *primâ facie* argument concerning it; 4, the answer (*uttara*) or demonstrated conclusion (*siddhánta*); 5, the pertinence or relevancy.[1]

cxl–clii, 289–291). The kingdom lasted till the fatal battle of Talikota, A.D. 1564, when it was overthrown by the united armies of the Muhammadan Kings of the Deccan. For the fullest account of Mádhava see Mr. A. C. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Vaṁśa-bráhmaṇa, Mangalore, 1873. He gives strong reasons for considering Mádhava and Sáyaṇa to have been the same person. Mádhava is said to have become the head of the S'ringeri maṭha, when he was 36 years old, in 1331.]

[1] [These are respectively called the *vishaya*, *saṁśaya*, *púrvapaksha*, *siddhánta*, and *sangati* (*Sarva-dars'.-sangr.* p. 122); in the *Nyáya-málá-vistara*, p. 4, *sangati* is reckoned as the third instead of the fifth. But the *sangati* rather relates to the relative position of the topic in the general theory of the *Mímánsá* (cf. *Nyáya-málá-v.*, pp. 3–11), and I believe the five members of an *adhikaraṇa* are often reckoned as the subject *vishaya*, the doubt *saṁśaya*, the *primâ-facie* argument *púrvapaksha*, the answer *uttarapaksha*, and the demonstrated conclusion *siddhán'a* or *ráddhánta*.]

The last-mentioned appertains to the whole arrangement as well as to its subdivisions; and commentators are occupied with showing the relation and connexion of subjects treated in the several lectures and chapters, and their right distribution and appropriate positions.

The text of Jaimini's aphorisms does not ordinarily [302] exhibit the whole of the five members of an *adhikaraṇa*. Frequently the subject, and the question concerning it, are but hinted, or they are left to be surmised; sometimes the disputable solution of it is unnoticed, and the right conclusion alone is set forth. The rest is supplied by the scholiasts; and they do not always concur as to the most apposite examples, nor concerning the presumed allusions of the text.

Its introductory *sútras* propose the subject in this manner. "Now then the study of duty is to be commenced. Duty is a "purpose which is inculcated by a command. Its reason must "be inquired."[1]

That is, according to the interpretation of commentators, 'Next, after reading the *Veda;* and therefore, for the sake of 'understanding it; the duty enjoined by it is to be investigated. 'Duty is a meaning deduced from injunction: its ground must 'be sifted. A command is not implicitly received for proof of 'duty.'

The business of the *Mímánsá*, then, being to investigate what is incumbent as a duty to be performed, the primary matter for inquiry is proof and authority (*pramáṇa*). This, accordingly, is the subject of the first lecture, comprising four chapters, which treat of the following matters: 1st, precept and its cogency; 2, affirmation or narrative (*arthaváda*),[2] as well as prayer and invocation (*mantra*), their cogency as inculcating

[1] Jaim. 1. 1. 1—3.

[2] [*Vidhi* and *arthaváda* are two important words in the Mímánsá: the first refers to those passages of the Veda which, being in the potential, imperative, or passive future participle, have a directly injunctive force; the second refers to those which explain and illustrate the object of some act which is enjoined by a former *vidhi*.]

some duty; 3, law memorial (*smṛiti*), and usage (*áchára*), their authority as presumption of some cogent revelation; 4, modifying ordinance and specific denomination, distinguished from direct or positive injunction.

Proceeding with the subject as above proposed, the *Mímánsá* declares that perception or simple apprehension is no reason of duty, for it apprehends a present object only, [303] whereas duty concerns the future.[1] Simple apprehension is defined in these words: "when the organs of man are in contiguity with "an object, that source of knowledge is *perception*."

The ancient scholiast has here introduced definitions of other sources of knowledge which the author had omitted, *viz.* inference, verbal communication, comparison, presumption, and privation. None of these are reasons of duty except verbal communication; for the rest are founded on perception, which itself is not so. Verbal communication is either human, as a correct sentence (*ápta-vákya*),[2] or superhuman, as a passage of the *Vedas*. It is indicative or imperative; and the latter is either positive or relative: Ex. 1. "This is "to be done:" 2. "That is to be done like this."

"On sight of one member of a known association, the con- "sequent apprehension of the other part which is not actually "proximate, is (*anumána*) inference.[3] The association must "be such as had been before directly perceived, or had become "known by analogy.

"Comparison (*upamána*) is knowledge arising from resem- "blance more or less strong. It is apprehension of the like- "ness which a thing presently seen bears to one before "observed: and likeness or similitude is concomitancy of

[1] Jaim. 1. 1. 4.

[2] [More usually interpreted "the declaration of a competent authority."]

[3] Anc. Schol. *Dídh.*, Párth., etc. [The ancient *vṛitti* is quoted at some length, but not in its exact words, in S'abara's Comm. on i. 1. 5, apparently from p. 7 to p. 18. *Abháva* is there included as one of the six sources of knowledge. This discussion of course formed no part of the original doctrine of Jaimini, but Upavarsha having introduced it in his Commentary, his sacred authority made it thenceforth an accepted part of the system.]

" associates or attributes with one object, which were as-
" sociated with another.

" Presumption (*arthápatti*) is deduction of a matter from
" that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing
" not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another
" which is seen, heard, or proven.

" Knowledge of a thing which is not proximate (or subject
" to perception) derived through understood sound, that is
" through words the acceptation whereof is known, [304] is
" (*śástra*) ordinance or revelation. It is (*śabda*) verbal com-
" munication."

These five sources of knowledge, or modes of proof, as here defined, are admitted by all *Mímánsakas:* and the followers of Prabhákara are stated to restrict their admission to those five.[1] *Bhaṭṭa* with his disciples, guided by the ancient scholiast, adds a sixth, which is privation (*abhára*); and the *Vedántis* or *Uttara Mímánsakas* concur in the admission of that number.

The *Chárvákas*, as noticed in the first part of this essay,[2] recognize but one, *viz.* perception. The followers of Kaṇáda and those of *Sugata* (*Buddha*) acknowledge two, perception and inference. The *Sánkhyas* reckon three, including affirmation.[3] The *Naiyáyikas*, or followers of Gotama, count four, *viz.* the foregoing together with comparison. The *Prábhákaras*, as just now observed, admit five. And the rest of the *Mímánsakas*, in both schools, prior and later *Mímánsá*, enumerate six.[4] It does not appear that a greater number has been alleged by any sect of Indian philosophy.[5]

The first six lectures of Jaimini's *Mímánsá* treat of positive

[1] *Vedánta-śikhámaṇi.*
[2] Ante, p. 253.
[3] Ante, p. 252.
[4] *Vedánta-śikhám.*
[5] [Besides these sources of knowledge, as recognized in the six orthodox schools, other sections increase the number to nine by adding 'equivalence' (*sambhava*); thus when a *prastha* is mentioned, its component measures, four *kuḍavas*, at once rise to the mind; *aitihya* or 'fallible testimony' (as opposed to infallible *śruti*); and *cheshṭá* or 'gesture,' as beckoning, etc. The first two are said to belong to the Paurániṇ schools, the third to that of the Tantras. Cf. p. [403] *infra.*]

injunction: it is the first half of the work. The latter half, comprising six more lectures, concerns indirect command: adapting to a copy, with any requisite modifications, that which was prescribed for the pattern or prototype.

The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture: its differences and varieties, its parts (or appendant members, contrasted with the main act), and the purpose of performance, are successively considered in the three next, and complete the subject of "that which is to be performed." The order of performance occupies the fifth [305] lecture; and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth.

The subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally, and in the eighth particularly. Inferrible changes, adapting to the variation or copy what was designed for the type or model, are discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth: that is, the co-operation of several acts for a single result is the subject of the one; and the incidental effect of an act, of which the chief purpose is different, is discussed in the other.

These which are the principal topics of each lecture are not, however, exclusive. Other matters are introduced by the way, being suggested by the main subject or its exceptions.

In the first chapter of the first lecture occurs the noted disquisition of the *Mímánsá* on the original and perpetual association of articulate sound with sense.[1]

"It is a primary and natural connexion," Jaimini affirms, "not merely a conventional one. The knowledge of it is "instruction, since the utterance of a particular sound conveys "knowledge, as its enunciation is for a particular sense. It "matters not whether the subject have been previously appre- "hended (the words being intelligible, or the context rendering

[1] A passage cited by writers on the dialectic *Nydya* from the disquisition on the perpetuity of sound (see ante, page 313), is not to be found in Jaimini's *sútras*: it must have been taken from one of his commentators.

"them so). Precept is authoritative, independently of human "communication."[1]

Grammarians assume a special category, denominated *sphoṭa*,[2] for the object of mental perception, which ensues [306] upon the hearing of an articulate sound, and which they consider to be distinct from the elements or component letters of the word.[3] Logicians disallow that as a needless assumption.[4] They insist, however, that "sound is an effect, because it is "perceived as the result of effort; because it endures not, but "ceases so soon as uttered; because it is spoken of as made or

[1] Jaim. 1. 1. 5. [This is a paraphrase; the *sútra* (according to S'abara) literally runs thus: "The natural connexion of a word with its meaning causes the knowledge thereof (sc. of duty); for there are (thus) instruction and the absence of error in respect to something imperceptible. This, according to Bádaráyaṇa's opinion, is the real source of knowledge, for it does not depend on anything else (as sense-perception, etc.)"]

[2] [For a further account of *sphoṭa*, see Note E. to Ballantyne's *Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy*. *Sphoṭa* is derived from *sphuṭ* 'to bud,' 'to open,' because it is that which is really manifested by the letters or which really manifests the meaning.—*Sarva-darś.-sangr.* p. 141.]

[3] [Cf. the following extract from Nágeśa Bhaṭṭa's Comm. to the *Mahábháshya*, p. 10: "The cognition 'This is one word,' 'This is one sentence,' is proof of the reality of the 'disclosure' (*sphoṭa*), and of its unity [— it being held to be one with knowledge which is God]; because, too, there is no solid evidence of the fact that memory *is* exactly according to the order of apprehension, since we *see* things that were apprehended in one order recollected even in the inverse order. But, in my opinion, as there becomes gradually, in a web, a tincture of various hues deposited by various dye-stuffs, so in that ['disclosure' *sphoṭa*] which is perfectly single, by the course of utterance does there take place a quite gradual tincture in the shape of each letter; and this is permanent, and it is this that the mind apprehends;—so that there is no fault [in the view thus illustrated]." He goes on to compare this substratum of the various sounds to the crystal which, itself unaltered, receives the different passing shadows of the various flowers placed near it. Cf. the extract from S'ankara, in p. [348]. The grammarians have not been slow to avail themselves of this tenet to exalt their favourite pursuit, see the *Páṇini-darśana* in the *Sarva-darś.-sangr.* A favourite verse to illustrate this theory is found in Ṛig V. iv. 58. 3, quoted by Patanjali in the *Mahábhásya*: "Four are his horns, three his feet, two his heads, seven his hands, triply bound the bull roars, the great god has entered mortals." (See *supra*, p. 152.) Bhartṛihari says in his *Vákyapadíya*, in allusion to this verse, "Moreover, the soul of him who employs language,—Sound abiding within, they call the great Bull, with whom union is desired." Hence grammar is always claimed as one of the roads to supreme bliss. Thus there is a text quoted, "A single word rightly understood and rightly employed is, in heaven and on earth, the cow that grants every desire."]

[4] *Didh.*, Párth. and Mádh.

"done; because it is at once apprehended in divers places at "the same instant, uttered by divers persons; because it is "liable to permutation; and because it is subject to increase "of intensity with the multitude of utterers." To all which the answer is, that "the result of an effort is uniform, the "same letters being articulated.[1] Sound is unobserved though "existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air emitted "from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound "by their appulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the "hollow of the ear; for want of such appulse, sound, though "existent, is unapprehended).[2] Sound is not made or done, "but is used: it is uttered, not called into existence. Its "universality is as that of the sun (common to all). The per- "mutation of letters is the substitution of a different one (as "a semivowel for a vowel), not the alteration of the same "letter. Noise, not sound, is increased by a multitude of "voices. Sound is perpetual, intended for the apprehension "of others:[3] it is universal, a generic term being applicable "to all individuals. Its perpetuity is intimated by a passage "of the *Veda*, which expresses, 'Send forth praise, with per- "'petual speech.'"[4]

The first chapter terminates with an inquiry into the authority of the *Veda*, which is maintained to be primeval and superhuman;[5] although different portions of it are de-[307] nominated from names of men, as *Káṭhaka*, *Kauthuma*,[6] *Paishpala*,[7] etc., and although worldly incidents and occurrences are mentioned. Those denominations of particular portions, it is affirmed, have reference to the tradition by

[1] [Or, perhaps, "the perception of sound is alike on both hypotheses,—whether it is produced or only manifested, its sensation only lasts for a moment."]

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] [If it really ceased *at the moment* of utterance, as the uttered sound seems to do, it would not reach the hearer's ear so as to convey our meaning to him.]

[4] Jaim. 1. 1. 6. 1–18 and Com. [The passage in the *Veda* occurs in Rig V. viii. 64. (75) 6.]

[5] [Cf. Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. iii. ch. i. § 8.]

[6] [Wrongly corrected in the old errata to Kauṭhuma.] [7] [Paippaláda?]

which a revelation has been transmitted. They are named after the person who uttered them, as to him revealed.

The eternity of the *Veda*, or authenticity of its revelation, is attempted to be proved by showing that it had no human origin; and for this purpose, the principal argument is, that no human author is remembered. In the case of human compositions, it is said, contemporaries have been aware that the authors of them were occupied in composing those works: not so with the *Veda*, which has been handed down as primeval, and of which no mortal author was known.

It is, however, acknowledged, that a mistake may be made, and the work of a human author may be erroneously received as a part of the sacred book by those who are unacquainted with its true origin. An instance occurs among those who use the *Bahvṛich*, a *śákhá* of the *Ṛigveda*, by whom a ritual of Áśwaláyana has been admitted, under the title of the fifth *Áraṇyaka*, as a part of the *Ṛigveda*.

The *Veda* received as holy by orthodox Hindus consists of two parts, prayer and precept (*mantra* and *bráhmaṇa*). Jaimini has attempted to give a short definition of the first, adding that the second is its supplement; "whatever is not "*mantra*, is *bráhmaṇa*."[1] The ancient scholiast has endeavoured to supply the acknowledged defect of Jaimini's imperfect definition, by enumerating the various descriptions of passages coming under each head. Later scholiasts have shown, that every article in that enumeration is subject to exceptions; and the only test of distinction, finally acknowledged, is admission of the expert, or acceptance of approved [308] teachers, who have taught their disciples to use one passage as a prayer, and to read another as a precept. Jaimini's definition, and his scholiast's enumeration, serve but to alleviate "the task of picking up grains."

[1] *Mim.* 2. 1. 7. [Jaimini's definition of *mantra* is *tach-chodakeshu* (i.e. *abhidhánasya chodakeshu*) *mantrákhyá*; "*mantra* is applied to those passages which are authoritative in explanation" (and not actual commands, *vidhi*).]

Generally, then, a *mantra* is a prayer, invocation, or declaration. It is expressed in the first person, or is addressed in the second. It declares the purpose of a pious act, or lauds or invokes the object. It asks a question or returns an answer; directs, inquires, or deliberates; blesses or imprecates, exults or laments, counts or narrates, etc.

Here it is to be remarked, that changes introduced into a prayer to adapt it, *mutatis mutandis*, to a different ceremony from that for which primarily it was intended, or the insertion of an individual's personal and family names where this is requisite, are not considered to be part of the *mantra*.

It is likewise to be observed, although *mantras* of the *Vedas* are ordinarily significant, that the chants of the *Sámaveda* are unmeaning. They consist of a few syllables, as *irá áyirá*, or *girá gáyirá*, repeated again and again, as required by the tune or rhythm. Nevertheless, significant *mantras* are likewise chanted; and two of the books of the *Sámaveda* are allotted to hymns of this description. The hymns consist of triplets (*tṛich*) or triple stanzas.

The first, or pattern verse or stanza, is found, with the name of the appropriate tune, in the *Chhandas* or *Yoni-grantha*; and the two remaining verses or stanzas, to complete the triplet, are furnished in the supplementary book called *Uttara-grantha*.

Mantras are distinguished under three designations. Those which are in metre are termed *ṛich*, those chanted are *sáman*, and the rest are *yajus*, sacrificial prayers in prose (for *yajus* imports sacrifice). Nevertheless, metrical prayers occur in the *Yajurveda*, and prose in the *Sámaveda*.

[309] Metrical prayers are recited aloud: those termed *sáman* with musical modulation; but the prose inaudibly muttered.[1] Such, however, as are vocative, addressed to a second person, are to be uttered audibly, though in prose: for communication is intended.[2]

Metrical prayers, however, belonging to the *Yajurveda*, are

[1] *Mim.* 3. 3. 1. [2] *Ibid.* 2. 1. 7—14.

inaudibly recited; and so are chants belonging to the same inaudibly chanted: for prayers take the character of the rite into which they are introduced; and where the same rite is ordained in more than one *Veda*, it appertains to that with which it is most consonant, and the prayer is either audibly or inaudibly chanted accordingly.[1]

[310] The prayers termed *ṛich* and *sáman* are limited by the metre and the chant respectively; but those which are in prose are regulated as to their extent by the sense. A complete sentence constitutes a single *yajus:* the sense must be one, and would be deficient were the phrase divided. Nevertheless, the sentence which constitutes a prayer may borrow, from a preceding or from a subsequent one, terms wanting to perfect the sense, unless an intervening one be incompatible with that construction.[2]

The *bráhmaṇa* of the *Veda* is in general a precept; or it expresses praise or blame, or a doubt, a reason, or a comparison; or intimates a derivation; or narrates a fact or an occurrence:

[1] *Ibid.* 3. 3. 1—3. Instances of the same prayer recurring either word for word, or with very slight variation, in more than one *Veda*, are innumerable. An eminent example is that of the celebrated *Gáyatrí*, of which the proper place is in the *Ṛig-veda* (3. 4. 10), among hymns of Viśwámitra. It is, however, repeated in all the *Vedas*, and particularly in the 3rd, 22nd, and 36th chapters of the white *Yajus* (3 § 35; 22, § 9; and 36, § 3).

Another notable instance is that of the *Purusha-súkta*, of which a version was given, from a ritual in which it was found cited (ante, p. 183). It has a place in the *Ṛig-veda* (8. 4. 7) among miscellaneous hymns; and is inserted, with some little variation, among prayers employed at the *Purusha-medha*, in the 31st chapter of the white *Yajur-veda*.

On collation of those two *Vedas* and their scholia, I find occasion to amend one or two passages in the version of it formerly given: but for this I shall take another opportunity.

That remarkable hymn is in language, metre, and style, very different from the rest of the prayers with which it is associated. It has a decidedly more modern tone; and must have been composed after the Sanskrit language had been refined, and its grammar and rhythm perfected. The internal evidence which it furnishes, serves to demonstrate the important fact, that the compilation of the *Vedas*, in their present arrangement, took place after the Sanskrit tongue had advanced, from the rustic and irregular dialect in which the multitude of hymns and prayers of the *Veda* was composed, to the polished and sonorous language in which the mythological poems, sacred and profane (*puráṇas* and *kávyas*), have been written.

[2] *Mim.* 2. 1. 14—18.

and a characteristic sign of it is that it very generally contains the particle "so" (*iti* or *itiha*):[1] as a *mantra* usually does the pronoun of the second person "thee," either expressed or understood, "(thou) art."[2]

In a still more general view the *brâhmaṇa* is practical, directing religious observances, teaching the purpose, time, and manner of performing them, indicating the prayers to be employed, and elucidating their import. The esoteric *brâhmaṇa* comprises the *upanishads*, and is theological.

It becomes a question which the *Mîmânsâ* examines at much length, whether those passages of the *Veda* which are not direct precepts, but are narrative, laudatory, or explanatory, are nevertheless cogent for a point of duty. In this inquiry is involved the further question, whether a consciousness of the scope of an act is essential to its efficacy for the production of its proper consequence. The *Mîmânsâ* maintains that narrative or indicative texts are proof of duty, as concurrent in import with a direct precept. There [311] subsists a mutual relation between them. One enjoins or forbids an act; the other supplies an inducement for doing it or for refraining from it: "Do so, because such is the fruit." The imperative sentence is nevertheless cogent independently of the affirmative one, and needs not its support. The indicative phrase is cogent, implying injunction by pronouncing benefit.

It virtually prescribes the act which it recommends.[3] Inference, however, is not to be strained. It is not equally convincing as actual perception: a forthcoming injunction or direct precept has more force than a mere inference from premises.[4]

A prayer, too, carries authority, as evidence of a precept bearing the like import. This is a visible or temporal purpose of a prayer; and it is a received maxim, that a perceptible

[1] [The Calcutta edition reads '*iti* or *ityâha*.']
[2] S'ab. etc. on *Mîm.* 1. 4. 1, and 2. 1. 7 (8).
[3] *Mîm.* 1. 2. 1—3. [4] *Ibid.* 1. 2. 3.

purpose being assignable, prevails before an imperceptible one. But the recital of a particular prayer at a religious rite, rather than a narrative text of like import, is for a spiritual end, since there is no visible purpose of a set form of words.[1]

Besides the evidence of precept from an extant revelation or recorded hearing (*śruti*) of it, another source of evidence is founded on the recollections (*smṛiti*) of ancient sages. They possess authority as grounded on the *Veda*, being composed by holy personages conversant with its contents. Nor was it superfluous to compose anew what was there to be found; for a compilation, exhibiting in a succinct form that which is scattered through the *Veda*, has its use. Nor are the prayers which the *smṛiti* directs unauthorized, for they are presumed to have been taken from passages of revelation not now forthcoming. Those recollections have come down by unbroken tradition to this day, admitted by [312] the virtuous of the three tribes, and known under the title of *Dharma-śástra*, comprising the institutes of law, civil and religious. Nor is error to be presumed which had not, until now, been detected. An express text of the *Veda*, as the *Mimánsá* maintains,[2] must then be concluded to have been actually seen by the venerable author of a recorded recollection (*smṛiti*).

But if contradiction appear, if it can be shown that an extant passage of the *Veda* is inconsistent with one of the *smṛiti*, it invalidates that presumption. An actual text, present to the sense, prevails before a presumptive one.[3]

Or though no contrary passage of the *Veda* be actually found, yet if cupidity, or other exceptionable motive may be assigned, revelation is not to be presumed in the instance, the recollection being thus impeached.[4]

The *Śákyas* (or *Bauddhas*) and *Jainas* (or *A'rhatas*), as Kumárila acknowledges, are considered to be *Kshatriyas*. It is not to be concluded, he says, that their *recollections* were

[1] *Mim.* 1. 2. 4.
[2] *Ibid.* 1. 3. 1.
[3] *Ibid.* 1. 3. 2.
[4] *Ibid.* 1. 3. 3.

founded upon a *Veda* which is now lost. There can be no inference of a foundation in *revelation*, for unauthentic recollections of persons who deny its authenticity. Even when they do concur with it, as recommending charitable gifts and enjoining veracity, chastity, and innocence, the books of the *Sákyas* are of no authority for the virtues which they inculcate. Duties are not taken from them: the association would suggest a surmise of vice,[1] tainting what else is virtuous. The entire *Veda* which is directed to be studied is the foundation of duty; and those only who are conversant with it are capable of competent *recollections*.

Usage generally prevalent among good men, and by them practised as understanding it to be enjoined and therefore [313] incumbent on them, is mediately, but not directly, evidence of duty: but it is not valid if it be contrary to an express text. From the modern prevalence of any usage, there arises a presumption of a correspondent injunction by a holy personage who remembered a revelation to the same effect. Thus usage presumes a *recollection*, which again presupposes *revelation*. Authors, however, have omitted particulars, sanctioning good customs in general terms: but any usage which is inconsistent with a recorded *recollection* is not to be practised, so long as no express text of scripture is found to support it.

In like manner, rituals which teach the proper mode of celebrating religious rites, and are entitled *Kálpa-sútra* or *Grihya-grantha*, derive their authority, like the *Dharma-śástra*, from a presumption that their authors, being persons conversant with the *Veda*, collected and abridged rules which they there found. The *Kalpa-sútras* neither are a part of the *Veda*, nor possess equal nor independent authority. It would be a laborious enterprise to prove a superhuman origin of them; nor can it be accomplished, since contemporaries were aware of the authors being occupied with the composition

[1] *Mím.* 1. 3. 4.

of them.[1] Whenever a *sútra* (whether of the *kalpa* or *gṛihya*) is opposed to an extant passage of the *Veda*, or is inconsistent with valid reason, it is not to be followed; nor is an alternative admissible in regard to its observance in such case, unless a corroborative text of the *Veda* can be shown.[2]

Neither are usages restricted to particular provinces, though certain customs are more generally prevalent in some places than in others: as the *Holáká* (vulg. *Húli*) or festival of spring in the east;[3] the worship of local tutelary deities hereditarily, by families, in the south; the racing of [314] oxen on the full moon of *Jyeshṭha*, in the north; and the adoration of tribes of deities (*mátṛi-gaṇa*),[4] in the west. Nor are rituals and law institutes confined to particular classes: though some are followed by certain persons preferably to others; as Vasishṭha, by the *Bahvṛich-śákhá* of the *Ṛigveda*; Gautama, by the *Gobhiliya* of the *Sámaveda*; Śankha and Likhita, by the *Vájasaneyi*; and Ápastamba and Baudháyana, by the *Taittiriya* of the *Yajurveda*. There is no presumption of a restrictive revelation, but of one of general import. The institutes of law, and rituals of ceremonies, were composed by authors appertaining to particular *śákhás*, and by them taught to their fellows belonging to the same, and have continued current among the descendants of those to whom they were so taught.

A very curious disquisition occurs in this part of the *Mimánsá*,[5] on the acceptation of words in correct language and barbaric dialects, and on the use of terms taken from either. Instances alleged are *yava*, signifying in Sanskrit, barley, but in the barbaric tongue, the plant named *priyangu*; *varáha*, in the one a hog, and in the other a cow;[6] *pilu*, a certain tree,[7] but among barbarians an elephant; *vetasa*, a

[1] Guru on *Mim.* 1. 3. 7. [2] Khaṇḍa-deva. [3] [Wilson, *Essays*, ii. 222.]

[4] [These are the personified energies of S'iva, and are variously numbered as 7, 8, 9, and 16.] [5] 1. 3. 5 [6].

[6] [S'abara says *kṛishṇa-śakuni*, sc. 'a crow.']

[7] The name is in vocabularies assigned to many different trees.

rattan cane and a citron.[1] The *Mímánsá* concludes, that in such instances of words having two acceptations, that in which it is received by the civilized (*áryas*), or which is countenanced by use in sacred books, is to be preferred to the practice of barbarians (*Mlechha*), who are apt to confound words or their meanings.

Concerning these instances, Kumárila remarks that the words have no such acceptation, in any country, as is by the scholiast alleged. He is wrong in regard to one, at [315] least, for *pílu* is evidently the Persian *fíl* or *pil*. Modern vocabularies[2] exhibit the word as a Sanskrit one in the same sense; erroneously, as appears from this disquisition.

Then follows, in Kumárila's *Várttika*, much upon the subject of provincial and barbaric dialects; which, adverting to the age in which he flourished, is interesting, and merits the attention of philologists. He brings examples from the Andhra and Drávida dialects, and specifies as barbaric tongues the Párasika,[3] Yavana, Raumaka, and Barbara, but confesses his imperfect acquaintance with these.

Jaimini gives an instance of a barbaric term used in the *Veda*, viz., *pika*, a black cuckow (*cuculus indicus*); to which his scholiasts add *nema*, half, *támarasa*, a lotus, and *sata*, a wooden colander; but without adducing examples of the actual use of them in any of the *Vedas*. Such terms must be taken in their ordinary acceptation, though barbarous; and the passage quoted from the *Veda* where the word *pika* occurs, must be interpreted "sacrifice a black cuckow at night."[4] It will here be remarked, that *pika* corresponds to the Latin *picus*, and that *nema* answers to the Persic *nim*.

On the other hand, a barbaric word, or a provincial corruption, is not to be employed instead of the proper Sanskrit term. Thus *go* (*gauḥ*), and not *gáví*, is the right term for a

[1] [Or 'a rose-apple,' *jambu*.]
[2] Jaṭádhara, etc.
[3] [Or Párasíka.]
[4] [In the *White Yajur Veda*, 24. 39, the *pika* is to be offered to *Káma*.]

cow.[1] Orthography, likewise, is to be carefully attended to; else by writing or reading *aśwa* for *áśwa* in the directions for the sacrifice of a horse, the injunction would seem to be for the sacrifice of a pauper (*a-śwa*, destitute of property).

Generally, words are to be applied in strict conformity with correct grammar. The *Śákyas*, and other heretics, [316] as Kumárila in this place remarks,[2] do not use Sanskrit (they employ Prákrit). But Bráhmaṇas should not speak as barbarians. Grammar, which is primeval, has been handed down by tradition. Language is the same in the *Vedas* and in ordinary discourse, notwithstanding a few deviations: the import of words is generic, though the application of them is specific.[3]

The peculiarities of the dialect of the *Veda* are not to be taken for inaccuracies. Thus, *tman* stands for *átman*, self or soul; and *Bráhmaṇásaḥ* for *Bráhmaṇáḥ*, priests; with many other anomalies of the sacred dialect.[4]

When the ordinary acceptation of a term is different from that which it bears in an explanatory passage, this latter import prevails in the text likewise, else the precept and its supplement would disagree. Thus *trivṛit*, triplet, is specially applied to a hymn comprising three *triplets* or nine stanzas, which is the peculiar sense it bears in the *Vedas*.

Again, *charu*, which in ordinary discourse signifies boiler or

[1] *Várt.* 1. 3. 9. [*Jaim.* i. 3. ss. 25, 26.] [2] *Várt.* 1. 3. 7.

[3] [The followers of Prabhákara are called *anvitábhidhána-vádinaḥ*. They maintain that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically connected with each other,—they thus only imply an action or something connected with an action; *i.e. gám* in *gám ánaya* (vaccam adduc) means not merely 'cow' but 'cow' as connected with the action of the verb. The followers of Kumárila on the other hand are called *abhihitánwaya-vádinaḥ*, as they (like the school of the *Nyáya*) maintain that words by themselves can express their own separate meanings, which are afterwards combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. Thus in regard to the sentence "let him who desires heaven sacrifice with the jyotishṭoma," *jyotishṭomena swargakámo yajeta*, the former hold that the entire sentence implies a command to sacrifice, and each word expresses a meaning only in this connexion; the latter that the third person singular affix of the potential in itself has an enjoining power which is 'tinged' or rendered definite by the meaning of the root, and so too for the base and the accusative affix.]

[4] *Mím.* 1. 3. 10.

cauldron, is in the *Vedas* an oblation of boiled food, as rice, etc. So *aśvabála*, which literally means horse-hair, is a designation of a species of grass (*saccharum spontaneum*) into which it is said the tail of a consecrated horse was once transformed; and of that grass a cushion is made for certain religious rites.

It will be observed, as has been intimated in speaking of the members of an *adhikaraṇa* in the *Mímánsá*, that a case is proposed, either specified in Jaimini's text or supplied by his scholiasts. Upon this a doubt or question is raised, and a solution of it is suggested, which is refuted, and a right conclusion established in its stead. The disquisitions of the *Mímánsá* bear, therefore, a certain resemblance to [317] juridical questions; and, in fact, the Hindu law being blended with the religion of the people, the same modes of reasoning are applicable, and are applied to the one as to the other. The logic of the *Mímánsá* is the logic of the law; the rule of interpretation of civil and religious ordinances. Each case is examined and determined upon general principles; and from the cases decided the principles may be collected. A well-ordered arrangement of them would constitute the philosophy of the law: and this is, in truth, what has been attempted in the *Mímánsá*. Jaimini's arrangement, however, is not philosophical; and I am not acquainted with any elementary work of this school in which a better distribution has been achieved. I shall not here attempt to supply the defect, but confine the sequel of this essay to a few specimens from divers chapters of Jaimini, after some more remarks on the general scope and manner of the work.

Instances of the application of reasoning, as taught in the *Mímánsá*, to the discussion and determination of juridical questions, may be seen in two treatises on the Law of Inheritance, translated by myself, and as many on Adoption, by a member of this Society, Mr. J. C. C. Sutherland (see *Mitákshará* on Inheritance, 1. 1. 10, and 1. 9. 11, and 2. 1. 34; *Jímútaváhana*, 11. 5. 16—19. *Datt. Mim.* on Adoption, 1. 1.

35—41, and 4. 4. 65—66, and 6. 6. 27—31. *Datt. Chand.* 1. 1. 24, and 2. 2. 4).

The subject which most engages attention throughout the *Mímánsá*, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. A *virtue* meantime subsists, unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world, the relative effect.

[318] That unseen virtue is termed *apúrva*, being a relation superinduced, *not before* possessed.[1]

Sacrifice (*yága*), which, among meritorious works, is the act of religion most inculcated by the *Vedas*, and consequently most discussed in the prior *Mímánsá*, consists in parting with a thing that it may belong to a deity, whom it is intended to propitiate.[2] Being cast into the fire for that purpose, it is a burnt offering (*homa*).[3] Four sorts are distinguished: a simple oblation (*ishṭi*),[4] the immolation of a victim (*paśu*), the presenting of expressed juice of the *soma* plant (*asclepias acida*), and the burnt-offering above mentioned.[5] The object of certain rites is some definite temporal advantage; of others, benefit in another world. Three ceremonies, in particular, are types of all the rest:[6] the consecration of a sacrificial fire, the presenting of an oblation, and the preparation of the *soma*. The oblation which serves as a model for the rest, is that which is offered twice in each month, *viz.* at the full and change of the moon. It is accompanied, more especially at the new moon, with an

[1] [For a full account of this transcendental δύναμις see the article *apúrva* in Prof. Goldstücker's Sanskrit Dictionary.]

[2] *Mím.* 4. 4. 12.

[3] [It consists of melted butter, and is offered with the exclamation *swáhá*.]

[4] [It consists of rice-cakes, *purodáśa*, etc.]

[5] *Mím.* 4. 4. 1.

[6] [On the sacrificial rites of the Brahmans, cf. Haug's transl. of the Aitareya-Bráhmaṇa, Müller's transl. of Ápastamba's *Yajna-paribhásha-sútras*, Zeitsch. d. Morg. Gesells. vol. ix., Weber's *Zur Kenntniss des vedischen Opferrituals*, Indische Stud. vol. x.]

oblation of whey from new milk. Accordingly, the *Yajurveda* begins with this rite. It comprehends the sending of selected cows to pasture after separating their calves, touching them with a leafy branch of *palâśa* (*butea frondosa*) cut for the purpose, and subsequently stuck in the ground in front of the apartment containing the sacrificial fire, for a protection of the herd from robbers and beasts of prey: the cows are milked in the evening and again in the morning; and, from the new milk, whey is then prepared for an oblation.

Concerning this ceremony, with all its details, numerous questions arise, which are resolved in the *Mímánsá:* for instance, the milking of the cows is pronounced to be not a [319] primary or main act, but a subordinate one; and the parting of the calves from their dams is subsidiary to that subordinate act.[1] The whey, which in fact is milk modified, is the main object of the whole preparation; not the curd, which is but incidentally produced, not being sought nor wanted.[2]

In the fourth chapter of the first book, the author discriminates terms that modify the precept from such as are specific denominations. Several of the instances are not a little curious. Thus it is a question, whether the hawk-sacrifice (*śyena-yâga*), which is attended with imprecations on a hated foe, be performed by the actual immolation of a bird of that kind. The case is determined by a maxim, that "a term intimating re-"semblance is denominative." *Hawk*, then, is the name of that incantation: "it pounces on the foe *as* a falcon on his "prey."[3] So *tongs* is a name for a similar incantation, "which "seizes the enemy from afar *as* with a pair of tongs;" and *cow*, for a sacrifice to avert such imprecations.

It is fit to remark in this place, that incantations for destruction of hated foes, though frequent in the *Vedas* (and modes of performing them, with greater or less solemnity, are there taught), cannot be deemed laudable acts of religion; on the

[1] *Mim.* 4. 3. 10. [2] *Ib.* 4. 1. 9.
[3] *Ib.* 1. 4. 5. and 3. 7. 23.

contrary, they are pronounced to be at least mediately criminal; and pains in hell, as for homicide, await the malevolent man who thus practises against the life of his enemy.

Another instance, discussed in the same chapter, is *chitrá*, applied to a sacrifice performed for acquisition of cattle. It is questioned whether the feminine termination, joined to the ordinary signification of the word, indicates a female victim of a *varied* colour. It intends, however, an [320] offering termed *various*, as consisting of no less than six different articles: honey, milk, curds, boiled butter, rice in the husk as well as clean, and water.[1]

In like manner, *udbhid* is the name of a sacrifice directed to be performed for the like purpose: that is, by a person desirous of possessing cattle. The sense approaches to the etymology of the term: it is a ceremony "by which possession of cattle "is, as it were, dug up." It does not imply that some tool for delving, as a spade or hoe for digging up the earth, is to be actually employed in the ceremony.[2]

A question of considerable interest, as involving the important one concerning property in the soil of India, is discussed in the sixth lecture.[3] At certain sacrifices, such as that which is called *viśwajit*, the votary, for whose benefit the ceremony is performed, is enjoined to bestow all his property on the officiating priests. It is asked whether a paramount sovereign shall give all the land, including pasture-ground, highways, and the site of lakes and ponds; an universal monarch, the whole earth; and a subordinate prince, the entire province over which he rules? To that question the answer is: the monarch has not property in the earth, nor the subordinate prince in the land. By conquest kingly power is obtained, and property in house and field which belonged to the enemy. The maxim of the law, that "the king is lord of all excepting sacerdotal "wealth," concerns his authority for correction of the wicked and protection of the good. His kingly power is for govern-

[1] *Mim.* 1. 4. 3. [2] [*Ib.* 1. 4. 1.] [3] *Ib.* 6. 7. 2.

ment of the realm and extirpation of wrong; and for that purpose he receives taxes from husbandmen, and levies fines from offenders. But right of property is not thereby vested in him; else he would have property in [321] house and land appertaining to the subjects abiding in his dominions. The earth is not the king's, but is common to all beings enjoying the fruit of their own labour. It belongs, says Jaimini, to all alike: therefore, although a gift of a piece of ground to an individual does take place, the whole land cannot be given by a monarch, nor a province by a subordinate prince; but house and field, acquired by purchase and similar means, are liable to gift.[1]

The case which will be here next cited, will bring to recollection the instance of the Indian Calanus,[2] who accompanied Alexander's army, and burnt himself at Babylon after the manner of his country.

This particular mode of religious suicide by cremation is now obsolete; as that of widows is in some provinces of India, and it may be hoped will become so in the rest, if no injudicious interference by direct prohibition arouse opposition and prevent the growing disuse. Other modes of religious suicide not unfrequently occur; such as drowning, burying alive, falling from a precipice or under the wheels of an idol's car, etc. But they are not founded on the *Vedas*, as that by burning is.[3]

Self-immolation, in that ancient form of it, is a solemn sacrifice, performed according to rites which the *Vedas* direct, by a man desirous of passing immediately to heaven without enduring disease. He engages priests, as at other sacrifices, for the various functions requisite to the performance of the rites, being himself the votary for whose benefit the ceremony is undertaken. At a certain stage of it, after wrapping a cloth round a branch of *udumbara* (*ficus glomerata*), which represents a sacrificial stake, and having appointed the priests to complete

[1] S'ab. Mádh. and Khaṇḍa, ad locum.

[2] Kalyáṇa.

[3] [Cf. *supra*, p. 133.]

the ceremony, he chants [322] a solemn hymn, and casts himself on a burning pile wherein his body is consumed. Afterwards, whatever concerns the rite as a sacrificial ceremony, is to be completed by the attendant priests: omitting, however, those matters which specially appertain to the votary, and which, after his death, there is no one competent to perform.[1]

In like manner, if the principal die by a natural death, after engaging *Brâhmaṇas* to co-operate with him in the celebration of certain rites requiring the aid of several priests, his body is to be burnt, and his ashes kept to represent him; and the ceremony is completed for his benefit, according to one opinion, but for theirs according to another. The ashes, it is argued, do not perform the ceremony, but the priests do. Being inanimate, the bones cannot fulfil the prescribed duties peculiar to the principal: as utterance of certain prayers, shaving of hair and beard, measure of his stature with a branch of *udumbara*, etc. These and similar functions are not practicable by an inanimate skeleton, and therefore are unavoidably omitted.[2]

The full complement of persons officiating at a great solemnity is seventeen. This number, as is shown, includes the votary or principal, who is assisted by sixteen priests engaged by him for different offices, which he need not personally discharge. His essential function is the payment of their hire or sacrificial fee.[3]

They rank in different gradations, and are remunerated proportionably. Four, whose duties are most important, receive the full perquisite; four others are recompensed with a half; the next four with a third; and the four last with a quarter.

On occasions of less solemnity four priests only are engaged, making with the principal five officiating persons. [323] A question is raised, whether the immolator of a victim at the

[1] *Mim.* 10. 2. 23. [2] *Ib.* 10. 2. 17—20. [3] *Ib.* 3. 7. 8—17.

sacrifice of an animal (usually a goat) be a distinct officiating person: the answer is in the negative. No one is specially engaged for immolator independently of other functions; but some one of the party, who has other duties to discharge, slays the victim in the prescribed manner, and is accordingly termed immolator.[1]

The victims at some sacrifices are numerous: as many as seventeen at the *vájapeya*, made fast to the same number of stakes; and at an *aśwamedha* not fewer than six hundred and nine of all descriptions, tame and wild, terrestrial and aquatic, walking, flying, swimming, and creeping things, distributed among twenty-one stakes and in the intervals between them; the tame made fast to the stakes, and the wild secured in cages, nets, baskets, jars, and hollow canes, and by various other devices. The wild are not to be slain, but at a certain stage of the ceremony let loose. The tame ones, or most of them (chiefly goats), are to be actually immolated.

The various rites are successively performed for each victim; not completed for one before they are commenced for another. But the consecration of the sacrificial stakes is perfected for each in succession, because the votary is required to retain hold of the stake until the consecration of it is done.[2]

The foregoing instances may suffice to give some idea of the nature of the subjects treated in the *Mímánsá*, and of the way in which they are handled. They have been selected as in themselves curious, rather than as instructive specimens of the manner in which very numerous and varied cases are examined and questions concerning them resolved. The arguments would be tedious, and the reasons of the [324] solution would need much elucidation, and after all would, in general, be uninteresting.

A few examples of the topics investigated, and still fewer of the reasoning applied to them, have therefore been considered

[1] *Mím.* 3. 7. 13. [2] *Ib.* 5. 2. 1—5.

as better conveying in a small compass a notion of the multifarious subjects of the *Mímánsá*.[1]

[1] [The *Mímánsá* tenets on 'correct knowledge' (*pramá*) are curious and often alluded to in philosophical treatises.

The followers of Prabhákara hold that knowledge is an object of internal perception, and its correctness is cognized by the same act of cognition as the knowledge itself. Thus there is first the perception, 'this is a jar,' and then the cognition of this perception, 'I perceive the jar,' and simultaneously with it the cognition of the truth of the perception. Thus the cognition is threefold, embracing the jar, the cognizing soul, 'I,' and the perception of the jar, which also includes a conviction of the truth of the perception; the same internal organ, the mind, grasps them all, and forms them into one act of cognition.

The followers of Kumárila hold that knowledge is supersensuous, and therefore not an object of perception, but of inference. According to them, when a jar is perceived, there is first produced in it a quality called 'cognizedness' (*jnátatá*); this cognizedness becomes an object of perception, in the form 'this jar is known.' I next infer, from its effect in the jar, the existence of this cognition in myself, and I also at the same time infer the correctness of the cognition. The *Nyáya* holds that the three steps, 1, perception, 2, consciousness of the perception (*anuvyavasáya*), and 3, the knowledge of its correctness, are successive, the last being gained by inference; the *Mímánsá* holds that the two last are simultaneous and in fact identical.

The *Mímánsá* school consistently does not allow such a thing as misapprehension, as all cognition presents real objects. In erroneous perceptions the cognition is correct as far as regards the terms of the proposition; thus when nacre is mistaken for silver, the nacre is actually present to the sight as 'this,' and the silver is similarly presented through some defect as bilious humour, etc.; the error lies in the mind failing to recognize that they should not be connected as subject and predicate, *i.e.* 'this (nacre) is silver' (*asamsargágrahakálínam dharmadharmiṇor jnánam eva bhramopapádakam*).]

X.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS.

PART IV.[1]

[From the *Transactions* of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. ii. pp. 1—39.]

INTRODUCTION.

[325] A PRECEDING essay on Indian philosophy contained a succinct account of the *Karma-mímánsá*. The present one will be devoted to the *Brahma-mímánsá;* which, as the complement of the former, is termed *uttara*, later, contrasted with *púrva*, prior,[2] being the investigation of proof, deducible from the *Vedas* in regard to *theology*, as the other is in regard to *works* and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of the *Vedas*, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later *Mímánsá* is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but, differing on

[1] Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, April 7, 1827.

[2] [These terms do not authorize any inference as to the relative antiquity of the two systems, they only refer to the respective time of study. The *Púrva-mímánsá* deals with the *Púrva-káṇḍa* or ceremonial part of the *Veda*, while the *Vedánta* treats of the *Uttara-káṇḍa* or the theological. But it is curious to compare the two readings in the *Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya*, p. 6, l. 16; the one in the printed text (*Púrvam vedamayárthataḥ*) seems to explain *púrva* as 'before the *Vedánta* in time' (cf. p. 7, l. 5); the other (*Púrvavedaprakáśakam*) gives distinctly the true explanation. But there can be no doubt that the *Púrva-mímánsá* school did precede the other by a considerable interval.]

many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as in a philosophical view.

The ordinary designation of the *Uttara-mímánsá* is *Vedánta*, a term likewise of more comprehensive import. It literally signifies "conclusion of the *Veda*," and bears reference to the *Upanishads*, which are, for the most part, terminating sections of the *Vedas* to which they belong. It implies, however, the doctrine derived from them, and extends to books of sacred authority, in which that doc[326]trine is thence deduced; and in this large acceptation, it is "the end and scope of the "*Vedas*."

The followers of the *Vedánta* have separated in several sects, as 'ancient' and 'modern' *Vedántins*, and bearing other designations. The points on which they disagree, and the difference of their opinions, will not be a subject of the present essay, but may be noticed in a future one.[1]

Among numerous *Upanishads*, those which are principally relied upon for the *Vedánta*, and which accordingly are most frequently cited, are the *Chhándogya*, *Kaushítaki*, *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, *Aitareyaka*, *Taittiríyaka*, *Káṭhaka*, *Kaṭhavalli*,[2] *Muṇḍaka*, *Praśna*, *Śvetáśvatara*; to which may be added the *Í'śá-vásya*, *Kena*, and one or two more.

Certain religious exercises, consisting chiefly in profound meditation, with particular sitting postures rigorously continued, are inculcated as preparing the student for the attainment of divine knowledge, and promoting his acquisition of it. Directions concerning such devout exercises are to be found in several of the *Upanishads*, especially in the *Śvetáśwatara*; and likewise in other portions of the *Vedas*, as a part of the general ritual. These are accordingly cited by the

[1] [For an able review of the *Veddnta*, more especially according to S'ankara's view of it, see Dr. Bruining's *Bijdrage tot de Kennis van den Vedanta*, Leiden, 1871. Nílakaṇṭha's *Refutation of Hindu Philosophy* abounds with valuable information, but it chiefly refers to the modern school of the *Veddnta*. Cf. also Banerjea's *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*.]

[2] [This should be 'the Káṭhaka or Kaṭhavallí.']

commentators of the *Vedánta*, and must be considered to be comprehended under that general term;[1] and others from different *śákhás* of the *Vedas*, as further exemplified in a note below.[2]

[327] Besides the portion of the *Vedas* understood to be intended by the designation of *Vedánta*, the grand authority for its doctrine is the collection of *sútras*, or aphorisms, entitled *Brahma-sútra* or *Śáriraka-mimánsá*, and sometimes *Śárira-sútra* or *Vedánta-sútra*. *Śárira*, it should be observed, signifies embodied or incarnate (soul).[3]

Other authorities are the ancient scholia of that text, which is the standard work of the science; and didactic poems comprehended under the designation of *smṛiti*, a name implying a certain degree of veneration due to the authors. Such are the *Bhagavad-gítá* and *Yoga-vásishṭha*, reputed to be inspired writings.

WRITERS ON THE VEDÁNTA.

The *Śáriraka-mimánsá* or *Brahma-sútra*, above mentioned, is a collection of succinct aphorisms attributed to Bádaráyaṇa, who is the same with Vyása or *Veda-vyása*;[4] also called *Dwaipáyana* or *Kṛishṇa-dwaipáyana*. According to mythology, he had in a former state, being then a *bráhmaṇa* bearing the name of Apántara-tamas,[5] acquired a perfect knowledge of revelation and of the divinity, and was consequently qualified for eternal beatitude. Nevertheless, by special command of the

[1] For instance, the *Agni-rahasya-bráhmaṇa* of the *Káṇwas* and of the *Vájins* (or *Vájasaneyins*); the *Rahasya-bráhmaṇa* of the *Táṇḍins* and of the *Paingins*.

[2] The *Udgitha-bráhmaṇa* of the *Vájasaneyins*, the *Panchagni-vidyá-prakaraṇa* of the same, the *Khila-grantha* of the *Ráṇáyaníyas*, the *Práṇa-samváda* or *Práṇa-vidyá*, *Dahara-vidyá*, *Hárda-vidyá*, *Paramátma-vidyá*, *Satya-vidyá*, *Vaiśwánara-vidyá*, *Śáṇḍilya-vidyá*, *Vámadevya-vidyá*, *Upakośala-vidyá*, *Paryanka-vidyá*, *Madhu-vidyá*, *Shoḍaśakala-vidyá*, *Samvarga-vidyá*, etc.

[3] [*Govindánanda* in 'Vedánta Aphorisms,' (*Bibl. Ind.*) p. 22.]

[4] [He is only called Bádaráyaṇa in the *sútras*.]

[5] Śank. etc. on *Br. Sútr.* 3. 3. 32.

deity, he resumed a corporeal frame and the human shape, at the period intervening between the third and fourth ages of the present world, and was compiler of the *Vedas*, as his title of *Vyása* implies.

In the *Puráṇas*, and by Parášara, he is said to be an incarnation (*avatára*) of Vishṇu.[1] This, however, is not altogether at variance with the foregoing legend; since Apántara-tamas, having attained perfection, was identified with the deity; and his resumption of the human form was a descent of the god, in mythological notions.

[328] Apart from mythology, it is not to be deemed unlikely, that the person (whoever he really was) who compiled and arranged the *Vedas*, was led to compose a treatise on their scope and essential doctrine. But Vyása is also reputed author of the *Mahábhárata*, and most of the principal *puráṇas;* and that is for the contrary reason improbable, since the doctrine of the *puráṇas*, and even of the *Bhagavad-gítá* and the rest of the *Mahábhárata*, are not quite consonant to that of the *Vedas*, as expounded in the *Brahma-sútras*. The same person would not have deduced from the same premises such different conclusions.

The name of Bádaráyaṇa frequently recurs in the *sútras* ascribed to him,[2] as does that of Jaimini, the reputed author of the *Púrva-mímánsá*, in his. I have already remarked, in the preceding essay,[3] on the mention of an author by his name, and in the third person, in his own work. It is nothing unusual in literature or science of other nations: but a Hindu commentator will account for it, by presuming the actual composition to be that of a disciple recording the words of his teacher.

Besides Bádaráyaṇa himself, and his great predecessor

[1] [Thus *Govindánanda* in his preliminary verses, *Vyásam Harim sútrakṛitam cha vachmi.*]

[2] [I. 3. 26; I. 3. 33; III. 2. 41; III. 4. 1, 8, 19; IV. 3. 15; IV. 4. 7, 12.]

[3] See p. 320 of this volume.

Jaimini,[1] several other distinguished names likewise occur, though less frequently: some which are also noticed in the *Púrva-mímánsá*, as Átreyí[2] and Bádari;[3] and some which are not there found, as Áśmarathya,[4] Auḍulomi,[5] Kárshṇájini,[6] and Káśakṛitsna;[7] and the *Yoga* of *Patanjali*,[8] which consequently is an anterior work; as indeed it must be, if its scholiast, as generally acknowledged, be the same Vyása who is the author of the aphorisms of the *Uttara-mímánsá*.

The *Śáríraka* is also posterior to the atheistical *Sánkhya* of Kapila, to whom, or at least to his doctrine, there are many marked allusions in the text.[9]

[329] The atomic system of Kaṇáda (or, as the scholiast of the *Śáríraka*, in more than one place, contumeliously designates him, Kaṇa-bhuj or Kaṇabhaksha[10]) is frequently adverted to for the purpose of confutation; as are the most noted heretical systems, *viz.* the several sects of *Jainas*, the *Bauddhas*, the *Páśupatas* with other classes of *Máheśwaras*, the *Páncharátras* or *Bhágavatas*, and divers other schismatics.[11]

From this, which is also supported by other reasons, there seems to be good ground for considering the *Śáríraka* to be the latest of the six grand systems of doctrine (*darśana*) in Indian philosophy: later, likewise, than the heresies which sprung up among the Hindus of the military and mercantile

[1] [I. 2. 28, 31; I. 3. 31; I. 4. 18; III. 2. 40; III. 4. 2, 18, 40; IV. 3. 12 IV. 4. 5, 11.]

[2] [This is probably a misprint for *Átreya*, cf. p. 320. He is named in III. 4. 44.]

[3] [I. 2. 30; III. 1. 11; IV. 3. 7; IV. 4. 10.]

[4] [I. 2. 29; I. 4. 20.] [5] [I. 4. 21; III. 4. 45; IV. 4. 6.]

[6] [III. 1. 9.] [7] [I. 4. 22.] [8] [II. 1. 3.]

[9] [See especially S'ankara's Comm. on I. 4. 28.]

[10] [Cf. note, p. [399] *infra*.]

[11] [The *Sútras*, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of a series of preceding developments, which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The *Sútras* mutually refer to each other; thus those of the Sánkhya school, which in itself I should consider one of the earliest, distinctly refer to *Vedánta* tenets. They expressly mention the *Vaiśeshika* in i. 25, v. 85; for the *Nyáya* cf. v. 27, 86, and for the *Yoga* i. 90.]

tribes (*kshatriya* and *vaiśya*), and which, disclaiming the *Vedas*, set up a *Jina* or a *Buddha* for an object of worship; and later even than some, which, acknowledging the *Vedas*, have deviated into heterodoxy in their interpretation of the text.

In a separate essay,[1] I have endeavoured to give some account of the heretical and heterodox sects which the *Śáríraka* confutes: and of which the tenets are explained, for the elucidation of that confutation, in its numerous commentaries. I allude particularly to the *Jainas*, *Bauddhas*, *Chárvákas*, *Páśupatas*, and *Páncharátras*.

The *sútras* of Bádaráyaṇa are arranged in four books or lectures (*adhyáya*), each subdivided into four chapters or quarters (*páda*). Like the aphorisms of the prior *Mímánsá*, they are distributed very unequally into sections, arguments, cases, or topics (*adhikaraṇa*). The entire number of *sútras* is 555; of *adhikaraṇas* 191. But in this there is a little uncertainty, for it appears from Śankara, that earlier commentaries subdivided some *adhikaraṇas*, where he writes the aphorisms in one section.

[330] An *adhikaraṇa* in the later, as in the prior *Mímánsá*, consists of five members or parts: 1st, the subject and matter to be explained; 2nd, the doubt or question concerning it; 3rd, the plausible solution or *primâ facie* argument; 4th, the answer, or demonstrated conclusion and true solution; 5th, the pertinence or relevancy and connexion.[2]

But in Bádaráyaṇa's aphorisms, as in those of Jaimini, no *adhikaraṇa* is fully set forth. Very frequently the solution only is given by a single *sútra*, which obscurely hints the question, and makes no allusion to any different plausible solution, nor to arguments in favour of it. More rarely the opposed solution is examined at some length, and arguments in support of it are discussed through a string of brief sentences.

[1] See p. [382] of this volume.

[2] [See the *Vyásádhikaraṇa-málá* of Bhárati-tírtha.]

Being a sequel of the prior *Mímánsá*, the latter adopts the same distinctions of six sources of knowledge or modes of proof[1] which are taught by Jaimini, supplied where he is deficient by the old scholiast. There is, indeed, no direct mention of them in the *Brahma-sútras*, beyond a frequent reference to oral proof, meaning revelation, which is sixth among those modes. But the commentators make ample use of a logic which employs the same terms with that of the *Púrva-mímánsá*, being founded on it, though not without amendments on some points. Among the rest, the *Vedántins* have taken the syllogism (*nyáya*) of the dialectic philosophy, with the obvious improvement of reducing its five members to three.[2] "It consists," as expressly declared, "of three, not "of five parts; for as the requisites of the inference are ex- "hibited by three members, two more are superfluous. They "are either the proposition, the reason, and the example; or "the instance, the application, and the conclusion."

In this state it is a perfectly regular syllogism, as I had [331] occasion to remark in a former essay:[3] and it naturally becomes a question, whether the emendation was borrowed from the Greeks, or being sufficiently obvious, may be deemed purely Indian, fallen upon without hint or assistance from another quarter. The improvement does not appear to be of ancient date, a circumstance which favours the supposition of its having been borrowed. The earliest works in which I have found it mentioned are of no antiquity.[4]

The logic of the two *Mímánsás* merits a more full examination than the limits of the present essay allow, and it has been reserved for a separate consideration at a future opportunity, because it has been refined and brought into a regular form by the followers, rather than by the founders of either school.

[1] *Vedánta-paribháshá.* [2] *Vedánta-paribháshá.*

[3] See p. 315 of this volume.

[4] In the *Vedánta-paribháshá* and *Padártha-dípiká.*

The *Śárîraka-sútras* are in the highest degree obscure, and could never have been intelligible without an ample interpretation. Hinting the question or its solution, rather than proposing the one or briefly delivering the other, they but allude to the subject. Like the aphorisms of other Indian sciences, they must from the first have been accompanied by the author's exposition of the meaning, whether orally taught by him or communicated in writing.

Among ancient scholiasts of the *Brahma-sútras* the name of Baudháyana occurs: an appellation to which reverence, as to that of a saint or *ṛishi*, attaches. He is likewise the reputed author of a treatise on law. An early gloss, under the designation of *ṛitti*, is quoted without its author's name, and is understood to be adverted to in the remarks of later writers, in several instances, where no particular reference is however expressed. It is apparently [332] Baudháyana's. An ancient writer on both *mímánsás* (prior and later) is cited, under the name of Upavarsha, with the epithet of venerable (*bhagavat*),[1] implying that he was a holy personage. He is noticed in the supplement to the *Amara-kosha*[2] as a saint (*muni*), with the titles or additions of *Hala-bhṛiti*, *Kṛita-koṭi*, and *Ayáchita*. It does not appear that any of his works are now forthcoming.

The most distinguished scholiast of these *sútras*, in modern estimation, is the celebrated Śankara-áchárya, the founder of a sect among Hindus which is yet one of the most prevalent. I have had a former occasion of discussing the antiquity of this eminent person; and the subject has been since examined by Ráma-mohan-ráya and by Mr. Wilson.[3] I continue of opinion, that the period when he flourished may be taken to have been the close of the eighth or beginning of the ninth century of the Christian era; and I am con-

[1] S'ank. 3. 3. 53. [Cf. *supra*, p. 321.] [2] *Trikáṇḍa-śesha.*

[3] Sanskrit Dict., first edit., pref. p. xvi. [Essays, v. p. 188, etc. Cf. 'Preface to the two treatises on the Hindu law of inheritance,' *infra*.]

firmed in it by the concurring opinions of those very learned persons.

How much earlier the older scholia were, or the text itself, there is no evidence to determine. If the reputed author be the true one, it would be necessary to go back nearly two thousand years, to the era of the arrangement of the *Vedas* by Vyásá.

Śankara's gloss or perpetual commentary of the *sútras* bears the title of *Śáríraka-mímánsá-bháshya*.[1] It has been annotated and interpreted by a herd of commentators; and among others, and most noted, by Váchaspati-miśra, in the *Bhámatí* or *Śáríraka-bháshya-vibhága*.

This is the same Váchaspati, whose commentaries on the *Sánkhya-kárikā* of Íśwara-kṛishṇa, and on the text and gloss of Patanjali's *Yoga* and Gotama's *Nyáya*, were noticed in former essays.[2] He is the author [333] of other treatises on dialectics (*Nyáya*), and of one entitled *Tattwa-vindu* on the *Púrva-mímánsá*, as it is expounded by Bhaṭṭa.[3] All his works, in every department, are held in high and deserved estimation.

Váchaspati's exposition of Śankara's gloss, again, has been amply annotated and explained in the *Vedánta-kalpataru* of Analánanda,[4] surnamed Vyásáśrama; whose notes, in their turn, become the text for other scholia: especially a voluminous collection under the title of *Parimala*, or *Vedánta-kalpataru-parimala*, by Apyáya-díkshita[5] (author of several other works); and an abridged one, under that of *Vedánta-kalpataru-manjarí*, by Vidyánátha-bhaṭṭa.

[1] [Printed at Calcutta in 1818, and reprinted in the Bibliotheca Indica with Govindánanda's gloss. An English translation by the Rev. K. M. Banerjea is in progress.]

[2] See pp. 246, 248, 283 of this volume.

[3] [Dr. Hall (*Bibl. Index*, p. 87) refers to a list of Váchaspati's seven works given at the close of the *Bhámatí*. Beside the *Tattwa-kaumudí* on the Sánkhya, the *Tattwa-śáradí* on the Yoga, and the *Nyáya-várttika-tátparya-ṭíká* on the Nyáya, the list gives two on the Vedánta (the *Bhámatí*, and the *Tattwa-samikshá*, a commentary on the *Brahma-siddhi*), and two on the Mímánsá, the *Nyáya-kaṇiká*, a gloss on the *Vidhi-viveka*, and the *Tattwa-vindu*.]

[4] [This should be Amalánanda, see *Bibl. Index*, p. 87.]

[5] [His name is variously spelt as Apayya, Appayya, Apya, Appi, etc.]

Other commentaries on Śankara's gloss are numerous and esteemed, though not burdened with so long a chain of scholia upon scholia: for instance, the *Brahma-vidyábharaṇa* by Adwaitánanda,[1] and the *Bháshya-ratna-prabhá* by Govindánanda: both works of acknowledged merit.

These multiplied expositions of the text and of the gloss furnish an inexhaustible fund of controversial disquisition, suited to the disputatious schoolmen of India. On many [334] occasions, however, they are usefully consulted, in succession, for annotations supplying a right interpretation of obscure passages in Śankara's scholia or in Vyása's text.

Another perpetual commentary on the *sútras* of the *Śáriraka* by a distinguished author, is the work of the celebrated Rámánuja, the founder of a sect which has sprung as a schism out of the *Vedántin*. The points of doctrine, on which these great authorities differ, will be inquired into in another place. It may be readily supposed that they are not unfrequently at variance in the interpretation of the text, and I shall, therefore, make little use of the scholia of Rámánuja for the present essay. For the same reason, I make no reference to the commentaries of Ballabha-áchárya,[2] Bhaṭṭa-bháskara, Anantatírtha surnamed Madhu,[3] and Nílakaṇṭha,[4] whose interpretations differ essentially on some points from Śankara's.

[1] It is by Mr. Ward named *Veddnta-sútra-vyákhyd* by Brahma-vidyábharaṇa, mistaking the title of the work for the appellation of the author. Yet it is expressly affirmed in the rubric and colophon to be the work of Adwaitánanda, who abridged it from an ampler commentary by Rámánanda-tírtha. The mistake is the more remarkable, as the same Adwaitánanda was preceptor of Sadánanda, whose work, the *Vedánta-sára*, Mr. Ward attempted to translate; and the only part of Sadánanda's preface, which is preserved in the version, is that preceptor's name. Mr. Ward's catalogue of treatises extant belonging to this school of philosophy exhibits other like errors. He puts *Mádhava* for *Madhusúdana*, the name of an author; converts a commentary (the *Muktávalí*) into an abridgment; and turns the text (*múla*) of the *Vedánta-sára* into its essence. Ward's Hindus, vol. iv. pp. 172, 173. [2] [The *Brahma-sútránubháshya*, cf. *Bibl. Index*, p. 93.]

[3] [Rather Ánanda-tírtha surnamed Madhu or Madhwa. Cf. Burnouf, *Bhág. Puráṇ.* i. pref. p. lxii; *Sarva-darśana-sangraha*, p. 73; Wilson, *Essays*, i. pp. 139—150. For an account of his sect, the Púrṇaprajnas, see *Sarva-darśana-sangraha*, pp. 61—73.]

[4] [Asiatic Researches, xvii. 202; *Bibl. Index*, p. 86.]

Commentaries on the *Śáríraka-sútras* by authors of less note are extremely numerous. I shall content myself with naming such only as are immediately under view, *viz.* the *Vedánta-sútra-muktávalí* by Brahmánanda-saraswatí;[1] the *Brahma-sútra-bháshya* or *Mímánsá-bháshya*, by Bháskaráchárya; the *Vedánta-sútra-vyákhyá-chandriká*, by Bhavadeva-miśra; the *Vyása-sútra-vṛitti*, by Ranganátha; the *Subodhiní* or *Śáríra-sútra-sárártha-chandriká*, by Gangádhara; and the *Brahmámṛita-varshiṇi*, by Rámánanda.

This list might with ease be greatly enlarged. Two of the commentaries, which have been consulted in progress of preparing the present essay, are without the author's name, either in preface or colophon, in the only copies which I have seen; and occasions have occurred for noticing authors of commentaries on other branches of philosophy, as [335] well as on the *Brahma-mímánsá* (for instance, Vijnána-bhikshu, author of the *Sánkhya-sára* and *Yoga-várttika*).[2]

To these many and various commentaries in prose, on the text and on the scholia, must be added more than one in verse. For instance, the *Sankshepa-śáríraka*, which is a metrical paraphrase of text and gloss, by Sarvajnátma-giri[3] a *sannyási*: it is expounded by a commentary entitled *Anvayártha-prakáśiká*, by Ráma-tírtha, disciple of Kṛishṇa-tírtha, and author of several other works; in particular, a commentary on the *Upadeśa-sahasrí*, and one on the *Vedánta-sára*.

Besides his great work, the interpretation of the *sútras*, Śankara wrote commentaries on all the principal or important *Upanishads*. His preceptor, Govinda, and the preceptor's teacher, Gauḍapáda, had already written commentaries on many of them.[4]

[1] Mr. Ward calls this an abridgment of the *Vedánta-sútras*. It is no abridgment, but a commentary in ordinary form.

[2] See pp. 213, 248, of this volume.

[3] [Dr. Hall (*Bibl. Index*, p. 90) gives the name as *Sarvajnátma Muni*.]

[4] [Gauḍapáda's *Kárikd* on the *Máṇḍúkya-upanishad* was edited by Röer in 1850 with S'ankara's Comment.]

Śankara is author, likewise, of several distinct treatises; the most noted of which is the *Upadeśa-sahasrí*, a metrical summary of the doctrine deduced by him from the *Upanishads* and *Brahma-sútras*, in his commentaries on those original works. The text of the *Upadeśa-sahasrí* has been expounded by more than one commentator; and among others by Ráma-tírtha, already noticed for his comment on the *Sankshepa-śáríraka*. His gloss of the *Upadeśa-sahasrí* is entitled *Pada-yojaniká*.

Elementary treatises on the *Vedánta* are very abundant. It may suffice to notice a few which are popular and in general use, and which have been consulted in the preparation of the present essay.

The *Vedánta-paribhásha* of Dharma-rája-díkshita[1] explains, as its title indicates, the technical terms of the *Vedánta;* and, in course of doing so, opens most of the [336] principal points of its doctrine. A commentary on this work by the author's son, Ráma-kṛishṇa-díkshita, bears the title of *Vedanta-śikhámaṇi*. Taken together, they form an useful introduction to the study of this branch of Indian philosophy.

The *Vedánta-sára*[2] is a popular compendium of the entire doctrine of the *Vedánta*.[3] It is the work of Sadánanda,

[1] [Printed at Calcutta, S'aka 1769. This is a text-book of the most modern school of Vedánta, and is written with a complete mastery of the armoury of the Nyáya. Its fundamental thesis is the division of existence into transcendental (*páramárthika*), conventional (*vyávahárika*), and apparent (*prátibhásika*); to the first belongs only Brahma, to the second all the objects of life, and even the soul and Íśwara viewed as personal beings; to the third those objects which men ordinarily call illusory, as the snake for which a rope is mistaken, or the silver supposed to be seen in nacre.]

[2] [This has been frequently printed and translated.]

[3] Mr. Ward has given, in the fourth volume of his View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindus (third edition), a translation of the *Vedánta-sára*. I wish to speak as gently as I can of Mr. Ward's performance; but having collated this, I am bound to say it is no version of the original text, and seems to have been made from an oral exposition through the medium of a different language, probably the Bengalese. This will be evident to the Oriental scholar on the slightest comparison: for example, the introduction, which does not correspond with the original in so much as a single word, the name of the author's preceptor alone excepted; nor is there a word of the translated introduction countenanced by any of the commentaries. At the commencement of the treatise,

disciple of Adwayánanda or Adwaitánanda before mentioned, and has become the text for several commentaries; and, among the rest, the *Vidwan-mano-ranjini* by [337] Ráma-tírtha, who has been already twice noticed for other works; and the *Subodhini*, by Nṛisinha-saraswatí, disciple of Kṛishṇánanda.

A few other treatises may be here briefly noticed.

The *Śástra-siddhánta-leśa-sangraha*, by Apyaya or (Apyai) díkshita, son of Ranganátha or Rangarája-díkshita, and author of the *Parimala* on the *Siddhánta-kalpataru*, before mentioned, as well as of other works, has the benefit of a commentary, entitled *Kṛishṇálankára*, by Achyuta-kṛishṇánanda-tírtha, disciple of Swayam-prakáśánanda-saraswatí. The *Vedánta-siddhánta-vindu*,[1] by Madhusúdana, disciple of Viśweśwaránanda-saraswatí, and author of the *Vedánta-kalpa-latiká*, and of other works, is in like manner commented on by Brahmánanda, disciple of Náráyaṇa-tírtha.

Analysis.[2]

The *Uttara-mímánsá* opens precisely as the *Púrva*, announcing the purport in the same terms, except a single, but most

too, where the requisite qualifications of a student are enumerated, Mr. Ward makes his author say, that a person possessing those qualifications is heir to the *Veda* (p. 176). There is no term in the text, nor in the commentaries, which could suggest the notion of heir; unless Mr. Ward has so translated *adhikárí* (a competent or qualified person), which in Bengalese signifies proprietor, or, with the epithet *uttara* (*uttarádhikárí*), heir or successor. It would be needless to pursue the comparison further. The meaning of the original is certainly not to be gathered from such translations of this and (as Mr. Ward terms them) of other principal works of the Hindus, which he has presented to the public.

I was not aware, when preparing the former essays on the Philosophy of the Hindus which have been inserted in the first volume of the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, that Mr. Ward had treated the same topics: but I think it now unnecessary to revert to the subject, for the purpose of offering any remarks on his explanation of other branches of Indian philosophy.

[1] [Dr. Hall (*Bibl. Index*, p. 108) calls this work *Siddhánta-tattwa-vindu* or *Siddhánta-vindu*, and describes it as a Commentary on the *Daśa-ślokí* of S'ankarácháryа.]

[2] In this analysis of the *sútras*, a portion of the scholia or explanations of commentators is blended with the text, for a brief abstract and intelligible summary of the doctrine.

important word, *brahma* instead of *dharma*. 'Next, therefore, 'the inquiry is concerning GOD.'[1] It proceeds thus: '[He is 'that] whence are the birth and [continuance, and dissolution] 'of [this world]: [He is] the source of [revelation or] holy 'ordinance.'[2] That is, as the commentators infer from these aphorisms so expounded, 'He is the omnipotent creator of the 'world and the omniscient author of revelation.' It goes on to say, 'This appears from the import and right construction of 'holy writ.'[3]

[338] The author of the *sútras* next[4] enters upon a confutation of the *Sánkhyas*, who insist that *nature*, termed *pradhána*, which is the material cause of the universe, as they affirm, is the same with the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the world recognized by the *Vedas*. It is not so: for 'wish'[5] (consequently volition) is attributed to that cause, which moreover is termed (*átman*) soul: 'He wished to be many and 'prolific, and became manifold.' And again, 'He desired to 'be many, etc.....'[6] Therefore he is a sentient rational being; not insensible, as the *prakṛiti* (nature) or *pradhána* (matter) of Kapila is affirmed to be.

In the sequel of the first chapter[7] questions are raised upon divers passages of the *Vedas*, alluded to in the text, and quoted in the scholia, where minor attributes are seemingly assigned to the world's cause; or in which subordinate designations occur, such as might be supposed to indicate an inferior being, but are shown to intend the supreme one.

The cases (*adhikaraṇas*) or questions arising on them are examined and resolved concisely and obscurely in the *sútras*, fully and perspicuously in the scholia.

'The omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe, 'is (*ánandamaya*) essentially happy.[8] He is the brilliant, 'golden person, seen *within* (*antar*) the solar orb and the

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 1. 1. § 1. [2] *Ib.* § 2. and 3. [3] *Ib.* § 4.
[4] *Ib.* § 5. (*sútr.* 5–11.) [5] [Rather 'reflection,' *ikshateḥ*.]
[6] *Chhándogya*, 6. [7] § 6 to § 11. [8] *Taittiriya*.

'human eye.[1] He is the *etherial* element (*ákáśa*), from which 'all things proceed and to which all return.[2] He is the *breath* '(*práṇa*) in which all beings merge, into which[3] they all rise.[4] 'He is the *light* (*jyotis*) which shines in heaven, and in all 'places high and low, every where throughout the world, and 'within the human person. He is the *breath* (*práṇa*) and in-'telligent self, immortal, unde[339]caying, and happy, with 'which Indra, in a dialogue with Pratardana, identifies him-'self.'[5]

The term *práṇa*, which is the subject of two of the sections just quoted (§ 9 and 11), properly and primarily signifies respiration, as well as certain other vital actions (inspiration, energy, expiration, digestion, or circulation of nourishment); and secondarily, the senses and organs.[6] But, in the passages here referred to, it is employed for a different signification, intending the supreme *Brahma*; as also in divers other texts of the *Vedas*: and, among the rest, in one where the senses are said to be absorbed into it during profound sleep;[7] for 'while a man sleeps without dreaming, his soul is with '*Brahma*.'

Further cases of the like nature, but in which the indications of the true meaning appear less evident, are discussed at length in the second and third chapters of the first book. Those in which the distinctive attributes of the supreme being are more positively indicated by the passage whereon a question arises, had been considered in the foregoing chapter: they are not so clearly denoted in the passages now examined. Such as concern God as the object of devout meditation and worship, are for the most part collected in the second chapter; those which relate to God as the object of knowledge, are reserved for the third. Throughout these cases, completed where requisite by the scholiast, divers interpretations of a

[1] *Chhándogya*, 1. [2] *Chhándogya*, 1. [3] [Rather 'from which.']
[4] *Udgitha*. [*Chhánd.* i. 11.] [5] *Kaushitaki*. [iii. 2.]
[6] *Br. Sútr.* 2. 4. § 1–6. (S. 1–13.) [7] S'ank. etc. on *Br. Sútr.* 1. 1. § 9.

particular term or phrase are first proposed, as obvious and plausible, and reasons favourable to the proposed explanation set forth; but are set aside by stronger arguments, for a different and opposite construction. The reasoning is here omitted, as it would need much elucidation; and the purpose of this [340] analysis is to exhibit the topics treated, and but summarily the manner of handling them.

It is not the embodied (*śárira*) and individual soul, but the supreme *Brahma* himself,[1] on whom devout meditation is to be fixed, as enjoined in a passage which declares: 'this universe is 'indeed *Brahma*;[1] for it springs from him, merges in him, 'breathes in him: therefore, serene, worship him. Verily, a 'devout man, as are his thoughts or deeds in this world, such 'does he become departing hence [in another birth]. Frame 'then the devout meditation, "a living body endued with '"mind....."'[2]

It is neither fire nor the individual soul, but the supreme being, who is the 'devourer' (*attṛi*) described in the dialogue between Yama and Nachiketas:[3] 'who, then, knows where 'abides that being, whose food is the priest and the soldier '(and all which is fixt or moveable), and death is his sauce?'

In the following passage, the supreme spirit, and not the intellectual faculty, is associated with the individual living soul, as "two occupying the cavity or ventricle of the heart" (*guhám pravishṭau átmánau*). 'Theologists, as well as 'worshippers maintaining sacred fires, term light and shade 'the contrasted two, who abide in the most excellent abode, 'worthy of the supreme, occupying the cavity (of the heart),

[1] *Brahman* is, in this acceptation, a neuter noun (nom. *Brahme* or *Brahma*); and the same term in the masculine (nom. *Brahmá*) is one of the three gods who constitute one person. But it is more conformable with our idiom to employ the masculine exclusively, and many Sanskrit terms of the same import are masculine; as *Paramátman(-tmá)*, *Parameśwara*, etc.

[2] *Chhándogya*, 3. *Śáṇḍilya-vidyá*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 1. (S. 1–8.) [For a fuller translation of this passage, see Bábú Rájendra-lála-Mitra's translation of the *Chhándogya Upanishad*.]

[3] *Kaṭhavalli* 2. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 2. (S. 9, 10.)

'dwelling together in the worldly body, and tasting the 'certain fruit of good (or of evil) works.'[1]

[341] In the following extract from a dialogue,[2] in which Satyakáma instructs Upakośala, the supreme being is meant; not the reflected image in the eye, nor the informing deity of that organ, nor the regent of the sun, nor the individual intelligent soul. 'This being, who is seen in the eye, is the self '(*átman*): He is immortal, fearless *Brahma*. Though liquid 'grease, or water, be dropped therein, it passes to the corners '(leaving the eye-ball undefiled).'

So, in a dialogue, in which Yájnavalkya instructs Uddálaka,[3] "the internal check" (*antaryámin*) is the supreme being; and not the individual soul, nor the material cause of the world, nor a subordinate deity, the conscious informing regent of the earth, nor a saint possessing transcendent power: where premising, 'he who eternally restrains (or governs) this 'and the other world, and all beings therein,' the instructor goes on to say: 'who standing in the earth is other than the 'earth, whom the earth knows not, whose body the earth is, 'who interiorly restrains (and governs) the earth: the same is 'thy soul (and mine), the "internal check" (*antaryámin*), 'immortal, etc.'

Again, in another dialogue,[4] Angiras, in answer to Mahášála,[5] who with Śaunaka visited him for instruction, declares 'there 'are two sciences, one termed inferior, the other superior. 'The inferior comprises the four *Vedas*, with their appendages, 'grammar, etc.' (all of which he enumerates): 'but the superior '(or best and most beneficial) is that by which the unalterable '(being) is comprehended, who is invisible (imperceptible by 'organs of sense), ungrasped (not prehensible by organs of 'action), come of no race, belonging to no tribe, devoid of eye,

[1] *Kaṭhavallí*, 3. *Br. S.* 1. 2. § 3. (S. 11, 12.)
[2] *Chhándogya*, 4. *Upakośala-vidyá*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 4. (S. 13–17.)
[3] *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, 5. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 5. (S. 18–20.)
[4] *Muṇḍaka*, an *Upanishad* of the *Átharvaṇa*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 6. (S. 21–23.)
[5] [Rather 'Saunaka, the great householder,' *mahá'śálah*.]

'ear (or other [342] sensitive organ), destitute of hand, foot, '(or other instrument of action), everlasting lord, present every 'where, yet most minute. Him, invariable, the wise contem- 'plate as the source (or cause) of beings. As the spider puts 'forth and draws in his thread, as plants spring from the 'earth (and return to it), as hair of the head and body grows 'from the living man, so does the universe come of the un- 'alterable.....' Here it is the supreme being, not nature or a material cause, nor an embodied individual soul, who is the invisible (*adréśya*) ungrasped source of (all) beings (*bhútayoni*).

In a dialogue between several interlocutors, Práchínaśála, Uddálaka, and Aśwapati, king of the Kaikeyís,[1] (of which a version at length was inserted in an essay on the *Vedas*,[2]) the terms *vaiśwánara* and *átman* occur (there translated universal soul). The ordinary acceptation of *vaiśwánara* is fire: and it is therefore questioned, whether the element of fire be not here meant, or the regent of fire, that is, the conscious, informing deity of it, or a particular deity described as having an igneous body, or animal heat designated as alvine fire; and whether likewise *átman* intends the living, individual soul, or the supreme being. The answer is, that the junction of both general terms limits the sense, and restricts the purport of the passage to the single object to which both terms are applicable: it relates, then, to the supreme being.[3]

Under this section the author twice cites Jaimini:[4] once for obviating any difficulty or apparent contradiction in this place, by taking the term in its literal and etymological sense (universal guide of men), instead of the particular acceptation of fire; and again, as justifying, by a parallel passage in another *Veda*,[5] an epithet intimating the minute [343] size of the being in question (*prádeśa-mátra*), a span long.[6] On this

[1] [Or rather 'son of Kekaya.'] [2] See p. 76 of this volume.
[3] *Chhándogya*, 5. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. § 7. (S. 24-32.)
[4] *Ib.* S. 28 and 31. [5] *Vájasaneyi-bráhmaṇa.*
[6] By an oversight, the expression relative to diminutive dimension was omitted in the translated passage.

last point other ancient authors are likewise cited: one, Áśmarathya, who explains it as the result of shrinking or condensation; the other, Bádari, as a fruit of imagination or mental conception.[1] Reference is also made to another *śákhá* of the *Veda*,[2] where the infinite, supreme soul is said to occupy the spot between the eye-brows and nose.

'That on which heaven and earth and the intermediate 'transpicuous region are fixt, mind, with the vital airs (or 'sensitive organs), know to be the one soul (*átman*): reject 'other doctrines. This alone is the bridge of immortality.'[3] In this passage of an *Upanishad* of the *Átharvaṇa*, Brahma is intended, and not any other supposed site (*áyatana*) of heaven, earth, etc.

In a dialogue between Nárada and Sanatkumára, the (*bhúman*) 'great' one, proposed as an object of inquiry for him who desires unlimited happiness, since there is no bliss in that which is finite and small, is briefly defined. 'He is great, in 'whom nought else is seen, heard, or known, but that wherein 'ought else is seen, heard, or known, is small.'[4] Here the supreme being is meant; not breath (*práṇa*), which had been previously mentioned as greatest, in a climax of enumerated objects.

So, in a dialogue between Yájnavalkya and his wife Gárgí,[5] being asked by her, 'the heaven above, and the earth beneath, 'and the transpicuous region between, and all which has been, 'is, and will be, whereon are they woven and sewn?' he answers, the ether (*ákáśa*); and being further asked, [344] what it is on which ether is woven or sewn? replies, 'the un-'varied being, whom *Bráhmaṇas* affirm to be neither coarse

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. 29, 30. [*i.e.* as conceived by the mind abiding in the heart, which is a span long.]

[2] *Jábála.* [Cf. Weber, *Ind. Stud.* ii. 74.]

[3] *Muṇḍaka. Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 1. (S. 1–7.)

[4] *Chhándogya*, 7. *Bhúmavidyá. Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 2. (S. 8, 9.)

[5] *Vṛihad-áraṇy.* 5. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 3. (S. 10–12.) [Gárgí is called the daughter of Vachaknu, but Yájnavalkya's two wives are generally called Maitreyí and Kátyáyaní.]

'nor subtile, neither short nor long.....' It is the supreme being who is here meant.

The mystic syllable *om*, composed of three elements of articulation, is a subject of devout meditation; and the efficacy of that meditation depends on the limited or extended sense in which it is contemplated. The question concerning this mode of worship is discussed in a dialogue between Pippaláda and Satyakáma.[1]

If the devotion be restricted to the sense indicated by one element,[2] the effect passes not beyond this world; if to that indicated by two of the elements, it extends to the lunar orb, whence however the soul returns to a new birth; if it be more comprehensive, embracing the import of the three elements of the word, the ascent is to the solar orb, whence, stripped of sin, and liberated as a snake which has cast its slough, the soul proceeds to the abode of *Brahma*, and to the contemplation of (*purusha*) him who resides in a corporeal frame: that is, soul reposing in body (*puríšaya*).

That mystic name, then, is applied either to the supreme *Brahma*, uniform, with no quality or distinction of parts; or to *Brahma*, not supreme, but an effect (*kárya*) diversified, qualified; who is the the same with the Viráj and Hiraṇyagarbha of mythology, born in the mundane egg.

It appears from the latter part of the text, that it is the supreme *Brahma* to whom meditation is to be directed, and on whom the thoughts are to be fixed, for that great result of liberation from sin and worldly trammels.

In a passage descriptive of the lesser ventricle of the heart, it is said: 'within this body (*Brahma-pura*) *Brahma's* [345] 'abode, is a (*dahara*) little lotus, a dwelling within which is 'a (*dahara*) small vacuity occupied by ether (*ákáša*). What 'that is which is within (the heart's ventricle) is to be inquired, 'and should be known.'[3] A question is here raised, whether

[1] *Praśna*, an *Upanishad* of the *A'tharvaṇa*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 4. (S. 13.)

[2] [Sc. the letter *a* of *om* (*a* + *u* + *m*).]

[3] *Chhándogya*, 8. *Dahara-vidyá*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 5. (S. 14–21.)

that 'ether' (*ákáśa*) within the ventricle of the heart be the etherial element, or the individual sensitive soul, or the supreme one; and it is pronounced from the context, that the supreme being is here meant.

'The sun shines not therein, nor the moon, nor stars: much 'less this fire. All shines after his effulgence (reflecting his 'light), by whose splendour this whole (world) is illumined.'[1] In this passage it is no particular luminary or mine of light, but the (*prájna*) intelligent soul (supreme *Brahma*) which shines with no borrowed light.

In the dialogue between Yama and Nachiketas, before cited, are the following passages.[2] 'A person (*purusha*) no bigger 'than the thumb abides in the midst of self;' and again, 'the 'person no bigger than the thumb is clear as a smokeless flame, 'lord of the past (present) and future; he is to-day and will 'be to-morrow: such is he (concerning whom you inquire).' This is evidently said of the supreme ruler, not of the individual living soul.

Another passage of the same *Upanishad*[3] declares: 'this 'whole universe, issuing from breath (*práṇa*), moves as it 'impels: great, terrible, as a clap of thunder. They, who 'know it, become immortal.' *Brahma*, not the thunderbolt nor wind, is here meant.

'The living soul (*samprasáda*) rising from this corporeal 'frame, attains the supreme light, and comes forth with his [346] 'identical form.'[4] It is neither the light of the sun, nor the visual organ, but *Brahma*, that is here meant.

'Ether (*ákáśa*) is the bearer (cause of bearing) of name and 'form. That in the midst of which they both are, is *Brahma*: 'it is immortality; it is soul.'[5] *Ákáśa* here intends the supreme being, not the element so named.

[1] *Muṇḍaka*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 6. (S. 22, 23.)
[2] *Kaṭha*. 4. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 7. (S. 24, 25.)
[3] *Kaṭha*. 6. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 10. (S. 39.)
[4] *Chhándogya* 8. *Prajápati-vidyá*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 11. (S. 40.)
[5] Ib. ad finem. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 12. (S. 41.)

In a dialogue between Yájnavalkya and Janaka,[1] in answer to an inquiry 'which is the soul?' the intelligent internal light within the heart is declared to be so. This likewise is shown to relate to the supreme one, unaffected by worldly course.

It had been intimated in an early aphorism of the first chapter, that the *Vedas*, being rightly interpreted, do concur in the same import, as there expressed concerning the omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe.[2] An objection to this conclusion is raised, upon the ground of discrepancy remarked in various texts of the *Vedas*,[3] which coincide, indeed, in ascribing the creation to *Brahma*, but differ in the order and particulars of the world's development. The apparent contradiction is reconciled, as they agree on the essential points of the creator's attributes; omnipotent and omniscient providence, lord of all, soul of all, and without a second, etc.: and it was not the object of the discrepant passages to declare the precise succession and exact course of the world's formation.

Two more sections are devoted to expound passages which define *Brahma* as creator, and which are shown to comport no other construction. In one,[4] cited from a dialogue between Ajátaśatru and Báláki, surnamed [347] Gárgya, the object of meditation and worship is pronounced to be, 'he who was the 'maker of those persons just before mentioned (regents of the 'sun, moon, etc.), and whose work this universe is.'

In the other, cited from a dialogue between Yájnavalkya and Maitreyí,[5] soul, and all else which is desirable, are contrasted as mutual objects of affection: 'it is for soul (*átman*) 'that opulence, kindred, and all else which is dear, are so; and 'thereunto soul reciprocally is so; and such is the object which 'should be meditated, inquired, and known, and by knowledge

[1] *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, 6. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 3. § 13. (S. 42, 43.)
[2] *Br. S.* 1. 1. § 4.
[3] *Chhándogya*, *Taittiríya*, and *Aitareya*.
[4] *Kaushítaki-bráhmaṇa* [or bráhmaṇopanishad, iv.] *Br. S.* 1. 4. § 5. (S. 16-18.)
[5] *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, *Maitreyí-bráhmaṇa*. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 4. § 6. (S. 19-22.)

'of whom all becomes known.' This, it is shown, is said of the supreme, not of the individual soul, nor of the breath of life.

Under this last head several authorities are quoted by the author, for different modes of interpretation and reasoning, *viz.* Áśmarathya, Auḍulomi, and Káśakṛitsna, as Jaimini under the next preceding (§ 5).

The succeeding section[1] affirms the important tenet of the *Vedánta*, that the supreme being is the material, as well as the efficient, cause of the universe: it is a proposition directly resulting from the tenor of passages of the *Vedas*, and illustrations and examples adduced.

The first lecture is terminated by an aphorism,[2] intimating that, in the like manner as the opinion of a plastic nature and material cause (termed by the *Sánkhyas*, *pradhána*) has been shown to be unsupported by the text of the *Veda*, and inconsistent with its undoubted doctrine, so, by the like reasoning, the notion of atoms (*aṇu* or *paramáṇu*) and that of an universal void (*śúnya*), and other as unfounded systems, are set aside in favour of the only consistent position just now affirmed. (*Br. Sútr.* 1. 1. § 5. and 1. 4. § 7.)

[348] Not to interrupt the connexion of the subjects, I have purposely passed by a digression, or rather several, comprised in two sections of this chapter,[3] wherein it is inquired whether any besides a regenerate man (or Hindu of the three first tribes) is qualified for theological studies and theognostic attainments; and the solution of the doubt is, that a *śúdra*, or man of an inferior tribe, is incompetent;[4] and that beings superior to man (the gods of mythology) are qualified.

In the course of this disquisition the noted question of the eternity of sound, of articulate sound in particular, is mooted and examined. It is a favourite topic in both *Mímánsás*, being intimately connected with that of the eternity of the *Veda*, or revelation acknowledged by them.

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 1. 4. § 7. (S. 23-27.)
[2] *Ibid.* § 8. (S. 28.)
[3] *Ibid.* 1. 3. § 8. 9. (S. 26-38.)
[4] *Ibid.* 1. 3. (S. 28-29.)

I shall not, however, enter into the matter further, in this place, though much remain to be added to the little which was said on it in a former essay.[1]

In the fourth chapter of the first lecture, the author returns to the task of confuting the *Sánkhya* doctrine; and some passages of the *Vedas*, apparently favouring that doctrine, are differently interpreted by him: 'the indistinct one (*avyakta*) 'is superior to the great one (*mahat*), and embodied soul '(*purusha*) is superior to the indistinct.'[2] Here the very same terms, which the *Sánkhyas* employ for 'intelligence, 'nature, and soul,' are contrasted, with allusion seemingly to the technical acceptations of them. This passage is, however, explained away; and the terms are taken by the *Vedántins* in a different sense.

The next instance is less striking and may be briefly dismissed, as may that following it: one relative to *ajá*, alleged to signify in the passage in question[3] the *unborn* [349] sempiternal nature (*prakṛiti*), but explained to intend a *luminous nature* (*prakṛiti*) noticed in the *Chhándogya*; (there is in the text itself an evident allusion to the ordinary acceptation of the word, a she-goat): the other concerning the meaning of the words *pancha-panchajanáḥ*, in a passage of the *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*,[4] which a follower of the *Sánkhya* would construe as bearing reference to five times five (twenty-five) principles; but which

[1] See p. 330 of this volume. [S'ankara first shows that the cognition of a word's meaning cannot be produced by its first letter (as this might lead astray), nor by the totality of letters (as they are not contemporaneous); neither can it be produced by the last letter aided by the impressions left by the former ones, as these impressions cannot be proved either by sense-evidence or by inference. Hence we must concede the existence of *sphoṭa* (see p. 330), which he explains as a something which suddenly makes itself manifest to the mind after it has received the seed of the impressions produced by the several letters as they are apprehended, and ripens under the influence of the final letter. It appears as the object of one complete cognition, just as the nature of a gem is only seen after several exertions of sight.]

[2] *Kaṭha*. 3. *Br. Sútr.* 1. 4. § 1. (S. 1–7.)

[3] *S'wetáś'watara*. *B. S.* 1. 4. § 2. (S. 8–10.)

[4] *Vṛihad-draṇ*. 6. *Br. S.* 1. 4. § 3. (S. 11–13.)

clearly relates to five objects specified in the context, and figuratively termed persons (*pancha-jana*).

It is because the *Sánkhya* doctrine is, in the apprehension of the *Vedántins* themselves, to a certain degree plausible, and seemingly countenanced by the text of the *Vedas*, that its refutation occupies so much of the attention of the author and his scholiasts. More than one among the sages of the law (Devala in particular is named)[1] have sanctioned the principles of the *Sánkhya;* and they are not uncountenanced by Manu.[2] Kapila himself is spoken of with the reverence due to a saint (*Mahá-ṛishi*) and inspired sage; and his most eminent disciples, as Panchaśikha, etc., are mentioned with like veneration; and their works are dignified with the appellations of *tantra* and *smṛiti* as holy writings, by the *Vedántins*, at the same time that these oppose and refute the doctrine taught by him.

Kapila, indeed, is named in the *Veda* itself as possessing transcendent knowledge: but here it is remarked, that the name has been borne by more than one sage; and in particular by Vásudeva, who slew the sons of Sagara.[3] This mythological personage, it is contended, is the Kapila named in the *Veda*.[4]

[350] The second lecture continues the refutation of Kapila's *Sánkhya*, which, it is observed, is at variance with the *smṛitis*, as with the *Vedas*: and here the name of Manu is placed at the head of them,[5] although the institutes, which bear his name, will be found, as just now hinted, and as subsequently admitted in another section, to afford seeming countenance to *Sánkhya* doctrines. Such passages are, however, explained away by the *Vedántins*, who rely in this instance, as they do in that of the *Veda* itself, on other texts, which are not reconcileable to the *Sánkhya*.

[1] [*i.e.* by S'ankara in his Comm. on I. 4. 28.]
[2] Manu's Institutes, ch. xii., v. 50.
[3] S'ank. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 1. § 1. (S. 1–2.)
[4] [Cf. *supra*, p. 242.]
[5] [Sc. in S'ankara's Comm.]

The same argument is in the following section,[1] applied to the setting aside of the *Yoga-smṛiti* of Patanjali (*Hairaṇya-garbha*),[2] so far as that is inconsistent with the orthodox tenets deduced from the *Vedas;* and, by parity of reasoning, to Kaṇáda's atomical scheme; and to other systems which admit two distinct causes (a material and an efficient one) of the universe.

The doctrine derived from the tenor of the *Vedas* is to be supported, likewise, by reasoning independently of authority. 'The objection, that the cause and effect are dissimilar, is not 'a valid one: instances of such dissimilarity are frequent. 'Hair and nails, which are insensible, grow from a sensible 'animal body; and sentient vermin (scorpions, etc.) spring 'from inanimate sources (cow-dung, etc.). The argument, too, 'might be retorted; for, according to the adverse position, 'sentient beings are produced from an insensible plastic 'nature.[3] On these and other arguments the orthodox doc-'trine is maintainable by reasoning: and by like arguments 'opinions concerning atoms and an universal void, which are 'not received by the best persons,[4] may be confuted.'[5]

[351] 'The distinction relative to fruition, discriminating one 'who enjoys and that which is enjoyed, does not invalidate the 'singleness and identity of *Brahma* as cause and effect.[6] The 'sea is one and not other than its waters; yet waves, foam, 'spray, drops, froth, and other modifications of it, differ from 'each other.'

'An effect is not other than its cause. *Brahma* is single 'without a second. He is not separate from the embodied self. 'He is soul; and the soul is he.[7] Yet he does not do that 'only which is agreeable and beneficial to self. The same earth 'exhibits diamonds, rock crystals, red orpiment, etc.; the

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 2. 1. § 2. (S. 3.)
[2] [This epithet does not occur in S'ankara's Comm. on the section.]
[3] *Br. Sútr.* 2. 1. § 3. (S. 4–11.)
[4] [*S'ishṭáparigrahaḥ.*]
[5] *Br. Sútr.* § 4. (S. 12.)
[6] *Ibid.* 2. 1. § 5. (S. 13.)
[7] *Ibid.* § 6. (S. 14–20.) and § 7. (S. 21–23.)

'same soil produces a diversity of plants; the same food is 'converted into various excrescences, hair, nails, etc.

'As milk changes to curd, and water to ice, so is *Brahma* 'variously transformed and diversified, without aid of tools or 'exterior means of any sort.[1] In like manner, the spider spins 'his web out of his own substance; spirits assume various 'shapes; cranes (*valáká*) propagate without the male; and the 'lotus proceeds from pond to pond without organs of motion. 'That *Brahma* is entire without parts, is no objection: he is 'not wholly transformed into worldly appearances. Various 'changes are presented to the same dreaming soul. Divers 'illusory shapes and disguises are assumed by the same spirit.'[2]

'*Brahma* is omnipotent, able for every act, without organ 'or instrument.[3] No motive or special purpose need be as-'signed for his creation of the universe, besides his will.'[4]

'Unfairness and uncompassionateness are not to be im-[352] 'puted to him, because some (the gods) are happy, others '(beasts and inferior beings) are miserable, and others again '(men) partake of happiness and unhappiness. Every one has 'his lot, in the renovated world, according to his merits, his 'previous virtue or vice in a former stage of an universe, which 'is sempiternal and had no beginning in time. So the rain-'cloud distributes rain impartially; yet the sprout varies 'according to the seed.'[5]

'Every attribute of a first cause (omniscience, omnipotence, 'etc.) exists in *Brahma*, who is devoid of qualities.'[6]

[1] *Br. Sútr.* § 8. (S. 24-25.)
[2] *Ibid.* § 9. (S. 26-29.)
[3] *Ibid.* § 10. (S. 30-31.)
[4] *Ibid.* § 11. (S. 32-33.)
[5] *Ibid.* 2. 1. § 12. (S. 34-36.)
[6] *Ibid.* § 13. (S. 37.) [S'ankara expressly says (IV. 3. 14.) that "those passages of *śruti* which speak of creation, etc., in reality only intend to produce the conviction of the identity of all things with Brahma, not to attribute various powers to him." Or as Dharmarája explains, in the *Vedánta-paribháshá* (p. 41), these passages show that the universe could only exist in Brahma as its material cause, and thus Brahma remains as the substratum, even when the universe is shown to be an illusory effect. "Thus even the passages which relate to creation, etc., declare indirectly Brahma as without a second." Govindánanda expressly remarks (I. 1. 2.), "How can causality be a characteristic of Brahma devoid of qualities,

The second chapter of the second lecture is controversial. The doctrine of the *Sánkhyas* is confuted in the first section; that of the *Vaiśeshikas* in two more; of the *Bauddhas* in as many; of the *Jainas* in one; of the *Páśupatas* and *Páncharátras*, likewise, in one each. These controversial disquisitions are here omitted; as a brief abstract would hardly be intelligible, and a full explanation would lead to too great length. They have been partly noticed in a separate treatise on the Philosophy of Indian Sects.[1] It is remarkable, that the *Nyáya* of Gotama is entirely unnoticed in the text and commentaries of the *Vedánta-sútras*.[2]

In the third chapter of the second lecture, the task of reconciling seeming contradictions of passages in the *Vedas* is resumed.

'The origin of air and the etherial element (*ákáśa*), unnoticed in the text of the *Veda* (*Chhándogya*), where the creation of the three other elements is described, has been affirmed in another (*Taittiríyaka*).[3] The omission of the one is supplied by the notice in the other; there is no contradiction, as the deficient passage is not restrictive, nor professes a complete enumeration. Ether and air are by [353] *Brahma* created. But he himself has no origin, no procreator nor maker, for he is eternal, without beginning as without end.[4] So fire, and water, and earth, proceed mediately from him, being evolved successively, the one from the other, as fire from air, and this from ether.[5] The element of earth is meant in divers passages where food (that is, esculent vegetable) is said to proceed from water: for rain fertilizes the earth. It is by

the real object of our inquiry? Just as silver is the characteristic of nacre, when we say 'this silver is really nacre,' so when we say 'the cause of the world is really Brahma,' this supposed causality is an approximative characteristic of Brahma." There is in truth no such thing as creation apart from the stand-point of 'ignorance.' Cf. *Ration. Refut.* p. 203.]

[1] See p. [378] of this volume.

[2] [The tenets of the Nyáya, so far as they relate to pure logic, are accepted by all the schools. Its followers are not attacked in the *Digvijaya*.]

[3] *Br. Sútr.* 2. 3. § 1 and 2. (S. 1–7 and 8.)

[4] *Ibid.* 2. 3. § 3. (S. 9.)

[5] *Ibid.* § 4–6. (S. 10–12.)

'his will, not by their own act, that they are so evolved; and 'conversely, they merge one into the other, in the reversed 'order, and are re-absorbed at the general dissolution of worlds, 'previous to renovation of all things.'[1]

'Intellect, mind, and organs of sense and action, being com- 'posed of the primary elements, are evolved and re-absorbed 'in no different order or succession, but in that of the elements 'of which they consist.'[2]

'The same course, evolution and re-absorption, or material 'birth and death, cannot be affirmed of the soul. Birth and 'death are predicated of an individual, referring merely to his 'association with body, which is matter fixed or moveable. 'Individual souls are, in the *Veda*, compared to sparks issuing 'from a blazing fire; but the soul is likewise declared expressly 'to be eternal and unborn. Its emanation is no birth, nor 'original production.[3] It is perpetually intelligent and con- 'stantly sensible, as the *Sánkhyas* too maintain; not adventi- 'tiously so, merely by association with mind and intellect, as 'the disciples of Kaṇáda insist. It is for want of sensible 'objects, not for want of sensibility or faculty of perception, 'that the soul feels not during profound sleep, fainting, or 'trance.

[354] 'The soul is not of finite dimensions, as its trans- 'migrations seemingly indicate; nor minutely small abiding within the heart, and no bigger than the hundredth part of a 'hundredth of a hair's point, as in some passages described; 'but, on the contrary, being identified with supreme *Brahma*, 'it participates in his infinity.'[4]

'The soul is active; not as the *Sánkhyas* maintain, merely 'passive.[5] Its activity, however, is not essential, but adventi- 'tious. As the carpenter, having his tools in hand, toils and 'suffers, and laying them aside, rests and is easy, so the soul

[1] *Br. Sútr.* § 7-8. (S. 13-14.)
[2] *Ibid.* § 9. (S. 15.)
[3] *Ibid.* § 10-11. (S. 16-17.)
[4] *Ibid.* 2. 3. § 15. (S. 19-32.)
[5] *Ibid.* § 14. (S. 33-39.)

'in conjunction with its instruments (the senses and organs) is 'active, and quitting them, reposes.[1]

'Blind in the darkness of ignorance, the soul is guided in 'its actions and fruition, in its attainment of knowledge, and 'consequent liberation and bliss, by the supreme ruler of the 'universe,[2] who causes it to act conformably with its previous 'resolves: now, according to its former purposes, as then con-'sonantly to its yet earlier predispositions, accruing from pre-'ceding forms with no retrospective limit; for the world had 'no beginning. The supreme soul makes the individuals act 'relatively to their virtuous or vicious propensities, as the 'same fertilizing rain-cloud causes various seeds to sprout 'multifariously, producing diversity of plants according to 'their kind.

'The soul is a portion of the supreme ruler,[3] as a spark is 'of fire. The relation is not as that of master and servant, 'ruler and ruled, but as that of whole and part. In more 'than one hymn and prayer of the *Vedas*[4] it is said, "All '"beings constitute one quarter of him; three quarters [355] '"are imperishable in heaven:" and in the *Íśwara-gítá*[5] and 'other *smṛitis*, the soul, that animates body, is expressly 'affirmed to be a portion of him. He does not, however, 'partake of the pain and suffering of which the individual 'soul is conscious, through sympathy, during its association 'with body; so solar or lunar light appears as that which it 'illumines, though distinct therefrom.

'As the sun's image reflected in water is tremulous, quaking 'with the undulations of the pool, without however affecting 'other watery images nor the solar orb itself; so the sufferings 'of one individual affect not another, nor the supreme ruler. 'But, according to the doctrine of the *Sánkhyas*, who main-

[1] *Br. Sútr.* § 15. (S. 40.) [2] [*Íśwara.*] *Ibid.* § 16. (S. 41–42.)
[3] *Ibid.* § 17. (S. 43–53.)
[4] *Ṛigveda*, 8. 4. 17. *Yajurveda* (*Vájasaneyí*) 31. 3.
[5] S'ankara [2. 3. 45] cites by this name the *Bhagavad-gítá* [15. 7].

'tain that souls are numerous, each of them infinite, and all 'affected by one plastic principle, nature (*pradhána* or *pra-'kṛiti*), the pain or pleasure, which is experienced by one, must 'be felt by all. The like consequence is objected to the 'doctrine of Kaṇáda, who taught that souls, numerous and 'infinite, are of themselves insensible; and mind, the soul's 'instrument, is minute as an atom, and by itself likewise 'unsentient. The union of one soul with a mind would not 'exclude its association with other souls, equally infinite and 'ubiquitary; and all, therefore, would partake of the same 'feeling of pain or pleasure.'

The fourth chapter of the second book proceeds in the task of reconciling apparent contradictions of passages in the *Vedas*.[1]

'The corporeal organs of sense and of action, designated by 'the term *práṇa* in a secondary acceptation (it is noticed in 'its proper signification further on, § 4), have, like the ele-'ments and other objects treated of in the foregoing chapter, a 'similar origin, as modifications of *Brahma;* [356] although 'unnoticed in some passages concerning the creation, and 'mentioned in others as pre-existent, but expressly affirmed 'in others to be successively evolved.[2] The deficiency or 'omission of one text does not invalidate the explicit tenor 'of another.

'In various passages, the number of corporeal organs is 'differently stated, from seven to thirteen. The precise num-'ber is, however, eleven:[3] the five senses, sight, etc.; five 'active organs, the hand, etc.; and lastly, the internal faculty, 'mind, comprehending intelligence, consciousness, and sen-'sation. Where a greater number is specified, the term is 'employed in its most comprehensive sense; where fewer are 'mentioned, it is used in a more restricted acceptation: thus 'seven sensitive organs are spoken of, relatively to the eyes, 'ears, and nostrils (in pairs), and the tongue.

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 2. 4. § 1. (S. 1–4.)
[2] *Ibid.* 2. 4. § 1. (S. 1–4.)
[3] *Ibid.* § 2. (S. 5–6.)

'They are finite and small: not, however, minute as atoms, 'nor yet gross, as the coarser elements.[1]

'In its primary or principal signification, *práṇa* is vital 'action, and chiefly respiration. This, too, is a modification 'of *Brahma*. It is not wind (*váyu*) or the air which is 'breathed, though so described in numerous passages of the '*Vedas* and other authorities; nor is it an operation of a 'corporeal organ; but it is a particular vital act, and com-'prehends five such: 1st, respiration, or an act operating 'upwards; 2nd, inspiration, one operating downwards; 3rd, 'a vigorous action, which is a mean between the foregoing two; '4th, expiration, or passage upwards, as in metempsychosis; '5th, digestion, or circulation of nutriment throughout the 'corporeal frame.'[2]

'Here, too, it must be understood of a limited, not vast or 'infinite act, nor minutely small. The vital act is not so [357] 'minute as not to pervade the entire frame, as in the 'instance of circulation of nourishment; yet is small enough 'to be imperceptible to a bystander, in the instance of life's 'passage in transmigration.

'Respiration and the rest of the vital acts do not take effect 'of themselves by an intrinsic faculty, but as influenced and 'directed by a presiding deity and ruling power, yet relatively 'to a particular body, to whose animating spirit, and not to 'the presiding deity, fruition accrues.[3]

'The senses and organs, eleven in number, as above men-'tioned, are not modifications of the principal vital act, respira-'tion, but distinct principles.[4]

'It is the supreme ruler, not the individual soul, who is 'described in passages of the *Vedas* as transforming himself 'into divers combinations, assuming various names and shapes, 'deemed terrene, aqueous, or igneous, according to the pre-'dominancy of the one or the other element. When nourish-

[1] *Br. Sútr.* § 3. (S. 7.) [2] *Ibid.* § 4. (S. 8.) § 5. (S. 9–12.) § 6. (S. 13.)
[3] *Ibid.* 2. 4. § 7. (S. 14–16.) [4] *Ibid.* § 8. (S. 17–19.)

'ment is received into the corporeal frame, it undergoes a three-
'fold distribution, according to its fineness or coarseness: corn
'and other terrene food becomes flesh; but the coarser portion
'is ejected, and the finer nourishes the mental organ. Water
'is converted into blood; the coarser particles are rejected as
'urine; the finer supports the breath. Oil or other combus-
'tible substance, deemed igneous, becomes marrow; the coarser
'part is deposited as bone, and the finer supplies the faculty of
'speech.'[1]

The third lecture treats on the means whereby knowledge is attainable, through which liberation and perpetual bliss may be achieved: and, as preliminary thereto, on the pas[358]sage of the soul furnished with organs into the versatile world and its various conditions; and on the nature and attributes of the supreme being.

'The soul is subject to transmigration. It passes from one
'state to another, invested with a subtile frame consisting of
'elementary particles, the seed or rudiment of a grosser body.
'Departing from that which it occupied, it ascends to the
'moon; where, clothed with an aqueous form, it experiences
'the recompense of its works; and whence it returns to occupy
'a new body with resulting influence of its former deeds. But
'evil-doers suffer for their misdeeds in the seven appointed
'regions of retribution.[2]

'The returning soul quits its watery frame in the lunar orb,
'and passes successively and rapidly through ether, air, vapour,
'mist, and cloud, into rain; and thus finds its way into a
'vegetating plant, and thence, through the medium of nourish-
'ment, into an animal embryo.'[3]

In the second chapter of this lecture the states or conditions of the embodied soul are treated of. They are chiefly three; waking, dreaming, and profound sleep: to which may be added

[1] *Br. Sútr.* § 9. (S. 20-22.)
[2] *Ibid.* 3. 1. § 1-3. (S. 1-7 and 8-11 and 12-21.)
[3] *Ibid.* § 4-6. (S. 22-23 and 24-27.)

for a fourth, that of death; and for a fifth, that of trance, swoon, or stupor, which is intermediate between profound sleep and death (as it were half-dead), as dreaming is between waking and profound sleep. In that middle state of dreaming there is a fanciful course of events, an illusory creation, which however testifies the existence of a conscious soul. In profound sleep the soul has retired to the supreme one by the route of the arteries of the pericardium.[1]

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the consider-[359]ation of the nature and attributes of the supreme being. 'He is described in many passages of the *Veda*, as 'diversified and endued with every quality and particular 'character; but in other and very numerous texts, as without 'form or quality. The latter only is truly applicable, not 'the former, nor yet both. He is impassible, unaffected by 'worldly modifications; as the clear crystal, seemingly coloured 'by the red blossom of a hibiscus, is not the less really 'pellucid. He does not vary with every disguising form or 'designation, for all diversity is expressly denied by explicit 'texts; and the notion of variableness relative to him is dis-'tinctly condemned in some *śákhás* of the *Veda*.[2]

'He is neither coarse nor subtile, neither long nor short, 'neither audible nor tangible; amorphous, invariable.'

'This luminous immortal being, who is in this earth, is the 'same with the luminous, immortal, embodied spirit, which 'informs the corporeal self, and is the same with the [supreme] 'soul.' 'He is to be apprehended by mind alone, there is not 'here any multiplicity. Whosoever views him as manifold 'dies death after death.'[3]

'He is amorphous, for so he is explicitly declared to be; 'but seemingly assuming form, as sunshine or moonlight, im-'pinging on an object, appears straight or crooked.'[4]

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 3. 2. § 1–4. (S. 1-6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.)

[2] *Ibid.* 3. 2. § 5. (S. 11-13.)

[3] Passages of the *Veda* cited among others by the scholiasts commenting on the above.

[4] *Br. Sútr.* 3. 2. (S. 14.)

'He is pronounced to be sheer sense, mere intellect and 'thought: as a lump of salt is wholly of an uniform taste 'within and without, so is the soul an entire mass of intelli-'gence.' This is affirmed both in the *Vedas* and in the *smṛitis*: and, as such, he is compared to the reflected [360] images of sun and moon, which fluctuate with the rise and fall of the waters that reflect them.[1] 'The luminous sun, though single, 'yet reflected in water, becomes various; and so does the 'unborn divine soul by disguise in divers modes.'

The *Veda* so describes him, as entering into and pervading the corporeal shapes by himself wrought.[2] 'He framed bodies, 'biped and quadruped; and becoming a bird, he passed into 'those bodies, filling them as their informing spirit.'

In the *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, after premising two modes of *Brahma*, morphous and amorphous; one composed of the three coarser elements, earth, water, and fire; the other consisting of the two more subtile, air and ether; it is said, 'next then 'his name is propounded,' "neither so nor so; for there is "none other but he, and he is the supreme." Here the finite forms premised are denied; for his existence as the supreme being is repeatedly affirmed in this and in other passages.[3]

'He is imperceptible; yet during devout meditation is, as 'it were, apprehended by perception and inference, through 'revelation and authentic recollections.[4]

'Like the sun and other luminaries, seemingly multiplied 'by reflection though really single, and like ether (space) 'apparently subdivided in vessels containing it within limits, 'the (supreme) light is without difference or distinction of par-'ticulars, for he is repeatedly declared so to be.[5] Therefore is 'one, who knows the truth, identified with the infinite being; 'for so revelation indicates. But since both are affirmed, the

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 3. 2. (S. 15-20.) [2] *Ibid.* S. 21.
[3] *Ibid.* § 6. (S. 22.) [*Vṛihad-áraṇyaka-upanishad*, ii. 3.]
[4] *Ibid.* S. 23-24. [5] *Ibid.* S. 25.

'relation is as that of the coiled serpent fancied to be a hoop; 'or as that [361] of light and the luminary from which it 'proceeds, for both are luminous.[1]

'There is none other but he, notwithstanding the apparent 'import of divers texts, which seem to imply differences, 'various relations, and aliquot parts. He is ubiquitary and 'eternal; for he is pronounced to be greater than etherial 'space, which is infinite.[2]

'The fruit or recompense of works is from him, for that is 'congruous; and so it is expressly affirmed in the *Vedas*. 'Jaimini alleges virtue or moral merit; but the author of the '*sútras* (Bádaráyaṇa-vyása) maintains the former, because the 'supreme being is in the *Vedas* termed the cause of virtue and 'of vice, as of every thing else.'[3]

The two last chapters of the third lecture relate chiefly to devout exercises and pious meditation, the practice of which is inculcated as proper and requisite to prepare the soul and mind for the reception of divine knowledge, and to promote its attainment. I pass rapidly over this copious part[4] of the text, for the same reason for which I restricted myself to a very brief notice of the *Yoga* or theistical *Sánkhya* of Patanjali; because religious observances are more concerned than philosophy with the topics there treated, and the ritual of the *Yoga* according to both systems, *Sánkhya* and *Vedánta*, would be a fitter subject of a separate treatise, rather than to be incidentally touched on while investigating the philosophical doctrines of both schools.

Various questions arise on the modes, forms, and object of meditation taught in the *Upanishads* and in other por-[362] tions of the *Vedas*, as well as on exterior observances either immediately or mediately connected therewith, and likewise on

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 3. 2. (S. 26-30.) [2] *Ibid.* § 7. [3] *Ibid.* § 8.

[4] The third chapter contains thirty-six sections, comprising sixty-six aphorisms; the fourth includes eighteen, comprehending fifty-two *sútras*; and the subject is pursued in the eight first sections of the fourth lecture.

the direct efficacy of knowledge, which are all considered and solved at much length. In general, but not always, the same divine knowledge, the same worship, and like meditations, are intended by the same designations in different *Vēdas*, the omissions and obscurities of one being supplied and explained by another, and even under various designations. By the acquisition of such knowledge, attainable as it is in the present or in a future birth, in lifetime, or to take effect after death, the influence of works is annulled, and consequent deliverance is single, not varying in degree and inducing different gradations of bliss, but complete and final happiness.

The fourth lecture relates chiefly to the fruit and effect of pious meditation properly conducted, and the consequent attainment of divine knowledge. The beginning of the first chapter is, however, supplemental to the foregoing lecture, treating of devout exercises, and the posture (a sitting one) in which devotion and contemplation should be practised, with constant repetition of those observances, and persisting therein during life.[1]

So soon as that knowledge is attained, past sin is annulled and future offence precluded.[2] "As water wets not the leaf of "the lotus, so sin touches not him who knows GOD: as the "floss on the carding comb cast into the fire is consumed, so "are his sins burnt away."[3]

'In like manner, the effect of the converse (that is, of merit 'and virtue) is by acquisition of knowledge annulled and pre-'cluded. It is at death that these consequences take place.[4] '"He traverses both (merit and demerit) [363] thereby."[5] '"The heart's knot is broken, all doubts are split, and his '"works perish, when he has seen the supreme being."[6] '"All sins depart from him:"[7] meaning good works as well

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 4. 1. § 1-8. (S. 1—12.)
[2] *Ibid.* § 9. (S. 13.)
[3] *Chhándogya, Brahma-vidyá* [iv. 14; v. 24].
[4] *Br. Sútr.* 4. 1. § 10. (S. 14.)
[5] *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka.*
[6] *Muṇḍaka* [ii. 2].
[7] *Chhándogya.*

'as misdeeds; for the confinement of fetters is the same, 'whether the chain be of gold or iron.'[1]

'But only such antecedent sin and virtue are annulled, as 'had not begun to have effect: for their influence lasts until 'his deliverance, and then does he merge in the supreme '*Brahma*.[2] Those which were in operation are not annulled, 'as the arrow, which has been shot, completes its flight, nor 'falls till its speed is spent; and the potter's wheel, once set 'in motion, whirls till the velocity which has been communi-'cated to it is exhausted.'

'However, the maintenance of a perpetual fire, and certain 'other religious observances enjoined as conducive to the same 'end, are not rendered inefficacious:[3] for it is declared that '"*Brâhmaṇas* seek divine knowledge by holy study, sacrifice, '"liberality, and devotion:"[4] and according to some *śâkhâs*[5] 'of the *Veda*, other merits remain likewise effectual; for sons 'succeed to the inheritance of their fathers' works; the affec-'tionate share his good deeds; and the malignant participate 'of his ill actions. These sacrificial observances may be such 'as are conjoined with devout exercises, faith, and pious medi-'tation; or unattended by those holy practices for attainment 'of divine knowledge, since they are pronounced most effica-'cious when so conjoined, which implies that they are not 'wholly inoperative by themselves.'[6]

[364] 'Having annulled by fruition other works which had 'begun to have effect; having enjoyed the recompense and 'suffered the pains of good and bad actions, the possessor of 'divine knowledge, on demise of the body, proceeds to a re-'union with *Brahma*.'[7]

The fruit of divine knowledge having been shown in the first chapter, the second chapter of this lecture treats of the

[1] Anon. Com. [2] *Br. Sûtr.* 4. 1. § 11. (S. 15.) *Chhândogya* [vi. 14].
[3] *Br. Sûtr.* 4. 1. § 12. (S. 16–17.) [4] *Vṛihad-âraṇyaka* [*Up.* iv. 4].
[5] *Satyâyana.* [*S'âṭyayana?*] [6] *Br. Sûtr.* 4. 1. § 13. (S. 18.) *Chhândogya.*
[7] *Br. Sûtr.* § 14. (S. 19.) *Chhândogya* and *Vṛihad-âraṇyaka.*

particular effect of devout exercises joined with appropriate meditation. It chiefly concerns the ascent of the soul, or mode in which it passes from the body.

'Of a dying person the speech, followed by the rest of the 'ten exterior faculties (not the corporeal organs themselves), is 'absorbed into the mind, for the action of the outer organ 'ceases before the mind's. This in like manner retires into 'the breath,[1] attended likewise by all the other vital functions, 'for they are life's companions; and the same retreat of the 'mind is observable, also, in profound sleep and in a swoon. 'Breath, attended likewise by all other vital faculties, is with-'drawn into the living soul which governs the corporeal organs, 'as the attendants of a king assemble around him when he is 'setting out upon a journey; for all vital functions gather 'about the soul at the last moment when it is expiring.[2] The 'living soul, attended with all its faculties, retires within a 'rudiment of body, composed of light with the rest of the five 'elements, in a subtile state. "Breath" is, therefore, said to 'withdraw into "light"; not meaning that element (or fire) 'exclusively; nor intending direct transition, for a traveller 'has gone from one city to another, though he passed through 'an intermediate town.'

'This retirement from the body is common to ordinary [365] 'uninformed people as to the devout contemplative worshipper, 'until they proceed further on their respective paths: and 'immortality (without immediate reunion with the supreme '*Brahma*) is the fruit of pious meditation, though impedi-'ments may not be wholly consumed and removed.[3]

'In that condition the soul of the contemplative worshipper 'remains united to a subtile elementary frame, conjoined with 'the vital faculties, until the dissolution of worlds, when it 'merges in the supreme deity. That elementary frame is 'minute in its dimensions as subtile in its texture, and is

[1] *Chhándogya* [vi. 15]. *Br. Sútr.* 4. 2. § 1–3.
[2] *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka* [*Up.* ii. 1; iv. 3].
[3] *Br. Sútr.* 4. 2. § 4. (S. 7.)

'accordingly imperceptible to bystanders when departing from 'the body: nor is it oppressed by cremation or other treat- 'ment which that body undergoes. It is by its warmth 'sensible so long as it abides with that coarser frame, which 'becomes cold in death when it has departed,[1] and was warm 'during life while it remained.

'But he who has attained the true knowledge of GOD does 'not pass through the same stages of retreat, proceeding 'directly to reunion with the supreme being, with which he 'is identified, as a river, at its confluence with the sea, merges 'therein altogether. His vital faculties and the elements of 'which his body consists, all the sixteen component parts 'which constitute the human frame, are absorbed absolutely 'and completely: both name and form cease; and he becomes 'immortal, without parts or members.'[2]

In course of expounding the text, some of the commentators compare the ultimate absorption of the vital faculties [366] to the disappearance of water sprinkled on a hot stone.[3] They seem to be unaware of its evaporation, and consider it to have sunk into the stone.

'The soul, together with the vital faculties absorbed in it, 'having retired within its proper abode, the heart, the sum- 'mit of that viscus flashes, and lightens the passage by which 'the soul is to depart: the crown of the head in the case of 'the wise; and any other part of the body, in the instance 'of the ignorant. A hundred and one arteries issue from the 'heart, one of which passes to the crown of the head: it is 'named *sushumṇa*. By that passage, in virtue of acquired 'knowledge, and of recollection of the meditated way, the soul 'of the wise, graced by the favour of *Brahma*, whose dwelling 'is in the heart, issues and meets a solar ray; and by that 'route proceeds, whether it be night or day, winter or sum-

[1] *Br. Sútr.* § 5. (S. 8–11.) *Kaṭhavallí*, etc.

[2] *Ibid.* § 6–8. (S. 12–16.) *Káṇwa*, *Mádhyandina* [*Vṛih. Ár. Up.* iii. 3], *Praśna* [vi. 5], etc.

[3] *Ranganátha* on *Br. Sútr.* 4. 2. § 6. (S. 12.)

'mer.[1] The contact of a sunbeam with the vein is constant, 'as long as the body endures: rays of light reach from the 'sun to the vein, and conversely extend from this to the sun. 'The preferableness of summer, as exemplified in the case of 'Bhíshma, who awaited the return of that auspicious season 'to die, does not concern the devout worshipper, who has 'practised religious exercises in contemplation of *Brahma*, 'as inculcated by the *Vedas*, and has consequently acquired 'knowledge. But it does concern those who have followed 'the observances taught by the *Sánkhya Yoga*; according 'to which, the time of day and season of the year are not 'indifferent.'

The further progress of the soul, from the termination of the coronal artery communicating with a solar ray to its final destination, the abode of *Brahma*, is variously de[367]scribed in divers texts of the *Veda*; some specifying intermediate stations which are omitted by others, or mentioned in a different order.[2] The seeming discrepancies of those passages are reconciled, and all are shown to relate to one uniform route, deduced from the text, for the divine journey (*devayána*) which the liberated soul travels. A question arises, whether the intermedia[3] stations, which are mentioned, be stages of the journey, or scenes of fruition to be visited in succession, or landmarks designated for the course and direction of the route.[3] On this point the settled conclusion is,[4] that the presiding deities or regents of the places or regions indicated are guides to the soul, who forward it on its way in its helpless condition, destitute of exerted organs, all its faculties being absorbed and withdrawn; as a blind man is led, or a faint person is conducted, by a guide.

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 4. 2. § 9–11. (S. 17–21.) *Vṛihad-áraṇ.*, *Chhándogya*, etc.

[2] *Chhándogya*, *Kaushítaki*, *Vṛihad-áraṇyaka*, etc.

[3] Bhavadeva instances Páṭaliputra and the Soṇa river, as indicated for the direction of the route from Tírabhukti (Tirhút) to Várâṇasí (Benares). It is clear that he understands Páṭaliputra (the ancient Palibothra) to be Patna.

[4] [*Br. Sútr.* 4. 3. (S. 4).]

The route deduced from the tenor of texts compared, and from divers considerations set forth,[1] is by a solar ray to the realm of fire; thence to the regents of day, of the semilunation, of the summer six months, of the year; and thence to the abode of gods; to air or wind, the regent of which forwards the journeying soul from his precincts, by a narrow passage compared to the nave of a chariot wheel, towards the sun: thence the transition is to the moon, whence to the region of lightning, above which is the realm of Varuṇa, the regent of water; for lightning and thunder are beneath the rain-cloud and aqueous region: the rest of the way is by the realm of Indra, to the abode of Prajápati or *Brahma*.

[368] A question arises, which is here discussed, whether *Brahma*, to whose dwelling and court the soul is conducted, be the supreme being, according to the ordinary and chief acceptation of the term, or be that effect of his creative will which is distinguished as *Kárya-brahma*, identified with the mythological personage entitled Hiraṇyagarbha, as having been included within the golden mundane egg. Jaimini affirms the supreme one to be meant: but Bádari maintains the other opinion; which is that which the commentators of the *sútras* understand the author of them to adopt.[2]

The souls of those holy persons only, whose devout meditation was addressed to the pure *Brahma* himself, take the route described;[3] not those whose contemplation was partial and restrictive: they have their special reward. Those, too, whose knowledge of God was more perfect, pass immediately, or by any route, to a reunion with the divinity, with whom they are identified.

The soul of him who has arrived at the perfection of divine knowledge, and is consequently liberated, "quitting its corporeal "frame, ascends to the supreme light which is *Brahma*, and "comes forth identified with him, conform and undivided;"[4]

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 4. 3. § 1-4. (S. 1-6.)
[2] *Ibid.* 4. 3. § 5. (S. 7-14.)
[3] *Ibid.* § 6. (S. 15-16.)
[4] *Ibid.* § 1-2. (S. 1-4.)

as pure water, dropped into the limpid lake, is such as that is.

Concerning the condition of the liberated man, a difference of doctrine is noticed.[1] Jaimini maintained, that he is endued with divine attributes, omniscience, ubiquitary power, and other transcendent faculties. Audulomi insisted, that he becomes sheer thought, sentient intelligence. The author of the *sútras* (Bádaráyaṇa) accedes to the last-mentioned opinion; admitting, however, the practical [369] or apparent[2] possession of divine faculties by one who has attained perfection of knowledge.

By certain devout exercises and meditation[3] a less perfect knowledge is acquired, which, as before mentioned, qualifies the possessor of it for reception at *Brahma's* abode, though not for immediate reunion and identity with his being. In that condition transcendent power is enjoyed. The *pitris*, or shades of progenitors, may be called up by a simple act of the will; and other superhuman faculties may be similarly exerted. The possessor of these is independent, subject to no other's control. He may, at his option, be invested with one or more bodies, furnished with senses and organs, or be unincumbered with a corporeal frame. On this point, however, a difference of doctrine subsists. Jaimini maintained the indispensable presence of body; Bádari, its absence; and the author (Bádaráyaṇa) admits the option. In one case, the condition is that of a person dreaming; in the other case, as of one awake.[4]

'Master of several bodies, by a simple act of his will, the 'Yogí does not occupy one only, leaving the rest inanimate, 'like so many wooden machines. He may animate more than 'one, in like manner as a single lamp may be made to supply 'more than one wick.'[5]

[1] *Br. Sútr.* § 3. (S. 5-7.)

[2] [S'aṅkara explains it as *Vyavahárápekshayá*, i.e. from the practical or conventional (*vyávahárika*) point of view of those who are still in ignorance.]

[3] *Hárda-vidyá* or *Dahara-vidyá* in the *Chhándogya* [viii. 1, 2].

[4] *Br. Sútr.* 4. 4. § 4. 5. (S. 9-14.)

[5] *Ibid.* § 6. (S. 15-16.)

Liberation (*mukti*), besides its proper and strict sense, which is that of final deliverance through a perfect knowledge of *Brahma*, and consequent identification with the divinity and absorption into his essence, is likewise employed in a secondary acceptation for that which takes effect in life-time (*jívan-mukti*); or which conducts the soul after death to dwell with *Brahma;* not, however, [370] divested of a subtile corporeal frame. The more complete deliverance is incorporeal (*videha-mukti*).[1] The less perfect liberation appertains to a *Yogí*, similar, in respect of the faculties and powers possessed by him, to one who has accomplished the like by the observances taught in the *Sánkhya* or *Yoga* of Patanjali.

Such a *Yogí*, uncontrolled and independent as he has been pronounced to be, can exert every faculty and superior power analogous to that of the divinity's which may be conducive to enjoyment; but he has not a creative power. His faculties are transcendent for enjoyment, not for action.[2]

The more perfect liberation is absolute and final: there is no return of the soul from its absorption in the divine essence, to undergo further transmigrations as before.[3] But incomplete knowledge, which conducts to *Brahma's* abode without qualifying the soul for such absorption into the divinity, exempts it from return during the subsisting *kalpa;* but not at a future renovation of worlds,[4] unless by special favour of the deity.

RECAPITULATION.

In the foregoing summary of the *Vedánta* from the *sútras* of Vyása, the interpretation by Śankara has been relied upon; and his gloss, with notes of his annotators and the commentaries of scholiasts who follow him, have been exclusively employed, lest the doctrine of separate schools and different

[1] Bhavadeva on *Br. Sútr.* 4. 4. S. 22.
[2] *Br. Sútr.* 4. 4. § 7. (S. 17-22.)
[3] *Ibid.* S. 22.
[4] On this point the commentators do not appear to agree.

branches of the *Vedánta* should be blended and confounded. Those commentaries are numerous, and explanations and elucidations of the text have been taken from one or from another indiscriminately, as they have been [371] found pertinent and illustrative, without particular preference or selection. This should be borne in mind in comparing that summary with its authorities, as it has not been judged necessary, nor generally practicable, to cite the particular commentary that is especially used in each instance.

Some remarks will be now added, in which other authorities are likewise employed, and chiefly the elementary works[1] mentioned in the introduction of this essay.

The principal and essential tenets of the *Vedánta* are, that God is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the existence, continuance, and dissolution of the universe. Creation is an act of his will. He is both efficient and material cause of the world: creator and nature, framer and frame, doer and deed. At the consummation of all things, all are resolved into him: as the spider spins his thread from his own substance and gathers it in again; as vegetables sprout from the soil and return to it, earth to earth; as hair and nails grow from a living body and continue with it. The supreme being is one, sole-existent, secondless, entire, without parts, sempiternal, infinite, ineffable, invariable ruler of all, universal soul, truth, wisdom, intelligence, happiness.

Individual souls, emanating from the supreme one, are likened to innumerable sparks issuing from a blazing fire. From him they proceed, and to him they return, being of the same essence. The soul which governs the body together with its organs, neither is born; nor does it die. It is a portion of the divine substance; and, as such, infinite, immortal, intelligent, sentient, true.

It is governed by the supreme. Its activity is not of its essence, but inductive through its organs: as an artisan,

[1] *Vedánta-sára*, *Vedánta-paribhásha*, etc.

taking his tools, labours and undergoes toil and pain, but [372] laying them aside reposes; so is the soul active, and a sufferer by means of its organs; but, divested of them, and returning to the supreme one, is at rest and is happy. It is not a free and independent agent, but made to act by the supreme one, who causes it to do in one state as it had purposed in a former condition. According to its predisposition for good or evil, for enjoined or forbidden deeds, it is made to do good or ill, and thus it has retribution for previous works. Yet God is not author of evil; for so it has been from eternity: the series of preceding forms and of dispositions manifested in them has been infinite.

The soul is incased in body as in a sheath, or rather in a succession of sheaths. The first or inner case is the intellectual one (*vijnánamaya*): it is composed of the sheer (*tan-mátra*), or simple elements uncombined, and consists of the intellect (*buddhi*) joined with the five senses.

The next is the mental (*manomaya*) sheath, in which mind is joined with the preceding.[1] A third sheath or case comprises the organs of action and the vital faculties, and is termed the organic or vital case.[2] These three sheaths (*kośa*) constitute the subtile frame (*súkshma-śarira* or *linga-śarira*) which attends the soul in its transmigrations. The interior rudiment confined to the inner case is the causal frame (*kárana-śarira*).[3]

The gross body (*sthúla-śarira*) which it animates from birth to death in any step of its transmigrations, is composed of the coarse elements, formed by combinations of the simple elements, in proportions of four-eighths of the predominant and

[1] [Others say that it is composed of mind joined with the organs of action.]

[2] [*i.e.* the *prdṇamaya*.]

[3] [This is often called the *Ánandamaya-kośa*. This sheath or envelope is described as consisting of the primeval ignorance with the quality of goodness predominant. Cf. Hippolytus, Philosophumena, i. p. 29, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ φῶς ὅ φασι λόγον τὸν Θεὸν, αὐτοὺς μόνους εἰδέναι Βραχμᾶνας λέγουσι, διὰ τὸ ἀπορρίψαι μόνους τὴν κενοδοξίαν, ὅ ἐστι χιτὼν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔσχατος.]

characteristic one with an eighth of each of the other four: that is, the particles of the several elements, being divisible, are, in the first place, split into moieties; whereof one is subdivided into quarters; and the remaining moiety combines with one part (a quarter of a moiety) from each of the four others, thus constituting coarse or mixed ele[373]ments.[1] The exterior case, composed of elements so combined, is the nutrimentitious (*annamaya*) sheath; and being the scene of coarse fruition is therefore termed the gross body.[2]

The organic frame assimilates the combined elements received in food, and secretes the finer particles and rejects the coarsest: earth becomes flesh; water, blood; and inflammable substances (oil or grease), marrow. The coarser particles of the two first are excreted as feces and urine; those of the third are deposited in the bones. The finer particles of the one nourish the mind; of the other, supply respiration; of the third, support speech.

Organized bodies are arranged by the *Vedántins* in either four or three classes: for both which arrangements the authority of passages of the *Veda* is cited. Their four classes are the same with those of other writers; but the threefold division appears to be peculiar to this school. It is, 1st, viviparous (*jívaja*), as man and quadrupeds; 2nd, oviparous (*aṇḍaja*), as birds and insects; 3rd, germiniparous (*udbhijja*).[3] The latter, however, comprehends the two terminating classes of the fourfold distribution, vermin and vegetable; differing but as one sprouts from the earth, the other pullulates from water: the one fixed, the other locomotive. To both, equivocal and spontaneous generation, or propagation without union of parents, is assigned.

The order in which the five elements are enumerated is that

[1] *Ved. Sára.* 136.

[2] [The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes Hiranyagarbha or the Supreme Soul viewed in his relation to the world as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly constitutes his gross body.]

[3] S'ank., etc. on *Br. Sútr.* 3. 1. § 3. (S. 21.)

of their development: 1st, the etherial element (*ákáśa*), which is deemed a most subtile fluid, occupying all space and confounded with vacancy; sound is its particular quality. 2nd. Wind (*váyu*), or air in motion: for mobility is its characteristic; sound and feel are sensible in it. 3rd. Fire or light (*tejas*), of which heat is the characteristic; and by [374] which sound, feel, and colour (or form) are made manifest. 4th. Water (*ap*), of which fluidity is characteristic; and in which sound, feel, colour, and taste occur. 5th. Earth (*pṛithivi* or *anna*), of which hardness is characteristic; and in which sound, feel, colour, taste, and smell are discernible.

The notion of ether and wind as distinct elements, an opinion which this has in common with most of the other schools of Indian philosophy, seems to originate in the assumption of mobility for the essential character of the one. Hence air in motion has been distinguished from the aërial fluid at rest, which is *ákáśa*, supposed to penetrate and pervade all worldly space; and, by an easy transition, *váyu* (wind) and motion, come to be identified, as *ákáśa* (ether) and space likewise are confounded.

An organized body, in its most subtile state of tenuity, comprises sixteen members (*avayava*) or corporeal parts, *viz.* five organs of sense, as many instruments of action, and the same number of vital faculties; to which are added mind (including intelligence, consciousness, and sensation); or, distinguishing mind and intellect (*buddhi*) as separate parts, the number is seventeen.

The vital faculties, termed *váyu*, are not properly air or wind, but vital functions or actions. Considered, however, with a reference to the proper meaning of that term, they are by some explained to be, 1st, respiration, which is ascending, and of which the seat is the nostril; 2nd, inspiration (or otherwise explained, flatus), which is descending, and which issues from the lower extremity of the intestine; 3rd, flatuousness, which is diffused through the body, passing by all the

veins and arteries; 4th, expiration ascending from the throat; 5th, digestion, or abdominal air, of which the seat is the middle of the body.

According to a different explanation, the first is respi-[375] ration; the second, inspiration; the third, a mean between the two, pulsation, palpitation, and other vital movements; the fourth is expiration; and the fifth is digestion.

Three states of the soul in respect of the body are recognized; to which must be added a fourth, and even a fifth, *viz.* waking, dreaming, profoundly sleeping, half-dead, and dead.[1] While awake, the soul, associated with body, is active under the guidance of providence, and has to do with a real (*páramárthiki*)[2] and practical (*vyávahárikí*) creation. In a dream there is an illusory (*máyámayí*) and unreal creation: nevertheless, dreams prognosticate events. Dreaming is the mean (*sandhyá*) between sleeping and waking. In profound sleep the soul is absent, having retired by the channel of the arteries, and being as it were enfolded in the supreme deity. It is not, however, blended with the divine essence, as a drop of water fallen into a lake, where it becomes undistinguishable; but, on the contrary, the soul continues discriminate, and returns unchanged to the body which it animates while awake. Swoon, or stupor, is intermediate between sleep and death. During insensibility produced by accident or disease, there is, as in profound sleep and lethargy,

[1] [It is usually held that in the waking state (*viśwa*) the Soul is disguised and limited by the gross effects, *i.e.* the *sthúla-śaríra* and the external world; in the dreaming state (*taijasa*) by the subtile effects, *i.e.* the *linga-śaríra* and the dream-world; but in sound sleep (*prájna*) it is only disguised and limited by ignorance as the general cause of all mundane existence,—this remains for the present latent, but is still capable of being called out into actuality. The fourth condition (*turíya*) is undisguised by either cause or effect, and therefore unlimited and absolute. Thus Gaudapáda says in his *Káriká* on the *Máṇḍukya-upanishad*: "The conditions Viśwa and Taijasa are bound by the cause and its effects (*i.e.* by the original ignorance and the ideas of mundane existence which it produces); the condition Prájna is only bound by the cause (*sc.* ignorance); but neither the cause nor the effect can exist in the Turíya."]

[2] [Cf. *supra*, p. 361.]

a temporary absence of the soul. In death it has absolutely quitted its gross corporeal frame.

Subject to future transmigration, it visits other worlds, to receive there the recompense of works or suffer the penalty of misdeeds. Sinners fall to various regions of punishment, administered by Chitragupta and other mythological persons in the realm of Yama. The virtuous rise to the moon, where they enjoy the fruit of their good actions; and whence they return to this world to animate new bodies, and act in them, under providence, conformably with their propensities and predispositions, the trace of which remains.

[376] The wise, liberated from worldly trammels, ascend yet higher, to the abode and court of *Brahma;* or, if their attainment of wisdom be complete, they at once pass into a reunion with the divine essence.

Three degrees of liberation or deliverance (*mukti*) are distinguished: one incorporeal, which is that last mentioned, and is complete; another imperfect, which is that before mentioned, taking effect upon demise, when the soul passes to the highest heaven, the abode of *Brahma.* The third is effectual in lifetime (*jíwan-mukti*), and enables the possessor of it to perform supernatural actions; as evocation of shades of progenitors, translation of himself into other bodies called into existence by the mere force of his will, instantaneous removal to any place at his pleasure, and other wondrous performances.

These several degrees of deliverance are achieved by means of certain sacrifices, as that of a horse (*aśwamedha*), or by religious exercises in various prescribed modes, together with pious meditation on the being and attributes of God: but the highest degree of it is attainable only by perfect knowledge of the divine nature, and of the identity of God with that which emanated from him, or was created of his substance and partakes of his essence.

Questions most recondite, which are agitated by theologians, have engaged the attention of the *Vedántins* likewise, and have

been by them discussed at much length; such as free-will (*swátantrya*), divine grace (*íśwara-prasáda*), efficacy of works (*karman*) or of faith (*śraddhá*), and many other abstruse points.

On the last-mentioned topic, that of faith, nothing will be found in the text of Bádaráyaṇa, and little in the gloss of Śankara. Its paramount efficacy is a tenet of another branch of the *Vedánta* school, which follows the authority of the *Bhagavad-gitá*. In that work, as in many [377] of the *Puráṇas*, passages relative to this topic recur at every turn.

The *fruit of works* is the grand subject of the first *Mimánsá*, which treats of religious duties, sacrifices, and other observances.

The latter *Mimánsá* more particularly maintains the doctrine of *divine grace*. It treats of *free-will*, which it in effect denies; but endeavours to reconcile the existence of moral evil under the government of an all-wise, all-powerful, and benevolent providence, with the absence of free-will, by assuming the past eternity of the universe, and the infinite renewals of worlds, into which every individual being has brought the predispositions contracted by him in earlier states, and so retrospectively without beginning or limit.

The notion, that the versatile world is an illusion (*máyá*), that all which passes to the apprehension of the waking individual is but a phantasy presented to his imagination, and every seeming thing is unreal and all is visionary, does not appear to be the doctrine of the text of the *Vedánta*. I have remarked nothing which countenances it in the *sútras* of Vyása nor in the gloss of Śankara,[1] but much concerning it in the

[1] [This is hardly correct, as regards S'ankara, since in his Comm. on II. 1. 9. he expressly mentions the doctrine of *máyá* as held by the teachers of the Vedánta, *vedántártha-sampradáya-vidbhir ácháryaih*, and he quotes a *śloka* (i. 16) to that effect from Gauḍapáda's *Kárikú*, cf. also his language in the opening of his Comm. on the second book. There is also a remarkable passage in his Comm. on the *Aitareya-upan.* i. 2: "It may be objected that a carpenter, etc., can make a house, etc., as he is possessed of material, but how can the soul, being without material, create the worlds? But there is nothing objectionable in this. The world can exist in its material cause, *i.e.* in that formless undeveloped subject which is called

minor commentaries and in elementary treatises. I take it to be no tenet of the original *Vedántin* philosophy, but of another branch, from which later writers have borrowed it, and have intermixed and confounded the two systems. The doctrine of the early *Vedánta* is complete and consistent, without this graft of a later growth.

Soul, just as the subsequently developed foam exists in water. There is therefore nothing contradictory in supposing that the omniscient, who is himself the material cause of names and forms, creates the world. Or better still, we may say as a skilful juggler without material creates himself as if it were another self going in the air, so the omniscient Deity, being omnipotent and mighty in *máyá*, creates himself as if it were another self in the form of the world." (For this feat of the Indian jugglers, see Yule's *Marco Polo*, vol. i. 281.) Cf. also the opening of his Commentary on the *Bhagavad-gítá*, where he identifies *Múla-prakṛiti* as the *máyá* of the Supreme. There can however be hardly a question as to the fact that the original *Vedánta* of the earlier *Upanishads* and of the *Sútras* did not recognize the doctrine of *máyá*. The earliest school seem to have held Brahma to be the material cause of the world in a grosser sense.]

XI.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS.

PART V.[1]

ON INDIAN SECTARIES.

[From the *Transactions* of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. pp. 549–579.]

[378] In the present essay, it is my intention to treat of the heretical systems of Jina and Buddha, as proposed in the first essay of this series on the Philosophy of the Hindus; and to notice certain other Indian sects, which, like them, exhibit some analogy to the *Sánkhyas*, or followers of Kapila or of Patanjali.

The theological or metaphysical opinions of those sectaries, apart from and exclusive of mythology and ritual ceremonies, may be not inaptly considered as a branch of philosophy, though constituting the essence of their religion, comprehending not only their belief as to the divinity and a future state, but also certain observances to be practised in furtherance of the prescribed means for attaining perpetual bliss: which here, as with most other sects of Indian origin, is the need proposed for true and perfect knowledge of first principles.

The *Jainas* and *Bauddhas* I consider to have been originally Hindus;[2] and the first mentioned to be so still, because they recognized, as they yet do, the distinction of the four castes.

[1] Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, February 3, 1827.

[2] As. Res., vol. ix. p. 288. [*Infra*, vol. ii. p. 172.]

It is true, that in Hindusthán, if not in the peninsula of India likewise, the *Jainas* are all of one [379] caste: but this is accounted for by the admission of their adversaries (Kumárila-bhaṭṭa, etc.), who affirm that they are misguided *kshatriyas* (Hindus of the second or military tribe): they call themselves *vaiśyas*. On renouncing the heresies of the *Jaina* sect, they take their place among orthodox Hindus, as belonging to a particular caste (*kshatriya* or *vaiśya*).[1] The representative of the great family of Jagat-śeṭh, who with many of his kindred was converted some years ago from the *Jaina* to the orthodox faith, is a conspicuous instance. Such would not be the case of a convert, who has not already caste as a Hindu.

Both religions of Jina and Buddha are, in the view of the Hindu, who reveres the *Veda* as a divine revelation, completely heterodox; and that more on account of their heresy in denying its divine origin, than for their deviation from its doctrine. Other sects, as the *Sánkhyas* and *Vaiśeshikas*, though not orthodox, do not openly disclaim the authority of the *Veda*. They endeavour to reconcile their doctrine to the text of the Indian scripture, and refer to passages which they interpret as countenancing their opinions. The *Mímánsá*, which professedly follows the *Veda* implicitly, is therefore applied, in its controversy with these half-heretics, to the confutation of such misinterpretations. It refutes an erroneous construction, rather than a mistaken train of reasoning. But the *Jainas* and *Bauddhas*, disavowing the *Veda*, are out of the pale of the Hindu church in its most comprehensive range; and the *Mímánsá* (practical as well as theological) in controversy with these infidels, for so it deems them, argues upon general grounds of reasoning independent of authority, to which it would be vain to appeal.

The *Uttara-mímánsá* devotes two sections (*adhikaraṇas*) to the confutation of the *Bauddhas*, and one to that of the *Jainas*. They are the 4th, 5th, and 6th sections in the [380] 2nd

[1] [Cf. *S'ankara-digvijaya*, p. 156.]

chapter of the 2nd lecture; and it proceeds in the same controversial chapter to confute the *Páśupatas* and other branches of the *Máheśwara* sect; and the *Páncharátra*, a branch of the *Vaishṇava*. The *Chárvákas* are alluded to incidentally in a very important section concerning the distinction of body and soul, in the 3rd chapter of the 3rd lecture (§ 30). In the *Púrva-mímánsá*, controversy is more scattered; recurring in various places, under divers heads: but especially in the 3rd chapter of the first book (§ 4).

The *Sánkhya* of Kapila devotes a whole chapter to controversy; and notices the sect of *Buddha*, under the designation of *Nástíkas;* and in one place animadverts on the *Páśupatas;* and in another, on the *Chárvákas*.

It is from these and similar controversial disquisitions, more than from direct sources, that I derive the information, upon which the following account of the philosophy of *Jainas* and *Bauddhas*, as well as of the *Chárvákas*, *Páśupatas*, and *Páncharátras*, is grounded. A good collection of original works by writers of their own persuasion, whether in the Sanskrit language or in Prákrit or Páli, the language of the *Jainas* and that of the *Bauddhas*, is not at hand to be consulted. But, although the information be furnished by their adversaries and even inveterate enemies, it appears, so far as I have any opportunity of comparing it with their own representations, essentially correct.

Sect of Jina.[1]

The *Jainas* or *Arhatas*, followers of Jina or Arhat (terms of like import), are also denominated *Vivasanas*, *Muktavasanas*,

[1] [Our present chief authorities for the Jaina doctrines, beside this Essay and that in vol. ii., are Wilson, *Essays*, vol. i. pp. 276–347; Stevenson's *Kalpa-sútra;* and Weber's *Satrunjaya-máhátmya* and *Fragment der Bhagavatí*. In Appendix A., p. 444 ff., I have added an abridgment of the Jaina system, as given in Mádhava's *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, as it seems to me the best available account, until we have editions of the authoritative native texts.]

Muktámbaras or *Digambaras*, with reference to the nakedness of the rigid order of ascetics in this sect, who go "bare of clothing," "disrobed," or "clad by the regions of space."[1] The less strict order of *Śve*[381]*támbaras*[2] "clad in white," is of more modern date and of inferior note. Among nicknames by which they are known, that of *Lunchita-keśa* occurs. It alludes to the practice of abruptly eradicating hair of the head or body by way of mortification. Párśwanátha is described as tearing five handfuls of hair from his head on becoming a devotee.[3]

According to the *Digambara Jainas*, the universe consists of two classes, "animate" and "inanimate" (*jíva* and *ajíva*), without a creator or ruling providence (*íśwara*).[4] They assign for the cause (*káraṇa*) of the world, atoms, which they do not, as the *Vaiśeshikas*, distinguish into so many sorts as there are elements, but consider these, *viz.* earth, water, fire, and air, the four elements by them admitted, as modified compounds of homogeneous atoms.

These gymnosophists distinguish, as already intimated, two chief categories: 1st, *Jíva*, intelligent and sentient soul (*chaitanátmá* or *bodhátmá*) endued with body and consequently composed of parts; eternal: 2nd, *Ajíva*, all that is not a living soul; that is, the whole of (*jaḍa*) inanimate and unsentient substance. The one is the object of fruition, being that which is to be enjoyed (*bhogya*) by the soul; the other is the enjoyer (*bhoktá*) or agent in fruition, soul itself.

This second comprehensive predicament admits a six-fold subdivision; and the entire number of categories (*padártha*), as distinguished with reference to the ultimate great object of the soul's deliverance, is consequently seven.[5]

[1] [Mr. A. C. Burnell has shown in the *Indian Antiquary*, vol. i. p. 310, that the *Nirgranthas*, who according to Hiouen-thsang formed the chief sect in South India in the seventh century, were Jainas.]

[2] Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. p. 416.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 433. [4] Rámánuja on *Br. Sútr.*

[5] S'ankara and other commentators on *Br. Sútr.*, and annotators on their gloss.

I. *Jiva* or soul, as before mentioned, comprising three descriptions: 1st, *nitya-siddha*, ever perfect, or *yoga-siddha*, [382] perfect by profound abstraction; for instance, *Arhats* or *Jinas*, the deified saints of the sect: 2nd, *mukta* or *muktátmá*, a soul which is free or liberated; its deliverance having been accomplished through the strict observance of the precepts of the *Jinas:* 3rd, *baddha* or *baddhátmá*, a soul which is bound, being in any stage antecedent to deliverance; remaining yet fettered by deeds or works (*karma*).

II. *Ajíva* taken in a restricted sense. It comprehends the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air; and all which is fixed (*sthávara*) as mountains, or moveable (*jangama*) as rivers, etc. In a different arrangement, to be hereafter noticed, this category is termed *Pudgala*, matter.

III.—VII. The five remaining categories are distributed into two classes, that which is to be effected (*sádhya*) and the means thereof (*sádhana*): one comprising two, and the other three divisions. What may be effected (*sádhya*) is either liberation or confinement: both of which will be noticed further on. The three efficient means (*sádhana*) are as follow:

III. *Ásrava* is that which directs the embodied spirit (*ásrayayati purusham*) towards external objects. It is the occupation or employment (*vṛitti* or *pravṛitti*) of the senses or organs on sensible objects. Through the means of the senses it affects the embodied spirit with the sentiment of taction, colour, smell, and taste.

Or it is the association or connexion of body with right and wrong deeds. It comprises all the *karmas:* for they (*ásravayanti*) pervade, influence, and attend the doer, following him or attaching to him.

It is a misdirection (*mithyá-pravṛitti*) of the organs: for it is vain, as cause of disappointment, rendering the organs of sense and sensible objects subservient to fruition.

IV. *Samvara* is that which stops (*samvṛiṇoti*) the course of the foregoing; or closes up the door or passage of it; [383]

and consists in self-command, or restraint of organs internal and external: embracing all means of self-control, and subjection of the senses, calming and subduing them.

It is the right direction (*samyak-pravṛitti*) of the organs.

V. *Nirjara* is that which utterly and entirely (*nir*) wears and antiquates (*jarayati*) all sin previously incurred, and the whole effect of works or deeds (*karma*). It consists chiefly in mortification (*tapas*): such as fasts, rigorous silence, standing upon heated stones, plucking out the hair by the roots, etc.

This is discriminated from the two preceding, as neither misdirection nor right direction, but non-direction (*apravṛitti*) of the organs towards sensible objects.

VI. *Baddha*[1] is that which binds (*badhnáti*) the embodied spirit. It is confinement and connexion, or association, of the soul with deeds. It consists in a succession of births and deaths as the result of works (*karman*).

VII. *Moksha* is liberation; or deliverance of the soul from the fetters of works. It is the state of a soul in which knowledge and other requisites are developed.

Relieved from the bondage of deeds through means taught by holy ordinances, it takes effect on the soul by the grace of the ever-perfect Arhat or Jina.

Or liberation is continual ascent. The soul has a buoyancy or natural tendency upwards, but is kept down by corporeal trammels. When freed from them, it rises to the region of the liberated.

Long immersed in corporeal restraint, but released from it; as a bird let loose from a cage, plunging into water to wash off the dirt with which it was stained, and drying its pinions in the sunshine, soars aloft; so does the soul, released from long confinement, soar high, never to return.

Liberation then is the condition of a soul clear of all impediments.

[1] [*Bandha*?]

[384] It is attained by right knowledge, doctrine, and observances: and is a result of the unrestrained operation of the soul's natural tendency, when passions and every other obstacle are removed.

Works or deeds (for so the term *karman* signifies, though several among those enumerated be neither acts nor the effect of action) are reckoned eight; and are distributed into two classes, comprising four each: the first *ghátin*, mischievous, and *asádhu*, impure, as marring deliverance: the second *aghátin*, harmless, or *sádhu*, pure, as opposing no obstacle to liberation.

I. In the first set is:

1st. *Jnána-varaṇiya*,[1] the erroneous notion that knowledge is ineffectual; that liberation does not result from a perfect acquaintance with true principles; and that such science does not produce final deliverance.

2nd. *Darśana-varaṇiya*, the error of believing that deliverance is not attainable by study of the doctrine of the *Arhats* or *Jinas*.

3rd. *Mohaniya*, doubt and hesitation as to particular selection among the many irresistible and infallible ways taught by the *Tirthankaras* or *Jinas*.

4th. *Antaráya*, interference, or obstruction offered to those engaged in seeking deliverance, and consequent prevention of their accomplishment of it.

II. The second contains:—

1st. *Vedaniya*, individual consciousness: reflection that "I "am capable of attaining deliverance."

2nd. *Námika*, individual consciousness of an appellation: reflection that "I bear this name."

3rd. *Gotrika*, consciousness of race or lineage: reflection that "I am descendant of a certain disciple of Jina, native of "a certain province."

4th. *Á'yushka*, association or connexion with the body [385]

[1] [Probably we should read *jnánávaraniya* and *darśanávaraṇiya*.]

or person: that, (as the etymology of the term denotes), which proclaims (*káyate*) age (*áyush*), or duration of life.

Otherwise interpreted, the four *karmas* of this second set, taken in the inverse order, that is, beginning with *áyushka*, import procreation, and subsequent progress in the formation of the person or body wherein deliverance is attainable by the soul which animates it: for it is by connexion with white or immaculate matter that final liberation can be accomplished. I shall not dwell on the particular explanation respectively of these four *karmas*, taken in this sense.

Another arrangement, which likewise has special reference to final deliverance, is taught in a five-fold distribution of the predicaments or categories (*astikáya*). The word here referred to is explained as signifying a substance commonly occurring; or a term of general import; or (conformably with its etymology), that of which it is said (*káyate*) that "it is" (*asti*): in other words, that of which existence is predicated.

I. The first is *jívástikáya:* the predicament, life or soul. It is, as before noticed, either bound, liberated, or ever-perfect.

II. *Pudgalástikáya:* the predicament, matter: comprehending all bodies composed of atoms. It is sixfold, comprising the four elements, and all sensible objects, fixed or moveable. It is the same with the *ajíva* or second of the seven categories enumerated in an arrangement before noticed.

III. *Dharmástikáya:* the predicament, virtue; inferrible from a right direction of the organs. *Dharma* is explained as a substance or thing (*dravya*) from which may be concluded, as its effect, the soul's ascent to the region above.

[386] IV. *Adharmástikáya:* the predicament, vice: or the reverse of the foregoing. *Adharma* is that which causes the soul to continue embarrassed with bod[illegible], notwithstanding its capacity for ascent and natural tendenc[illegible] to soar.

V. *A'kásástikáya:* the predicament, *ákáśa*, of which there are two, *Lokákáśa* and *Alokákáśa*.

1. *Lokákáśa* is the abode of the bound: a worldly region,

consisting of divers tiers, one above the other, wherein dwell successive orders of beings unliberated.

2. *Alokákáśa* is the abode of the liberated, above all worlds (*lokas*) or mundane beings. Here *ákáśa* implies that, whence there is no return.

The *Jaina* gymnosophists are also cited[1] for an arrangement which enumerates six substances (*dravya*) as constituting the world: *viz.*—

1. *Jiva*, the soul.

2. *Dharma*, virtue; a particular substance pervading the world, and causing the soul's ascent.

3. *Adharma*, vice; pervading the world, and causing the soul's continuance with body.

4. *Pudgala*, matter: substance having colour, odour, savour, and tactility; as wind, fire, water, and earth: either atoms, or aggregates of atoms; individual body, collective worlds, etc.

5. *Kála*, time: a particular substance, which is practically treated, as past, present, and future.

6. *A'káśa*, a region, one, and infinite.

To reconcile the concurrence of opposite qualities in the same subject at different times, and in different substances at the same times, the *Jainas* assume seven cases deemed by them apposite for obviating the difficulty (*bhanga-naya*): 1st. May be, it is; [somehow, in some measure, it so is]: [387] 2nd. May be, it is not: 3rd. May be, it is, and it is not [successively]: 4th. May be, it is not predicable; [opposite qualities co-existing]: 5th. The first and fourth of these taken together: may be it is, and yet not predicable: 6th. The second and fourth combined: may be it is not, and not predicable: 7th. The third (or the first and second) and the fourth, united: may be it is and it is not, and not predicable.

This notion is selected for confutation by the *Vedántins*, to show the futility of the *Jaina* doctrine. 'It is,' they observe, 'doubt or surmise, not certainty nor knowledge. Opposite

[1] Rámánuja on the *Br. Sútr.*

'qualities cannot co-exist in the same subject. Predicaments 'are not unpredicable: they are not to be affirmed if not 'affirmable: but they either do exist or do not; and if they 'do, they are to be affirmed: to say that a thing is and is not, 'is as incoherent as a madman's talk or an idiot's babble.'[1]

Another point, selected by the *Vedántins* for animadversion, is the position, that the soul and body agree in dimensions.[2] 'In a different stage of growth of body or of transmigration 'of soul, they would not be conformable: passing from the 'human condition to that of an ant or of an elephant, the 'soul would be too big or too little for the new body animated 'by it. If it be augmented or diminished by accession or 'secession of parts, to suit either the change of person or cor-'poreal growth between infancy and puberty, then it is 'variable, and, of course, is not perpetual. If its dimensions 'be such as it ultimately retains, when released from body, 'then it has been uniformly such in its original and inter-'mediate associations with corporeal frames. If it yet be of a 'finite magnitude, it is not ubiquitary and eternal.'

[388] The doctrine of atoms, which the *Jainas* have in common with the *Bauddhas* and the *Vaiśeshikas* (followers of Kaṇáda) is controverted by the *Vedántins*.[3] The train of reasoning is to the following effect: 'Inherent qualities of the 'cause,' the *Vaiśeshikas* and the rest argue, 'give origin to the 'like qualities in the effect, as white yarn makes white cloth: 'were a thinking being the world's cause, it would be endued 'with thought.' The answer is, that according to Kaṇáda himself, substances great and long result from atoms minute and short: like qualities then are not always found in the cause and in the effect.

'The whole world, with its mountains, seas, etc., consists 'of substances composed of parts disposed to union: as cloth 'is wove of a multitude of threads. The utmost sub-division

[1] S'ank. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 6. (S. 33.)
[2] *Ib.* S. 34–36.
[3] *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 2. and § 3. (S. 11–17.)

'of compound substances, pursued to the last degree, arrives 'at the atom, which is eternal, being simple: and such atoms, 'which are the elements, earth, water, fire, and air, become 'the world's cause, according to Kaṇáda: for there can be no 'effect without a cause. When they are actually and univer- 'sally separated, dissolution of the world has taken place. At 'its renovation, atoms concur by an unseen virtue, which 'occasions action: and they form double atoms, and so on, to 'constitute air; then fire; next water; and afterwards earth; 'subsequently body with its organs; and ultimately this whole 'world. The concurrence of atoms arises from action (whether 'of one or both) which must have a cause: that cause, alleged 'to be an unseen virtue, cannot be insensible; for an insen- 'sible cause cannot incite action: nor can it be design, for a 'being capable of design is not yet existent, coming later in 'the progress of creation. Either way, then, no action can 'be; consequently no union or disunion of atoms; and [389] 'these, therefore, are not the cause of the world's formation or 'dissolution.

'Eternal atoms and transitory double atoms differ utterly; 'and union of discordant principles cannot take place. If 'aggregation be assumed as a reason of their union, still the 'aggregate and its integrants are utterly different; and an 'intimate relation is further to be sought, as a reason for the 'aggregation. Even this assumption therefore fails.

'Atoms must be essentially active or inactive: were they 'essentially active, creation would be perpetual; if essentially 'inactive, dissolution would be constant.

'Eternity of causeless atoms is incompatible with properties 'ascribed to them; colour, taste, smell, and tactility: for 'things possessing such qualities are seen to be coarse and 'transient. Earth, endued with those four properties, is 'gross; water, possessing three, is less so; fire, having two, 'is still less; and air, with one, is fine. Whether the same 'be admitted or denied in respect of atoms, the argument is

'either way confuted: earthy particles, coarser than aërial, 'would not be minute in the utmost degree; or atoms pos-'sessing but a single property, would not be like their effects 'possessing several.

'The doctrine of atoms is to be utterly rejected, having 'been by no venerable persons received, as the *Sánkhya* doc-'trine of matter, a plastic principle, has been, in part, by 'Manu and other sages.'[1]

Points, on which the sectaries differ from the orthodox, rather than those on which they conform, are the subjects of the present treatise. On one point of conformity, however, it may be right to offer a brief remark, as it is one on which the *Jainas* appear to lay particular stress. It con[390]cerns the transmigration of the soul, whose destiny is especially governed by the dying thoughts, or fancies entertained at the moment of dissolution.[2] The *Vedas*,[3] in like manner, teach that the thoughts, inclinations, and resolves of man, and such peculiarly as predominate in his dying moments, determine the future character, and regulate the subsequent place, in transmigration. As was his thought in one body, such he becomes in another, into which he accordingly passes.

Sect of Buddha.

The *Bauddhas* or *Saugatas*, followers of Buddha or Sugata (terms of the same import, and corresponding to Jina or Arhat), are also called *Mukta-kachha*, alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked. They are not unfrequently cited by their adversaries as (*Nástikas*) atheists, or rather, disowners of another world.

[1] Sank., etc. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 3. (S. 17.)

[2] See Transact. of the Roy. Asiat. Soc., vol. i. p. 437.

[3] *Br. Sútr.* 1. 2. 1. [*Chhándogya-up.* iii. 14. S'ankara, in his Commentary, also quotes the *Bhagavad-gítá*, viii. 6.]

Buddha-muni,[1] so he is reverently named by the opponents of his religious system, is the reputed author of *sútras*,[2] constituting a body of doctrine termed *ágama* or *śástra*, words which convey a notion of authority and holiness. The Buddha here intended is no doubt the last, who is distinguished by the names of Gautama and Śákya, among other appellations.

[1] [All accounts agree that S'ákya-muni or Gotama, the founder of Buddhism, was a prince of Kapilavastu, north of Gorakhpur in Oudh. His legendary life is given in the *Lalita-vistara*, edited in Sanskrit by Bábú Rájendralála Mitra in the Bibliotheca Indica, and translated from the Tibetan by Foucaux, Paris, 1848. The supposed date of his death differs widely in the various Buddhist countries; but the most probable date is B.C. 543 or 477 (see Müller's *Hist. Anc. Sansk. Lit.* p. 298). He seems to have spent his life, like Socrates, in oral teaching, and to have left no written documents behind him. In the following centuries a vast body of writings was compiled which now forms the Buddhist canon, called the three baskets (*tripiṭaka*), i.e. the *sútras* or discourses of Buddha, the *vinaya* or discipline, and the *abhidharma* or metaphysics. These are said to have been arranged by three celebrated councils. The first was held immediately after Buddha's death; but, as to the dates of the other two, tradition disagrees. That of the northern Buddhists, current in Nepal, Tibet, and China, declares that these canonical works were written in Sanskrit, and fixes the second council as held 110 years after the first, in the reign of As'oka, King of Páṭaliputra, and the third as held more than 400 years after Buddha's death under Kanishka (the Kanerki of the Indo-scythic coins). That of the southern Buddhists, current in Ceylon, Burmah, and Siam, maintains that the original language was Páli, and fixes the second council as held 100 years after Buddha's death, in the reign of Kálás'oka, and the third 235 years after Buddha, under the great As'oka (B.C. 242?). We have thus two separate recensions of the Buddhist canonical works, in Sanskrit and in Páli. There can be no doubt that the Páli represents the older recension; and hence the importance of the study of Páli for the investigation of primitive Buddhism. Mr. Colebrooke has only treated of Buddhism as a philosophy, *i.e.* as represented in the third *piṭaka* or *abhidharma*; it did not fall within his scope to consider it as a religion, and he therefore omits all mention of its sublime morality. For his view of its philosophical tenets, he was necessarily dependent on the hostile representations of Brahmanical controversialists. We are hardly prepared, even at present, to give an authentic account of the metaphysical ideas of Buddhism, as we cannot trust the second-hand representations found in Chinese books, nor are the Sanskrit works current in Nepal (such as *Le Lotus de la bonne loi* translated by Burnouf) to be entirely followed. We must wait for the publication of Páli texts before we can pronounce confidently as to the actual nature of primitive Buddhism. It may suffice here to refer the reader for further details to Burnouf, *Introduction*, and *Lotus de la bonne loi*; Koeppen, *Die Religion des Buddha und ihre Entstehung*, vol. i. 1857; Vassilief, *Le Bouddhisme*, Paris, 1865; and Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, 1853.]

[2] Quotations from them in the Sanskrit language occur in commentaries on the *Vedánta*: (the *Bhámatí* on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. 19.)

Either from diversity of instruction delivered by him to his disciples at various times, or rather from different constructions of the same text, more or less literal, and varying with the degree of sagacity of the disciple, have arisen no less than four sects among the followers of Buddha.[1] Com-[391] mentators of the *Vedánta*, giving an account of this schism of the *Bauddhas*, do not agree in applying the scale of intellect to these divisions of the entire sect, some attributing to acuteness or superior intelligence, that which others ascribe to simplicity or inferior understanding.

Without regarding, therefore, that scale, the distinguishing tenets of each branch of the sect may be thus stated. Some maintain that all is void (*sarva śúnya*), following, as it seems, a literal interpretation of Buddha's *sútras*. To these the designation of *Mádhyamika* is assigned by several of the commentators of the *Vedánta;* and in the marginal notes of one commentary, they are identified with the *Chárvákas:* but that is an error.

Other disciples of Buddha except internal sensation or intelligence (*vijnána*) and acknowledge all else to be void. They maintain the eternal existence of conscious sense alone. These are called *Yogáchára*s.

Others, again, affirm the actual existence of external objects, no less than of internal sensations: considering external as perceived by senses; and internal as inferred by reasoning.

Some of them recognize the immediate perception of exterior objects. Others contend for a mediate apprehension of them, through images, or resembling forms, presented to the intellect: objects they insist are inferred, but not actually perceived. Hence two branches of the sect of Buddha: one denominated *Sautrántika;* the other *Vaibháshika*.[2]

[1] [For these four schools, cf. Vassilief, *Le Bouddhisme*, pp. 262–335.]

[2] [Mádhava, in his account of the *Bauddha-darśana*, gives the tenets of these four schools separately; but as he puts their views in the form of a very abstruse discussion, I have not thought it worth while to translate it, particularly as his arguments are probably not derived from actual Buddhist books, but are merely

As these, however, have many tenets in common, they may be conveniently considered together; and are so treated of by the scholiasts of Vyása's *Brahma-sútras*: understanding one *adhikaraṇa* (the 4th of the 2nd chapter in the 2nd lecture) to be directed against these two sects of *Buddhists;* and the next following one (2. 2. 5.) to be addressed [392] to the *Yogácháras;* serving, however, likewise for the confutation of the advocates of an universal void.[1]

The *Sautrántika* and *Vaibháshika* sects, admitting then external (*báhya*) and internal (*abhyantara*) objects, distinguish, under the first head, elements (*bhúta*) and that which appertains thereto (*bhautika*), namely, organs and sensible qualities; and under the second head, intelligence (*chitta*), and that which unto it belongs (*chaitta*).

The elements (*bhúta* or *mahábhúta*), which they reckon four, not acknowledging a fifth, consist of atoms. The *Bauddhas* do not, with the followers of Kaṇada, affirm double atoms, triple, quadruple, etc. as the early gradations of composition; but maintain indefinite atomic aggregation, deeming compound substances to be conjoint primary atoms.

Earth, they say, has the nature or peculiar character of hardness; water, that of fluidity; fire, that of heat; and air, that of mobility. Terrene atoms are hard; aqueous, liquid; igneous, hot; aërial, mobile. Aggregates of these atoms partake of those distinct characters. One authority, however, states, that they attribute to terrene atoms the characters of

reproductions of old Brahmanical misrepresentations. Buddhist quotations do occasionally occur, but, as the *Kusumánjali* is quoted, p. 9, Mádhava has probably derived all his knowledge from the discussions in Brahmanical works.]

[1] This schism among the *Bauddhas*, splitting into four sects, is anterior to the age of S'ankara-áchárya, who expressly notices all the four. It had commenced before the composition of the *Brahma-sútras*, and consequently before the days of S'abara-swámí and Kumárila-bhaṭṭa; since two, at the least, of those sects, are separately confuted. All of them appear to have been indiscriminately persecuted, when the *Bauddhas* of every denomination were expelled from Hindusthán and the peninsula. Whether the same sects yet subsist among the *Bauddhas* of Ceylon, Thibet, and the trans-gangetic India, and in China, deserves inquiry. [Cf. Vassilief, *l.c.*]

colour, savour, odour, and tactility; to aqueous, colour, savour, and tactility; to igneous, both colour and tactility; to aërial, tactility only.[1]

[393] The *Bauddhas* do not recognize a fifth element, *ákáśa*, nor any substance so designated; nor soul (*jiva* or *átman*) distinct from intelligence (*chitta*); nor any thing irreducible to the four categories above mentioned.

Bodies, which are objects of sense, are aggregates of atoms, being composed of earth and other elements. Intelligence, dwelling within body, and possessing individual consciousness, apprehends objects, and subsists as self; and, in that view only, is (*átman*) self or soul.

Things appertaining to the elements (*bhautika*), the second of the predicaments, are organs of sense, together with their objects, as rivers, mountains, etc. They are composed of atoms. This world, every thing which is therein, all which consists of component parts, must be atomical aggregations. They are external; and are perceived by means of organs, the eye, the ear, etc., which likewise are atomical conjuncts.

Images or representations of exterior objects are produced; and by perception of such images or representations, objects are apprehended. Such is the doctrine of the *Sautrántikas* upon this point. But the *Vaibháshikas* acknowledge the direct perception of exterior objects. Both think, that objects cease to exist when no longer perceived: they have but a brief duration, like a flash of lightning, lasting no longer than the perception of them. Their identity, then, is but momentary: the atoms or component parts are scattered; and the aggregation or concourse was but instantaneous.

Hence these *Buddhists* are by their adversaries, the orthodox Hindus, designated as *Párṇa-* or *Sarva-vainášikas*, 'arguing total perishableness;' while the followers of Kaṇáda, who acknowledge some of their categories to be eternal and invariable, and reckon only others transitory and changeable,

[1] Rámánuja on *Br. Sútr.*

and who insist that identity ceases with [394] any variation in the composition of a body, and that a corporeal frame, receiving nutriment and discharging excretions, undergoes continual change, and consequent early loss of identity, are, for that particular opinion, called *Ardha-vainášikas*, 'arguing half-perishableness.'

The second head of the arrangement before mentioned, comprising internal objects, *viz.* intelligence, and that which to it appertains, is again distributed into five *skandhas*,[1] as follow:—

1st. *Rúpa-skandha;* comprehending organs of sense and their objects considered in relation to the person, or the sensitive and intelligent faculty which is occupied with them. Colours and other sensible qualities and things are external; and, as such, are classed under the second division of the first head (*bhautika*), appurtenance of elements: but, as objects of sensation and knowledge, they are deemed internal, and therefore recur under the present head.

2nd. *Vijnána-skandha* consists in intelligence (*chitta*), which is the same with self (*átman*) and (*vijnána*) knowledge. It is consciousness of sensation, or continuous course and flow of cognition and sentiment. There is not any other agent, nor

[1] [The five *skandhas* (in Páli *khandhas*) are 'the elements or attributes of being.' "They embrace all the essential properties of every sentient being: some beings possess them less completely than others, and the inhabitants of the four Arúpabrahmalokas do not possess the first khandha at all. When a man dies the khandhas of which he is constituted perish, but by the force of his Kamma (merits) a new set of khandhas instantly starts into existence, and a new being appears in another world, who, though possessing different khandhas and a different form, is in reality identical with the man just passed away, because his Kamma is the same. Kamma then is the link that preserves the identity of a being through all the countless changes which it undergoes in its progress through Samsára." —Childers, *Páli Dict.* p. 198.

Thus, according to the stricter schools of Buddhist philosophy, especially as represented in Ceylon, there is no such thing as soul apart from the five skandhas; the soul is simply their aggregation; and consequently there cannot properly be said to be any transmigration in Buddhism. (Cf. *Śiśupala-badha*, ii. 28.) The doctrine of the Northern Buddhists is not so clear, cf. Burnouf, *Introd.* pp. 511, 512. For the Chinese view of the skandhas, see Julien, *Si yu ki*, i. 385, note.]

being which acts and enjoys; nor is there an eternal soul: but merely succession of thought, attended with individual consciousness abiding within body.

3rd. *Vedaná-skandha* comprises pleasure, pain, or the absence of either, and other sentiments excited in the mind by pleasing or displeasing objects.

4th. *Sanjná-skandha* intends the knowledge or belief arising from names or words: as ox, horse, etc.; or from indications or signs, as a house denoted by a flag, and a man by his staff.

5th. *Sanskára-skandha* includes passions; as desire, hatred, fear, joy, sorrow, etc., together with illusion, virtue, [395] vice, and every other modification of the fancy or imagination. All sentiments are momentary.

The second of these five *skandhas* is the same with the first division of the second general head, *chitta*, or intelligence. The rest are comprehended under the second head, *chaittika*, appurtenance of intellect; and under the larger designation of *ádhyátmika*, belonging to (*átman*) self. The latter term, in its most extensive sense, includes all the five *skandhas*, or branches, moral and personal.

The seeming but unreal course of events, or worldly succession, external and mental, or physical and moral, is described as a concatenation of causes and effects in a continual round.

Concerning the relation of cause and effect, it is to be premised that proximate cause (*hetu*) and concurrent occasion (*pratyaya*) are distinguished: and the distinction is thus illustrated in respect of both classes, external and personal.

From seed comes a germ; from this a branch; then a culm or stem; whence a leafy gem; out of which a bud; from which a blossom; and thence, finally, fruit. Where one is, the other ensues. Yet the seed is not conscious of producing the germ; nor is this aware of coming from seed: and hence is inferred production without a thinking cause, and without a ruling providence.

Again, earth furnishes solidity to the seed, and coherence to the germ; water moistens the grain; fire warms and matures it; air or wind supplies impulse to vegetation; ether expands the seed;[1] and season transmutes it. By concurrence of all these, seed vegetates, and a sprout grows. Yet earth and the rest of these concurrent occasions are [396] unconscious; and so are the seed, germ, and the rest of the effects.

Likewise, in the moral world, where ignorance or error is, there is passion: where error is not, neither is passion there. But they are unconscious of mutual relation.

Again, earth furnishes solidity to the bodily frame; water affords to it moisture; fire supplies heat; wind causes inspiration and respiration; ether occasions cavities;[1] sentiment gives corporeal impulse and mental incitement. Then follows error, passion, etc.

Ignorance (*avidyá*) or error, is the mistake of supposing that to be durable, which is but momentary. Thence comes passion (*sanskára*), comprising desire, aversion, delusion, etc. From these, concurring in the embryo with paternal seed and uterine blood, arises sentiment (*vijnána*) or incipient consciousness. From concurrence of this with parental seed and blood, comes the rudiment of body; its flesh and blood; its name (*náman*) and shape (*rúpa*). Thence the (*shad-áyatana*), sites of six organs, or seats of the senses, consisting of sentiment, elements (earth, etc.), name and shape (or body), in relation to him whose organs they are. From coincidence and conjunction of organs with name and shape (that is, with body) there is feeling (*sparśa*) or experience of heat or cold, etc., felt by the embryo or embodied being. Thence is sensation (*vedaná*) of pain, pleasure, etc. Follows thirst (*tṛishṇá*) or longing for renewal of pleasurable feeling and desire to shun that which is painful. Hence is (*upádána*) effort, or exertion of body or speech. From this is (*bhava*) condition of (*dharma*)

[1] So the commentaries on S'ankara (the *Bhámati*, *Abharaṇa*, and *Prabhá*). But the fifth element is not acknowledged by the *Bauddhas*.

merit, or (*adharma*) demerit. Thence comes birth (*játi*) or aggregation of the five branches (*skandhas*).[1] The maturity of those [397] five branches is (*jará*) decay. Their dissolution is (*maraṇa*) death. Regret of a dying person is (*śoka*) grief. Wailing is (*paridevaná*) lamentation. Experience of that which is disagreeable is (*duḥkha*) pain or bodily suffrance. But mental pain is (*daurmanasya*) discomposure of mind. Upon death ensues departure to another world. That is followed by return to this world. And the course of error, with its train of consequences, recommences.[2]

Besides these matters, which have a real existence but momentary duration, the *Bauddhas* distinguish under the category and name of (*nirúpa*[3]) unreal, false, or non-existent, three topics: 1st, wilful and observable destruction (*pratisankhyá-nirodha*) of an existing thing, as the breaking of a jar by a stroke of a mallet; 2nd, unobserved nullity or annihilation (*apratisankhyá-nirodha*); and 3rd, vacancy or space (*ákáśa*) unencompassed and unshielded, or the imaginary etherial element.

The whole of this doctrine is formally refuted by the *Vedántins*. 'The entire aggregate, referred to two sources, 'external and internal, cannot be; nor the world's course 'dependent thereon: for the members of it are insensible; and 'its very existence is made to depend on the flash of thought; 'yet no other thinking permanent being is acknowledged, ac- 'cumulating that aggregate, directing it, or enjoying; nor 'is there an inducement to activity without a purpose, and 'merely momentary.

[1] One commentary of the *Vedánta* (*viz.* the *Abharaṇa*), explains *bhava* as corporeal birth; and *játi* genus, kind. Other differences among the *Vedántin* writers, on various minor points of the *Buddhist* doctrine, are passed over to avoid tediousness.

[2] S'ank., Vách., etc. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. (S. 19.) [This explanation of the twelve *nidánas*, or 'causes of existence,' is taken from Govindánanda's gloss; cf. *Lalita-vistara*, pp. 442–447, Foucaux, transl. pp. 331–335; Burnouf, *Introd.* pp. 485–510; Koeppen, i. pp. 609–613. Mr. Childers has kindly furnished me with a note on the *nidánas*, as understood by the Southern Buddhists. See Appendix B., pp. 453–455 of this volume.]

[3] [*Nirapákhya*?]

'Nor is the alleged concatenation of events admissible: for 'there is no reason of it. Their existence depends on that 'of the aggregate of which they are alleged to be severally 'causes. The objections to the notion of eternal atoms with 'beings to enjoy, are yet more forcible against [398] mo-'mentary atoms with none to enjoy. The various matters 'enumerated as successive causes, do not account for the sum of 'sensible objects. Nor can they, being but momentary, be 'the causes of effects: for the moment of the one's duration 'has ceased, before that of the other's existence commences. 'Being then a non-entity, it can be no cause. Nor does one 'last till the other begins, for then they would be contem-'poraneous.

'The etherial element (*ákáśa*) is not a non-entity: for its 'existence is inferrible from sound.

'Nor is self or soul momentary: memory and recollection 'prove it: and there is no doubt nor error herein; for the 'individual is conscious that he is the same who to-day re-'members what he yesterday saw.

'Nor can entity be an effect of non-entity. If the one 'might come of the other, then might an effect accrue to a 'stranger without effort on his part: a husbandman would 'have a crop of corn without tilling and sowing; a potter 'would have a jar without moulding the clay; a weaver would 'have cloth without weaving the yarn: nor would any one 'strive for heavenly bliss or eternal deliverance.'[1]

To confute another branch of the sect of Buddha, the *Vedántins* argue, that 'the untruth or non-existence of ex-'ternal objects is an untenable position; for there is perception 'or apprehension of them: for instance, a stock, a wall, a jar, 'a cloth; and that, which actually is apprehended, cannot be 'unexistent. Nor does the existence of objects cease when 'the apprehension does so. Nor is it like a dream, a juggle, 'or an illusion; for the condition of dreaming and waking is

[1] S'ank. and other Com. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 4. (S. 18 27.)

'quite different. When awake a person is aware of the illusory 'nature of the dream which he recollects.

'Nor have thoughts or fancies an independent existence: '[399] for they are founded on external and sensible objects, 'the which, if unapprehended, imply that thoughts must be so 'too. These are momentary: and the same objections apply 'to a world consisting of momentary thoughts, as to one of 'instantaneous objects.

'The whole doctrine, when tried and sifted, crumbles like 'a well sunk in loose sand. The opinions advanced in it are 'contradictory and incompatible: they are severally untenable 'and incongruous. By teaching them to his disciples, Buddha 'has manifested either his own absurdity and incoherence, or 'his rooted enmity to mankind, whom he sought to delude.'[1]

A few observations on the analogy of the doctrine, above explained, to the Grecian philosophy, may not be here out of place.

It has been already remarked, in former essays, that the *Bauddhas*, like the *Vaiśeshikas*, admit but two sources of knowledge (p. 329 of this volume). Such likewise appears to have been the opinion of the more ancient Greek philosophers; especially the Pythagoreans: and accordingly Ocellus, in the beginning of his treatise on the universe, declares that he has written such things, concerning the nature of the universe, as he learned from nature itself by manifest signs, and conjectured as probable, by thought through reasoning; thereby intimating, as is remarked by his annotator, that the means of knowledge are two.[2]

Concerning the atomic doctrine, maintained not only by the *Vaiśeshikas*, or followers of Kaṇáda, surnamed Káśyapa,[3] but

[1] Com. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 5. (S. 28-32.)

[2] Opusc. mythолog. phys. et eth. p. 505.

[3] A remark may be here made, which was omitted in its proper place (Part 2 of this essay), that the followers of the atomic sect are sometimes contumeliously designated by their orthodox opponents, as *Káṇabhuj* * or *Káṇabhaksha*, in allusion to the founder's name. *Káṇa* signifies a crow; and the import of *Káṇa-bhuj*,

* S'ank. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 3. § 12. (S. 18.)

by the sect of Buddha, and likewise by [400] several others as well heterodox as orthodox, no person needs to be told, that a similar doctrine was maintained by many among the ancient Greek philosophers; and in particular by Leucippus (if not previously by Moschus), and after him by Democritus; and likewise by Empedocles, who was of the Pythagorean school. They disagreed, as the Indian philosophers likewise do, respecting the number of elements or different kinds of atoms. Empedocles admitted five, developed in the following order: ether, fire, earth, water, and air. Here we have the five elements (*bhúta*) of the Hindus, including *ákáśa*. The great multitude of philosophers, however, restricted the number of elements to four; in which respect they agree with the *Jainas*, *Bauddhas*, *Chárvákas* and some other sectaries, who reject the fifth element affirmed by the Hindus in general, and especially by the orthodox.

In published accounts of the religious opinions of *Bauddhas* and *Jainas*, derived principally from oral information, doubts have been expressed as to the sense attached by them to the terms which they use to signify the happy state at which the perfect saints arrive. It has been questioned whether annihilation, or what other condition short of such absolute extinction, is meant to be described.

Both these sects, like most others of Indian origin, propose, for the grand object to which man should aspire, the attainment of a final happy state, from which there is no return.

[401] All concur in assigning to its attainment the same term, *mukti* or *moksha*, with some shades of difference in the interpretation of the word: as emancipation, deliverance from evil, liberation from worldly bonds, relief from further transmigration, etc.

synonymous with *Káṇád*, is crow-eater (*káṇa-ad*). The original name, however, is derivable from *kaṇa*, little (with *ad*, to eat, or *dá*, to receive), implying abstemiousness or disinterestedness of the person bearing the name. Conformably with the first of those derivations, Kaṇáda himself is sometimes called *Kaṇabhaksha* or *Kaṇabhuj*.

Many other terms are in use, as synonymous with it; and so employed by all or nearly all of these sects; to express a state of final release from the world: such as *amṛita*, immortality; *apavarga*, conclusion, completion, or abandonment; *śreyas*, excellence; *niḥ-śreyasa*, assured excellence, perfection; *kaivalya*, singleness; *niḥ-saraṇa*, exit, departure. But the term which the *Bauddhas*, as well as *Jainas*, more particularly affect, and which however is also used by the rest, is *nirváṇa*, profound calm. In its ordinary acceptation, as an adjective, it signifies extinct, as a fire which is gone out; set, as a luminary which has gone down; defunct, as a saint who has passed away: its etymology is from *vá*, to blow as wind, with the preposition *nir* used in a negative sense: it means calm and unruffled. The notion which is attached to the word, in the acceptation now under consideration, is that of perfect apathy. It is a condition of unmixed tranquil happiness or ecstacy (*ánanda*). Other terms (as *sukha*, *moha*, etc.) distinguish different gradations of pleasure, joy, and delight. But a happy state of imperturbable apathy is the ultimate bliss (*ánanda*) to which the Indian aspires: in this the *Jaina*, as well as the *Bauddha*, concurs with the orthodox *Vedántin*.

Perpetual uninterrupted apathy can hardly be said to differ from eternal sleep. The notion of it as of a happy condition seems to be derived from the experience of ecstacies, or from that of profound sleep, from which a person awakes refreshed. The pleasant feeling is referred back to the period of actual repose. Accordingly, as I had occasion to show in a preceding essay, the *Vedánta* considers the [402] individual soul to be temporarily, during the period of profound sleep, in the like condition of reunion with the Supreme, which it permanently arrives at on its final emancipation from body.

This doctrine is not that of the *Jainas* nor *Bauddhas*. But neither do they consider the endless repose allotted to their perfect saints as attended with a discontinuance of individu-

ality. It is not annihilation, but unceasing apathy, which they understand to be the extinction (*nirváṇa*) of their saints; and which they esteem to be supreme felicity, worthy to be sought by practice of mortification, as well as by acquisition of knowledge.[1]

Chárvákas and Lokáyatikas.

In my first essay on the Philosophy of the Hindus (p. 240 of this volume) it was stated, upon the authority of a scholiast of the *Sánkhya*, that Chárváka,[2] whose name is familiar as designating a heretical sect called after him, has exhibited the doctrine of the *Jainas*. In a marginal note to a scholiast of

[1] [For *nirváṇa* and its Buddhist meaning, see Burnouf, *Introd.* pp. 521, 589–591; Prof. Müller's Lecture on Buddhist Nihilism (1869); and Mr. J. D'Alwis, *Buddhist Nirváṇa* (1871). Great difference of opinion has long existed among European scholars as to the real nature of Nirváṇa; but I think Mr. Childers has cleared up most of the difficulties in his article on *Nibbánam* in his Páli Dictionary. "Nirváṇa is applied to two different things: first, that annihilation of being which is the goal of Buddhism; and, secondly, the state of blissful sanctification called *arahatta* or arhatship, which terminates in annihilation." Thus annihilation (as already indicated by the etymology) is the only ultimate meaning; all existence is absolutely an evil to the Buddhist, and consequently its absolute extinction is the only summum bonum. But although this may have been the true teaching of Buddhism from the first, it does not follow that it was universally accepted or understood, especially as the doctrine spread beyond the limits of India and Ceylon.

Goldstücker (*Páṇini*, p. 226) well distinguishes the Brahmanical *moksha* from the Buddhist *nirváṇa*. "The Brahmanic Hindus hope that their soul will ultimately become united with the universal spirit; which, in the language of the Upanishads, is the neuter Brahman; and, in that of the sects, the supreme deity, who takes the place of this philosophical and impersonal god. And however indefinite this god Brahman may be, it is nevertheless, to the mind of the Brahmanic Hindu, an *entity*. The final salvation of a Buddhist is entire non-entity. The various expressions for eternal bliss in the Brahmanic creed, like *apavarga*, *moksha*, *mukti*, *niḥśreyasa*, all mean either 'liberation from this earthly career' or 'the absolute good'; they therefore imply a condition of hope. The absolute end of a Buddhist is without hope; it is *nirváṇa* or extinction."]

[2] [Chárváka is mentioned in the *Mahábhárata* as a rákshasa who endeavoured, by a false report of Bhíma's death, to ruin the Páṇḍavas in the moment of their final triumph. The founding of the sect, however, is generally ascribed to Vṛihaspati, who promulgated these doctrines to overthrow the power of the sons of Raji, see *Matsya-pur.* and *Vishṇu-pur.* Cf. Dr. Muir's paper, Journ. R.A.S. vol. xix., and also Journ. B.A.S. for 1862, pp. 371–390.]

the *Brahma-sútras*, one of the four branches of the sect of Buddha (the *Mádhyamika*) is identified with the *Chárvákas*. This I take to be clearly erroneous; and upon comparison of the tenets of the *Jainas* and *Chárvákas*, as alleged by the commentators of the *Vedánta* in course of controversy, the other position likewise appears to be not correct.

For want of an opportunity of consulting an original treatise on this branch of philosophy, or any connected summary furnished even by an adversary of opinions professed by the *Chárvákas*, no sufficient account can be yet given of their peculiar doctrine, further than that it is undisguised materialism. A few of their leading opinions, however, are to be collected from the incidental notice of them by opponents.

[403] A notorious tenet of the sect, restricting to perception only the means of proof and sources of knowledge, has been more than once adverted to (pp. 253 and 329 of this volume). Further research enables me to enlarge the catalogue of means of knowledge admitted by others, with the addition of probability (*sámbhavi*) and tradition (*aitihya*) separately reckoned by mythologists (*Paurániks*) among those means.[1] The latter is however comprehended under the head of (*śábda*) oral communication. In regard to probability or possibility (for the term may be taken in this lower meaning) as a ground or source of notions, it must be confessed, that in the text of the mythologists (their *Puráṇas*) a very ample use is made of the latitude; and what by supposition might have been and may be, is put in the place of what has been and is to be.

The *Chárvákas* recognize four (not five) elements, *viz.* earth, water, fire, and wind (or air); and acknowledge no other principles (*tattwa*).[2]

The most important and characteristic tenet of this sect concerns the soul, which they deny to be other than body.[3] This

[1] *Padártha-dípiká* [cf. 329]. [2] *Várhaspatya-sútra*, cited by Bháskara.
[3] S'ankara on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. 2. and 3. 3. 53.

doctrine is cited for refutation in Vyása's *sútras*, as the opinion of "some;" and his scholiasts, Bhavadeva-miśra and Ranganátha, understand the *Chárváks* to be intended. Śankara, Bháskara, and other commentators, name the *Lokáyatikas*; and these appear to be a branch of the sect of Chárváka. Sadánanda, in the *Vedánta-sára*, calls up for refutation no less than four followers of Chárváka, asserting that doctrine under various modifications; one maintaining that the gross corporeal frame is identical with the soul; another that the corporeal organs constitute the soul; a third affirming [401] that the vital functions do so; and the fourth insisting, that the mind and the soul are the same. In the second of these instances, Sadánanda's scholiast, Ráma-tírtha, names the *Lokáyatanas*,[1] a branch of the *Chárváks*, as particularly intended. No doubt they are the same with the *Lokáyatikas* of Śankara and the rest.

'Seeing no soul but body, they maintain the non-existence 'of soul other than body; and arguing that intelligence or 'sensibility, though not seen in earth, water, fire, and air, 'whether simple or congregate, may nevertheless subsist in the 'same elements modified in a corporeal frame, they affirm that 'an organic body (*káya*) endued with sensibility and thought, 'though formed of those elements, is the human person '(*purusha*).[2]

'The faculty of thought results from a modification of the 'aggregate elements, in like manner as sugar with a ferment 'and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as 'betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu, chewed together, 'have an exhilarating property, not found in those substances 'severally, nor in any one of them singly.

'So far there is a difference between animate body and in-'animate substance. Thought, knowledge, recollection, etc., 'perceptible only where organic body is, are properties of an 'organized frame, not appertaining to exterior substances, or

[1] [In the printed ed. *lokáyatáh*.]

[2] S'ankara, etc.

'earth and other elements simple or aggregate, unless formed 'into such a frame.

'While there is body, there is thought, and sense of pleasure 'and pain; none when body is not; and hence, as well as 'from self-consciousness, it is concluded that self and body are 'identical.'

Bháskara-áchárya[1] quotes the *Várhaspatya-sútras* [405] (Vṛihaspati's aphorisms), apparently as the text-work or standard authority of this sect or school; and the quotation, expressing that "the elements are earth, water, fire and air; "and from the aggregation of them in bodily organs, there "results sensibility and thought, as the inebriating property "is deduced from a ferment and other ingredients."

To the foregoing arguments of the *Lokáyatikas* or *Chárvákas*, the answer of the *Vedántins* is, that 'thought, sensa- 'tion, and other properties of soul or consciousness, cease at 'the moment of death, while the body yet remains; and 'cannot therefore be properties of the corporeal frame, for 'they have ceased before the frame is dissolved. The qualities 'of body, as colour, etc., are apprehended by others: not so 'those of soul, *viz.* thought, memory, etc. Their existence, 'while body endures, is ascertained: not their cessation when 'it ceases. They may pass to other bodies. Elements, or 'sensible objects, are not sentient, or capable of feeling, them- 'selves; fire, though hot, burns not itself; a tumbler, however 'agile, mounts not upon his own shoulders. Apprehension of 'an object must be distinct from the thing apprehended. 'By means of a lamp, or other light, objects are visible: if a 'lamp be present, the thing is seen; not so, if there be no 'light. Yet apprehension is no property of the lamp; nor is 'it a property of body, though observed only where a cor- 'poreal frame is. Body is but instrumental to apprehension.'

Among the Greeks, Dicæarchus of Messene held the same tenet, which has been here ascribed to the *Lokáyatikas*, and

[1] On *Br. Sútr.* 3. 3. 53.

other followers of Chárváka, that there is no such thing as soul in man; that the principle, by which he perceives and acts, is diffused through the body, is inseparable from it, and terminates with it.[1]

Máheśwaras and Páśupatas.

[406] The devoted worshippers of Śiva or Maheśwara, take their designation from this last-mentioned title of the deity whom they adore, and whose revelation they profess to follow. They are called *Máheśwaras*, and (as it seems) *Śiva-bhágavatas*.

The ascetics of the sect wear their hair braided, and rolled up round the head like a turban; hence they are denominated (and the sect after them) *Jaṭádhárí*, 'wearing a braid.'

The *Máheśwaras* are said to have borrowed much of their doctrine from the *Sánkhya* philosophy: following Kapila on many points; and the theistical system of Patanjali on more.

They have branched into four divisions: one, to which the appellation of *Śaivas*, or worshippers of Śiva, especially appertains: a second, to which the denomination of *Páśupatas* belongs, as followers of Paśupati, another title of Maheśwara: the third bears the name of *Kárunika-siddhántins;* but Rámánuja[2] assigns to this third branch the appellation of *Kálámukhas:* the fourth is by all termed *Kápálas* or *Kápálikas*.

They appeal for the text of their doctrine to a book, which they esteem holy, considering it to have been revealed by Maheśwara, Śiva, or Paśupati: all names of the same deity. The work, most usually bearing the latter title, *Paśupati-śástra* (*Maheśwara-siddhánta*, or *Śivágama*), is divided into five lectures (*adhyáya*), treating of as many categories (*padárthas*). The enumeration of them will afford occasion for noticing the principal and distinguishing tenets of the sect.[3]

[1] [See Appendix C., pp. 456—460.]

[2] Com. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. 37.

[3] [These five *padárthas* belong to the *Nakulíśa-páśupatas*, according to the

[107] I. *Kárana*, or cause. The *Páśupatas* hold, that *I'śwara*, the Supreme Being, is the efficient cause of the world, its creator (*kartá*) and superintending (*adhishṭhátá*) or ruling providence; and not its material cause likewise. They, however, identify the one supreme God, with Śiva, or Paśupati, and give him the title of Maheśwara.

II. *Kárya*, or effect: which is nature (*prakṛiti*), or plastic matter (*pradhána*), as the universal material principle is by the *Páśupatas* denominated, conformably with the terminology of the *Sánkhyas;* and likewise *mahat*, the great one, or intelligence, together with the further development of nature, *viz.* mind, consciousness, the elements, etc.

III. *Yoga*, abstraction; as perseverance in meditation on the syllable *om*, the mystic name of the deity; profound contemplation of the divine excellence, etc.

IV. *Vidhi*, enjoined rites; consisting in acts, by performance of which merit is gained; as bath, and ablutions, or the use of ashes in their stead; and divers acts of enthusiasm, as of a person overjoyed and beside himself.

V. *Duḥkhánta*, termination of ill, or final liberation (*moksha*).

The purpose, for which these categories are taught and explained, is the accomplishment of deliverance from the bondage (*bandha*) or fetters (*páśa*), *viz.* illusion (*máyá*), etc., in which the living soul (*jíva* or *átmá*), by this sect termed *paśu*, is entangled and confined. For it is here maintained, that *paśus* (living souls) are individual sentient beings, capable of deliverance from evil, through the knowledge of God and the

Sarva-darśana-sangraha, pp. 74-80. The first *sútra* of their *śástra* is there quoted and explained, *athátaḥ paśupateḥ páśupata-yoga-vidhim vyákhyásyámaḥ*. The five *padárthas* are explained at length in pp. 75-78. My *paṇḍit*, Maheśachandra-nyáyaratna had two sets of S'aiva aphorisms different from this one,—the one commenced *chaitanyam átmá*, and was in three books (cf. Hall, *Bibl. Index*, p. 196); the other, which was commented upon by Abhinava-gupta in his *Pratyabhijñá-sútra-vimarshiṇi*, opened with the *śloka* found in the *Sarva-darś.-sang.* p. 91. 1-4, in the account of the *Pratyabhijñá-darśana*. (The true reading is *maheśwarasya dásyam.*)]

practice of prescribed rites, together with perseverance in profound abstraction.

The *Pásupatas* argue, that as a potter is the efficient, not the material, cause of the jar made by him; so the sentient being, who presides over the world, is the efficient, not the material, cause of it: for the superintendent, and [408] that which is by him superintended, cannot be one and the same.

In a more full exposition of their opinions[1] they are stated as enumerating under the heads of effects and causes, those which are secondary; and as subdividing likewise the heads of prescribed rites and termination of ill.

I. They distinguish ten effects (*kárya*): namely, five principles (*tattwa*), which are the five elements: earth, water, fire, air, and ether; and five qualities (*guṇa*), colour, etc.

II. They reckon thirteen causes or instruments (*karaṇa*); *viz.* five organs of sense, and as many organs of action; and three internal organs, intelligence, mind, and consciousness. These thirteen causes or means are the same with the thirteen instruments of knowledge enumerated by Kapila and his followers, the *Sánkhyas*.

III. *Yoga*, abstraction, does not appear to admit any subdivision.

IV. Enjoined rules (*vidhi*) are distributed under two heads: 1st, *vrata*; 2nd, *dwára*.

To the first head (*vrata* or vow) appertains the use of ashes in place of water for bath or ablutions: that is, first, in lieu of bathing thrice a day; at morning, noon, and evening: secondly, instead of ablutions for special causes, as purification from uncleanness after evacuation of urine, feces, etc.

To the same head belongs likewise the sleeping upon ashes: for which particular purpose they are solicited from householders, in like manner as food and other alms are begged.

This head comprises also exultation (*upahára*), which com-

[1] *Vidyábharaṇa* on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. 37.

prehends laughter, dance, song, bellowing as a bull, bowing, recital of prayer, etc.

[409] The second head (*dwára*) consists of, 1st, pretending sleep, though really awake; 2nd, quaking, or tremulous motion of members, as if afflicted with rheumatism or paralytic affection; 3rd, halting, as if lame; 4th, joy, as of a lover at sight of his beloved mistress; 5th, affectation of madness, though quite sane; 6th, incoherent discourse.

V. Termination of pain (*duḥkhánta*) or deliverance from evil, is twofold: one is absolute extinction of all ills; the other is acquisition of transcendent power, and exercise of uncontrolled and irresistible will. The last comprises energy of sense and energy of action.

The energy of sense (*dṛik-śakti*) varies according to the sense engaged, and is of five sorts: 1st, vision (*darśana*), or distinct and perfect perception of minute, remote, confused and undefined objects; 2nd, (*śravaṇa*) perfect hearing of sound; 3rd, (*manana*) intuitive knowledge, or science without need of study; 4th, (*vijnána*) certain and undoubted knowledge, by book or fact; 5th, (*sarvajnatwa*) omniscience.

Energy of action (*kriyá-śakti*) is properly single of its kind. It admits nevertheless of a threefold subdivision; which, however, is not well explained, in the only work in which I have found it noticed.[1]

The opinions of the *Páśupatas* and other *Máheśwaras*,[2] are

[1] *Abharaṇa* (§ 39) 2. 2. 27. The only copy of it seen by me is in this part apparently imperfect. [The *Sarva-dars.-sang.* explains them (p. 76) as the possession of swiftness like thought, the power of assuming any body, and the power of exercising all faculties even without a body.]

[2] [The *Sarva-darśana-sangraha* gives an account of two other S'aiva sects, the *Pratyabhijná-darśana* (pp. 90–97), and the *S'aiva-darśana* (pp. 80–90). The latter is a very interesting summary, and may be usefully compared with the Rev. H. R. Hoisington's articles in the Journ. Amer. Or. Soc. vol. iv., and the Rev. T. Foulkes' translation of the *S'iva-prakáśa-pattalai* and Catechism of the S'aiva religion. Besides these we have (pp. 97–103) the S'aiva sect of the Raseśwaras or worshippers of S'iva under the form of quicksilver. This strange superstition is illustrated by the *páradapána* mentioned as one of the practices of the devotees in the *S'ankara-dig-vijaya*, ch. 49, and also by Marco Polo's account of the Indian *Yogis*, Yule's ed. vol. ii. p. 300.]

heretical, in the estimation of the *Vedántins*, because they do not admit pantheism, or creation of the universe by the deity out of his own essence.

The notion of a plastic material cause, termed *pradhána*,[1] borrowed from the *Sánkhyas*, and that of a ruling provi-[410] dence, taken from Patanjali, are controverted, the one in part, the other in the whole, by the orthodox followers of the *Vedánta*.[2]

'An argument drawn from the prevalence of pain, pleasure, 'and illusion in the universe, that the cause must have the 'like qualities and be brute matter, is incongruous,' say the *Vedántins*, 'for it could not frame the diversities, exterior and 'interior, which occur: these argue thought and intention, in 'like manner as edifices and gardens, which assuredly are not 'constructed without design. Nor could there be operation 'without an operator; clay is wrought by the potter who 'makes the jar; a chariot is drawn by horses yoked to it; 'but brute matter stirs not without impulse. Milk nourishes 'the calf, and water flows in a stream, but not spontaneously; 'for the cow, urged by affection, suckles her calf, which, in-'cited by hunger, sucks the teat; a river flows agreeably to 'the inclination of the ground, as by providence directed. 'But there is not, according to the *Sánkhyas* and *Páśupatas*, 'any thing besides matter itself to stir or to stop it, nor any 'motive: for soul is a stranger in the world. Yet conversions 'are not spontaneous: grass is not necessarily changed to 'milk; for particular conditions must co-exist: swallowed by 'a cow, not by an ox, the fodder is so converted. Or, granting

[1] That by which the world is accomplished (*pradhíyate*), and in which it is deposited at its dissolution, is first (*pradhána*) matter.

[2] [The *S'aiva-darśana* has a considerable resemblance to the Theistic Sánkhya; its advocates hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities, and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and gradually to unite it to God. S'iva is the chief deity of the system, and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the allegory of a beast, its bonds, and its owner. Paśupati is a well-known name of S'iva, as the master or creator of all inferior things, cf. *Váj. Sanh.* xvi. 28.

'that activity is natural to matter, still there would be no pur-
'pose. The halt, borne by the blind, directs the progress: a
'magnet attracts contiguous iron. But direction and con-
'tiguity are wanting to the activity of plastic matter. The
'three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which
'characterize matter, would not vary to become primary and
'secondary in the derivative principles of intelligence and the
'rest, without some external instigator whomsoever. Apart
'from the energy of a thinking being, those qualities cannot
'be argued to have [411] a natural tendency to the produc-
'tion of such effects as are produced.'[1]

'The *Pásupatas*' notion of Supreme GOD being the world's
'cause, as governing both (*pradhána*) matter and (*purusha*)
'embodied spirit, is incongruous,' say again the *Vedántins*,
'for he would be chargeable with passion and injustice, distri-
'buting good and evil with partiality. Nor can this imputa-
'tion be obviated by reference to the influence of works: for
'instigation and instigator would be reciprocally dependent.
'Nor can the objection be avoided by the assumption of an infi-
'nite succession (without a beginning) of works and their fruits.

'Neither is there any assignable connexion by which his
'guidance of matter and spirit could be exercised: it is not
'conjunction, nor aggregation, nor relation of cause and effect.
'Nor can the material principle, devoid of all sensible qualities,
'be guided and administered. Nor can matter be wrought
'without organs. But, if the Supreme Being have organs, he
'is furnished with a corporeal frame, and is not GOD, and he
'suffers pain, and experiences pleasure, as a finite being. The
'infinity of matter and of embodied spirit, and GOD's omni-
'science, are incompatible; if he restrict them in magnitude and
'number, they are finite; if he cannot define and limit them,
'he is not omniscient (and omnipotent).'[2]

A further objection to the *Sánkhya* doctrine, and conse-

[1] S'ankara, etc. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 1. (S. 1–10.)
[2] S'ank., etc. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 7.

quently to the *Páśupata* grounded on it, is 'its alleged incon-'sistencies and contradictions:[1] one while eleven organs are 'enumerated, at another seven only, the five senses being re-'duced to one cuticular organ, the sense of feeling. [412] 'The elements are in one place derived immediately from the 'great or intelligent principle; in another, from consciousness. 'Three internal faculties are reckoned in some instances, and 'but one in others.'

The grounds of this imputation, however, do not appear. Such inconsistencies are not in the text of Kapila, nor in that of the *Kárikà:* and the *Vedánta* itself seems more open to the same reproach: for there is much discrepancy in the passages of the *Veda*, on which it relies.

The point on which the *Páśupatas* most essentially differ from the orthodox, the distinct and separate existence of the efficient and material causes of the universe, is common to them with the ancient Greek philosophers before Aristotle. Most of these similarly affirmed two, and only two, natural causes, the efficient and the material; the first active, moving: the second, passive, moved; one effective, the other yielding itself to be acted on by it. Ocellus terms the latter γένεσις, generation, or rather production; the former its cause, αἰτία γενέσεως.[2] Empedocles, in like manner, affirmed two principles of nature; the active, which is unity, or God; the passive, which is matter.[3]

Here we have precisely the *prakṛiti* and *káraṇa* of the Indian philosophers: their *upádána* and *nimitta-káraṇa*, material and efficient causes. The similarity is too strong to have been accidental. Which of the two borrowed from the other I do not pretend to determine: yet, adverting to what has come to us of the history of Pythagoras, I shall not hesitate to acknowledge an inclination to consider the Grecian to have

[1] S'ank., etc. *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 1. (S. 2, and 10.)

[2] Ocellus de Universo, c. 2., in Opusc. Mythol. p. 505. Cicero, Academ. [Arist. Metaph. i. 3, 4.]

[3] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. ix. 4.

been on this, as on many other points, indebted to Indian instructors.

[413] It should be observed, that some among the Greek philosophers, like the *Sánkhyas*, who follow Kapila, admitted only one material principle and no efficient cause. This appears to have been the doctrine of Heraclitus in particular. His *psegmata* correspond with the sheer (*tanmátra*) particles of Kapila's *Sánkhya;* his intelligent and rational principle, which is the cause of production and dissolution, is Kapila's *buddhi* or *mahat;* as his material principle is *pradhána* or *prakṛiti:* the development of corporeal existences, and their return to the first principle at their dissolution,[1] correspond with the upward and downward way, ὁδὸς ἄνω and ὁδὸς κάτω, of Heraclitus.[2]

I shall not pursue the parallel further. It would not hold for all particulars, nor was it to be expected that it should.

Páncharátras or Bhágavatas.

Among the *Vaishṇavas* or special worshippers of Vishṇu, is a sect distinguished by the appellation of *Páncharátras*, and also called *Vishṇu-Bhágavatas*, or simply *Bhágavatas*. The latter name might, from its similarity, lead to the confounding of these with the followers of the *Bhagavad-gitá*, or of the *Śrí Bhágavata-puráṇa*. The appropriate and distinctive appellation then is that of *Páncharátra*, derived from the title of the original work which contains the doctrine of the sect.[3] It is noticed in the *Bhárata*, with the *Sánkhya*, *Yoga* and *Páśupata*, as a system deviating from the *Vedas;* and a passage quoted by Śankara-áchárya[4] seems to intimate that

[1] See p. 267 of this volume. [2] Diog. Laert. ix. 8 and 9.

[3] [The *Nárada-pancharátra* was edited by the Rev. K. M. Banerjea in the Bibl. Ind. 1865.]

[4] [*Ved. Sút.* ii. 2. 45. He had mentioned the *Pancharátra-siddhántinaḥ* in his Comm. on ii. 2. 44.]

its promulgator was Śáṇḍilya, who was dissatisfied with the *Vedas*, not finding in them a prompt and sufficient way of supreme excellence (*para-śreyas*) and final beatitude; and therefore [414] he had recourse to this *śástra*.[1] It is, however, by most ascribed to Náráyaṇa or Vásudeva himself; and the orthodox account for its heresy, as they do for that of Buddha's doctrines, by presuming delusion wilfully practised on mankind by the holy or divine personage, who revealed the *tantra*, or *ágama*, that is, the sacred book in question, though heterodox.

Some of its partisans nevertheless pretend, that it conforms with one of the *śákhás* of the *Veda*, denominated the *Ekáyana*.[2] This does not, however, appear to be the case; nor is it clear, that any such *śákhá* is forthcoming, or has ever existed.

Many of this sect practise the (*sanskáras*) initiatory ceremonies of regeneration and admission to holy orders, according to the forms directed by the *Vájasaneyi-śákhá* of the *Yajurveda*.

[1] [The aphorisms of Śáṇḍilya, with Swapneśwara's Comm., were edited by Ballantyne in the Bibl. Ind. 1861. They are mainly based on the *Bhagavad-gítá*, which is quoted by name in *Sút.* 83. Their fundamental tenet, as opposed to the *Vedánta*, is that faith (*bhakti*), and not knowledge, is the cause of liberation. *Bhakti* in the highest sense is defined as 'an affection fixed on God' (*anuraktir íśware*), and its characteristics differ from those of earthly affection in the object rather than in their nature. Knowledge only produces the removal of the mind's foulness (*málinya*), as the shelling removes the husk of the rice; it thus leads to faith, and this to liberation. Where *málinya* is removed even without knowledge, as in the case of the *gopís* (*Vishṇu-pur.* v. 13. 15), and faith is preternaturally produced, liberation still follows. Knowledge and devout concentration (*yoga*) are called the two visible aids in attaining faith (*dṛishṭopakárakau*); but in one point of view *yoga*, though properly a means to faith, is also a means to knowledge (s. 19). The highest form of faith (*parà bhaktiḥ*) is properly directed to Kṛishṇa, who is considered as identical with the Supreme Brahma; but it may also be directed to his various *avatáras*, and also to the various forms of Śiva, as these are all said to have the characteristic marks of Brahma. The inferior forms are directed to Indra and the other inferior deities, the spiritual teacher, etc.; they tend to produce knowledge by removing the hindrances caused by sin.

There are four kinds of votaries (*bhaktáḥ*): the *ártta*, whose aim is to remove the misery arising from sin; the *jijñásu*, who performs sacrifices, etc., to obtain knowledge; the *arthárthin*, who seeks heaven, etc., by the lower forms of faith; these three are *gauṇa* or inferior; and superior to them is the *jñánin* or *para-bhakta*, who seeks liberation by the highest faith.

This path is open to all casts, as all alike need deliverance.]

[2] [Cf. Weber, *Ind. Stud.* i. pp. 267, 484.]

Others, abiding rigidly by their own rules, perform the initiatory rites, in a different, and even contrary mode, founded, as is pretended, on the supposed *Ekáyana-śákhá*. But their sacerdotal initiation is questioned, and their rank as *Bráhmaṇas* contested, on the ground of the insufficiency of their modes unsanctioned by either of the three genuine and authoritative *Vedas*.

The religious doctrine of the sect is, by admission of Śankara and other commentators of the *Vedánta*, reconcileable on many points with the *Veda;* but in some essential respects it is at direct variance with that authority, and consequently deemed heretical; and its confutation is the object of the 8th or last *adhikaraṇa* in the controversial chapter of the *Brahma-sútras* (2. 2. 8).

Yet Rámánuja,[1] in his commentary on those *sútras*, defends the superhuman origin and correct scope of the *Páncharátra;* the authority of which he strenuously maintains, and earnestly justifies its doctrine on the controverted points; and even endeavours to put a favourable construc[415]tion on Bádaráyaṇa's text, as upholding rather than condemning its positions.

Vásudeva, who is Vishṇu, is by this sect identified with *Bhagavat*, the Supreme Being; the one, omniscient, first principle, which is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe: and is likewise its superintending and ruling providence. That being, dividing himself, became four persons, by successive production. From him immediately sprung *Sankarshaṇa*, from whom came *Pradyumna;* and from the latter issued *Aniruddha*. *Sankarshaṇa* is identified with the

[1] [For the *Rámánuja-darśana* see *Sarva-darśana-sang.* pp. 41–61. Cf. Wilson, *Essays*, i. pp. 34–68, Banerjea's *Dialogues*, pp. 401–426. Rámánuja opposed the theory of *advaita*, *i.e.* that all things are Brahma, and also that of *máyá*, *i.e.* that all except Brahma is illusion. With him souls (*chit*) and matter (*achit*) are the body, of which God is the soul. God is endowed with qualities and to be identified with Vishṇu.—He wrote his Comm. on the *Sútras* as an abridgment of the voluminous work of Bodháyanáchárya (S. D. S. p. 56).]

living soul (*jiva*); *Pradyumna*, with mind (*manas*); and *Aniruddha*, with (*ahankára*) egotism, or consciousness.

In the mythology of the more orthodox *Vaishṇavas*, Vásudeva is *Kṛishṇa*; *Sankarshaṇa* is his brother Balaráma; *Pradyumna* is his son Káma (Cupid); and *Aniruddha* is son of Káma.

Vásudeva, or *Bhagavat*, being supreme nature, and sole cause of all, the rest are effects. He has six especial attributes, being endued with the six pre-eminent qualities of

1st. Knowledge (*jnána*), or acquaintance with everything animate or inanimate constituting the universe.

2nd. Power (*śakti*), which is the plastic condition of the world's nature.

3rd. Strength (*bala*), which creates without effort, and maintains its own creation without labour.

4th. Irresistible will (*aiśwarya*), power not to be opposed or obstructed.

5th. Vigour (*vírya*), which counteracts change, as that of milk into curds, and obviates alteration in nature.

6th. Energy (*tejas*), or independence of aid or adjunct in the world's creation, and capacity of subjugating others.

[416] From the diffusion and co-operation of knowledge with strength, *Sankarshaṇa* sprung; from vigour and irresistible will, *Pradyumna*; and from power and energy, *Aniruddha*. Or they may all be considered as partaking of all the six attributes.

Deliverance, consisting in the scission of worldly shackles, is attainable by worship of the deity, knowledge of him, and profound contemplation; that is, 1st, by resorting to the holy temples, with body, thought, and speech subdued, and muttering the morning prayer, together with hymns and praise of (*Bhagavat*) the deity, and with reverential bowing and other ceremonies; 2ndly. By gathering and providing blossoms, and other requisites of worship; 3rdly. By actual performance of divine worship; 4thly. By study of the sacred text (*Bhagavat-*

śástra) and reading, hearing, and reflecting on that and other holy books (*puráṇas* and *ágamas*), which are conformable to it; 5thly. By profound meditation and absorbed contemplation after evening worship, and intensely fixing the thoughts exclusively on (*Bhagavat*) the deity.

By such devotion, both active and contemplative (*kriyá-yoga* and *jnána-yoga*), performed at five different times of each day, and persisted in for a hundred years, Vásudeva is attained; and by reaching his divine presence, the votary accomplishes final deliverance, with everlasting beatitude.

Against this system, which is but partially heretical, the objection upon which the chief stress is laid by Vyása, as interpreted by Śankara[1] and the rest of the scholiasts, is, that 'the soul would not be eternal; if it were a production, and 'consequently had a beginning. Springing from the deity, 'and finally returning to him, it would merge in its cause and 'be re-absorbed; there would be neither [417] reward nor 'punishment; neither a heaven, nor a hell: and this doctrine 'virtually would amount to (*nástikya*) denial of another world. 'Nor can the soul, becoming active, produce mind; nor again 'this, becoming active, produce consciousness. An agent does 'not generate an instrument, though he may construct one by 'means of tools; a carpenter does not create, but fabricate, an 'axe. Nor can four distinct persons be admitted, as so many 'forms of the same self-divided being, not springing one from 'the other, but all of them alike endued with divine attributes, 'and consequently all four of them gods. There is but one 'God, one Supreme Being. It is vain to assume more; and 'the *Páncharátra* itself affirms the unity of God.'

A few scattered observations have been thrown out on the similarity of the Greek and Indian philosophy, in this and preceding portions of the present essay. It may be here remarked by the way, that the Pythagoreans, and Ocellus in particular, distinguish as parts of the world, the heaven, the

[1] *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. 8. (42–45). S'ank., etc.

earth, and the interval between them, which they term lofty and aërial, λέγω δὲ μέρη, οὐρανὸν, γῆν, τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων· ὃ δὴ μετάρσιον καὶ ἀέριον ὀνομάζεται.[1]

Here we have precisely the (*swar*, *bhú*, and *antariksha*) heaven, earth, and (*transpicuous*) intermediate region of the Hindus.

Pythagoras, as after him Ocellus, peoples the middle or aërial region with demons, as heaven with gods, and the earth with men. Here again they agree precisely with the Hindus, who place the gods above, man beneath, and spiritual creatures, flitting unseen, in the intermediate region. The *Vedas* throughout teem with prayers and incantations [418] to avert and repel the molestation of aërial spirits, mischievous imps, who crowd about the sacrifice and impede the religious rite.

Nobody needs to be reminded, that Pythagoras and his successors held the doctrine of metempsychosis, as the Hindus universally do the same tenet of transmigration of souls.

They agree likewise generally in distinguishing the sensitive, material organ (*manas*), from the rational and conscious living soul (*jivátman*):[2] θυμός and φρήν of Pythagoras; one perishing with the body, the other immortal.

Like the Hindus, Pythagoras, with other Greek philosophers, assigned a subtle etherial clothing to the soul apart from the corporeal part, and a grosser clothing to it when united with body; the *súkshma* (or *linga*) *śarira* and *sthúla śarira* of the *Sánkhyas* and the rest.[3]

They concur even in the limit assigned to mutation and change; deeming all which is sublunary mutable, and that which is above the moon subject to no change in itself.[4] Accordingly, the manes doomed to a succession of births rise, as the *Vedas* teach, no further than the moon: while those

[1] Ocell. c. 3., in Opusc. Myth. p. 528.
[2] Empedocles. See Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. j. 1117.
[3] See p. 257 of this volume. [4] Ocellus, Opusc. Mythol. 527.

only pass that bourne who are never to return. But this subject rather belongs to the *Vedánta:* and I will therefore terminate this treatise; purposing to pursue the subject in a future essay, in which I expect to show that a greater degree of similarity exists between the Indian doctrine and that of the earlier than of the later Greeks;[1] and, as it is scarcely probable that the communication should have taken place, and the knowledge been imparted, at the precise [419] interval of time which intervened between the earlier and later schools of Greek philosophy, and especially between the Pythagoreans and Platonists, I should be disposed to conclude that the Indians were in this instance teachers rather than learners.[2]

[1] [For the relations between Indian and Greek philosophy, cf. G. Pauthier's notes to his translation of the philosophical Essays of this volume, Paris, 1833, and Von Eckstein's singular article in *Ind. Stud.* ii. pp. 369–388. See also Ritter's chapter on Indian Philosophy in the fourth vol. of his "History of Ancient Philosophy," Max Müller's essay on Indian logic, Wilson's notes to the *Sánkhya-kárikd*, and also Saint-Hilaire's remarks in his memoir on the Sánkhya.]

[2] [I may here add that much interesting information on all these various sects of Hindu philosophy may be found in Goldstücker's articles in Chambers' Encyclopædia.]

APPENDIX A.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE JAINA DOCTRINES FROM THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

[I have added this analysis of Mádhava's account of the Jainas, as it seemed to me one of the best available authorities, and it is based on Jaina text-books, which he everywhere quotes by name.—E. B. C.]

The chapter opens with an attack from the Jaina point of view on the Buddhist doctrines (these having taken up the previous chapter),—this I omit;—and the system of the omniscient Arhat is then upheld in the words of Arhachchandra-súri in his *Áptaníschayálankára:*

"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient One who has overcome all the faults, desire, etc.,—adored by the three worlds, the declarer of things as they are."

A passage is then quoted from Tautátita[1] (Bhaṭṭa-kumárila), which tries to prove that no such being can exist, as his existence is not established by any one of the five recognized positive proofs,[2]—the sixth, *ábhava,* being negative, is of course not applicable. This is answered by maintaining that the soul has a natural capacity for knowing all things, but its action is at present hindered; as these hindrances are removed it knows more, and when all are removed it will know all things. The same thing also follows from the existence of universal propositions (*vyápti*), which even the Nyáya allows (such as the Jaina principle that 'all things are indeterminate from the very fact of their existence'), and from the authoritative nature

[1] The St. Petersburg Dictionary would perhaps read *Tautátika*, but this is certainly contrary to native tradition. The word supplies a favourite riddle among Bengali boys; they ask for a name of four syllables which has only *one* consonant.

[2] I have not translated this quotation in full, as it is irrelevant to the Jaina doctrines. The last couplet is obscure, but I understand it as showing the inapplicability of *arthápatti*, or 'presumption' (*supra*, p. 329). A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative, but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it cannot be convincing in his own.

of the injunctions commanding religious duties (Mímánsá Sút. i. 1. 2), which embrace past, present, future, etc. And as for the hindrances in question, they *can* be removed; for this is the very end of the Jaina system.

The Jaina next shows that there is no such eternally omniscient being, since every soul must have been first bound before it could become liberated (*mukta*). He then attacks the favourite Naiyáyika argument, "the earth, etc., must have had a maker, because they have the nature of effects, like a jar (*i.e.* are composed of parts)." This leads to a long and intricate discussion of the meaning of *sávayavatwa*, and in the course of it he maintains that the soul consists of parts, although it is eternal. He quotes two passages from the *Vítarága-stuti*:—

"'There is one eternal maker of the world, all-pervading, independent and true';—they have none of these inextricable delusions, whose teacher art Thou.

"There is here no maker acting by his own freewill, else his influence would extend to the daily works of man. What would be the use of yourself or the artisans, if Íśwara fabricates the three worlds?"

The removal of hindrances is effected by the Jaina doctrines as taught in their sacred books (*ágama*), delivered in a continuous succession by a constant series of teachers, each deriving his knowledge from his predecessor, and transmitting it to his successor, as the seed produces the shoot and the shoot the seed.

The three 'gems' which lead to liberation are 'right intuition' (*samyag-darśana*), 'right knowledge' (*samyag-jnána*), and 'right conduct' (*samyak-cháritra*). Right intuition is absolute faith in the predicaments declared by the *arhat* (this may either come by natural character or by another's instruction). Right knowledge is a knowledge of the true nature of soul and non-soul, undisturbed by any illusion or doubt. This knowledge is divided into five kinds. 1. *Mati*, the unimpeded action of the senses and mind. 2. *S'ruta*, the certain knowledge produced by *mati*. 3. *Avadhi*, the knowledge of special objects produced by right intuition, etc., as destroying the natural hindrances.[1] 4. *Manasparyáya*, the definite knowledge of another's thoughts produced by the perfect absence of all envy, etc. (*i.e.* by complete sympathy). 5. *Kevala*, the pure unalloyed knowledge such as ascetics seek by penance, etc. The first of these is not self-cognized (*i.e.* self-conscious); the other four are.[2] "True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow,

[1] I read in p. 32, l. 9, *samyagdarśanádi*.

[2] Cf. the opinion of the Bhaṭṭa Mímánsakas, see *supra*, p. 349.

and which manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two ways."

The third, right conduct, is the conduct of one who, having faith and right knowledge, abstains from all evil actions. It is fivefold, as consisting of the five 'vows' (*vrata*).[1] 1. Refraining from all injury to living beings (*ahinsá*). 2. Speaking what is true and salutary, and consulting the feelings of others (*sánṛita*). 3. Refraining from all theft (*asteya*). 4. Chastity (*brahmacharyá*), which is of 18 kinds, as abstaining from earthly or heavenly desires in thought, word, and deed, each being again subdivided, as done by oneself, or consented to or caused to be done (2 × 3 × 3). 5. The renouncing all delusive interest in anything mundane (*aparigraha*).

(There are five states of mind (*bhávaná*) in which these *vratas* are to be performed; our author illustrates them from a Jaina *sútra*, with regard to *sánṛita*, as the abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, anger, and speech.)

These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as in the case of an elixir, if it is to produce its effect, you must have the knowledge of what it is and faith in its virtues, and the medicine must be taken.[2]

The *tattwas* are two, *jíva* and *ajíva*. The soul (*jíva*) is defined as pure intelligence, while *ajíva* is non-intelligent. The light of knowledge is called *upayoga* or 'the true employment of the soul's activities,' when the soul recognizes its real nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of *pradeśa*,[3] considers itself one with its actions and with the body which they produce, knowledge should be rather defined as the cause of its recognizing that it is other than these.[4]

In *moksha* the soul attains its true nature of pure intelligence. The soul's five different states are described as follows. 1. *Aupaśamika*, when all action ceases, as when mud sinks to the bottom of water by the influence of the clearing nut-plant; this is only temporary, and action may return. 2. *Kshávika*, when actions are totally destroyed and their power of influencing the future is abolished—this is *moksha*. 3. *Miśra*, the mixed state of (1) and (2), as when water is partly pure. 4. *Audayika*, when actions arise, exerting an inherent influence on the future. 5. *Páriṇámika*, the real but

[1] Cf. the five *yamas* in the *Yoga-sútras*, ii. 30. Hemachandra (*Abhidh.* 81) calls them *yamas*.

[2] I read *rasáyanajñána-śraddhávachárańáni*. Cf. Suśruta, vol. ii. pp. 157, etc.

[3] See infra, p. 449.

[4] This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it by the scholiast to Hemachandra, *Abhidh.* 79.

unrecognized condition of the soul, viewed apart from its apparent states, whether (1), (2) or (4) [just as in the Sánkhya philosophy the soul is not really bound, though it seems to itself to be so].[1]

Others make the *tattwas* five (cf. *supra*, p. 409), viz. *Jiva*, *ákáśa*, *dharma*, *adharma*, and *pudgala;* these are the *astikáyas*. *Jivas* are divided into two, mundane, or those who pass from birth to birth, and released. The mundane are again subdivided into those possessing an internal sense (*manas*), and those destitute of it. The former are called *sanjnin*, i.e. endued with the power of seizing objects, talking, action, and receiving instruction; the latter are either *trasa*, "locomotive," or *sthávara*, "immoveable." The 'locomotive' are those possessing at least two senses, touch and taste, as snails, worms, etc.; the 'immoveable' are earth, water, fire, air, and trees (which, by Hemachandra, *Abhidh.*, possess only one sense, 'touch' or 'form'). But here we come to a distinction. These immoveable substances may be either mere masses, as earth, dust, etc., or aggregated bodies, as bricks, etc.; or they may be viewed in their relation to souls which have assumed or will assume them as bodies in which they are to be impersonated. It is only the souls, thus impersonated in bodies of earth, etc., which really belong to the class *jiva;* in themselves earth, etc., are considered as *mukta*, incapable of passing into any other state of existence. *Dharma* and *adharma* are 'merit' and 'demerit.' *Ákáśa*, 'ether' or 'space,' is the means by which souls ascend or descend according to their merit or demerit; the definition of *ákáśa* is that it is that which causes one thing to enter into the space occupied by another. *Pudgala* or 'body' is atomic or compound. (This category takes up the forms of *sthávara*, which were excluded from *jiva*.) To these five *tattwas* or (as they are also called) *dravyas*, we may also add 'time' (*kála*), as, although not an *astikáya*, it is a *dravya*, since it possesses qualities and actions.[2]

Others make seven *tattwas*, *jiva*, *ajiva*, *ásrava*, *bandha*, *samvara*, *nirjará*, and *moksha*. Here *ásrava* is the impulse, called *yoga* or 'attention,' by which the soul participates in the movement of its various bodies, *audarika*, etc. As a door opening into the water makes the stream descend through it, so actions flow in upon the soul by the pipe of *yoga;* or again, as a wet garment exposed to the wind

[1] There is a hard passage in p. 34, ll. 5–8, which I would hesitatingly translate thus: "The universal definition of the *parinata* soul (*i.e.* the soul as it is in itself) is pure intelligence, but this will appear as (3) from the greater or less influence of (1) or (2), or it will appear altered by defilement from the influence of (4)."

[2] It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mádhava for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is analyzing, that he gives the Jaina terminology for this definition of *dravya*, cf. *Vaiśesh. Sútra* i. 1. 15.—*Paryáya* is explained as *karman* in Hemach. *Anek.*

collects the dust from every part, so the soul, wet with previous sins, on all sides collects actions which are brought to it by *yoga*. *Á'srava* is good or evil, as it is directed to right or wrong objects. *Á'srava* has also been defined as 'the action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects.'

By the influence of the four causes, false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness and sin (*kashâya*), the soul assumes various bodies suited to its actions—this is *bandha*. 1. 'False intuition' is either innate from one's natural character (*naisargika*), as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines by the influence of past evil actions, or derived (*apara*), when learned by another's teaching. 2. 'Non-indifference' (*avirati*) is the non-restraint of the five senses and the internal organ. 3. Carelessness (*pramâda*) is a want of effort to practise the five duties, *samiti*, *gupti*, etc. 4. Sin (*kashâya*) consists of anger, pride, delusion, and greed.

Bandha or 'bondage' is divided into four kinds,—*prakṛiti*, *sthiti*, *anubhâva*, and *pradeśa*: the second and third are caused by false intuition, etc.; the first and fourth by *âsrava* or *yoga*. 1. *Prakṛiti* means 'the natural qualities,' as bitterness or sweetness in the nimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into eight *mûla-prakṛitis*.[1] Thus obstructions (*âvaraṇa*)[2] cloud the knowledge and intuition as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is *a. jnânâvaraṇa* or *b. darśanâvaraṇa*. *c.* An object recognized as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge—this is *vedanîya*. *d.* A delusion in intuition produces want of faith, like association with the wicked; delusion in conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. *e. Âyus* produces the bond of the body, like a snare.[3] *f. Nâma* or 'the name' produces various individual appellations, as a painter paints his different pictures. *g. Gotra* produces the idea of noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots (cf. Romans ix. 21). *h. Antarâya* produces obstacles to liberality, etc., as the treasurer hinders the king by considerations of economy.

2. *Sthiti* is 'continuance.' As the milk of the goat, cow, and buffalo have continued for countless ages as they are now, so the actions of the first three *mûla-prakṛitis* and the last have lasted more than crores of crores of periods measured by thirty *sâgaropamas*.

[1] These are also called the eight *karmans* (*supra*, p. 408), cf. Govindânanda's gloss. *Ved. Sût.* ii. 2. 33.

[2] The Calcutta MS. reads *ddaraṇîyasya* for *âvaraṇîyasya* in p. 37, last line. But *âvaraṇîya* may be used for *âvaraṇa* (*Pâṇ.* 3. 4. 68), cf. *Yoga Sût.* ii. 52, where Vyâsa's Comm. has *âvaraṇîya*.

[3] *Jâlavat?* The printed text has *jalavat*.

3. *Anubhâva* or 'power,' *i.e.* the various degrees of capacity in the different material bodies (*pudgala*) for producing their respective actions, as the milk of goats, cows, and buffaloes is rich or poor.

4. *Pradeśa* is the entrance into the different parts of the soul by the different parts of the various bodies which are produced by the influence of previous actions.

Samvara is the stopping of *âsrava*—that by which the influence of past actions (*karman*) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is divided into *gupti*, *samiti*, etc. *Gupti* is the withdrawal of the soul from that 'attention' (*yoga*) which causes mundane existence,—it may relate to body, speech, or mind. *Samiti* is the acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings, *a. îryâ-samiti*, walking carefully so as not to hurt insects, etc.; *b. bhâshâ-samiti*, speaking few, and those kind, words; *c. eshaṇâ-samiti*, taking alms free from the 42 faults; *d. âdâna-samiti*, the handling everything, as chairs, etc., so as to injure no living creature; *e. utsarga-samiti*, a similar care in performing the bodily excretions.

(Mâdhava omits the remaining divisions of *samvara*. Wilson, *Essays*, i. p. 311, gives them as *parishahâ*, 'endurance,' as of a vow; *yatidharma*, 'the ten duties of an ascetic,' patience, gentleness, etc.; *bhâvanâ*, 'conviction,' as that worldly existences are not eternal, etc.; *châritra*, 'virtuous observance.')

Nirjarâ is the causing the fruit of all past actions to decay by self-mortification, etc., as by pulling out the hair, etc.; this may still involve the potentiality of desire (*sakâma*), as in ascetics, or it may be devoid of all desire (*akâma*), as in those beings who possess higher bodies.

Moksha or 'liberation' is thus defined. "Since, at the moment of its attainment, there is an entire absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false perception, etc.) are stopped,[1] and since all past actions are abolished in the presence of the causes of *nirjarâ*, there arises the absolute release from all actions,—this is *moksha*; then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's wheel, whirled by the stick and hand, moves on even after these have stopped, until the impulse is exhausted,—so the previous intense contemplations of the soul for the attainment of *moksha* exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul onward to the end of the world; or as the gourd, encased with clay, sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its encumbrance,—so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by

[1] I read *nirodhe* for *nirodhah* in p. 40, l. 6; cf. p. 37, l. 13. The 'causes of bondage' produce the assumption of bodies in which future actions are to be performed.

its isolation[1] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.[2] Hence it has been said,

> However often they go away, the sun, moon, and planets return;
> But never to this day have returned any who have gone to Alokákáśa.

"Others hold *moksha* to be the abiding in the highest regions, the soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself untainted by any pain or impression thereof."

Others hold nine *tattwas*, adding 'merit' and 'demerit' to the foregoing seven,—these two are the causes of pleasure and pain.

Mádhava then gives an account of the *sapta-bhanga-naya*, cf. *supra*, p. 410; this is also called the *syád-váda*, and hence the Jainas are sometimes called *Syádvádins*.

"*Syát*, 'may be,' is here defined as an indeclinable particle (*nipáta*), added like a verbal affix (*ting*),—its use is to convey the idea of indefiniteness, as 'may be,' 'in a manner,' etc.[3] If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, everywhere and for everybody, and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this,—'is *being* or *non-being* the real nature of the thing?' The real nature of the thing cannot be *being*, for then you could not properly use the phrase 'it is a pot' (*ghato 'sti*), as the two words 'is' and 'pot' would be tautological; nor ought you to say 'it is not a pot,' as the words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same argument is to be used in other questions.[4] As it has been declared,

> It must not be said 'it is a pot,' since the word 'pot' implies 'is';
> Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive.

"The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents severally hold the doctrine of existence,—non-existence,—existence and non-existence successively,—and the doctrine that everything is inexplicable (*anirvachaníyatá*, i.e. *ἀκαταληψία* or

[1] Literally 'absence of *sanga*.' *Sanga* is defined as 'mutual contact'; *bandha* is the mutual interpenetration of parts, as in body and soul.

[2] This is Mádhava's expansion of a Jaina *sútra* which he quotes.

[3] May we read, p. 42, l. 4, *kimutataḍvidhaḥ*?

[4] Thus Govindananda applies it (*Ved. Sút.* ii. 2. 33) to 'may be it is one,' 'may be it is many,' etc.

ἐποχή);[1] three other classes hold one or other of the three first theories, combined with the fourth. Now when they meet us with the scornful question, 'Does the thing exist?' we have an answer always possible, 'It exists in a certain way,' and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues to the holder of the *syád-váda*, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things. Thus said the teacher in the *Syád-váda-manjarí*:

"'A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of scientific investigation. When our reasonings based on one point proceed in the revealed way, it is called the *Syád-váda*, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things.'

"'All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions and counterpropositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which with no partiality equally favours all sects.'"

Mádhava then sums up in the words of Jinadatta-súri.

"The hindrances of vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure, giving and receiving,—sleep, fear, ignorance, reviling, laughter, liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow, deceit,—these are the eighteen 'faults' (*dosha*) according to our system.[2] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true knowledge of the *tattwas*. The path of emancipation consists of knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof (*pramáṇa*) in the *Syád-váda* doctrine,—sense-perception and inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are nine or seven *tattwas*. The *Jiva*, the *ajíva*, merit and demerit, *ásrava*, *samvara*, *bandha*, *nirjará*, *mukti*,—we will now explain each. *Jiva* is defined as intelligence, *ajíva* is all other than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the opposite; *ásrava* is the bondage of actions,[3] *nirjará* is the unloosing thereof; *moksha* arises from the destruction of the eight forms of *karman* or 'action.' But by some teachers 'merit' is included in *samvara*, and 'demerit' in *ásrava*.

"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[4] and is hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute liberation is declared by Jina. The Swetámbaras are the

[1] This is Śríharsha's doctrine in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khádya*.

[2] This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is really identical with that given in Hemachandra's *Abhidhána-chintámaṇi*, 72, 73; but we must correct the readings to *antaráyás*, *rágadweshán aviratih smarah*, and *háso* for *hinsá*. The order of the 18 *doshas* in the Calcutta edition, is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.

[3] This seems corrupt,—a line is probably lost.

[4] Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul, the liberated, and liberation? These are called *ananta*, see Weber's *Bhagavatí*, p. 250, 261–6.

destroyers of all defilement,[1] they live by alms, they pluck out their hair, they wear white garments, they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the Jaina *Sádhus*. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they eat upright in the giver's house, —these are the second class of the Jaina Rishis.

"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,—so say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point between them and the Swetámbaras."[2]

[1] *Sarajoharaṇáḥ* is explained by the *rajoharaṇadhárin* (=*vratin*) of Halá-yudha, ii. 189.

[2] Cf. Wilson, *Essays*, i. 340. For *strim* read *stri*.

APPENDIX B.

ON THE TWELVE NIDÂNAS.

[Mr. R. C. Childers has kindly furnished the following note on the twelve *Nidânas* of the Buddhists, see *supra*, p. 421.]

The Pali text of the twelve Nidânas is as follows: *avijjâpaccayâ saṅkhârâ, saṅkhârappaccayâ viññâṇaṁ, viññâṇappaccayâ nâmarûpaṁ, nâmarûpappaccayâ saḷâyatanaṁ, saḷâyatanappaccayâ phasso, phassappaccayâ vedanâ, vedanappaccayâ taṇhâ, taṇhappaccayâ upâdânaṁ, upâdânappaccayâ bhavo, bhavappaccayâ jâti, jâtippaccayâ jarâmaraṇaṁ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupâyâsâ sambhavanti*, "from Error springs Karma, from Karma springs Consciousness, from Consciousness springs the Organized Being, from the Organized Being spring the six Organs of Sense, from the six Organs of Sense springs Contact, from Contact springs Sensation, from Sensation springs Desire, from Desire springs Attachment, from Attachment springs Continued Existence, from Continued Existence springs Birth, from Birth spring Decay and Death, Sorrow, Lamentation, physical and mental Suffering, and Despair." By *Avijjâ* is meant ignorance of the Truth, and in particular of the Four Great Truths, in which all knowledge necessary to salvation is summed up. *Saṅkhârâ* (pl.) is practically synonymous with Karma, though more strictly speaking it designates those *states or predispositions* of the mind which bring about the performance of good or bad actions. These Saṅkhârâs or mental states are six in number, *puññâbhisaṅkhâro, apuññâbhisaṅkhâro, ânañjâbhisaṅkhâro, kâyasaṅkhâro, vacîsaṅkhâro, cittasaṅkhâro.* The first of these is thus explained, *kusalâ cetanâ kâmâvacarâ rûpâvacarâ dânamayâ sîlamayâ bhâvanâmayâ ayaṁ vuccati puññâbhisaṅkhâro*, "virtuous (or meritorious) state of the thoughts, having its sphere in Kâma and Rûpa (*viz.* causing re-birth in the Kâma and Rûpa Devalokas), productive of charity, piety, and meditation." The second or evil state of the heart (*apuññâbhisaṅkhâro*) causes re-birth in the eleven lowest worlds, including the hells; the third causes re-birth in the four Arûpa heavens, and is in the highest degree meritorious. The remaining Saṅkhârâs are states of mind which produce the three sorts of Karma, *kâyakammaṁ vaṭkammaṁ manokammaṁ*, or acts of deed, word and thought. The words Saṅkhâra and Abhisaṅkhâra are synonymous (compare Abhisaṅkhâra Mâra, the embodiment of Karma in the form of a wicked angel). The reason of good being associated with evil Karma as a productive

cause of existence and of suffering is that, according to the Buddhist doctrine, *all Karma* causes continued existence, the good causing re-birth in a world of happiness and the evil in a world of suffering. Hence in order to bring existence to an end it is necessary to get rid of all Karma *good and bad*, and this is done by entering the Four Paths, and getting rid of Avijjâ, and therefore of the Karma which is produced by it. The second great cause is, "Mental States produce Consciousness," explained to be consciousness of the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the touch, and the mind. Here the causation appears to me to be somewhat arbitrary, and I think the terms of the proposition might be reversed with equal probability: this however would probably not be disputed by the author of the doctrine of the twelve Nidânas, as I shall show further on. Next, Consciousness uniting with the embryo in the mother's womb calls into being the Nâmarûpa or Individual consisting of mind and body. I find the following passage in Mahânidâna Sutta, *viññâṇañ ca hi Ânanda mâtukucchiṁ na okkamissatha api nu kho nâmarûpaṁ mâtukucchismiṁ samuccissatha? no h' etaṁ bhante: viññâṇañ ca hi Ânanda mâtukucchiṁ okkamitvâ vokkamissatha api nu kho nâmarûpaṁ itthattâya abhinibbattissatha? no h' etaṁ bhante*, "now, Ânanda, supposing a being's Consciousness did not enter the mother's womb, would the Living Being with its mental and physical attributes be formed in the mother's womb? Certainly not, Lord. And if the Consciousness after entering the mother's womb departed from it again, would the individual ever be born into the world? Certainly not, Lord." The next four causes require no explanation. By Upâdâna is meant Attachment, or the morbid clinging to that Existence which the Buddha has shown to be an evil. It is made up of four sensuous states, Kâma, Dṛishṭi, Çîlavrata, and Âtmavâda, or sensual pleasure, false views, ritualism, and egoity or self-consciousness. This clinging to existence naturally produces the next cause, Bhava or continued existence, this in turn causes re-birth, and birth brings with it a heritage of woe. I do not think that the twelve Nidânas are intended to be necessarily consecutive in the order in which they are given. They are rather the enumeration of the principal causes to which existence may be attributed, and within certain limits the order in which they are enumerated is arbitrary. It is easy, for instance, to see that the twelve causes extend over three births or existences of the sentient being. For the first and second belong to one birth, the third, Viññâṇa, forms the transition to a second birth, a new Nâmarûpa or manifestation of the individual being the result, while the last but one, Jâti, commences the third existence. The

process described by the words "Consciousness is the producing cause of the individual," is really the same as that described by the words "Continued existence causes birth"—it is the same event viewed from a different aspect. Nor must we forget that of the twelve Nidânas the first is a cause, the ten following both causes and effects, while the last is an effect only, for we cannot unite the ends of the chain, and go on to say "Suffering is the cause of Error." How little the usual order of the Nidânas is considered an essential part of the doctrine is evident from a passage near the beginning of Mahânidâna Sutta, where first Viññâṇa is derived from Nâmarûpa and then Nâmarûpa is derived from Viññâṇa: *iti kho Ánanda nâmarûpappaccayâ viññâṇaṁ viññâṇappaccayâ nâmarûpaṁ nâmarûpappaccayâ saḷâyatanaṁ saḷâyatanappaccayâ phasso*, etc. In the same discourse many other Causes are enumerated, as *pariyesanâ, lâbha, vinicchaya, chandarâga*, while Saṅkhârâ and Avijjâ are altogether omitted. At p. 434 of Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, is shown (in a quotation from Milinda Pañha) how an endless chain or circle of cause and effect may be made out of some of the twelve Nidânas: *viññâṇappaccayâ phasso, phassappaccayâ vedanâ, vedanappaccayâ taṇhâ, taṇhappaccayâ saṅkhârâ, saṅkhârappaccayâ viññâṇaṁ, viññâṇappaccayâ phasso*, and so on, as before, *ad infinitum*. This is called *paṭiccasamuppâdacakkaṁ*, or circle of causation. The best published explanation of the twelve Nidânas that I am acquainted with is to be found at pp. 66 and foll. of Gogerly's "Evidences and Doctrines of the Christian Religion, Part I., on Buddhism, Colombo, 1862,"—a little work less known than it deserves to be. I have ascertained by an examination of the chapter on the Paṭiccasamuppâda in Visuddhi Magga that Gogerly's exposition is perfectly correct. In conclusion I wish to observe that to obtain a right understanding of a doctrine like that of the Nidânas it is necessary to go straight to Buddhist sources. Knowing as we do how constantly Protestant doctrine is misunderstood by Catholics (and I may add *vice versâ*), we might expect Buddhist doctrine to be similarly misunderstood by orthodox Hindus. That, in point of fact, such is the case may be seen from p. 420 *supra*, where a Hindu writer is represented as explaining Saṁskâra to mean "passion, comprising desire, aversion, delusion, etc." An extreme case may be seen in note [1] on page 421, stating that a commentary on the Vedanta explains Bhava as corporeal birth, and Jâti as genus, kind. These are the random guesses of a man who wishes not to appear ignorant of his subject.

R. C. Childers.

APPENDIX C.

ON THE CHÁRVÁKA SECT.

The publication of Mádhaváchárya's *Sarva-darśana-sangraha* in the Bibliotheca Indica has partly enabled us to supply the want noticed by Colebrooke, *suprà*, p. 427. Among the fourteen systems there analyzed, that of the Chárvákas is placed first,—it being entitled to that priority as the most degraded of all, the next places to it being successively occupied by those of the Bauddhas and the Jainas.

Much of the chapter gives only the same details which Colebrooke had already collected from various scattered references; but the discussion on the sources of knowledge has an interest of its own, as being the best account we have of the Hindu sceptical school corresponding to Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus among the Greeks. I have therefore translated the latter half in full; at the end will be found some of the Várhaspatya ślokas.

After giving the general tenets of the school, Mádhava thus proceeds:—

"All this has been thus summed up,

In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire and air;
And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,—
Just like the intoxicating power from kiṇwa, etc., mixed together;
Since in 'I am fat,' 'I am lean,' these attributes [1] abide in the same subject,
And since fatness, etc., reside only in the body,[2] it alone is the soul and no other,
And such phrases as 'my body' are only significant metaphorically.

"Be it so," says the opponent, "your wish would be gained, if inference, etc., had no force of proof; but then they have this force; else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on hearing another say 'there are fruits on the bank of the river,' do those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"

All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.

Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the *sign*, or middle term, as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the major.[3] Now this invariable connexion must be a relation destitute

[1] *i. e.* personality and fatness, etc. [2] I read *dehe* for *dehaḥ*.

[3] Literally "must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable attendedness (*vyápti*)."

of any condition, accepted or disputed;[1] and this connexion does not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its *existence*, as the eye, etc., are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being *known*. What then is the means of this connexion's being known?

We will first show that it is not *perception*. Now perception is held to be of two kinds, external and internal, *i.e.* as produced by the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind. The former is not the required means; for although it is possible that the actual contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition,[2] which was to embrace the invariable connexion of the middle and major terms in every case, becomes impossible to be known. Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the general class as its object, because, if so, there might arise a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connexion in this particular case[3] (as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying fire).

Nor is internal perception the means, for you cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an external object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, etc., have their objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."

Nor can *inference* be the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since, in the case of this inference, we should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an *ad infinitum* retrogression.

Nor can *testimony* be the means thereof, since we may either allege in reply, in accordance with the *Vaiśeshika* doctrine of Kaṇáda, that this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on the recognition of a *sign*, in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man;[4] and moreover there is no more reason for our believing, on another's word, that smoke and fire are

[1] For the *sandigdha* and *niśchita upádhi* see *Siddhánta-muktávali*, p. 125, The former is accepted only by one party.

[2] Literally, the knowledge of the invariable attendedness (as of smoke by fire).

[3] The attributes of the class are not always found in every member,—thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place.

[4] See *Sáhitya-darpaṇa* (Dr. Ballantyne's translation), p. 16, and *Siddhánta-muktávali*, p. 80.

invariably connected, than for our receiving the ipse dixit of Manu, etc. (which of course we *Chárvákas* reject).

And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connexion between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference of one thing (as fire) on seeing another thing (as smoke); hence on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for oneself[1] would have to end in mere idle words.

Then again *comparison*,[2] etc., must be utterly rejected as the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connexion (*i.e.* the universal proposition), because their end is to produce the knowledge of quite another connexion, *viz.* the relation of a name to something so named.

Again, this same absence of a condition,[3] which has been given as the definition of an invariable connexion (*i.e.* a universal proposition), can itself never be known; since it is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objects of perception, and therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to inference, etc., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in extension[4] with the major term, though not constantly accompanying the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" (*i.e.* reciprocal), are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of sound, as 'being produced,' 'the nature of a jar,' and 'the not causing audition;'[5] wherefore the definition holds,—and again it

[1] The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument (*sup.* p. 316).

[2] "*Upamána*, or the knowledge of a similarity, is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named." Dr. Ballantyne's *Tarka-sangraha*.

[3] The upádhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference 'the mountain has smoke because it has fire,' if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case of a true vyápti there is of course no upádhi.

[4] *Α'ντιστρέφει.* We have here our own A with distributed predicate.

[5] If we omitted the first clause and only made the upádhi "that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it," then in the Naiyáyika argument 'sound is non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound,'

is established by the śloka of the great Doctor beginning *samá-sama.*[1]

But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is possible, *i.e.* a knowledge in the form of such a connexion between the middle term and major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand the knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the invariable connexion. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence, by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition, it becomes impossible to establish inference, etc.[2]

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, etc., to the knowledge of fire, etc., can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases this step is justified by the result, is accidental, just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, etc.

'being produced' would serve as a Mímánsaka upádhi, to establish the *vyabhichára* fallacy, as it is reciprocal with 'non-eternal'; but the omitted clause excludes it, as an Upádhi must be consistent with *either* party's opinions, and of course the Naiyáyika maintains that 'being produced' *always* accompanies the class of sound. Similarly if we defined the upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upádhi 'the nature of a jar,' as this is never found with the middle term (the class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar only in a jar), while at the same time wherever the class of jar is found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly if we defined the upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly accompanying the major," we might have as a Mímánsaka upádhi 'the not causing audition,' *i.e.* the not being apprehended by the organs of hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.

[1] This refers to an obscure śloka of Udayanáchárya, "where a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connexion (*i.e.* universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the same argument (as *e.g.* to prove the existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by the other reprocal of the first." Thus 'the mountain has smoke because it has fire' (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke, though smoke is by fire), or 'because it has fire from wet fuel' (smoke and fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this will not be the case, where the non-reciprocating term *is* thus invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as 'the mountain has fire because it has smoke;' here, though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by heat which is the reciprocal of fire.

[2] Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii.—In S. D. S. pp. 7, 8, we have an attempt to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or genus and species.

From this it follows that fate, etc.,[1] do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do not allow *adṛishṭa*, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been said,

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn,
By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.

And all this has been also said by Vṛihaspati.

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,
Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect.
The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes,
Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.
If a beast slain in the Jyotishṭoma rite will itself go to heaven,
Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?[2]
If the S'rāddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,
Then here too in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.
If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the S'rāddha here,
Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?
While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee, even though he runs in debt,
When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?
If he who departs from the body goes to another world,
How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his kindred?
Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established here
All these ceremonies for the dead,—there is no other fruit anywhere.
The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves and demons.
All the well-known formulæ of the paṇḍits, jarpharī, turpharī, etc.,[3]
And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aśwamedha,
These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests,[4]
While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons.

Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge to the doctrine of Chārvāka. Such is the pleasant consummation."

[1] *Adṛishṭa*, i.e. the merit and demerit in our actions which produce their effects in future births.

[2] This is an old Buddhist retort, see Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 209.

[3] Rig veda, x. 106.—For the Aśwamedha rites, see Wilson's Rig. V., preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.

[4] Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be handled in the rites."

XII.

PREFACE TO THE DIGEST OF HINDU LAW ON CONTRACTS AND SUCCESSIONS.

Published at Calcutta, 1798.

The motives for undertaking the compilation of a new Digest of Indian Law are so well unfolded in a letter addressed by the late Sir William Jones to the Supreme Council of Bengal, that it will suffice to extract therefrom the sentiments expressed by that venerable magistrate. It must ever be regretted that the public has lost, by his premature death, a translation, from his pen, of a Digest compiled under his direction, and an introductory discourse, for which he had prepared curious and ample materials.[1] The loss is irreparable; for no other joins to a competent knowledge of Oriental languages that legislative spirit and intimate acquaintance with the principles of Jurisprudence which he possessed in so eminent a degree.

"Nothing," says Sir William Jones, in the Address alluded to, "could be more obviously just than to determine "private contests according to those laws which the parties "themselves had ever considered as the rules of their conduct "and engagements in civil life; nor could anything be wiser "than, by a legislative act, to assure the Hindu and Musul-"man subjects of Great Britain, that the private laws which

[1] See his last Anniversary Discourse as President of the Asiatic Society, vol. iv. p. 176 [8vo. ed. vol. iii. p. 245].

"they severally hold sacred, and a violation of which they "would have thought the most grievous oppression, should "not be superseded by a new system, of which they could "have no knowledge, and which they must have considered as "imposed on them by a spirit of rigour and intolerance. So "far the principle of decision between the native parties in a "cause appears perfectly clear: but the difficulty lies (as in "most other cases) in the application of the principle to "practice; for the Hindu and Musulman laws are locked up "for the most part in two very difficult languages, Sanskrit "and Arabic, which few Europeans will ever learn, because "neither of them leads to any advantage in worldly pursuits; "and if we give judgment only from the opinions of the "native lawyers and scholars, we can never be sure that we "have not been deceived by them. It would be absurd and "unjust to pass an indiscriminate censure on a considerable "body of men; but my experience justifies me in declaring, "that I could not, with any easy conscience, concur in a "decision, merely on the written opinion of native lawyers, "in any cause in which they could have the remotest interest "in misleading the Court: nor, how vigilant soever we might "be, would it be very difficult for them to mislead us; for a "single obscure text explained by themselves might be quoted "as express authority, though perhaps in the very book from "which it was selected it might be differently explained, or "introduced only for the purpose of being exploded. The "obvious remedy for this evil had occurred to me before I left "England, where I had communicated my sentiments to some "friends in Parliament, and on the bench in Westminster "Hall, of whose discernment I had the highest opinion; and "those sentiments I propose to unfold in this letter with as "much brevity as the magnitude of the subject will admit. "If we had a complete Digest of Hindu and Muhammadan "laws, after the model of Justinian's inestimable Pandects, "compiled by the most learned of the native lawyers, with

"an accurate verbal translation of it into English; and if "copies of the work were reposited in the proper offices of the "Sadr Díwáni Adálat, and of the Supreme Court, that they "might occasionally be consulted as a standard of justice, we "should rarely be at a loss for principles at least, and rules of "law, applicable to the cases before us, and should never per- "haps be led astray by the Pandits or Maulavis, who would "hardly venture to impose on us, when their imposition might "so easily be detected. The great work, of which Justinian "has the credit, consists of texts collected from law-books of "approved authority, which in his time were extant at Rome: "and those texts are digested according to a scientifical "analysis; the names of the original authors, and the titles "of their several books, being constantly cited, with references "even to the parts of their works from which the different "passages were selected. But although it comprehends the "whole system of jurisprudence, public, private, and criminal, "yet that vast compilation was finished, we are told, in three "years; it bears marks, unquestionably, of great precipita- "tion, and of a desire to gratify the Emperor by quickness of "dispatch; but, with all its imperfections, it is a most valuable "mine of juridical knowledge. It gives law at this hour to "the greatest part of Europe; and, though few English "lawyers dare make such an acknowledgment, it is the true "source of nearly all our English laws that are not of a feudal "origin. It would not be unworthy of a British Government "to give the natives of these Indian provinces a permanent "security for the due administration of justice among them, "similar to that which Justinian gave to his Greek and Roman "subjects; but our compilation would require far less labour, "and might be completed with far greater exactness, in as "short a time: since it would be confined to the laws of con- "tracts and inheritances, which are of the most extensive use "in private life, and to which the legislature has limited the "decisions of the Supreme Court in causes between native

"parties: the labour of the work would also be greatly "diminished by two compilations already made in Sanskrit "and Arabic, which approach nearly, in merit and in method, "to the Digest of Justinian. The first was composed a few "centuries ago by a Brâhman of this province, named Raghu- "nandana, and is comprised in twenty-seven books at least, "on every branch of Hindu law: the second, which the Arabs "call the Indian Decisions, is known here by the title of "*Fatáwa'i Álamgíri*, and was compiled, by the order of Aurang- "zíb, in five large volumes, of which I possess a perfect and "well-collated copy. To translate these immense works "would be superfluous labour; but they will greatly facilitate "the compilation of a Digest on the laws of inheritance and "contracts; and the code, as it is called, of Hindu law, which "was compiled at the request of Mr. Hastings, will be useful "for the same purpose, though it by no means obviates the "difficulties before stated, nor supersedes the necessity, or the "expedience at least, of a more ample repository of Hindu "laws, especially on the twelve different contracts to which "Ulpian has given specific names, and on all the others, which, "though not specifically named, are reducible to four general "heads. The last-mentioned work is entitled *Vivádárṇava* "*Setu*, and consists, like the Roman Digest, of authentic texts, "with the names of their several authors regularly prefixed to "them, and explained, where an explanation is requisite, in "short notes, taken from commentaries of high authority. It "is, as far as it goes, a very excellent work; but though it "appear extremely diffuse on subjects rather curious than "useful, and though the chapter on Inheritances be copious and "exact, yet the other important branch of jurisprudence, the "law of Contracts, is very succinctly and superficially discussed, "and bears an inconsiderable proportion to the rest of the "work. But, whatever be the merit of the original, the trans- "lation of it has no authority, and is of no other use than to "suggest inquiries on the many dark passages which we find

"in it: properly speaking, indeed, we cannot call it a transla-
"tion; for though Mr. Halhed performed his part with
"fidelity, yet the Persian interpreter had supplied him only
"with a loose injudicious epitome of the original Sanskrit, in
"which abstract many essential passages are omitted, though
"several notes of little consequence are interpolated, from a
"vain idea of elucidating or improving the text."[1]

Besides the great work of Raghunandana above mentioned, many other Digests have been compiled by Hindu lawyers; which, like his, consist of texts collected from the institutes attributed to ancient legislators, with a gloss, explanatory of the sense, and reconciling seeming contradictions, to fulfil the precept of their great lawgiver; "When there are two sacred "texts apparently inconsistent, both are held to be law; for "both are pronounced by the wise to be valid and reconcile-"able."[2] From various digests, and from commentaries on the institutes of law, the present Digest has been compiled; and the venerable author, Jagannátha, has added a copious commentary, sometimes indeed pursuing frivolous disquisitions, but always fully explaining the various interpretations of which the text is susceptible. In restricting this compilation to the law of contracts and successions, he has omitted the law of evidence, the rules of pleading, the rights of landlord and tenant, the decision of questions respecting boundaries, with some other topics, which should be likewise treated for the purpose of assisting courts of civil judicature in deciding private contests according to the laws which the Hindu subjects of Great Britain hold sacred. The body of Indian law comprises a system of duties religious and civil. Separating

[1] The letter from which this extract is taken is dated 19th March, 1788. On the same date, the then Governor-General, Marquis Cornwallis, with the concurrence of the Members of Council, accepted the offer in terms honourable to the proposer and expressive of the most liberal sentiments. "The object of your proposition," they say, "being to promote a due administration of justice, it becomes interesting to humanity; and it is deserving of our peculiar attention, as being intended to increase and secure the happiness of the numerous subjects of the Company's provinces."

[2] Manu, chap. ii. v. 14.

the topic of religious duties, and omitting ethical subjects, Hindu lawyers have considered civil duties under the distinct heads of private contests and forensic practice: the first comprehends law private and criminal; the last includes the forms of judicial procedure, rules of pleading, law of evidence written and oral, adverse titles, oaths, and ordeal. The translation of Manu has sufficiently made known the criminal law of the Hindus, which is now superseded by the Muhammadan system: but another head of private contests, in which, under the name of disputes concerning boundaries, the rights of husbandmen are examined, contains matter both curious and useful; practical law, especially the system of evidence, must be sometimes consulted in the provincial courts, which are not governed by English law; and the rules of special pleading have been pronounced excellent by one whose opinion has great weight.[1]

The *Dharma-śástra* or sacred code of law, comprising all the subjects above mentioned, is called *smṛiti*, what was remembered, in contradistinction to *śruti*, what was heard. By these names it is signified that the *Veda* has preserved the words of revelation, while the system of law records the sense expressed in other words. It has been promulgated by thirty-six ancient sages,[2] who are named in three verses of the *Padma-puráṇa;* Yájnavalkya, however, mentions no more than twenty.[3] On the other hand, sages are cited in law tracts, whose names do not appear in either list.

Treatises, attributed to these ancient philosophers, are extant, which internal evidence proves to be,[4] though probably composed by other persons, as the *Puráṇas*, written by many different authors, are all ascribed to Vyása; for the dramatic form which has been given to most of those tracts, and the use of the third person when the reputed author is named in

[1] Sir William Jones in a manuscript note.

[2] [Cf. Stenzler, 'Zur Literatur der Indischen Gesetzbücher,' *Ind. Stud.* i. 232–246.]

[3] [i. 4, 5.]

[4] [Sic in original; should we read 'proves to be, however, probably composed, etc.'?]

his code, extort a confession from commentators, that the institutes must have been composed by pupils from the recollection of precepts delivered by their holy instructor. Without examining whether the authenticity of codes now extant be thus sufficiently established, the Hindus revere those institutes as containing a system of sacred law confirmed by the *Veda* itself, in a text[1] thus translated by Sir William Jones, according to the gloss of Śankara: "GOD, having "created the four classes, had not yet completed his work; "but, in addition to it, lest the royal and military class should "become insupportable through their power and ferocity, he "produced the transcendent body of law; since law is the king "of kings, far more powerful and rigid than they: nothing "can be mightier than law, by whose aid, as by that of the "highest monarch, even the weak may prevail over the strong."

Concerning the birth and actions of the legislators, we know little more than what is recorded in the *Puráṇas;* and the whole of what is there recorded belongs either to heroic history or to mythology. Such topics would be here misplaced: but a short notice of the institutes, commentaries, and digests, which have been used by the compiler, may be fitly subjoined to introduce to the reader's acquaintance the authorities cited in the work.

The laws of Manu, who is revered by Hindus as the first of legislators, have already appeared in the English language. Among the numerous commentaries on his institutes, the most esteemed have been noticed in the preface to the translation of his work, namely, a commentary by Medhátithi, son of Bíraswámi-bhaṭṭa, which, having been partly lost, has been completed by other hands at the Court of Madana-pála, a prince of Ḍígh; another commentary by Govinda-rája; a third by Dharaṇídhara; and the celebrated gloss of Kullúka-bhaṭṭa, entitled *Manvartha-muktávali;* and some others are occasionally quoted in this Digest.

[1] [*Vṛihad-áraṇyaka-upanishad*, i. 4. 14.]

Atri,[1] not named among legislators in the *Padma-puráṇa*, is second in the list of Yájnavalkya; he is one of the ten lords of created beings,[2] and father of Dattátreya, Durvásas and Soma: a perspicuous treatise in verse, attributed to him, is extant. Vishṇu, not the Indian divinity, but an ancient philosopher who bore this name, is reputed author of an excellent law treatise in verse; and Hárita is cited as the author of a treatise in prose: metrical abridgments of both works are also extant.

Yájnavalkya, grandson of Viswámitra, is described, in the introduction of his own institutes, as delivering his precepts to an audience of ancient philosophers assembled in the province of Mithilá. These institutes have been arranged in three chapters, containing one thousand and twenty-three couplets. An excellent commentary, entitled *Mitákshará*,[3] was composed by Vijnáneśwara, a hermit, who cites other legislators in the progress of his work, and expounds their texts, as well as those of his author, thus composing a treatise which may supply the place of a regular digest; it is so used in the province of Benares, where it is preferred to other law tracts; but some of his opinions have been successfully controverted by late writers. Following the arrangement of his author, he has divided his work into three parts: the first treats of duties; the second, of private contests and administrative law; the third, of purification, the orders of devotion, penance and so forth. Another commentary on Yájnavalkya by Devabodha, and one by Viśwarúpa, are occasionally cited. The *Dípakalikà*, by Śúlapáṇi, which is likewise a commentary on Yájnavalkya, is in deserved repute with the Gaudíya school.

Uśanas is another name of Śukra, the regent of the planet Venus: he was grandson of Bhrigu: his institutes in verse, with an abridgment, are extant; as is a short treatise con-

[1] [The series of works, supposed to be the *smṛitis* of these nineteen inspired legislators, have been printed in Calcutta.]

[2] Manu, chap. i. v. 35.

[3] [More than once printed in India.]

taining about seventy couplets ascribed to Angiras, who holds a place among the ten lords of created beings, and, according to the *Bhágavata*, became father of Utathya and of Vṛihaspati in the reign of the second Manu. A short tract containing a hundred couplets is attributed to Yama, brother of the seventh Manu, and ruler of the world below. Kullúka-bhaṭṭa wrote a gloss on his institutes. Ápastamba was author of a work in prose, which is extant, with an abridgment in verse; but the metrical abridgment only of the institutes of Samvarta is among the tracts which were collected for the present compilation. Kátyáyana is author of a clear and full treatise on law, and also wrote on grammar and on other subjects. Vṛihaspati, regent of the planet Jupiter, has a place among legislators; he was son of Angiras according to one legend, but son of Devala according to another; the abridgment of his institutes, if not the code at large, is extant. Paráśara, grandson of Vaśishṭha, is termed the highest authority for the fourth age; a work attributed to him is extant, with a commentary by Mádhaváchárya. Vyása, son of Paráśara, is reputed author of the *Puráṇas*, which, with some works more immediately connected with law, are often cited in his name. Śankha and Likhita are the authors of a joint work in prose, which has been abridged in verse; their separate tracts in verse are also extant. Heroic history notices two personages of the name of Daksha: one son of Brahmá, the other son of Prachetas. A similar legend on the marriage of their daughters, and which is evidently allegorical, is told of both; it does not appear certain which of them is the legislator; however, a law treatise in verse is dignified with this name. Gautama, son of the celebrated founder of a rational system of metaphysics and logic, is named in every list of legislators, although texts are cited in the name of his father Gotama, the son of Utathya; an elegant treatise in prose is ascribed to Gautama. Śátátapa is author of a treatise on penance and expiation, of which an abridgment in verse is extant. Vaśishṭha, the preceptor of

the inferior gods, and one of the lords of created beings, is the last of twenty legislators named by Yájnavalkya; his elegant work in prose mixed with verse is extant.

In the *Padma-puráṇa* the number of thirty-six legislators is completed by the following names: Maríchi, the father of Kaśyapa; Pulastya, father of Agastya; Prachetas, son of Práchínavarhisha by a daughter of the ocean, and father of Daksha; Bhṛigu, son of Manu; Nárada, begotten by Brahmá, and again by Kaśyapa, on the wife of Daksha; Kaśyapa, son of Maríchi; Viswámitra, a sage among military men, who became a Bráhmaṇa through his devotion; Devala, son of Viswámitra, and grandfather of the celebrated grammarian Páṇini, but according to another legend great-grandson of Daksha; Ṛishyaśringa, son of Vibháṇḍaka by a miraculous birth from a doe; Gárgya, the astronomer; Baudháyana, who is frequently cited by lawyers; Paiṭhínasi, who is also cited in this Digest; Jábáli, Sumantu, Paráskara, Lokákshi, and Kuthumi, whose names rarely occur in any compilation of law. Besides these legislators, Dhaumya, the priest of the *Páṇḍavas*, and author of a commentary on the *Yajurveda*, Áśwaláyana, who wrote on the detail of religious acts and ceremonies, and Datta, the son of Atri, are cited in this compilation; and Bháguri is quoted for a gloss on the institutes of Manu.

The *Rámáyaṇa* of Válmíki, the earliest epic poem, is cited as nearly equal in authority with the poems on mythology and heroic history, which are ascribed to Vyása. For the purpose of elucidation, the compiler sometimes quotes metaphysical rules and ethical maxims, and, with particular veneration, the sublime works of Udayanáchárya, the reviver of the rational system of philosophy. For the same purpose he has made some use of the dramas and epic poem of Kálidása, and lyric poetry of Jayadeva. The treatises and commentaries of lawyers, which have been consulted by the compiler, are numerous.

The *Chhandoga-parišishṭa* by Keśava-miśra, a celebrated philosopher, and its commentary named *Parišishṭa-prakáśa*, are works of great authority; they treat of the duties of priests, especially those who are guided in their religious ceremonies by the *Sámaveda*. A more general treatise, entitled *Dwaita-parišishṭa*, is the work of the same author, a native of Mithilá. The *Viváda-ratnákara*, a digest highly esteemed by the lawyers of Mithilá or Tírabhukti, was compiled under the superintendence of Chaṇḍeśwara, minister of Harasinhadeva, king of Mithilá.[1] Chaṇḍeśwara is reputed author of other tracts. The *Viváda-chintámaṇi*,[2] *Vyaahára-chintámaṇi*, and other works of Váchaspati-miśra, are also in high repute among the lawyers of Mithilá. No more than ten or twelve generations have passed since he flourished at Semaul in Tirhút. The *Viváda-chandra* and other works composed by Lakhimádeví are likewise much respected in the Mithilá school. This learned female set the name of her nephew Misarú-miśra to all her compositions on law and philosophy, and took the titles of her work from the tenth reigning prince, Chandrasinha, grandson of Harasinhadeva. The *Viváda-chandra* is never cited by name in the new Digest; although it has been frequently copied in the anonymous commentary.

The *Vyaahára-tattwa*,[3] *Dáya-tattwa*,[3] and other works of Raghunandana-bandyaghaṭíya, are highly respected by the Gauḍíya school. This great lawyer is frequently cited by the title of Smárta-bhaṭṭáchárya, as Váchaspati-miśra is distinguished by his family name of Miśra. The *Dwaita-nirṇaya* of Váchaspati-bhaṭṭáchárya, a treatise on questions of law, is often quoted by the compiler of the new Digest, who has only once named him; in every other instance he cites him by the appellation of "my venerable grandfather." In allusion to

[1] [He flourished A.D. 1314, see Hall, preface to the *Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya*, p. 36.]

[2] [Printed at Calcutta in 1837; a translation was published in 1863 by Prasanna Kumár Ṭhákur.]

[3] [Printed at Calcutta in 1828. These form part of the *Smṛiti-tattwa* (Calc. 1834).]

the similarity of their names, this lawyer adopted a title for his work from a similar treatise by Váchaspati-miśra. The compiler of the new Digest also quotes his maternal grandfather's brother by the appellation of "modern Váchaspati."

Jímútaváhana, who gave his name to a digest entitled *Dharma-ratna*, is said to have reigned on the throne of Śáliváhana. He is probably the same with the son of Jímútaketu, a prince of the race of Silára, who reigned at Tagara.[1] The chapter on inheritance is extant, with a commentary by Śrí-kṛishṇa-tarkálankára, a modern writer, of no great authority, who belongs to the Gaudíya school, and is often cited.

Haláyudha, the spiritual adviser of Lakshmaṇasena (a renowned monarch who gave his name to an era of which six hundred and ninety-two years are expired), is the author of the *Nyáya-sarvasva*, *Bráhmaṇa-sarvasva*, *Paṇḍita-sarvasva*, and many other tracts on the administration of justice, and on the duties of classes and professions. He was son of Dhanañjaya, the celebrated lexicographer; and his brothers Pasúpati and Íśána are authors of rituals, the first for obsequies, etc., the second for daily acts of religion.

Lakshmídhara composed a treatise on administrative justice, by command of Govindachandra, a king of Kási, sprung from the Vástava race of Káyasthas. He is likewise author of a digest entitled *Kalpataru*, which is often cited. By command of the same prince, Narasinha, son of Rámachandra, the grammarian and philosopher, composed a law tract entitled *Govindárṇava*, and several other treatises.

Śríkaráchárya and his son Śrínáthácháryа-chúḍámaṇi were both celebrated lawyers of the Mithilá school. The first wrote a treatise on inheritances, the last is author of a tract on the duties of the fourth class, which is entitled *Áchárya-chandriká*.[2] I have not seen the other works of these authors.

The *Smṛiti-sára*, or, at full length, *Smṛityartha-sára*, by

[1] Asiatic Researches, vol. i. pp. 357 and 361. [Cf. *infra*, p. 489.]

[2] [*Áchára-chandriká*, see Aufrecht, *Bodl. Catal.*, p. 253, *b*.]

Śrídharáchárya, a priest of the Dravir[1] tribe, is a treatise on religious duties, in which questions of civil duty are incidentally introduced. He cites the *Kámadhenu*, a law tract said to be a gloss on Manu; but which, not having seen the book, I cannot affirm. The *Pradípa*, *Kalpadruma*, and *Kalpalatá*, works of which I can give no other notices, are cited in the *Smṛiti-sára*.

The *Madana-párijáta*, on civil duties, is the work of Viśweśwara-bhaṭṭa, and derives its name from Madana-pála, a prince of the Jáṭ race, who reigned at Káshṭhanagar or Ḍígh. This work, which is sometimes quoted in the name of Madana-pála himself, cites, among other authorities, the *Sáparárka*[2] and *Smṛiti-chandriká*, which do not appear to be otherwise known, and the *Hemádri*, which is occasionally quoted in the new Digest.

Śúlapáṇi, a native of Mithilá, who resided at Sáhurīa in Bengal,[3] wrote a treatise on penance and expiation, which is in great repute with both schools. His commentary on Yájnavalkya, entitled *Dípakalikā*, has been already noticed. Bhavadeva-bhaṭṭa, also called Balabalabhi-bhujanga, was author of several treatises on religious duties. These, with the rituals of the same author, are much consulted in Bengal and in the southern provinces of India. Jitendriya is often cited in the *Mitákshará*, and sometimes in the new Digest. Goyíchandra, Graheśwara, Dháreśwara, Balarúpa, Harihara, Murári-miśra, and many others, have been occasionally consulted.

Among modern digests the most remarkable are the *Vivádárṇava-setu*, compiled by order of Mr. Hastings; the *Vivádasárárṇava*, compiled at the request of Sir William Jones, by Sarvoru-trivedí, a lawyer of Mithilá; and the *Viváda-bhangárṇava*, by Jagannátha, which is now translated.

On this translation I shall briefly observe, that the version of many texts comes from the pen of Sir W. Jones; for most

[1] [Drávida.] [2] [*Aparárka*?]
[3] ["Sáhuḍiyána, S'úlapáṇis cognomen," Aufrecht, *Bodl. Catal.*]

of the laws quoted from Manu are found in his translation of the *Mánava-dharma-śástra*, and other texts had been already translated by him when perusing the original digest formerly compiled by order of Mr. Hastings. It has become my part to complete a translation of the new Digest of Indian Law. Selected for this duty by Sir John Shore, whose attention extended to promote the happiness of the native inhabitants of the provinces which he governs, and to encourage the labours of the literary society over which he presides, is no less conspicuous than his successful administration of the British interests in India, I have cheerfully devoted my utmost endeavours to deserve the choice by which I was honoured; nothing, which diligence could effect, has been omitted to render the translation scrupulously faithful; and to this it has been frequently necessary to sacrifice perspicuous diction. The reader, while he censures this and other defects of a work executed in the midst of official avocations, will candidly consider the obvious difficulties of the undertaking. Should it appear to him that much of the commentary might have been omitted without injury to the context, or that a better arrangement would have rendered the whole more perspicuous, he will remember that the translator could use no freedom with the text, but undertook a verbal translation of it: what has been inserted to make this intelligible is distinguished by italics, as was practised by Sir William Jones in his version of Manu and of the Sirájiyyah; in very few instances has any greater liberty been taken, except grammatical explanations and etymologies, which are sometimes, though rarely, omitted, or abridged, where a literal version would have been wholly unintelligible to the English reader. In the orthography of Sanskrit words, the system adopted by Sir W. Jones has been followed.[1] To obviate the necessity of referring to the first volume of the Asiatic Researches, where that system was proposed, an explanatory note is subjoined.

[1] [This has been of course altered in the present reprint.]

This, with an index, and a few scattered annotations, which have been added, may prove sufficient to assist the occasional perusal of a work intended to disseminate a knowledge of Indian law, and, serving as a standard for the administration of justice among the Hindu subjects of Great Britain, to advance the happiness of a numerous people.

MIRZAPOOR,
17th December, 1796.

XIII.

PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF TWO TREATISES ON THE HINDU LAW OF INHERITANCE.

Published at Calcutta, 1810.

No branch of jurisprudence is more important than the law of successions or inheritance; as it constitutes that part of any national system of laws, which is the most peculiar and distinct, and which is of most frequent use and extensive application.

In the law of contracts, the rules of decision, observed in the jurisprudence of different countries, are in general dictated by reason and good sense; and rise naturally, though not always obviously, from the plain maxims of equity and right.

As to the criminal law, mankind are in general agreed in regard to the nature of crimes; and, although some diversity necessarily result from the exigencies of different states of society, leading to considerable variation in the catalogue of offences, and in the scale of relative guilt and consequent punishment, yet the fundamental principles are unaltered, and may perhaps be equally traced in every known scheme of exemplary and retributive justice.

But the rules of succession to property, being in their nature arbitrary, are in all systems of law merely conventional. Admitting even that the succession of the offspring to the parent is so obvious as almost to present a natural and

universal law, yet this very first rule is so variously modified by the usages of different nations, that its application at least must be acknowledged to be founded on consent rather than on reasoning. In the laws of one people the rights of primogeniture are established; in those of another the equal succession of all the male offspring prevails; while the rest allow the participation of the female with the male issue, some in equal, others in unequal proportions. Succession by right of representation, and the claim of descendants to inherit in the order of proximity, have been respectively established in various nations, according to the degree of favour with which they have viewed those opposite pretensions. Proceeding from linear to collateral succession, the diversity of laws prevailing among different nations is yet greater, and still more forcibly argues the arbitrariness of the rules. Nor is it indeed practicable to reduce the rules of succession, as actually established in any existing body of law, to a general or leading principle, unless by the assumption of some maxim not necessarily nor naturally connected with the canons of inheritance.

In proportion, then, as the law of successions is arbitrary and irreducible to fixed and general principles, it is complex and intricate in its provisions; and requires, on the part of those entrusted with the administration of justice, a previous preparation by study; for its rules and maxims cannot be rightly understood, when only hastily consulted as occasions arise. Those occasions are of daily and of hourly occurrence; and, on this account, that branch of law should be carefully and diligently studied.

In the Hindu jurisprudence in particular, it is the branch of law, which specially and almost exclusively merits the attention of those who are qualifying themselves for the line of service in which it will become their duty to administer justice to our Hindu subjects, according to their own laws.

A very ample compilation on this subject is included in the Digest of Hindu Law prepared by Jagannátha, under the

directions of Sir William Jones. But copious as that work is, it does not supersede the necessity of further aid to the study of the Hindu law of inheritance. In the preface to the translation of the Digest, I hinted an opinion unfavourable to the arrangement of it, as it has been executed by the native compiler. I have been confirmed in that opinion of the compilation since its publication; and indeed the author's method of discussing together the discordant opinions maintained by the lawyers of the several schools, without distinguishing in an intelligible manner which of them is the received doctrine of each school, but on the contrary leaving it uncertain whether any of the opinions stated by him do actually prevail, or which doctrine must now be considered to be in force, and which obsolete, renders his work of little utility to persons conversant with the law, and of still less service to those who are not versed in Indian jurisprudence; especially to the English reader, for whose use, through the medium of translation, the work was particularly intended.

Entertaining this opinion of it, I long ago undertook a new compilation of the law of successions with other collections of Hindu law, under the sanction of the Government of Bengal, for preparing for publication a supplementary Digest of such parts of the law as I might consider to be most useful. Its final completion and publication have been hitherto delayed by important avocations; and it has been judged mean time advisable to offer to the public in a detached form a complete translation of two works materially connected with that compilation.

They are the standard authorities of the Hindu law of inheritance in the schools of Benares and Bengal respectively; and considerable advantage must be derived to the study of this branch of law, from access to those authentic works, in which the entire doctrine of each school, with the reasons and arguments by which it is supported, may be seen at one view and in a connected shape.

In a general compilation, where the authorities are greatly multiplied, and the doctrines of many different schools and of numerous authors are contrasted and compared, the reader is at a loss to collect the doctrines of a particular school, and to follow the train of reasoning by which they are maintained. He is confounded by the perpetual conflict of discordant opinions and jarring deductions; and by the frequent transition from the positions of one sect to the principles of another. It may be useful, then, that such a compilation should be preceded by the separate publication of the most approved works of each school. By exhibiting in an exact translation the text of the author with notes selected from the glosses of his commentators, or from the works of other writers of the same school, a correct knowledge of that part of the Hindu law which is expressly treated by him will be made more easily attainable, than by trusting solely to a general compilation. The one is best adapted to preparatory study; the other may afterwards be profitably consulted, when a general, but accurate knowledge has been thus previously obtained by the separate study of a complete body of doctrine.

These considerations determined the publication of the present volume. It comprehends the celebrated treatise of Jímútaváhana on successions, which is constantly cited by the lawyers of Bengal under the emphatic title of *Dáya-bhága* or "inheritance"; and an extract from the still more celebrated *Mitákshará*, comprising so much of this work as relates to inheritance. The range of its authority and influence is far more extensive than that of Jímútaváhana's treatise, for it is received in all the schools of Hindu law, from Benares to the southern extremity of the peninsula of India, as the chief groundwork of the doctrines which they follow, and as an authority from which they rarely dissent.

The works of other eminent writers have, concurrently with the *Mitákshará*, considerable weight in the schools of law which have respectively adopted them; as the *Smṛiti-chan-*

drikâ[1] in the south of India; the *Chintámaṇi, Ratnákara,* and *Vivâda-chandra*[2] in Mithilâ; the *Viramitrodaya* and *Kamalâkara*[3] at Benares; and the *Mayúkha*[4] among the Marhâṭṭas: but all agree in generally deferring to the authority of the *Mitákshará*, in frequently appealing to its text, and in rarely, and at the same time modestly, dissenting from its doctrines on particular questions. The Bengal school alone, having taken for its guide Jímútaváhana's treatise, which is, on almost every disputed point, opposite in doctrine to the *Mitákshará*, has no deference for its authority. On this account, independently of any other considerations, it would have been necessary to admit into the present volume either his treatise, or some one of the abridgments of his doctrine which are in use, and of which the best known and most approved is Raghunandana's *Dáya-tattwa*. But the preference appeared to be decidedly due to the treatise of Jímútaváhana himself; as well because he was the founder of this school, being the author of the doctrine which it has adopted; as because the subjects which he discusses are treated by him with eminent ability and great precision; and for this further reason, that quotations from his work, or references to it, which must become necessary in a general compilation of the Hindu law of inheritance, can be but very imperfectly intelligible without the opportunity of consulting the whole text of his close reasoning and ample disquisitions.

[1] By Devánḍa-bhaṭṭa. This excellent treatise on judicature is of great and almost paramount authority, as I am informed, in the countries occupied by the Hindu nations of Drávida, Tailanga, and Karṇáṭa; inhabiting the greatest part of the peninsula or Dakhin. [It was translated in 1867 by T. Kristnasawmy Iyer.]

[2] *Vivâda-chintámaṇi, Vyavahâra-chintámaṇi,* and other treatises of law by Váchaspati-miśra; *Vivâda-ratnákara, Vyavahâra-ratnákara,* and other compilations by Paṇḍitas employed by Chaṇḍeśwara; *Vivâda-chandra* by Misarú-miśra, or rather by his aunt Lakhimá or Lakshmí-devi.

[3] *Viramitrodaya,* an ample and very accurate digest by Mitra-miśra [printed at Calcutta in 1815]. *Vivâdatáṇḍava* and other works of Kamalákara.

[4] *Vyavahâra-mayúkha* and other treatises by Nílakaṇṭha. [Translated by H. Borrodaile in 1827; printed at Bombay in 1863.]

Having selected, for reasons which have been here explained, the *Dáya-bhága* of Jímútaváhana, and the *Mitákshará* on inheritance, for translation and separate publication, I was led in course to draw the chief part of the annotations necessary to the illustration of the text from the commentaries on those works. Notes have been also taken from original treatises, of which likewise brief notices will be here given, that their authority may be appreciated.

In the selection of notes from commentaries and other sources, the choice of them has not been restricted to such as might be necessary to the elucidation of the subject as it is exhibited in the English version; but variations in the reading and interpretation of the original text have been regularly noticed, with the view of adapting this translation to the use of those who may be induced to study it with the original Sanskrit text. The mere English reader will not be detained by these annotations, which he will of course pass by.

Having verified with great care the quotations of authors, as far as means are afforded to me by my own collection of Sanskrit law-books (which includes, I believe, nearly all that are extant), I have added at the foot of the page notes of reference to the places in which the texts are found. They will be satisfactory to the reader as demonstrating the general correctness of the original citations. The inaccuracies, which have been remarked, are also carefully noticed. They are few and not often important.

The sources from which the annotations have been chiefly drawn are the following.

The commentary of Śríkṛishṇa-tarkálankára on the *Dáya-bhága* of Jímútaváhana has been chiefly and preferably used.[1] This is the most celebrated of the glosses on the text. It is the work of a very acute logician, who interprets his author and reasons on his arguments, with great accuracy and precision; and who always illustrates the text, generally confirms

[1] [Printed at Calcutta in 1818 and 1829.]

its positions, but not unfrequently modifies or amends them. Its authority has been long gaining ground in the schools of law throughout Bengal; and it has almost banished from them the other expositions of the *Dáya-bhága;* being ranked, in general estimation, next after the treatises of Jímútaváhana and of Raghunandana.

An original treatise by the same author, entitled *Dáya-krama-sangraha*,[1] contains a good compendium of the law of inheritance according to Jímútaváhana's text, as expounded in his commentary. It has been occasionally quoted in the notes: its authority being satisfactorily demonstrated by the use which was made of it in the compilation of the Digest translated by Mr. Halhed; the compilers of which transcribed largely from it, though without acknowledgment.

The earliest commentary on Jímútaváhana is that of Śrínátha-áchárya-chúḍámaṇi. It has been constantly in Śríkṛishṇa's view, who frequently copies it; but still oftener cites the opinions of Chúḍámaṇi to correct or confute them. Notwithstanding this frequent collision of opinions, the commentary of Chúḍámaṇi must be acknowledged as, in general, a very excellent exposition of the text; and it has been usefully consulted throughout the progress of the translation, as well as for the selection of explanatory notes.

Another commentary, anterior to Śríkṛishṇa's, but subsequent to Chúḍámaṇi's, is that of Achyuta-chakravartí (author likewise of a commentary on the *Śráddha-viveka*). It is in many places quoted for refutation, and in more is closely followed by Śríkṛishṇa, but always without naming the author. It contains frequent citations from Chúḍámaṇi, and is itself quoted with the name of the writer by Maheśwara. This work is upon the whole an able interpretation of the text of Jímúta-váhana, and has afforded much assistance in the translation of it, and furnished many notes illustrating its sense.

The commentary of Maheśwara is posterior to those of

[1] [Printed at Calcutta in 1828, and translated by Wynch in 1818.]

Chúḍámaṇi and of Achyuta, both of which are cited in it; and is probably anterior to Śríkṛishṇa's, or at least nearly of the same date, if my information concerning these authors be correct;[1] for they appear to have been almost contemporary, but Maheśwara seemingly a little the elder of the two. They differ greatly in their expositions of the text, both as to the meaning and as to the manner of deducing the sense; but neither of them affords any indication of his having seen the other's work. A comparison of these different and independent interpretations has been of material aid to a right understanding and correct version of obscure and doubtful passages in Jímútaváhana's text.

Of the remaining commentaries, of which notices had been obtained, only one other has been procured. It bears the name of Raghunandana, the author of the *Smṛiti-tattwa*, and the greatest authority of Hindu law in the province of Bengal. In proportion to the celebrity of the writer was the disappointment experienced on finding reason to distrust the authenticity of the work. But not being satisfied of its genuineness, and on the contrary suspecting it strongly of bearing a borrowed name, I have made a very sparing use of this commentary either in the version of the text or in the notes.[2]

The *Dáya-tattwa*, or so much of the *Smṛiti-tattwa* as relates to inheritance, is the undoubted composition of Raghunandana; and, in deference to the greatness of the author's name and the estimation in which his works are held among the learned Hindus of Bengal, has been throughout diligently consulted and carefully compared with Jímútaváhana's treatise, on which it is almost exclusively founded. It is indeed an ex-

[1] Great-grandsons of both these writers were living in 1806; and the grandson (daughter's son) of S'ríkṛishṇa was alive in 1790. Both consequently must have lived in the first part of the last century. They are modern writers; and S'ríkṛishṇa is apparently the most recent.

[2] [These five commentaries were published in the grand edition edited by Paṇḍit Bharatachandra-śiromaṇi, in 1806, under the patronage of Prasanna Kumár Ṭhákur; and, besides these, it also contains those of Rámabhadra-nyáyálankára and Kṛishṇakánta-vidyávágís'a.]

cellent compendium of the law, in which not only Jímútaváhana's doctrines are in general strictly followed, but are commonly delivered in his own words in brief extracts from his text. On a few points, however, Raghunandana has differed from his master; and in some instances he has supplied deficiencies. These, as far as they have appeared to be of importance, have furnished annotations; for which his authority is of course quoted.

A commentary by Káśiráma on Raghunandana's *Dáya-tattwa*, has also supplied a few annotations, and has been of some use in explaining Jímútaváhana's commentators, being written in the spirit of their expositions of that author's text, particularly Śríkṛishṇa's gloss; and often in the very words of that commentator.

The *Dáya-rahasya* or *Smṛiti-ratnávali* of Rámanátha-vidyá-váchaspati, having obtained a considerable degree of authority in some of the districts of Bengal, has been frequently consulted, and is sometimes quoted in the notes. It is a work not devoid of merit, but, as it differs in some material points from both Jímútaváhana and Raghunandana, it tends too much to unhinge the certainty of the law on some important questions of very frequent recurrence. The same author has written a commentary on Jímútaváhana's *Dáya-bhága*, and makes a reference to it at the close of his own original treatise. My researches, however, and endeavours to procure a copy of it, have not been successful. I should else have considered it right to advert frequently to it in the illustrations of the text.

Other treatises on inheritance, according to the doctrines received in Bengal, as the *Dáya-nirṇaya* of Śríkara-bhaṭṭá-chárya, and one or two more which have fallen under my inspection, are little else than epitomes of the work of Raghu-nandana or of Jímútaváhana: and on this account have been scarcely at all used in preparing the present publication.

The remaining names, which occur in the notes, are of works or of their authors belonging to other schools. These

are rarely, I may say never, cited, unless for variations in the reading of original texts of legislators, excepting only the *Viramitrodaya* of Mitra-miśra; from whose work a few quotations may be found in the notes, contradicting passages of the text. This author, in the compilation mentioned, uniformly examines and refutes the peculiar doctrines maintained by Jímútaváhana and Raghunandana: but it did not fall within the design of the present publication to exhibit the controversial arguments of the modern opponents of the Bengal school; and quotations from his work have been therefore sparingly inserted in the notes to Jímútaváhana's treatise.

The commentaries on the *Mitákshará*[1] of Vijnáneśwara are less numerous. Of four, concerning which I have notices, two only have been procured, the *Subodhiní*, by Viśweśwara-bhaṭṭa, and a commentary by a modern author, Bálambhaṭṭa.

The *Subodhiní* is a collection of notes elucidating the obscure passages of the *Mitákshará*, concisely, but perspicuously. It leaves few difficulties unexplained, and dwells on them no further than is necessary to their elucidation. The commentator is author likewise of a compilation entitled *Madana-párijáta*, chiefly on religious law, but comprising a chapter on inheritance, a topic connected with that of obsequies. To this work he occasionally refers from his commentary. Both therefore have been continually consulted in the progress of the translation, and have furnished a great proportion of the annotations.

Bálambhaṭṭa's work is in the usual form of a perpetual comment. It proceeds, sentence by sentence, expounding every phrase and every term in the original text. Always copious on what is obscure, and often so on what is clear, it has been a satisfactory aid in the translation, even where it was busy in explaining that which was evident: for it has been gratifying to find, though no doubts were entertained,

[1] [The whole of the *Mitákshará* was printed at Calcutta in 1809, and has been reprinted at Bombay, 1864, and Benares, 1866; the *Vyavahára* section was reprinted at Calcutta in 1829.]

that the intended interpretation had the sanction of a commentator. Bálambhaṭṭa's gloss in general follows the *Subodhiní* as far as this goes. It has supplied annotations where Viśweśwara's commentary was silent; or where the explanation, couched in Viśweśwara's concise language, might be less intelligible to the English reader.

Vijnáneśwara's *Mitákshará* being a commentary on the institutes of Yájnavalkya, it has been a natural suggestion to compare his expositions of the law, and of his author's text in particular, with the commentaries of other writers on the same institutes, viz. the ancient and copious gloss of Aparárka of the royal house of Silára, and the modern and succinct annotations of Śúlapáṇi in his comment entitled *Dípakalikú*. A few notes have been selected from both these works, and chiefly from that of Aparárka.

For like reasons the commentators on the institutes of other ancient sages have been similarly examined. They are those of Medhátithi and Kullúka-bhaṭṭa on Manu; Haradatta's gloss on Gautama, which is entitled *Mitákshará;* Nanda-paṇḍita's commentary under the title of *Vaijayanti*, on the institutes which bear the name of the god Vishṇu, and those of the same author, and of Mádhava-áchárya, on Parásara.

Nanda-paṇḍita is author also of an excellent treatise on adoption, entitled *Dattaka-mímánsá*,[1] of which much use has been made, among other authorities, in the enlarged illustrations which it has been judged advisable to add to the short chapter contained in the *Mitákshará* on this important topic of Hindu law.

The same writer appears, from a reference in a passage of his gloss on Vishṇu, to have composed a commentary on the *Mitákshará* under the title of *Pratítákshará*. Not having been able to procure that work, but concluding that the opinions which the writer may have there delivered correspond with those which he has expressed in his other compositions, I have

[1] [Printed with the *Dattaka-chandriká* at Calcutta in 1857.]

made frequent references to the rest of his writings, and particularly to his commentary on Vishṇu, which is a very excellent and copious work, and might serve, like the *Mitákshará*, as a body or digest of law.

All the works of greatest authority in the several schools which hold the *Mitákshará* in veneration, have been occasionally made to contribute to the requisite elucidation of the text, or have been cited when necessary for such deviations from its doctrine, as it has been judged right to notice in the annotations. It will be sufficient to particularize in this place the *Viramitrodaya* before mentioned, of which the greatest use has been made; that compilation conforming generally to the doctrines of the *Mitákshará*, the words of which it very commonly cites with occasional elucidations of the text interspersed, or with express interpretations of it subjoined, or sometimes with the substitution of a paraphrase for parts of the original text. All these have been found useful auxiliaries to the professed commentaries and glosses.

This brief account of the works from which notes have been selected or aid derived, will sufficiently make known the plan on which the text of the *Mitákshará* and that of Jímúta-váhana have been translated and elucidated, and the materials which have been employed for that purpose. It is hardly necessary to add, by way of precaution to the reader, that he will find distinguished by hyphens, whatever has been inserted from the commentaries into the text to render it more easily intelligible,—a reference to the particular commentary being always made in the notes at the foot of the page.

Concerning the history and age of the authors whose works are here introduced to the attention of the English reader, some information will be expected. On these points, however, the notices, which have been collected, are very imperfect, as must ever be the case in regard to the biography of Hindu authors.

Vijnáneśwara, often called Vijnána-yogí, the author of the *Mitákshará*, is known to have been an ascetic, and belonged, as

is affirmed, to an order of *Sannyásis*, said to have been founded by Śankara-áchárya. No further particulars concerning him have been preserved. A copy of his work has indeed been shown to me, in which, at its close, he is described as a contemporary of Vikramáditya. But the authority of this passage, which is wanting in other copies, is not sufficient to ground a belief of the antiquity of the book; especially as it cannot be well reconciled to the received opinion above noticed of the author's appertaining to a religious order founded by Śankara-áchárya, whose age cannot be carried further back at the utmost than a thousand years. The limit of the lowest recent date which can possibly be assigned to this work, may be more certainly fixed from the ascertained age of the commentary; the author of which composed likewise (as already observed) the *Madana-párijáta*, so named in honour of a prince called Madana-pála, apparently the same who gives title to the *Madana-vinoda*, dated in the fifteenth century of the Sambat era.[1] It may be inferred as probable, that the antiquity of the *Mitákshará* exceeds 500, and is short of 1000 years. If indeed Dháreśwara, who is frequently cited in the *Mitákshará* as an author, be the same with the celebrated Rájá Bhoja, whose title may not improbably have been given to a work composed by his command, according to a practice which is by no means uncommon, the remoter limit will be reduced by more than a century; and the range of uncertainty as to the age of the *Mitákshará* will be contracted within narrower bounds.

Of Jímútaváhana as little is known. The name belongs to a prince of the house of Silára, of whose history some hints may be gathered from the fabulous adventures recorded of him in popular tales; and who is mentioned in an ancient and authentic inscription found at Salset.[2] It was an obvious conjecture, that the name of this prince might have been affixed to a treatise of law composed perhaps under his patronage or

[1] 1431 Sambat; answering to A.D. 1375. [2] *Asiatic Researches*, vol. i. p. 357.

by his directions. That however is not the opinion of the learned in Bengal; who are more inclined to suppose that the real author may have borne the name which is affixed to his work, and may have been a professed lawyer who performed the functions of judge and legal adviser to one of the most celebrated of the Hindu sovereigns of Bengal. No evidence, however, has been adduced in support of this opinion; and the period when this author flourished is therefore entirely uncertain. He cites several earlier writers; but, their age being not less doubtful than his own, no aid can be at present derived from that circumstance, towards the determination of the limits between which he is to be placed. His commentators suppose him in many places to be occupied in refuting the doctrines of the *Mitákshará*. Probably they are right; it is however possible, that he may be there refuting the doctrines of earlier authors, which may have subsequently been repeated from them in the later compilation of Vijnáneśwara. Assuming, however, that the opinion of the commentators is correct, the age of Jímútaváhana must be placed between that of Vijnáneśwara, whose doctrine he opposes, and that of Raghunandana, who has followed his authority. Now Raghunandana's date is ascertained at about three hundred years from this time: for he was pupil of Vásudeva-sárvabhauma, and studied at the same time with three other disciples of the same preceptor, who likewise have acquired great celebrity: viz. Śiromaṇi, Kṛishṇánanda, and Chaitanya; the latter is the well-known founder of the religious order and sect of *Vaishṇavas* so numerous in the vicinity of Calcutta, and so notorious for the scandalous dissoluteness of their morals; and, the date of his birth being held memorable by his followers, it is ascertained by his horoscope said to be still preserved, as well as by the express mention of the date in his works, to have been 1411 of the Śaka era, answering to A.C. 1489; consequently Raghunandana, being his contemporary, must have flourished at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

XIV.

ON HINDU COURTS OF JUSTICE.[1]

[From the *Transactions* of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. ii. pp. 166—196.]

THE composition of an Indian court of justice, conformably with the ancient Hindu institutions,[2] being very imperfectly understood, and many erroneous notions having become prevalent on this subject, it appears to deserve a more full investigation than it has yet undergone; and, with this view, I submit to the Society the result of a careful perusal of original authorities of Hindu law relating to that point.

The following is an abstract,[3] from very ample disquisitions, contained in treatises of Indian jurisprudence.

An assembly for the administration of justice is of various sorts: either stationary, being held in the town or village; or moveable, being held in field or forest; or it is a tribunal superintended by the chief judge appointed by the sovereign, and entrusted with the royal seal to empower him to summon

[1] Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, May 24, 1828.

[2] [Wilson, in a note to Mill (vol. i. p. 213), assigns these regulations to "a period not long subsequent to the Code of Manu, if not contemporary." It would be an interesting subject of inquiry to determine how far the Hindu courts and laws were allowed to remain in force during the five centuries and a half of Muhammadan predominance throughout India. Cf. Elphinstone, *History*, pp. 91, 484, 487, 545.]

[3] A short extract from this treatise was communicated to Mr. H. St. George Tucker, for insertion in the Appendix to his work on the financial state of the East-India Company.

parties; or it is a court held before the sovereign in person. The two first of these are constituted at the request of parties, who solicit cognizance and determination of their differences; they are not established by operation of law, nor by the act of the king, but by voluntary consent. The two last are courts of judicature, established by the sovereign's authority: such a court is resorted to for relief as occasions occur, and not, as the first-mentioned, constituted merely for the particular purpose.

To accommodate or determine a dispute between contending parties, the heads of the family, or the chiefs of the society, or the inhabitants of the town or village, select a referee approved by both parties.

Among persons who roam the forest, an assembly for terminating litigation is to be held in the wilderness; among those who belong to an army, in the camp; and among merchants and artisans, in their societies.

Places of resort for redress are:

1st. The court of the sovereign, who is assisted by learned Bráhmans as assessors. It is ambulatory, being held where the king abides or sojourns.

2nd. The tribunal of the chief judge ("*Prád-viváka*," or "*Dharmádhyaksha*") appointed by the sovereign, and sitting with three or more assessors, not exceeding seven. This is a stationary court, being held at an appointed place.

3rd. Inferior judges, appointed by the sovereign's authority, for local jurisdictions. From their decisions an appeal lies to the court of the chief judge, and thence to the rájá or king in person.

The gradations in arbitration are also three:

1st. Assemblies of townsmen, or meetings of persons belonging to various tribes, and following different professions, but inhabiting the same place.

2nd. Companies of traders or artisans; conventions of persons belonging to different tribes, but subsisting by the practice of the same profession.

3rd. Meetings of kinsmen, or assemblages of relations connected by consanguinity.

The technical terms in the Hindu law-books for these three gradations of assemblies are, 1st. *Púga;* 2nd. *Śreṇi;* 3rd. *Kula.*

Their decisions or awards are subject to revision; an unsatisfactory determination of the "*Kula,*" or family, is revised by the "*Śreṇi,*" or company, as less liable to suspicion of partiality than the kindred; and an unsatisfactory decision of fellow-artisans is revised by the "*Púga,*" or assembly of co-habitants, who are still less to be suspected of partiality. From the award of the "*Púga,*" or assembly, an appeal lies, according to the statutes of Hindu law, to the tribunal of the "*Prád-viváka,*" or judge; and, finally, to the court of the *Rájá,* or sovereign prince.

The "*Púga,*" "*Śreṇi,*" and "*Kula,*" are different degrees of arbitration, which, as is apparent, is not in the nature either of a jury or of a rustic tribunal, with which they have been assimilated; but merely a system of arbitration, subordinate to regularly constituted tribunals or courts of justice.

I now proceed to the more detailed consideration of the composition of such courts.

In several passages of Hindu law-books the members of the judicature are enumerated, but not without some discrepancy: one authority specifying so many as ten; others eight, but in some instances, nevertheless, noticing a greater number. The difference, however, is not material.

That enumeration concerns the sovereign court, wherein the king personally presides. The composition of subordinate tribunals, with respect to its members and attendants and officers, has not been particularized; nor are there any directions found concerning the manner in which the business of inferior courts is to be conducted, or the sittings of arbitrators. No doubt the analogy of the sovereign court would be followed, so far as applicable; and the composition of the

highest tribunal would be the type or model for the construction of a subordinate one.

A court of judicature is, in the passages which have been adverted to, likened to a body furnished with limbs; and the similitude of the members of the one and limbs of the other is followed out to a puerile minuteness. Without regard, however, to this solemn trifling, it may be observed, that the members enumerated are: first, the king or sovereign prince; next, the chief judge, or superintendent appointed by him; afterwards the assessors or puisne judges, considered in the aggregate as one member, though their number ought to be three, five, or seven. The written law is to be had for reference or consultation, and is mentioned as one member; gold and fire are also to be in readiness, for use in the administration of oaths, and are in like manner noticed as members; as is also water, provided for refreshment. The principal officers of the court, namely, the accountant, the scribe, and the sequestrator, complete the formal enumeration. But to these must be added, other officers and attendants of the court, as the summoner and the moderator; likewise the king's domestic priest or spiritual counsellor, and his ministers of state or temporal advisers; and also the audience or bystanders, comprehending qualified persons, any one of whom may interpose in the capacity of an *amicus curiæ;* and persons in attendance to keep order and prevent the intrusion of the populace.

By the Hindu institutes, the administration of justice, civil and criminal, is among the chief functions of the *Rájá* or sovereign; not arbitrarily, according to his mere will and pleasure; but conformably with fixed laws recorded by ancient sages, and agreeable to the established custom of the country.

He will naturally need the assistance of learned persons conversant with those laws and usages, and competent to the application of them in particular and individual cases. There

is need likewise of attendants and officers to conduct the process and execute the adjudications of the tribunal. The number, functions, and powers of those advisers and attendants, as prescribed by law, form the legal constitution of a Hindu sovereign court.

It is a topic considered and discussed in every general treatise of Indian forensic law: there is no occasion, therefore, for premising a disquisition on the authorities to which reference will be made.

§ 1. *The sovereign Prince.*

The Hindu sovereign in person hears litigant parties to redress injuries and decide their contests; or he devolves that office on a chief judge, whose duty it is to assist him when present, and to preside in his stead when absent. The right of personal superintendence is in strictness confined to the regular royal tribe of *kshatriya*, or to the *brāhmaṇa* invested with sovereignty: one of an inferior class, whether the third or the fourth caste, or a mixed tribe, is not qualified to assume personal cognizance of causes, but is by law required to depute a judge to officiate in his stead. On this point, however, commentators of the law differ; some maintaining the competency of every sovereign, whatever be his tribe, for the personal exercise of judicial authority.

It is the sovereign on whom the duty of administering justice is incumbent. The chief judge, attendants, and officers, are only assistant in the trial of causes, like a stipendiary priest in the celebration of religious rites; and they possess no proper nor original jurisdiction. It is a positive obligation on him; and the attendance of the rest is not indispensable. The spiritual reward of a due administration of law, and the offence of its omission, concern him alone.[1]

Composure and sedateness of demeanour, with simplicity of dress and ornament, are enjoined, lest the suitors of the court

[1] *Smṛiti-chandrikā*, etc.

be overawed and confounded. A sitting posture facing the east is directed for a spiritual purpose; yet a trivial case may be heard by the prince standing; but he should not be walking to and fro, nor lying down, nor reclining. He holds out his right arm, wearing his mantle in the manner of a scarf, as is usual in an assembly of *bráhmaṇas*, and having his hand free to make signs when there may be occasion so to do.

§ 2. *The chief Judge.*

The chief judge assists the prince when present, or presides in court when he is absent. The proper title of this high officer is *Práḍ-viváka*, which signifies 'interrogator and discriminative pronouncer.' He questions the parties; investigates the case; distinguishes right and wrong; awards trial; and pronounces judgment. All this is implied in the title of his office. Another designation is *Dharmádhyaksha*, superintendent of justice. It occurs in the rubric and colophon of divers treatises on law, as the author's official designation, especially in the works of Haláyudha.

The chief judge should be a *bráhmaṇa*, observant of the duties of his tribe; conversant with the law in all its branches; skilled in logic and other sciences; acquainted with scripture and jurisprudence; and versed in holy literature, possessing conciliatory qualities, with many attainments. He should be gentle, not austere; deliberate, patient, and placid, yet firm; virtuous, wise, diligent, cheerful, impartial and disinterested; and, above all, sincere.

But, if a *bráhmaṇa* duly qualified cannot be found, a man of the military class, or one of the commercial tribe (that is, a *kshatriya*, or a *vaiśya*), who is conversant with jurisprudence, may be appointed chief judge: but not a *śúdra*, on any account, whatever be his knowledge and qualifications. This prohibition concerns spiritual consequences regarding the king's fortunes; it does not affect the validity of the *śúdra's* judicial acts.

§ 3. *The Assessors.*

The assessors of the court, appointed by the sovereign to assist the chief judge with their advice, or himself when presiding there in person, are three, five, or seven, not fewer than the less, nor more than the greater number mentioned; an uneven number being required, that, in case of disagreement, the opinions and votes of the majority may prevail, supposing their capacity and qualifications equal.

They should be *bráhmaṇas*, versed in sacred and profane literature, conversant with jurisprudence, habitually veracious, and strictly impartial towards friend and foe; being honest, disinterested, and opulent; incorruptible, attentive to their duties, and devoid of wrath and avarice, and uninfluenced by other passions.

If *bráhmaṇas* duly qualified cannot be selected, *kshatriyas* or *vaiśyas* may be nominated; but not a *śúdra* by any means. The judicial acts of an incompetent or disqualified person are void, though they chance to be conformable with the law. In the instance of the chief judge, however, the *śúdra's* act is not void; neither should it be deemed so in the case of the assessor.

§ 4. *The Audience.*

Writers on Hindu law reckon the audience as a component part of a court of justice; for a bystander may interpose with his advice, as the *amicus curiæ* does in an European court.

This part of the audience consists of persons qualified to sit in court as assessors; being learned *bráhmaṇas*, conversant with law; not appointed to be assessors, but attending the court of their own accord, or upon their own affairs. Their interposition is not equally incumbent as it is on the assessors; nor is it called for, unless they possess such qualifications.

A further part of the audience consists of persons attending the court to maintain order, and prevent the intrusion of the populace. They should be *vaiśyas*, that is, persons of the third tribe, either merchants or husbandmen.

§ 5. *The Domestic Priest, or Spiritual Adviser.*

The king's domestic priest is regularly a member of the sovereign court of judicature. His nomination is specifically for the one object, as much as for the other: and it is his incumbent duty to check and restrain the king from wrong proceedings, no less in judicial than in religious matters. The nomination of one such priest being sufficient, no more than one is to be appointed. He should be a *brâhmaṇa*, versed in science, faithful, disinterested, diligent, and veracious.

§ 6. *Ministers of State.*

The ministers of state attendant on the king are reckoned among the component members of the sovereign court; or, the chief judge and the assessors or councillors, being selected from among the king's ministers and public servants, attend in those capacities, and are strictly members of the court.

§ 7. *Officers of the Court.*

The proper subordinate officers of the court are five, *viz.*

1. Accountant;
2. Scribe;
3. Keeper of claims and enforcer of judgments;
4. Messenger, or summoner of parties and witnesses;
5. Moderator of the court.

1. The requisite qualifications of the accountant are skill in computation, and a thorough acquaintance with every branch of mathematical knowledge, including astronomy (and even astrology), grammar, and other sciences, as well as sacred studies, and familiar knowledge of various modes of writing. He must be pure in conduct, and clearly deserving of trust.

2. The like qualifications are required of the scribe. His diction must be unambiguous; his hand-writing fair: he must be honest, placid, disinterested, and veracious.

Both these officers should be of a regenerate tribe.

3. The enforcer of judgment, and guardian of things claimed,

may be a *śúdra*. He should be one who has been uniformly employed in the king's service; firm in conduct, but strictly obedient to the judges of the court. His functions are, the custody of things in dispute during the pendency of the cause, and the giving effect to the court's judgment.

4. The messenger, or king's own officer, is one who has been long in his service, but is placed by him under the control of the judges, for the duty of summoning parties, holding them in custody, and seeking and calling their witnesses.

5. Another officer is noticed, under the designation of moderator of the court, but with no other functions assigned to him besides the delivery of discourses on morality for the edification of the parties in suits, the judges, and the officers of the court.

§ 8. *Conduct of Judges.*

Passages relative to the conduct of judges, their functions and duties, are very numerous in the institutes of Hindu law. These may not be without interest, collected and exhibited together for reciprocal illustration.

It will be obvious, from the frequent notice of the direct part taken by the sovereign in the administration of justice, and the manner in which this topic is weighed upon, that both when the institutes were written in the names of ancient sages, and when compilations were made from them by later authors, whose names are attached to works received as authority in divers countries of India, the Hindu sovereigns were accustomed to preside in their own tribunals, and take a personal and active share in the discharge of judicial duties.

The obligation of impartial justice incumbent on the sovereign and the judges, is earnestly inculcated, in language forcible and impressive. Careful investigation, a candid avowal of opinion, and strenuous remonstrance against unjust decisions, are strongly enjoined; and it appears from the whole tenor

of numerous passages, that the monarch presiding in person determines the causes on his own responsibility. The assessors of the court merely offer advice, but have no voice or vote in the decision.

§ 9. *Punishment of iniquitous Judges.*

Iniquitous judges are punishable by fine, exile, and confiscation, for partiality, corruption, and collusion.

The fine is rated at twice the amount of the penalty to which the party cast would be liable; or, according to a different inference from the same law, twice the value of the thing litigated: but where this is not appreciable, the prescribed punishment is confiscation of property. This, however, is a controverted point; and the first-mentioned construction is the prevalent one. Confiscation extends to the whole property of the offender; and is awarded in a case of bribery; as is banishment also.

If the judge's iniquity be not discovered until after judgment has been passed, he is held bound in amends to make good to the aggrieved party the whole amount of his loss. Whether the cause shall be reheard, is a controverted point: one authority requiring revision of the judgment, and another directing that it shall not be disturbed, but amends made to the aggrieved party. This difference is grounded on a variation in the reading of the same text of law.

§ 10. *Court-House.*

Minute directions are given concerning the situation and aspect of the court-house, and the decorations of the apartment in which the court is held. It will be sufficient to cite authorities on these points, without going into a discussion of unimportant questions arising out of them. It matters little whether the court-room should be an apartment of the royal palace or a separate edifice: nor does it much signify what are the proper and auspicious dimensions of a building designed

for this purpose, according to Hindu notions of symmetry. The east is the prescribed aspect, whether the house be a distinct one, or contiguous to the palace.

§ 11. *Time and mode of Sitting.*

There is something curious, or approaching to it, as descriptive of ancient manners, yet not differing much from the habits of modern Hindu princes, in the minute directions given concerning the time when the courts should sit, *viz.* the forenoon, as most convenient; the hour at which the king should take his seat after early religious observances and ordinary preparations of the morning; the manner in which the members of the court are distributed, the king facing the east, the judges on the right, the scribe on his left, and the accountant facing him; and likewise concerning inauspicious days, on which courts should not assemble.

To this brief summary I annex a copious collection of passages relative to all points which have been here touched upon. It will be found to be full and sufficient on the whole subject, amply explaining the constitution of a Hindu sovereign court, its jurisdiction, original and appellate, and that of subordinate courts, and arbitration in several gradations. The topic is not without importance for its political bearing, as well as for illustration of Hindu manners.[1]

[1] [There is a curious picture of the administration of Hindu law in the ninth act of the 'Toy-cart,' a drama generally supposed to be not later than the commencement of our era. The *śreshṭhin* or 'chief of the merchants,' and the *kâyastha* or 'scribe,' appear to sit there as joint-assessors with the judge.]

APPENDIX.

§ 1. *Resort for Redress of Wrongs.*

"Bhṛigu[1] ordained ten or else five places for the trial of causes, where litigant parties, involved in controversies, may obtain decisions.

"The frequenters of forests should cause their differences to be determined by men of their own order; members of a society, by persons belonging to that society; people appertaining to an army, by such as belong to the army; and the inhabitants of town [and country],[2] likewise by residents in both.

"Let the heads of the family, or the chiefs of the society, or the inhabitants of the city, or of the village, select an umpire, approved by both parties.

"The village, the townsmen, an assemblage of families, associations of artisans, and a scholar in the four sciences, persons belonging to the same class, allied families, heads of the family, constituted judges, and the king, [are the several judicatories].[3]

"Among persons who roam the forest, a court should be held in the wilderness; among those who belong to an army, in the camp; and among merchants, in their own societies.[4]

"'Men of their own order,' are persons abiding in the forest. From the term 'likewise,' which occurs in the text, it appears that they who reside in a town or village and in the forest or wilderness, should cause their disputes to be adjusted by residents in both; that is, by persons abiding in the village and the forest [for they are conversant with disputes incident to both].[5] The heads of the family are the chief persons among the kindred. The chiefs of the society are the leaders of a company assembled in a village, or on a pilgrimage, and so forth. The city signifies the principal town; the village, one inferior thereto: thus there is a distinction between the inhabitants of a city and of a village. The umpire, selected by the family, etc., completes the number of five resorts. They are suited to particular descriptions of persons, as foresters, etc.[6]

[1] Or *Manu*, according to the *Smṛiti-chandrikā*. [2] *Mádh.*
[3] *Bhṛigu*, cited in *Sm. Ch.* and *Mádh.*
[4] *Vṛihaspati*, cited in *Kalpataru*; *Kátyáyana*, in *Vyavahára-chintámaṇi.*
[5] *Viramitrodaya.* [6] *Madh.* in *Mádhavíya.*

"An assembly is of four sorts: stationary, moveable, graced by the signet, and governed by the institutes of law; the judges or arbitrators are as various. A stationary court meets in the town or village; a moveable one is assembled in the forest; one graced by the signet is superintended by the chief judge; one governed by the institutes of law is held before the king.[1]

"The five first places of reference are adapted to particular descriptions of persons, as foresters and the rest. If a dispute arise among persons dwelling within the bounds of a village, it is determined by the inhabitants of the adjoining villages. The heads of families, the chiefs of societies, and the inhabitants of towns and villages, select an umpire approved by both plaintiff and defendant.

"The village and the rest are ten resorts common to all. The village intends people dwelling together in the manner of a hamlet. Townsmen are the whole of the inhabitants of a town. An assemblage (*gaṇa*) is a set of families; for Kátyáyana says, 'an assemblage of families is termed *gaṇa*.' Associations denote washermen and the rest of eighteen low tribes. A scholar in the four sciences is a man conversant in logic and the rest of four requisite branches of knowledge. The conjunctive particle, which occurs in this place, indicates the association of such scholar with other learned persons; for Pitámaha forbids the exposition of the law by one individual, however learned. Persons belonging to the same class (*carga*) are such as appertain to the same assemblage, and so forth; for Kátyáyana says, 'Vṛihaspati declares, that assemblages of families and societies of heretics, companies of armed men, unions of low tribes, as well as other associated persons, are termed *varga*.' The authority of Vṛihaspati is cited to show, that the term was already known in this acceptation. A company of armed men is a party of persons variously armed; for it is so explained by the same author. Families import such as are related to the plaintiff or to the defendant within the degree of *sagotra*. Heads of families are elders sprung of the same kin with the plaintiff and defendant. Constituted judges are the chief judge with three assessors. The king, assisted by *bráhmaṇas*, etc., is last.[2]

"An assembly, which is held in the forest or other of three situations [first mentioned] is moveable; for, in general, it is suited to travelling. Among inhabitants of both town and country and other specified situations it is stationary, for it is not adapted to change of place. One held at an appointed spot is graced by the signet; for it is attended by the superintendent or other officer

[1] *Vṛihaspati*, cited in *Sm. Ch.*, *Kalp.* and *Mádh.* [2] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Ch.*

holding the seal. But at the king's residence the court is one governed by the law; for it is precisely guided by the sacred institutes. This distribution of courts is shown by the same author. The superintendent is the chief judge; for he is appointed by the king to try causes, and the royal seal is entrusted to him, that he may be enabled to summon defendants. This is implied in the text. The stationary and the moveable assemblies are specially constituted at the request of parties soliciting the meeting, with presents and other means of inducing consent; for such tribunals are not established by the mere operation of law, nor by the spontaneous act of the king. But a court graced by the signet, and one governed by the law, are established by the king of his own authority; therefore, to obtain a decision the court is resorted to, not constituted for the special purpose. The king's court, governed by law, is superior to all the rest."[1]

§ 2. *Jurisdiction original and appellate.*

"Judges appointed by the king, assemblies [of townsmen], companies [of artisans], and meetings [of kindred], must be understood to be superior, the one to the other, in order as here enumerated, for the decision of law-suits among men.[2]

"Meetings [of kindred], companies [of artisans], assemblies [of co-habitants], an appointed judge, and the king himself, are resorts for the trial of law-suits; and, among these, the last in order is superior to the preceding.[3]

"Persons who have been fully appointed by the king, the kindred of the parties, fellow-artisans, co-habitants, and others, may decide law-suits among men, excepting causes concerning violent crimes. Meetings of kinsmen, companies of artisans, assemblies of co-habitants, and courts of justice, are declared to be judicatories, to which he, against whom judgment is given, may successively resort. A cause, which has not been thoroughly investigated by the kinsmen, must be tried by persons of the same profession with the parties; one, which has not been well adjudged by fellow-artisans, should be revised by the townsmen; and what exceeds the compass of their understandings, must be heard by appointed judges. The members of a court of judicature are superior in jurisdiction to the kindred and the rest; the chief judge is superior to them; and the king is above all, since causes are always justly decided by him: for the intellect of the sovereign surpasses the understandings of others, in the trial of the highest, lowest, and mean controversies.[4]

[1] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Ch.* [2] *Yájnavalkya*, 1. 30. [3] *Nárada*, 1. 8.
[4] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Viramitr.*, and partially in *Vyav. Chint.* and *Dipakalikà*.

"The spiritual parent, the master, the family, the father, the eldest brother, and the grandsire, should try controversies among men, in matters to which they are competent.[1]

"Litigants who have been before a previous tribunal, resorting, whether justly or unjustly, to the king, become plaintiffs [in appeal].[2]

"One, who had been heard before the village, may appeal to the town; he, who has been before the town, may resort to the king; but one, who has been tried by the king, whether ill or well, has no further appeal.[3]

"A cause, which has been tried by the kinsmen, must be revised by successive judicatures, if either party be dissatisfied, until it be finally decided by the king. But they who pass decisions in lawsuits without being properly authorized, are guilty of assumption of royal functions, and the king shall inflict punishment on them accordingly. Yet persons wearing the token [of a religious profession], companies [of artisans], assemblies [of co-habitants], merchants, and bodies of armed men, should always adjust their affairs according to their own laws.[4]

"Among merchants, artisans, and the rest, as well as among such as subsist by agriculture, painting, and dyeing, since a decision cannot be passed by others, the king should cause their disputes to be adjusted by persons acquainted with the principles of their calling].[5]

"Husbandmen, mechanics, artists, men of a low tribe, dancers, persons wearing the token [of a religious order], and robbers or irregular soldiers, should adjust their controversies according to their own particular laws.[6]

"The king should cause the disputes of men who practise austerity to be settled by persons conversant with three sciences, and not decide them himself, lest he rouse the resentment of adepts in illusion.[7]

"Persons are appointed to try causes, according to the situation of the people concerned: the king and the society should adjust the matter conformably with justice. So Bhrigu ordains. He should cause the instruction [which shall determine the controversy] among men of the highest tribe, spiritual parents, venerable pre-

[1] *Vyása*, cited in *Mádh.* [2] *Pitámaha*, cited in *Sm. Ch.*
[3] *Pitámaha*, cited in *Sm. Ch.* and *Mádh.*
[4] *Kátyáyana*, cited in the *Kalpataru.*
[5] *Vyása*, as cited in *Mádh.* and *Viramitr.*; and *Nárada* quoted in *Vyav. Chint.*, and *Kátyáyana* in *Kalp.*
[6] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Kalp.* and *Viramitr.*
[7] *Vrihaspati* and *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Kalp.*, *Vyav. Chint.*, etc.

ceptors, and austere devotees, to be delivered by a person endowed with thorough knowledge.[1]

"Let not a prince, who seeks his own good, pronounce the law among twice-born men, who dispute concerning affairs relative to the several orders: but let him, after giving them due honour, according to their merits, and first soothing them by mildness, apprise them of their duty with the assistance of *bráhmaṇas*.[2]

"Judges appointed by the king are persons authorized by him to try causes. Assemblies (*púga*) are meetings; companies are associations of persons subsisting by the same mechanical employments; families are societies of husbandmen. Among these, the first being superior to the last in order as enumerated, their relative authority in the trial of causes follows the same order. Therefore, when a cause has been tried by the family (*kula*), if there be suspicion that it has been ill decided, a revision by the company of fellow-artisans is proper. When it has been tried before the company (*śreṇi*), the revision is by the assembly; or, tried before the assembly (*púga*), it is reviewed by the king's judges, and not conversely.[3]

"An assembly (*púga*) signifies a meeting; for Kátyáyana's text expresses, that a meeting of traders and the rest is termed *púga*. An assemblage of persons of different classes is a company (*śreṇi*): one of persons of the same class is a family (*kula*). When these are appointed by the king for the decision of causes, the first respectively must be deemed superior to the latter; and this superiority is relative to appeal and revision. Thus, when a cause has been tried by an *assembly*, it must not be reheard by a *company*. By these several authorities causes may be tried, except such as concern violent crimes. So Vṛihaspati declares.[4]

"Judges appointed by the king are members of a court of judicature nominated by the sovereign to administer justice. Assemblies are multitudes or meetings of persons belonging to different tribes and following different avocations, but inhabiting the same place, such as villagers, townsmen, or citizens. Companies are conventions of persons belonging to various tribes, but subsisting by the practice of the same profession, such as watchmen, dealers in betel, weavers, curriers, and the rest. Kindred signify meetings of relations connected by consanguinity. Of these four, namely, the king's judges and the rest, that jurisdiction which is here first mentioned must be deemed relatively 'superior,' or possessed of

[1] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Kalp.*
[2] *Manu*, 8. 390-391.
[3] *Aparárka* on *Yájnavalkya*, 1. 30.
[4] *Śúlapáṇi* in *Dípakalikā.*

higher power 'for the decision of law-suits,' or trial of causes 'among men'; that is, between litigant parties. The meaning is, that in a cause decided by judges appointed by the king, the party that is cast cannot revive the suit before the townsmen and the rest, although he be dissatisfied, thinking the decision unjust. So, in a cause decided by the co-habitants, there is no resort to the fellow-artisans; nor, in one adjudged by them, to the kindred. But, if it were determined by the family, it may be appealed to the craft, and so forth. In like manner, if it be decided by the company of fellow-artisans, it may be appealed to the assembly; or if adjudged by the assembly, the next resort is to judges appointed by the king; and Nárada declares, that in a suit tried by the king's judges, a further appeal lies to the king in person. Moreover, when he is resorted to, and the appealed cause, whereon a double amercement is staked, shall be decided by the king, aided by other assessors, together with the former judges, should the appellant be cast, he shall be amerced; or if he gain the cause, the former judges shall be fined.

"A cause tried by inferior judicatories may be appealed; but the judgment passed in a superior court cannot be reversed;[1] but Nárada has declared that a decision passed by judges appointed by the sovereign, may be reversed before the king in person. Here the mention of king sub-denotes the chief judge; for he is superior in comparison with persons appointed by the sovereign. Therefore, a decision passed by persons so appointed, may be revised before the chief judge; and one by him adjudged may be rescinded before the king. Here, on appeal to the king, when a cause upon which an amercement is staked against the first judges is tried by the king, assisted by other assessors, should the appellant be cast, he shall be fined in a double penalty; but if he gain the cause on appeal, the original judges shall be fined, as the law provides. That will be explained in another place.

"Is not the trial of causes by townsmen and the rest impossible? How then can one jurisdiction be superior to another? For it may be asked, have they power to try causes in their own right, or by delegation from the king? The one supposition is not correct; for the appointment of a chief judge as assessor and representative of the monarch, and that of the spiritual advisers, the ministers of state, and judges as assessors only, is exclusively propounded. Nor is the other supposition right; for those only who are empowered to protect the people are invested with authority of inspecting judicial

[1] *Vijnáneśwara*, in *Mitákshará* on *Yájnavalkya*, 1. 30.

affairs: others, then, cannot possess that authority in their own right.

"It is thought that townsmen and the rest have power to try law-suits between merchants and others by the king's special appointment only, because it appears from texts of Vyása, Vṛihaspati, and others, that they are appointed assessors in the mode before explained.

"That is wrong. For if such were the case, the power of trying all causes would belong to the king and the chief judge exclusively, because no others could try suits without reference to them: and, since it is a maxim that denominations are taken from the principal object, the rule, that suits determined by kinsmen, etc., may be appealed, would be impertinent, for none could be determined by them. Townsmen and the rest could not themselves try a suit with delegated power, because it is forbidden to delegate judicial authority to *S'údras;* now the townsmen and the rest mostly belong to the servile class, and even to the lowest tribes of it, sprung in the inverse order of the classes.

"To all this the answer is, admitting that townsmen and the rest could not themselves try suits, still, in law-suits between merchants and the like, the charge is brought by persons of that description, and the king and the judge rely on such persons in deciding the cause. Taking their acts as the chief objects, the denomination may be fitly assumed from what is done by them. For the purpose of regulating the appeal, when a law-suit is recommenced, under a notion that it was ill decided, their consecutive authority is propounded by the text: else the precept would be irrelevant:

"But, in fact, townsmen and others, though persons to whom delegation of judicial authority is forbidden, are regenerated as to the cognizance of suits between fellow-townsmen and the rest; for a person to whom judicial power may be delegated, is not restricted by the texts of Vyása and others to the cognizance of certain particular charges. Their power of themselves trying causes, like the chief judge, may therefore be affirmed. Consequently there is nothing impertinent. Moreover, Vṛihaspati supports this very doctrine.[1]

"Kindred are relations of the parties. By the term 'and the rest' [in the text of Vṛihaspati], companies and classes are meant. A company (*śreṇi*) is a convention of merchants, and so forth. A class (*gaṇa*), is an assemblage of priests, etc. Members of a court

[1] *Mitra-miśra*, in *Viramitrodaya*.

of justice are authorized judges. The chief judge is the superintendent of the judicature. Among these, including the king, the last in order has superior jurisdiction in the trial of causes, on account of pre-eminent knowledge.[1]

"The reason of the law is this: kindred and the rest, being related by consanguinity or other tie, may decide unjustly, through partiality or a like motive. An appeal, therefore, lies to the king and other authorities, on alleging, with probable truth, that the cause had been ill decided. Fellow-artisans have superior jurisdiction above the kindred, because they are alien to the parties. But townsmen, though the single connexion of a common residence exist, have superior authority, because they are strangers to the parties, with no mutual relation, since they belong to different tribes and follow other professions. Persons appointed by the king, being still less connected with the parties, have jurisdiction above the co-habitants, because men appointed by the king, after due examination, cannot be susceptible of the influence of partiality or the like motives, since they are under awe of the sovereign. Assuredly, for the two reasons above mentioned, the chief judge, the domestic priest, and the ministers of state, have superior authority. The impartiality of the king is obviously and absolutely certain, for he is entrusted with the protection of the people; partiality would in him be a still more heinous sin; and he must apprehend the temporal and evident evils arising therefrom, such as perturbation of the people, and so forth: since it is a maxim, 'when the prince commits injustice, who can restrain him?' His jurisdiction is therefore superior to all. The comparison of intellect, too, is expressly noticed in the text of Vṛihaspati.[2]

"Husbandmen, in the subsequent text of Vṛihaspati, are cultivators of land. Artisans are painters, etc.[3]

"Husbandmen, or cultivators; mechanics, carpenters, and the rest; artists, painters, etc.; usurers, lenders at interest; persons wearing the token, etc.; *páśupata*, and other heretical sects:[4] these and the following texts are not intended to prohibit the king's hearing such law-suits, but to show that in cases of this kind, since the suits are brought against merchants and the like, such persons should not be excluded from the trial and decision of the causes.[5]

"The trial of law-suits between persons whose resentment is formidable, should be conducted through the intervention of people belonging to the same class. The several orders are those of

[1] *Váchaspati-miśra* in *Vyavahára-chintámaṇi*.
[2] *Mitr. miśr.* in *Viramitr.*
[3] *Lakshmídhara*, in *Kalp.*
[4] [See *supra*, p. 430.]
[5] *Mitr. miśr.* in *Viramitr.*

students in theology, and so forth. If there be a variance of opinion on the question, what is, or what is not ordained, the king, even though he enter on the inquiry, should not expressly declare the law, lest he excite the anger of the party that is foiled. First assuaging the wrath of these persons by mildness and gentle discourse, let him then inculcate their duty on them through the intervention of *brâhmaṇas*.[1]

"Among twice-born men, amidst whom a controversy has arisen concerning affairs relative to the order of a householder, 'whether this be the sense of the law, or that be its true interpretation,' the king, desirous of effecting his own good, should not with violence pronounce positively what the construction of the law is. Having shown them that honour which is their due respectively, he should with aid of other *brâhmaṇas*, after previously extenuating the presumption by his kindness, apprise them of that which is their duty.[2]

"Concerning affairs relative to the several orders, as that of student in theology, and so forth, let not the prince pronounce the law; let him not specifically declare it; let him not adjudge victory and defeat. By mildness or conciliatory discourse, soothing them, or appeasing their wrath and other passions, [let him apprise them of their duty]."[3]

§ 3. *Members of a Court of Judicature.*

"The king and his officers, the judges, the sacred code of law, the accountant and the scribe, gold, fire, and water, are the eight members of the judicature.[4]

"A court consists of eight members, the scribe, the accountant, the sacred code, the sequestrator of the goods claimed, the judges, gold, fire, and water.[5]

"The king, the appointed [superintendent of his courts], the judges, the law, the accountant, and the scribe, gold, fire, and water, and the king's own officer, are ten members of legal redress. A court of judicature is a body composed of these ten members; and such a court, wherein the king presides and attentively inspects the trial of causes, is a meeting sanctified by solemn acts of religion.

"The office of those several members is separately propounded: the chief judge is the organ of the court; the king is the dispenser of justice; the assessors investigate the merits of the cause; the law dictates the decision of the case, namely, judgment [in favour of the one party], and a fine imposed on the other; gold and fire

[1] *Vâch. miśr.* in *Vyav. Chint.*
[2] *Kullûka Bh.* on *Manu*, 8. 390, 391.
[3] *Lakshm.* in *Kalp.*
[4] *Nârada*, 1. 16.
[5] *Prajâpati*, cited in the *Sm. Ch.*

serve for administering oaths; water for relieving thirst or appeasing hunger; the accountant should compute the sums; the scribe should record the pleadings; the king's officer should compel the attendance of the defendant and of the witnesses, and he should detain both the plaintiff and the defendant if they have given no sureties.

"Among these members of the judicature the king is the crown of the head; the chief judge is the mouth; the assessors are the arms; the law is both hands; the accountant and the scribe are the legs; gold, fire, and water, are the eyes; and the king's officer is the feet.[1]

"The court of judicature is a body in shape of an assembly, and composed of ten members; in which assemblage, likened to a body, the king presides as its soul. It is thus intimated, that as the soul animates the corporeal frame, so the king, presiding over the court and its members, and inspecting all its acts, both enjoys and confers the consequent benefits.[2]

"In Nárada's enumeration, the king and his officers are considered as one member of the court; consequently there is no reason for supposing the number of nine."[3]

§ 4. *The Sovereign Prince.*

"The king, or a very learned *brâhmaṇa* [entitled judge], shall decide the various sorts of law-suit.[4]

"Let a man of the royal tribe, who has received the investiture of sovereignty, or one of the sacerdotal class who is conversant with many sciences, ascend the tribunal without ostentation [in his dress or demeanour], and inspect judicial proceedings.[5]

"The king, associating justice with himself, and devoid of partiality or malice, should thoroughly investigate the affairs of contending parties.[6]

"Divested of wrath and avarice, let the king inspect law-suits with the aid of learned priests, according to the sacred code of justice.[7]

"The king should repair to the court of justice, sedate in his demeanour, and without ostentation in his dress; and sitting there, or standing, with his face turned towards the east, should examine the affairs of litigant parties; he should be attended by assessors, firm in the discharge of their duties, intelligent, sprung from a noble root, belonging to the highest class of regenerate men, skilled

[1] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Kalpataru* and *Viramitrodaya*. Some stanzas are transposed in the first-mentioned compilation. [2] *Viramitr.*
[3] *Mádhav.* [4] *Vrih.*, expounded in *Sm. Chand*
[5] *Prajápati.* [6] *Nárada*, or *Yama.* [7] *Yájnavalkya*, 2. 1.

in expounding the sacred code, and perfectly acquainted with moral discipline. Thus calm and unostentatious, attended by the superintendent of his courts of justice, by his ministers of state, by *bráhmaṇas*, and by his own domestic priest, he should himself adjudge the gain and loss of the litigants' causes. A prince who judges the suits before him, abides accordingly hereafter in a region of bliss, together with the chief judge, the ministers of state, the attending *bráhmaṇas*, his own domestic priests, and the assessors of the court.[1]

"The king himself should inspect forensic affairs, with the aid of learned priests, or appoint a *bráhmaṇa* to try causes.[2]

"Let princes of the military class administer justice in their own dominions respectively; but an eminent *bráhmaṇa* should act for any other sovereign."[3]

§ 5. *The Chief Judge.*

"Placing the sacred code of law before him, and abiding by the advice of his chief judge, let the king try causes with composure in regular order.[4]

"Let the king or a twice-born man, as chief judge, try causes; setting the members of the judicature before him, and abiding by the doctrine of the law, and by the opinion of the assessors.[5]

"When the king cannot inspect forensic affairs in person, let him appoint, for the inspection of them, a *bráhmaṇa* of eminent learning.[6]

"By a prince, whom urgent business (or disease, or other cogent reason) prevents from trying causes in person, a *bráhmaṇa*, thoroughly acquainted with all [civil and religious] duties must be appointed, together with assessors, [to examine all causes].[7]

"When the king is prevented [by the exigency of affairs] from superintending the decision of causes, let him appoint a learned *bráhmaṇa*, perfectly conversant with sacred literature, patient, sprung from a good family, impartial, deliberate, firm, awed by the dread of another world, virtuous, diligent and placid.[8]

"Of him who neglects employing regenerate men, and inspects forensic affairs with persons of the servile tribe, the kingdom totters, and his wealth and power pass away.[9]

"[The king should administer justice,] or appoint a *bráhmaṇa* to try the causes.[10]

"A *bráhmaṇa*, supported only by [the profession of] his class, or

[1] *Kátyáyana*. See likewise *Manu*, 8. 1, 2. [2] *Vishṇu*, 3. 73.
[3] *Prajápati*. [4] *Nárada*, 1. 32.
[5] *Vṛihaspati*, cited in *Kalp.* and *Mádh.* [6] *Manu*, 8. 9.
[7] *Yájnavalkya*, 2. 3. [8] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*, *Kalp.*, etc.
[9] *Vyása*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*, etc. [10] *Vishṇu*, 3. 73.

one barely reputed a *bráhmaṇa*, may at the king's pleasure interpret the law to him; but not a *śúdra* by any means. Of that king, who stupidly looks on while a *śúdra* decides causes, the kingdom itself shall be embarrassed, like a cow in deep mire.[1]

"He [the judge] interrogates, and is therefore the interrogator (*práṭ*); and he discriminates, and is consequently the discriminator (*viváka*).[2]

"Because, having inquired the transactions relative to the matter in dispute, he carefully investigates the merits of the suit, with the assessors; therefore is he called the chief judge.[3]

"He inquires the question whereon the law-suit is founded, and is thence named the interrogator; and because he examines into it, he is termed the [illegible] judge.[4]

"In a controv[illegible], he inquires the question which is agitated, and the answer which is given: having interrogated the parties with gentleness, he pronounces judgment, and therefore he is called the chief judge.[5]

"The most momentous of all obligations is the declaration of the truth to the judge [who interrogates].[6]

"Being conversant with the eighteen topics of litigation, and with the thousand and eight subdivisions thereof, and being skilled in logic and other sciences, and perfectly acquainted with scripture and jurisprudence, he inquires the law relative to the controversy, and investigates the matter in question, and is therefore called the chief judge.[7]

"A person, not austere, but gentle and tender, the hereditary servant of the state, wise, cheerful, and disinterested, should be appointed by the king for the trial of causes.[8]

"When the king tries causes in person, this officer is his colleague in the administration of justice; but when he is unable to inspect judicial affairs himself, by reason of other urgent business, or through want of health and ease, the chief judge is his representative.[9]

"The denomination of chief judge is a derivative term. He interrogates the plaintiff and the defendant, and is thence named the interrogator. With the assessors he discriminates or investigates the consistency and contradiction of the allegations on both sides, and is therefore called the investigator. He is both interrogator

[1] *Manu*, 8. 21.
[2] *Vyása*, cited in *Kalp.* and *Chint.*
[3] *Vṛihaspati*, in *Sm. Chand.*, etc.
[4] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*
[5] *Vṛihaspati*, in *Sm. Chand.*, etc.
[6] *Gautama*, 13.
[7] *Nárada.*
[8] *Viramitrodaya.*
[9] *Viramitrodaya.*

(*prát*) and investigator (*viváka*), and he is for that reason entitled chief judge (*práḍ-viváka*).[1]

"The judge interrogates the plaintiff and the defendant, and is therefore termed interrogator. Investigating with the assessors what is affirmed by the parties, he pronounces judgment, and is thence denominated the pronouncer (*viváka*). Vyása, using the word investigate, indicates this derivation of the term; he who discriminates is the discriminator (*viváka*). But Gautama defines it thus: he pronounces after investigation, and is therefore entitled the (*viváka*) pronouncer of judgment.[2]

"He asks the plaintiff, what is your complaint? and the defendant, what is your answer? and he is consequently the interrogator. Having heard them, he distinguishes or pronounces the gain or loss of the cause, according to right and wrong, and is therefore pronouncer.[3]

"He inquires the charge, and is consequently the interrogator; he awards ordeal suitable thereto, and is therefore awarder. He both interrogates and awards, and is thence so entitled. He should inquire the transaction, and then examine into what is alleged by the two parties.[4]

"He questions both parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, and is therefore the interrogator: and he specially pronounces judgment, and is consequently the adjudicator. Thus the appellation is etymologically significant. It is exhibited by Nárada in a different manner explanatory of the learning which he should possess. Thus by stating the derivative sense of the term, both legislators do virtually propound the duties of the chief judge."[5]

§ 6. *The Assessors.*

"Let the king, accompanied by three assessors at the least, enter the court-room; and there, either sitting or standing, try causes.[6]

"Let the chief judge, accompanied by three assessors, enter the court-room; and either sitting or standing, try the causes brought before the king. In whatever place, three *bráhmaṇas*, skilled in the *vedas*, sit together with the learned *bráhmaṇa* appointed by the king; the wise call that assembly a court of judicature.[7]

"Wherever seven, or five, or even three, *bráhmaṇas*, versed in sacred and profane literature, and acquainted with the law, sit

[1] *Mitákshará* on *Yájnavalkya*, 2. 3.
[2] *Víramitrodaya*.
[3] *Raghunandana* in *Vyavahára-tattwa*.
[4] Same in *Divya-tattwa*.
[5] *Smṛiti-chandriká*.
[6] *Vṛihaspati*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*
[7] *Manu*, 8. 10, 11.

together, that assembly is similar to a meeting for a solemn sacrifice.[1]

"In every law-suit, several persons, conversant with many sciences, must be appointed to try the cause: a prudent man should not trust a single individual, however virtuous he may be.[2]

"Let persons, who are conversant with sciences and holy studies, acquainted with the law, habitually veracious, and strictly impartial towards friend and foe, be appointed by the king assessors of the court.[3]

"Twice-born men, disinterested, opulent, acquainted with jurisprudence, habitually veracious, and skilled in all sacred sciences, should be appointed by princes assessors of their courts of judicature. A man, who has studied but one science, would not know how to pass a just decision in a cause; therefore should one who has many attainments be appointed by the monarch supreme in the trial of forensic controversies. If there be no learned priests, let the king appoint a man of the military class, or one of the commercial tribe, who is conversant with jurisprudence: but let him carefully avoid nominating a *śúdra*. Whatever act shall be done by others, than such as here described, though they be formally appointed, must be considered as an illegal proceeding, even though it chance to be conformable with the law.[4]

"Men, qualified by honesty and religious acts, strict in veracity, and attentive to their duties, void of wrath and avarice, and conversant with the institutes of law, should be appointed by the king assessors of the court.[5]

"Persons, qualified by birth, religious acts, and rigid observances, and who are impartial towards friend or foe, and incorruptible by the parties in the cause, through any means whatsoever, whether by influencing their lust, wrath, fear, avarice, or other passion, should be appointed by the king assessors of the court.[6]

"The king should appoint, as members of the court, honest men of tried integrity, who are able to support the burden of the administration of justice like bulls (bearing a heavy load). The assessors of the king's courts of judicature should be men skilled in jurisprudence, sprung from good families, rigidly veracious, and strictly impartial towards friend and foe.[7]

"They, who are unacquainted with the customs of the country, who hold atheistical tenets, who neglect the sacred code, and who

[1] *Vrihaspati*, in *Mit. Kalp.* and *Mádh.*
[2] *Nárada*, 1. § 2. 3.
[3] *Yájnavalkya*, 2. 2.
[4] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Kalp.*, etc.
[5] *Vrihaspati*, ibid.
[6] *Vishńu*, 3. 71.
[7] *Nárada*, 1. § 2. 7, 8.

are insane, passionate, avaricious, or diseased, must not be consulted in the decision of a cause.[1]

"Let the *bráhmaṇa*, who has been appointed by the king to be chief judge, being accompanied by three *bráhmaṇas*, who are learned men, fit to sit in the court, and conversant with the trial of causes, enter that court, and there sitting or standing, but not moving to and fro, lest his attention should be distracted, try the causes relative to matters of debt or other litigated topics, which are depending for trial before the king. In whatever spot even three *bráhmaṇas*, learned in the three *vedas* (*rich*, *yajus*, and *sáman*), sit; and with them the learned *bráhmaṇa*, who has been appointed by the king, also sits; people deem such an assembly similar to the court of the god with four faces (*Brahmá*).[2]

"Accompanied by three assessors at the least; not by so few as two or one.[3]

"The assessors appointed should be three: for such is the import of the plural term. But they may be more, either five, or else seven.[4]

"The implied sense is, that fewer than three should not be appointed, nor more than seven. The uneven number is intended to show that, in case of disagreement, the opinion of the greater number should be respected, since it is a rule, when the many and the few disagree, that the judgment of the majority shall prevail: provided, however, their qualifications be equal. But, if these be unequal, the opinion of the best qualified ought to prevail; agreeably to the saying, 'even a hundred blind men cannot see.'[5]

"Persons, possessing the qualifications described; namely, conversant with philosophy, grammar, and other sciences, familiar with the study of the *vedas*, acquainted with the law, being versed in the sacred code of justice, endued with the quality of speaking the truth, and impartial towards friends and foes, being divested of malice, affection, or passion; should be appointed by the king assessors of the court (*sabhásad*). They should be induced by presents, reverence, and courtesy, to sit (*sad*) in the court (*sabhá*) or assembly.[6]

"They should be persons sprung of noble families; descended both on the father's and on the mother's side from ancestors free from any stain, such as that of a mixt class or other debased origin.[7]

"By others (than such as described in the text), though formally

[1] *Vṛihaspati*, in *Sm. Chand.* and *Kalp.* and *Madh.*
[2] *Kull. Bh.* on *Manu*, 8. 10, 11.
[3] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Ch.*
[4] *Mit.* on *Yájn.*
[5] *Mitr. miśr.* in *Viramitr.*
[6] *Mit.* on *Yájn.*
[7] *Ragh.* in *Vyav. tattwa.*

appointed, yet destitute of the requisite qualifications, if a decision consonant to law chance to be passed, still it must be considered to be inconclusive.[1]

"By valuable presents, by courtesy, and other conciliatory means, the king should induce qualified persons not to decline sitting in court for the trial of law-suits.[2]

"The assessors should be persons incorruptible by the parties in the cause, through any means whatsoever. They should be such as cannot be gained by the litigant parties.[3]

"Not to be influenced by the parties or litigants acting on their passions."

§ 7. *The Audience.*

"Whether appointed or not appointed [to be a member of the court], one, who is skilled in jurisprudence, has a right to speak: for he, who lives in strict observance of the law, delivers a speech, which the gods approve:[4] or [as the reason is given by another author] for that which he deliberately pronounces in the court, is doubtless conformable with the law.[5]

"One who is not appointed (nor is qualified to act as judge) must on no account speak at the trial of a law-suit: but by him, who has been appointed, an impartial opinion ought to be given.[6]

"Either the court must not be entered, or law and truth must be openly declared; but that man is criminal who either says nothing, or says what is false and unjust.[7]

"Either the court should not be entered; either the duty of inspecting law-suits should not be accepted; or, if it be accepted, the truth should be spoken. When the judges are deciding unjustly, the wise do not approve the silence of one even who has approached the court of his own accord, not being regularly appointed.[8]

"One, who is conversant with the law, has a right to declare his opinion, though he be not formally appointed to assist at the trial.[9]

"If the king, notwithstanding proper and legal advice, given by the constituted judges, should act unjustly, he must be checked by them, else they incur blame. Again, if persons, who are not formally appointed, tender wrong advice, or none, blame falls on them; but not for omitting to check the king when he persists in acting illegally.[10]

[1] *Kalpataru.* [2] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Ch.* [3] *Lakshm.* in *Kalp.*
[4] *Nárada*, 1. § 2. 2. *Vasishṭha*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*
[5] *Vṛihaspati*, cited in *Kalpataru.* [6] *Nárada*, 1. § 2. 1.
[7] *Manu*, 8. 13. *Nárada*, 1. § 2. 16. [8] *Medhátithi* on *Manu.*
[9] *Váchaspati-miśra.* [10] *Mit.* on *Yáj.*

"The court should be surrounded by a few men of the commercial tribe, assembled in a group, persons mild and well disposed, advanced in years, of good families, opulent, and devoid of malice.[1]

"Merchants should be hearers of what passes at the trial of causes.[2]

"To restrain the populace, the court should be encompassed by a few men of the mercantile tribe,[3] forming a throng."[4]

§ 8. *The Domestic Priest or Spiritual Adviser.*

"The king should appoint for his domestic priest, a diligent and faithful *brâhmaṇa*, conversant with sciences and sacred duties, disinterested, and rigidly veracious.[5]

"For releasing a criminal who ought to have been punished, the king must fast one night; and his domestic priest three. But, for inflicting pains on one, who should not have been chastised, the domestic priest must observe the severe fast; and the king, that which lasts three nights.[6]

"A domestic priest must be appointed by the king for the inspection of judicial proceedings, in like manner as he is delegated for the celebrating of lustrations and other religious ceremonies.[7]

"Only one domestic priest is appointed. The singular number therefore is here purposely employed: for the object is attained by a single appointment.

"The king should be checked by the domestic priest, if he act unjustly, partially, or perversely. Accordingly Vasishṭha ordains penance for the domestic priest, as well as for the king, when the penal law has been contravened."[8]

§ 9. *Ministers of State.*

"When tired of overlooking the affairs of men, let the king assign the station of inspector to a principal minister, who well knows his duty, who is eminently learned, whose passions are subdued, and whose birth is exalted.[9]

"Let the king appoint for his counsellor a priest or a twice-born man, perfectly conversant with the sense of all the sacred institutes, devoid of avarice, a just speaker, intelligent, and who has been uniformly employed in the royal service.[10]

"The king must appoint seven or eight ministers, who must be

[1] *Kâtyâyana*, cited in the *Sm. Chand.*, etc.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Mitâkshará.*
[4] *Mádhaviya.*
[5] *Vyâsa*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*
[6] *Vasishṭha*, 19.
[7] *Mitra-miśra* in *Viramitrodaya.*
[8] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Chand.*
[9] *Manu*, 7. 141.
[10] *Vyâsa*, cited in *Sm. Ch.*

sworn; men who are hereditary servants of the throne, who are versed in holy books, who are personally brave, who are skilled in the use of weapons, whose lineage is noble.[1]

"Although the text specify a priest, the word twice-born is nevertheless added, to show that, for want of such a learned priest, the king may appoint for his minister a *kshatriya*, or a *vaiśya*, but not a *śúdra*.

"Minister is here expressed in the singular number with an indefinite sense; for it is only meant to enjoin the appointment (not to prescribe the number), and Manu directs the king to repair to the court with many counsellors."[2]

§ 10. *Officers of the Court.*

"They who are subordinate to the court are properly called the king's officers; the accountant and the scribe are likewise officers of the court. All these the king should require to attend the judicial assembly.[3]

"Two persons, versed in grammar and language, skilled in computation, pure in conduct, and well acquainted with various modes of writing, should be appointed by the king to be respectively accountant and scribe.[4]

"The king should appoint as accountant one who is versed in the three branches of mathematics, who is clearly deserving of trust, and who is conversant with sciences and sacred studies.[5]

"Let him appoint, as scribe, one whose diction is unambiguous, whose hand-writing is fair, and who is honest, placid, disinterested, and strictly veracious.[6]

"A man of the servile tribe, who has been uniformly employed in the king's service, and will be firm and strictly obedient to the judges, should be appointed by the king to be keeper of things claimed and enforcer of the recovery.[5]

"A man of strict veracity must be nominated by the king as his own officer, under the control of the judge, to summon the parties, to hold them in custody, and to seek their witnesses.[6]

"He who recreates the plaintiff and defendant, the judges, the scribe, and the accountant, with discourses on morality, holds the office of moderator of the court.[7]

"The accountant should be a person versed in the science of astronomy, comprehending three branches, entitled *horá*, or astrology;

[1] *Manu*, 7. 54.
[2] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Ch.*
[3] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Kalp.*
[4] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Sm. Ch.* and *Mádh.*
[5] *Vyása*, cited in the same.
[6] *Vrihaspati*, cited in the same.
[7] *Vyása*, ib.

gaṇita, computation (arithmetic, algebra, and mensuration), and *sanhitá*, or body of astronomy. The condition, that he be conversant with sciences and sacred studies, implies that he must belong to a regenerate tribe; and the scribe, mentioned in the same place, should likewise be a twice-born man. To show that the keeper of things claimed need not be so, the same author says of him, 'a man of the servile tribe,' etc.[1]

"'The king's own officer,' is a messenger placed under the control of the judges to summon parties, etc.[2]

"The moderator of the court, or diverter of all parties, may belong to any one of the four tribes, since no preference is intimated. But according to the *Smṛiti-chándriká*, he should appertain to one of the three first tribes, since the nomination of a *śúdra* to an office in court is to be carefully avoided, as an offence forbidden."[3]

§ 11. *Conduct of Judges, etc.*

"Since it is one of the functions of a sovereign to examine controversies in person, that duty is discharged by wise princes in the manner enjoined by law. Therefore should a king thoroughly guard his realm with care, by the due administration of justice, so will his wealth, virtue, and royal power be increased. Let him not side with either party, forgetting Yama's virtue of impartiality; but constantly inspect forensic affairs, banishing lustful and angry passions.[4]

"To him who decides causes according to justice, having subdued his lustful and angry passions, subjects flock as rivers flow to the sea. Like Yama, therefore, should the sovereign himself, forsaking favour and dislike, practise the virtues of self-command, having conquered his wrath and subdued all his passions.[5]

"But a king, especially, who is careful to discharge his duty, must make strict inquiry to distinguish right from wrong, because human intellect is confused. Liars compared with veracious men, sincere persons contrasted with insincere, appear in various shapes, and therefore trial and examination are enjoined. The sky seems to have a basis, and the luminary which shines in the heavens appears as fire; yet there is no base to the sky, nor fire in the celestial luminary. Hence it is right to examine a fact strictly, even though it occurred in the inquirer's own sight: he, who ascertains facts by rigid investigation, deviates not from justice. A king, thus con-

[1] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Ch.*
[2] *Vách. miśr.* in *Vyav. Chint.*, and *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Ch.*
[3] *Mitr. miśr.* in *Viramitr.*
[4] *Kátyáyana*, cited by *Bálam-bhaṭṭa.* [5] *Manu*, ib.

stantly inspecting forensic affairs with attention, here passes through a region of glory, and hereafter reaches the splendid abode of the sun.[1]

"A prince thus practising vigilance in the due administration of justice, as ordained by law, here passes through a region of glory, and hereafter becomes a counsellor of Indra.[2]

"A king who acts with justice in defending all creatures, and slays only those who ought to be slain, performs, as it were, a daily sacrifice with a hundred thousand gifts.[3]

"A sovereign, who chastises those who should be chastened, and duly puts to death those who deserve capital punishment, performs a sacrifice with a hundred thousand gifts.[4]

"A king, who inflicts punishment on such as deserve it not, and inflicts none on those who deserve it, brings great infamy on himself, and shall go to a region of torment.[5]

"Surely neither the king's brother, nor his son, nor his father-in-law, nor his uncle, should be exempted from penalty for infringing their respective duties.[6]

"A king is pronounced equally unjust in releasing one who merits punishment and punishing one who deserves it not; he is just who always inflicts the penalty ordained by law.[7]

"As for the maxim that the king is the dispenser of distributive justice, it is intended to show, that he is exclusively invested with power to impose pecuniary penalties and inflict corporal pains; for reproof and imprecation may be used by the chief judge also; but the king alone is competent to exact a fine from one who is liable to amercement, and slay a man who deserves capital punishment. Reproof and imprecation are not restricted, because they are intended only for correction. Accordingly, after mention of the king or a very learned *brâhmaṇa*, as the proper persons to decide suits, the legislator adds, 'both reproof and imprecation are declared to be within the competence of the priest; but pecuniary and corporal punishment appertain to the functions of the sovereign.'[8] It must be inferred that the judges and arbitrators, whether sitting in a stationary or in a moveable court, have only power to pass a decision; for by this text they are not competent to inflict any punishment whatsoever.[9]

"The chief duty of a prince invested with sovereignty by con-

[1] *Nârada*, 1. 62 and 66, 69.
[2] *Vṛihaspati*, cited by *Bál. Bh.*
[3] *Manu*, 8. 306.
[4] *Yâjnavalkya*, 1. 360.
[5] *Manu*, 8. 128.
[6] *Yâjnavalkya*, 1. 359.
[7] *Manu*, 9. 219.
[8] The author is not named.
[9] *Mitr. miśr.* in *Vîramitr.*

secration and inauguration, is the protection of his people, and that cannot be effected without restraining the wicked; nor can these be detected without inspecting judicial proceedings. Therefore should forensic affairs be daily inspected, as enjoined by the author[1] in a preceding passage. 'Reflecting apart on the reward of daily administering justice, equal to that of a solemn sacrifice, the king should day by day inspect law-suits in person, surrounded by assessors.'[2]

"Daily, except on the fourteenth day of every semi-lunation, and other excepted times.[3]

"Let not the king do that which is inconsistent with revealed or memorial law, nor what is injurious to living beings: if that, which is so, be practised, let him check such conduct. Whatever has been inadvertently done, contrary to justice, by another monarch, let him redress according to maxims ordained by traditional law.[4]

"Traditional law is the *Veda*.[5]

"Let the king carefully check, to the utmost of his power, whatever is contrary to justice; but if unable to do so, blame shall not be imputed to him: the wise restrict imputation of iniquity to wilful offences.[6]

"Ere long his foes will subdue the wicked king, who decides causes unjustly through delusion of mind.[7]

"When the king issues an unjust command in the affairs of litigant parties, the judge should remonstrate with the king, and effectually restrain him. A just and impartial opinion must indispensably be delivered by a member of a judicial assembly; if the prince listen not to it, that judge is nevertheless exonerated. But, knowing the prince's mind to be diverted from the path of justice, still he must not flatter him: a judge who so did would be criminal. Let not the members of the judicial assembly neglect to check the king when he acts unjustly; they who neglect it, fall headlong with him to a region of torture. Judges, who conform with him when he is disposed to proceed iniquitously, share his guilt. Therefore should the king be slowly advised by the members of the tribunal.[8]

"By saying slowly,[9] it is intimated that the judges should not,

[1] *Yájnavalkya.* [2] *Mitákshará.* [3] *Smṛiti-chandriká.*

[4] *Nárada*, 18. 9, 10. *Yama*, cited in *Vyav. Chint.* and *Kátyáyana*, quoted in other compilations. [5] *Vách. miśr.* in *Vyav. Chint.*

[6] *Kátyáyana.* [7] *Manu.*

[8] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*, *Kalp.*, and *Vyav. Chint.* Several of the verses are quoted as *Nárada's* in *Viramitr.* and variations occur in the reading of the text.

[9] The reading here is slowly '*ḍanaiḥ*,' instead of '*sa taiḥ*,' by them, as in other compilations, *Kalp. Chint.*, etc.

for fear of sin, abruptly at the instant oppose the king with their advice, but at another opportunity dissuade him.[1]

"A judge, who applauds an unjust sentence pronounced by the king, is criminal. Blame is likewise imputable to one who neglects to check the king when he deviates from the right path, and also to one who follows the king in his deviation from that path.[2]

"Perceiving the prince's mind to be diverted from the road of justice, still he must not flatter him; and thus only the judge will not be criminal.[3]

"He must not flatter him by delivering an opinion simply in conformity with the king's inclination, but should opine strictly according to equity. Such being his conduct, the judge will not be criminal.[4]

"When law-suits are justly decided, the judges obtain their own absolution, since their innocence depends on the justice of their decisions: therefore should equitable judgments only be pronounced.[5]

"The reward, as of a solemn sacrifice, belongs to him who, banishing avarice, hatred, and other passions, decides causes in the mode prescribed by law. The gods practise veracity, but men are conversant with falsehood; a divine character belongs, even in this world, to him whose sentiments strictly conform with truth.[6]

"As a blind man, heedless, swallows thorny fish; so does he, who enters a court of justice, and there pronounces an opinion remote from equity and truth, through mistake of facts.[7]

"A judge, pronouncing a fair opinion, incurs neither enmity nor sin; but one who acts otherwise, incurs both.[8]

"If the decision be at variance with truth, the witnesses, the judges, the superintendent of the court, and the sovereign of the land, forfeit confidence, lose stability, and fall to a region of torture.[9]

"When the judges, fully understanding the latent truth of the case, nevertheless pass judgment otherwise, and not as ordained by the law; when the cause is decided in such manner, then is truth wounded by perjured wicked judges. Whenever the sacred code is transgressed by the judges in the decision of a cause, justice, being injured by iniquity, doubtless will destroy those sinful men.[10]

"The divine form of justice is represented as a bull showering boons; and the gods consider him who impedes justice as a slayer of a bull and hinderer of benefactions: let no man, therefore, violate

[1] *Sm. Ch.* [2] *Vyav. Chint.*
[3] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Sm. Ch.*, but *Nárada* as quoted in *Viramitr.*
[4] *Mitr. misr.* in *Viramitr.* [5] *Nárada*, 1. 2. 11.
[6] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Kalp.*, etc.
[7] *Nárada*, 1. 2. 21. and *Hárita*, cited in *Sm. Ch.* [8] *Nárada*, 1. 2. 6.
[9] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Kalp.* [10] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Kalp.*, etc.

justice. The only firm friend who follows men, even after death, is virtue: every other is extinct with the body.[1]

"Justice being destroyed, will destroy; being preserved, will preserve; therefore it must never be violated, lest, being injured, it should destroy [thyself and] us.[2]

"Justice, wounded by the shafts of falsehood, roars in the midst of the assembly against injustice set before him: this evil being should be slain, even by the wicked.[3]

"For where justice is destroyed by iniquity, and truth by falsehood, the judges who basely look on, shall also be destroyed.[4]

"But judges who, repairing to the court, sit there in silent meditation, and do not deliver a candid opinion as they ought, are all deemed guilty of deliberate falsehood.[5]

"When justice, wounded by iniquity, approaches, and the judges extract not the dart, they also shall be wounded by it.[6]

"As a surgeon draws a dart from a wounded body by cautious efforts, so should the chief judge extract the dart of iniquity from the law-suit.[7]

"When all the persons who are members of the judicial assembly opine 'this is right,' the suit is relieved from the dart of injustice; but otherwise it continues wounded by the rankling dart. There is no judicial assembly wherein no elders sit; nor are they elders who pronounce not an equitable judgment; nor is that an equitable judgment which truth does not pervade; nor is that truth which is contaminated with fraud."[8]

§ 12. *Punishment of iniquitous Judges.*

"Whether it be through passion, ignorance, or avarice, that a judge speaks otherwise [than truth requires], he must be considered as no assessor of the court, and the king should severely punish that sinful man.[9]

"Fully considering the just decision of the cause, let a judge pronounce sentence accordingly; a different opinion must not be given. He who does deliver an unjust sentence, incurs a penalty of twice the amount.

"Whether it be through affection, ignorance, or avarice, that a judge gives an opinion contrary to justice, he is declared by the law to be deserving of punishment.[10]

[1] *Manu*, 8. 16, 17. *Nárada*, 1. 2. 9, 10. *Hárita*, and *Baudhdyana*, cited in *Kalp.*
[2] *Manu*, 8. 15. *Nárada*, 1. 2. 14.
[3] *Nárada*, 1. 2. 12.
[4] *Manu*, 8. 14. *Nárada*, 1. 2. 13.
[5] *Nárada*, 1. 2. 17.
[6] *Manu*, 8. 12. *Nárada*, 1. 2. 15.
[7] *Nárada*, 1. 2. 22. and *Hárita*.
[8] *Nárada*, 1. 2. 23, 24.
[9] *Nárada*, 1. 60.
[10] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*, *Kalp.*, and *Mádh.*

"Judges who act contrary to law and usage, through fear, avarice, or partiality, shall be severally fined twice the amount of the suit.[1]

"Judges who give opinions inconsistent with law and equity; those who accept bribes; and men who defraud such as have trusted them; should all be invariably banished.[2]

"Of false witnesses the whole property should be confiscated, and of corrupt judges.[3]

"Those who accept bribes, let the king banish, having stript them of their wealth.[4]

"An iniquitous judge, a perjured witness, and the slayer of a priest, are considered equal criminals.[5]

"A chief judge, corruptly deciding a cause according to his own perverse will, though conscious that the opinion of the assessors is right, shall also incur punishment.[6]

"Whatever loss is sustained through the fault of a judge, must be fully made good by him; but the king should not reverse the judgment which has been so passed between the litigant parties [or as differently read and interpreted, the king should investigate anew the cause which has been so decided].[7]

"If the chief judge converse in secret with one of the parties in an undecided suit, he shall doubtless be liable to punishment; and so shall a member of the judicial assembly, who is guilty of the same collusion.[8]

"A judge who gives an opinion contrary to justice, through the influence of affection or avarice, or through fear, should be fined in twice the amount of the penalty which is incident to the loss of the cause.[8]

"The assessors before mentioned, acting contrary to law, or inconsistently with the sacred code, or contrary to usage (as implied by the conjunctive particle), being overcome by ungovernable passion, through excess of affection, inordinate covetousness, or overpowering terror, shall be amerced respectively in twice the penalty which would be incurred by the party that is cast: not twice the value of the thing which was the subject of the law-suit: else it might be supposed that no fine would be incurred in the case of a trial for adultery or other matter [not pecuniary]. Partiality, avarice, and fear, are specified to restrict the precept which prescribes a penalty of twice the amount, to the instance of acting

[1] *Yájnavalkya*, 2. 4.
[2] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*, etc.
[3] *Vishṇu*, 5. 179, 180.
[4] *Yájnavalkya*, 1. 340.
[5] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Vyav. Chint.*
[6] *Kátyáyana*, cited in the *Kalp.*, etc.
[7] *Vyav. Chint.*
[8] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Chand.*

through partiality, etc.; it shall not be incurred in the case of inadvertence, error, and so forth.[1]

"Judges passing a decision contrary to law, through the influence of passion, shall be severally fined in twice the amount of the thing which is the subject of the law-suit. This direction for imposing fines is applicable in controversies concerning valuables; but in other disputes, such as personal insult, etc., a different punishment must be understood. Accordingly Vishṇu directs confiscation of property for acceptance of bribes; and here acceptance of bribes is stated merely as an instance.[2]

"The offending judge shall be compelled to pay twice the penalty which is involved in the suit. This meaning, consonant to the interpretation of many commentators, must be received. Not as it has been interpreted by a certain commentator,[3] twice the amount of the thing which is the subject of controversy, for that is incongruous; and the incongruity has been shown by many authors: it is not here repeated, for fear of prolixity.[4]

"Kátyáyana ordains punishment when the judge's fault is discovered subsequently to the decision of the cause. Though determined by a corrupt judge, the judgment is not to be rescinded by the king; but he should compel the iniquitous judge to make good the loss.[4]

"The king should again try that cause which has been ill investigated and wrong decided.[5]

"The same author provides that the chief judge, or assessors, shall be fined even for merely conversing in private with either of the parties, previous to the decision of the cause."[6]

§ 13. *Court-House.*

"The place where the original matter is thoroughly investigated by a disquisition of law, is a court of justice.[7]

"The court of justice should be built on the eastern quarter [of the king's palace];[8] and should be furnished with fire and water.[9]

"In the middle of his fortress, let the king construct a house, apart [from other edifices], with trees and water adjacent[10] to it [or, according to a different reading, a large edifice encompassed with water[11]]; and let him allot for a court [an apartment] on the

[1] *Mit.* on *Yájn.* 2. 4.
[2] *Aparárka* on *Yájn.* 2. 4.
[3] Alluding apparently to *Aparárka.*
[4] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Chand.*
[5] *Vách. miśr.* in *Vyav. Chint.*
[6] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Chand.*
[7] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Sm. Chand.* and *Mádh.*
[8] *Dev. Bh.*
[9] *Śankha*, cited in *Sm. Ch.*
[10] As read in the *Mádh.*
[11] As read in *Sm. Chand.*

eastern side of it, with an eastern aspect, and duly proportioned, furnished too with a throne, decorated with wreaths, perfumed with fragrant resins, supplied with corn, embellished with gems, adorned with statues and pictures, and with images of deities, and accommodated likewise with fire and water.[1]

"An apartment for the assembly or court of justice should be allotted on the eastern side of the royal palace. It should be designed according to the dimensions taught by the rules of architecture. The place of assembly is termed a court of justice.[2]

"The place where a thorough investigation, or complete ascertainment of the original matter set forth, is competently instituted and conducted by means of a legal inquiry, and by persons qualified to decide, is called a court of justice (*dharmádhikaraṇa*): a term signifying, agreeably to its etymology, a place where the original matter is thoroughly investigated according to rules of law."[3]

§ 14. *Time and mode of Sitting.*

"Having risen in the last watch of the night, his body being pure and his mind attentive, having made oblations to fire, and shown due respect to the priests, let him [the king[4]] enter his hall decently splendid.[5]

"The king, having made oblations early in the morning and performed ablutions, and being composed and collected, and having shown due honour to his spiritual parents, to learned astronomers and physicians, to the deities and to *bráhmaṇas*, and to domestic priests, with flowers, ornaments and vesture, and having saluted his spiritual parents and the rest, should enter the court-room with a cheerful aspect.[6]

"Let the king, uninfluenced by partiality, decide causes in the mode prescribed by law, during the forenoon, in his courts of justice; omitting the [first] eighth part of a day, but during [the next] three: such is the best time for the trial of causes, as ordained by the sacred code.[7]

"After the first four hours (*ghaṭṭiká*), for that time is allotted to the business of the perpetual fire, and other religious affairs. In this space of three [eighth] parts of a day, the king should constantly inspect law-suits.[8]

"'The eighth part,' from the first half watch (*prahara*) to the second (*prahara*).[9]

[1] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Sm. Ch.* and *Mádh.*
[2] *Mádhava.*
[3] *Dev. Bh.*
[4] *Sm. Chand.*
[5] *Manu*, 7. 145.
[6] *Vrihaspati*, cited in *Sm. Chand.* and *Mádh.*
[7] *Kátyáyana*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*, etc.
[8] *Dev. Bh.* in *Sm. Ch.*
[9] *Ragh.* in *Vyav. tattwa.*

"The trial of causes, during the forenoon only, is here ordained. That again is intended for temporal purposes, because the understanding is then clear, and the king is yet disengaged from other business. A restriction is subjoined. The eighth part is half the first *prahara*: three parts subsequent thereto, but preceding the turn of noon; for else it would contradict the injunction for hearing causes in the forenoon. The omission of half the first *prahara*, too, is intended for a sensible purpose; as it serves to obviate any obstruction to the performance of daily sacrifices and the like.[1]

"A wise man should not inspect judicial proceedings on these lunar days; namely, the fourteenth of each half of the month; the day of conjunction (new moon); that of opposition (full moon); and the eighth day of every semilunation.[2]

"This prohibition is intended for spiritual ends, since it can have no temporal use: just like the prohibition of sitting towards a certain quarter [the south] during meals.[3]

"Let the king sit facing the east, and the judges facing the north; the accountant looking towards the west, and the scribe towards the south: and the king should cause gold, fire, water, and the code of law, to be placed in the midst of them, and also other holy things.[4]

"The rest may sit as most convenient; since there is no restriction concerning their places."[5]

[1] *Mitr. miśr.* in *Viramitr.*
[2] *Samvarta*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*
[3] *Mitr. miśr.* in *Viramitr.*
[4] *Vṛihaspati*, cited in *Sm. Chand.*
[5] *Mitr. miśr.* in *Viramitr.*

XV.

ON INDIAN WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.[1]

[From the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. v. pp. 91—109. *Calcutta*, 1798. 4to.]

COMMENTATORS reconcile the contradictions of ancient authors on the subject of weights and measures by a reference to different standards. To understand their explanations I have been led to some inquiries, the result of which I shall state concisely, to alleviate the labour of others, who may seek information on the same subject; omitting, however, such measures as are of very limited use.

Most of the authorities, which I shall quote, have not been consulted by myself, but are assumed from the citations in a work of Gopála-bhaṭṭa on numbers and quantities, which is entitled *Sankhyáparimáṇa*.

Manu,[2] Yájnavalkya,[3] and Nárada trace all weights from the least visible quantity, which they concur in naming *trasareṇu*, and describing as "the very small mote, which may be discerned in a sunbeam passing through a lattice." Writers on medicine proceed a step further, and affirm, that a *trasareṇu* contains thirty *paramáṇu* or atoms; they describe the *trasareṇu*

[1] [For further information on the subject I would refer the reader to Mr. Thomas's edition of Prinsep's *Useful Tables*, pp. 109–130, and also his papers in the *Numismatic Chronicle*, vol. iv. (N.S.), and *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vols. ii. and vi. (N.S.), his "Initial Coinage of Bengal," Parts i. and ii., and his "Chronicles of the Pathán Kings of Dehli," pp. 221, etc. I have admitted some verbal corrections from the author's own copy of the *Researches*.]

[2] [viii. 132, etc.] [3] [i. 361, etc.]

in words of the same import with the definition given by Manu; and they furnish another name for it, *vanśi*.[1] According to them, eighty-six *vanśis* makes one *marichi*, or sensible portion of light.

The legislators above named proceed from the *trasareṇu*, as follows:

8 *trasareṇus*	= 1 *likshá*, or minute poppy-seed.[2]
3 *likshás*	= 1 *rája-sarshapa*, or black mustard-seed.
3 *rája-sarshapas*	= 1 *gaura-sarshapa*, or white mustard-seed.
6 *gaura-sarshapas*	= 1 *yava*, or middle-sized barley-corn.
3 *yavas*	= 1 *kṛishṇala*, or seed of the *gunjá*.

This weight is the lowest denomination in general use, and commonly known by the name of *ratti*, the same with *rattiká*,[3] which, as well as *raktiká*, denotes the red seed, as *kṛishṇala* indicates the black seed of the *gunjá*-creeper. Each *ratti* used by jewellers is equal to $\frac{7}{8}$ of a carat. The seeds themselves have been ascertained by Sir William Jones, from the average of numerous trials, at $1\frac{3}{10}$ grain.[4] But factitious *rattis* in common use should be double of the *gunjá* seed; however, they weigh less than two grains and a quarter. For the *sicca* weight contains $179\frac{1}{3}$ grains nearly; the *másha* $17\frac{3}{8}$[5] nearly; the *ratti* $2\frac{3}{10}$ nearly.[6]

[1] [Or rather *dhwansi*, as given in the *Vaidyaka-paribhásha*, quoted in the *S'abda-kalpadruma*.]

[2] [Or 'a nit,' cf. Ujjwalad. *Uṇádi-sút.* iii. 66.]

[3] *Asiatic Researches*, vol. ii. p. 154.

[4] [Mr. Thomas has shown, *Numismatic Chronicle*, vol. iv. (N.S.) p. 131, that the *ratti* = 1·75 grains. Cf. *R. A. S. Journ.*, vol. ii. (N.S.) p. 151.]

[5] [This is not clearly printed in the original, but the London reprint reads it $17\frac{3}{8}$.]

[6] ["The determination of the true weight of the *ratti* has done much both to facilitate and give authority to the comparison of the ultimately divergent standards of the ethnic kingdoms of India. Having discovered the guiding *unit*, all other calculations become simple, and present singularly convincing results, notwithstanding that the basis of all these estimates rests upon so erratic a test as the growth of the seed of the *gunjá*-creeper (*Abrus precatorius*) under the varied incidents of soil and climate. Nevertheless, this small compact grain, checked in early times by other products of nature, is seen to have had the remarkable faculty of securing a uniform average throughout the entire continent of India, which only came to be disturbed when monarchs, like Shír Sháh and Akbar, in their vanity, raised the weight of the coinage without any reference to the number of *rattis* inherited from Hindu sources as the *given* standard, officially

Writers on medicine trace this weight from the smallest sensible quantity, in another order.

30 *paramáṇus* or atoms = 1 *trasareṇu* or *vanśi*.
86 *vanśis* = 1 *marichi*, or sensible quantity of light.
6 *marichis* = 1 *rájiká*, or black mustard-seed.
3 *rájikás* = 1 *sarshapa*, or white mustard-seed.
8 *sarshapas* = 1 *yava*, or barley-corn.
4 *yavas* = 1 *gunjá*, or *raktiká*.

A *rattiká* is also said to be equal in weight to four grains of rice in the husk; and Gopála-bhaṭṭa affirms, that one seed of the *gunjá*, according to writers on astronomy, is equal to two large barley-corns. Notwithstanding this apparent uncertainty in the comparison of a seed of the *gunjá* to other productions of nature, the weight of a *raktiká* is well determined by practice, and is the common medium of comparison for other weights. These I shall now state on the authority of Manu, Yájnavalkya, and Nárada.

Weights of Gold.

5[1] *kṛishṇalas* or *raktikás* = 1 *másha*, *máshaka*, or *máshika*
16 *máshas* = 1 *karsha*, *aksha*, *tolaka*, or *suvarṇa*.
4 *karshas* or *suvarṇas* = 1 *pala* (the same weight which is also denominated *nishka*).
10 *palas* = 1 *dharaṇa* of gold.

Yájnavalkya adds, that five *suvarṇas* make one *pala* (of gold), according to some authorities.

Weights of Silver.

2 *raktikás* or seeds of the *gunjá* = 1 *máshaka* of silver.
16 *máshakas* = 1 *dharaṇa* of silver, or *puráṇa*.
10 *dharaṇas* of silver = 1 *śatamána* or *pala* of silver.

But a *karsha* or eighty *raktikás* of copper is called a *paṇa* or *kárshápaṇa*.

Commentators differ on the application of the several terms.

recognized in the old, but altogether disregarded and left undefined in the reformed Muhammadan mintages."—Thomas, *Initial Coinage of Bengal*, Part ii. p. 6.]

[1] [Mr. Colebrooke adds a MS. reference to "Raghunandana's *Divya-tattwa* near the end" (printed ed. vol. ii. p. 348), where the *másha* appears to be reckoned as containing six *kṛishṇalas*.]

Some consider *krishṇala* as a term appropriated to the quantity of one *raktiká* of gold; but Kullúka-bhaṭṭa thinks the *suvarṇa* only peculiar to gold, for which metal it is also a name. A *paṇa* or *kárshápaṇa* is a measure of silver as well as of copper. There is a further diversity in the application of the terms; for they are used to describe other weights. Nárada says, a *másha* may also be considered as the twentieth of a *kárshápaṇa;* and Vṛihaspati describes it as the twentieth part of the *pala.* Hence we have no less than four *máshas:* one containing five *raktikás;* another, four (according to Nárada); a third, sixteen (according to Vṛihaspati); and a fourth (the *máshaka* of silver) consisting of two *raktikás;* not to notice the *máshaka* used by the medical tribe, and consisting of ten, or, according to some authorities, of twelve *raktikás,* which may be the same with the jeweller's *másha* of six double *rattis.* To these I do not add the *másha* of eight *raktikás,* because it has been explained, as measured by eight silver *ratti* weights, each twice as heavy as the seed. Yet as a practical denomination it must be noticed. Eight such *rattis* make one *másha;* but twelve *máshas* compose one *tola.* This *tola* is nowhere suggested by the Hindu legislators. Allowing for a difference in the *ratti,* it is double the weight of the legal *tola,* or 210 grains instead of 105 grains.

A *nishka,* as synonymous with *pala,* consists of five *suvarṇas.* According to some authors, it is also a denomination for the quantity of one hundred and fifty *suvarṇas.* Other large denominations are noticed in dictionaries.

108 *suvarṇas,* or *tolakas* of gold, constitute an *urubhúshaṇa, pala,* or *dinára.*

100 *palas,* or *nishkas,* make one *tulá;* 20 *tulás,* or 2000 *palas,* one *bhára;* and 10 *bháras,* one *áchita.*

200 *palas,* or *nishkas,* constitute one *hára.*

According to Dánayogíswara, the tenth of a *bhára* is called *adhára,* which is consequently synonymous with *hára* as a term for a specific quantity of gold.

Gopála-bhaṭṭa also states other weights, without mentioning by what classes they are used. I suspect an error in the statement, because it reduces the *másha* to a very low denomination; and I suppose it to be the jeweller's weight.

6 *rájikás* (*raktikás*)	= 1	*máshaka*, *hema*,[1] or *vánaka*.
4 *vánakas*	= 1	*sala*, *dharaṇa*, or *ṭanka*.
2 *ṭankas*	= 1	*koṇa*.
2 *koṇas*	= 1	*karsha*.

Probably it should be *raktikás* instead of *rájikás*, which would nearly correspond with the weights subjoined, giving twenty-four *rattikás* for one *dharaṇa* in both statements. It also corresponds with the tables in the *Á'yín-i Akbarí* (vol. iii. p. 94), where a *tank* of twenty-four *rattis*, fixed at ten barley-corns to the *ratti*, contains two hundred and forty barley-corns; and a *másha* of eight *rattis*, at seven and a half barley-corns each, contains sixty barley-corns; consequently four *máshas* are equal to one *ṭanka*, as in the preceding table; and six jeweller's *rattis* are equal to eight double *rattis* as used by goldsmiths.

The same author (Gopála-bhaṭṭa) observes that weights are thus stated in astronomical books.

2 large barley-corns	= 1	seed of the *gunjá*.
3 *gunjás*	= 1	*balla*.
8 *ballas*	= 1	*dharaṇa*.
2 *dharaṇas*	= 1	*alaka*.
1000 *alakas*	= 1	*dhaṭaka*.

The tale of shells, compared to weight of silver, may be taken on the authority of the *Lílávatí*.

20 *kapardakas*, shells, or cowries	= 1	*kákiṇí*.
4 *kákiṇís*	= 1	*paṇa*, *kárshápaṇa*, or *karshika*.[2]
16 *paṇas* (= 1 *puráṇa* of shells)	= 1	*bharma* (of silver).
16 *bharmas*	= 1	*nishka* (of silver).

It may be inferred, that one shell is valued at one *raktiká* of copper: one *paṇa* of shells, at one *paṇa* of copper; and

[1] [A MS. note adds, "Hemadhánaka, see Raghunandana."] [2] [Karsha?]

sixty-four *paṇas*, at one *tolaka* of silver, which is equal in weight to one *paṇa* of copper. And it seems remarkable, that the comparative value of silver, copper, and shells, is nearly the same at this time as it was in the days of Bháskara.[1]

On the measures of grain Gopála-bhaṭṭa quotes the authority of several *Puráṇas*.

Varáha-puráṇa:
1 *mushṭi* or handful = 1 *pala*.
2 *palas* = 1 *prasṛiti*.
8 *mushṭis* = 1 *kunchi*.
8 *kunchis* = 1 *pushkala*.
4 *pushkalas* = 1 *áḍhaka*.
4 *áḍhakas* = 1 *droṇa*.

Bhavishya-puráṇa:
2 *palas* = 1 *prasṛiti*.
2 *prasṛitis* = 1 *kuḍava*.
4 *kuḍavas* = 1 *prastha*.
4 *prasthas* = 1 *áḍhaka*.
4 *áḍhakas* = 1 *droṇa*.
2 *droṇas* = 1 *kumbha* or *súrpa*.
16 *droṇas* = 1 *khárí* or *sháṛí*.

Padma-puráṇa:
4 *palas* = 1 *kuḍava*.
4 *kuḍavas* = 1 *prastha*.
4 *prasthas* = 1 *áḍhaka*.
4 *áḍhakas* = 1 *droṇa*.
16 *droṇas* = 1 *khárí*.
20 *droṇas* = 1 *kumbha*.
10 *kumbhas* = 1 *báha*, or load.

Skanda-puráṇa:
2 *palas* = 1 *prasṛiti*.
2 *prasṛitis* = 1 *kuḍava*.
4 *kuḍavas* = 1 *prastha*.
4 *prasthas* = 1 *áḍhaka*.
4 *áḍhakas* = 1 *droṇa*.
2 *droṇas* = 1 *kumbha*, according to some.
20 *droṇas* = 1 *kumbha*, according to others.

From these may be formed two tables. The first coincides with the texts of the *Varáha-puráṇa*, and is preferred by

[1] The comparative value of silver and copper was the same in the reign of Akbar, for the *dám*, weighing five *tanks* or twenty *máshas* of copper, was valued at the fortieth part of the *Jaldlí rúpiya*, weighing twelve *máshas* and a half of pure silver; whence we have again the proportion of sixty-four to one. [Cf. Mr. E. Thomas, *The Chronicles of the Pathán Kings of Dehlí*, pp. 407–409.]

Raghunandana; the second, formed on the concurrent authority of the *Bhavishya*, *Padma*, and *Skanda-puráṇas*, is adopted in the *Kalpataru*, rejecting however the *kumbha* of two *droṇas*, and making the *pala* equal to the weight of three *tolakas* and a half.

TABLE I.

8 *mushṭis* or handfuls	= 8 *palas* = 4 *prasṛitis*	= 1 *kunchi*.
8 *kunchis*	= 1 *pushkala*.	
4 *pushkalas*	= 1 *áḍhaka*.	
4 *áḍhakas*	= 1 *droṇa*.	
20 *droṇas*	= 1 *kumbha*.	

TABLE II.

4 *palas* = 2 *prasṛitis*	= 1 *kuḍava*, or *setiká*,	14 *tolas*.
4 *kuḍavas*	= 1 *prastha*	56 ,,
4 *prasthas*	= 1 *áḍhaka*	224 ,,
4 *áḍhakas*	= 1 *droṇa*	896 ,,
20 *droṇas*	= 1¼ *khárís* = 1 *kumbha*	17,920 ,,
10 *kumbhas*	= 1 *báha*	1,79,200 ,,

But some make two *droṇas* equal to one *kumbha*.

Would it be unreasonable to derive the English comb of four bushels from the *kumbha* of the Hindus? The *khári* subsequently described contains 5,832 cubic inches, if the cubit be taken at eighteen inches. It would consequently be equal to two bushels, two pecks, one gallon and two-thirds: and the *kumbha*, equal to one *khári* and a quarter, will contain three bushels and three gallons nearly. According to Lakshmídhara's valuation of the *pala* at three *tolakas* and a half, the *khári* weighs 14,336 *tolakas* or 215 lb. avoirdupois nearly, and the *kumbha*, 17,920 *tolakas* or 268 lb., which corresponds nearly to the weight of a comb of good wheat: and a *báha* will be nearly equal to a wey or a ton in freight.

The name of *setiká*, for the fourth of a *prastha*, is assumed from the *Varáha-puráṇa*; and Hemádri accordingly declares it synonymous with *kuḍava*: the *Kalpataru*, *Smṛiti-sára*, *Ratnákara*, and *Samaya-pradípa* also make the *setiká* equal

to the *kuḍava*, or a quarter of the *prastha*, but it contains twelve *prasṛitis* according to those commentaries; and the *prasṛiti* is described, in the *Dánakáṇḍa*, by Lakshmídhara, author of the *Kalpataru*, as the quantity held in both hands by a man of the common size. Twelve such handfuls fill a *kuḍava*, described as a vessel four fingers wide and as many deep, which is used in measuring small wood, canes, iron and other things. But Váchaspati-miśra adopts this *kuḍava* of twelve *prasṛitis*, whence we have a third table of legal measures in general use.

TABLE III.

12 double handfuls	=	1 *kuḍava*.
4 *kuḍavas*	=	1 *prastha*.
4 *prasthas*	=	1 *áḍhaka*.
4 *áḍhakas*	=	1 *droṇa*.
20 *droṇas*	=	1 *kumbha*.

Besides the contradiction already noticed on the subject of the *kumbha*, commentators have suggested wider differences. According to Kullúka-bhaṭṭa, it contains twenty *droṇas*, but this *droṇa* contains two hundred *palas*.

In the *Dána-viveka*, the *kumbha* is stated at one thousand *palas*; in the *Ratnákara*, at twenty *prasthas*. But, according to Játúkarṇa, five hundred and twelve *palas*, only, constitute a *kumbha*. This may be the same quantity with the *droṇa*, as a measure or weight estimated by the hand: it should consist of four *áḍhakas*, each equal to four *prasthas*, and each of these weighing, according to the *Atharva-veda*, thirty-two *palas* of gold. This, again, seems to be the *prastha* of Magadha, described by the *Gopatha-bráhmaṇa*.[1]

4[2] *kṛishṇalas*	=	1 *másha*.
64 *máshas*	=	1 *pala*.
32 *palas*	=	1 *prastha* as used in Magadha.

[1] [This passage is not found in the printed *Gopatha-bráhmaṇa*; it is really the passage quoted by Prof. Weber from the *Atharva-pariśishṭa*, in his treatise *über den Vedakalender*, Berlin, 1862, p. 82. Cf. Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathán Kings*, pp. 221, 222.]

[2] [*Five* in the *pariśishṭa*.]

Since the *pala* of gold weighs 420 troy grains, the *prastha* contains one pound avoirdupois, fourteen ounces and three-quarters nearly. The *droṇa* last mentioned contains 30 lb. 11 oz. and a fraction, and a *kumbha* of twenty such *droṇas* 614 lb. 6 oz., and a half nearly.

The measures of grain in common use are probably derived from the ancient *kumbha* and *droṇa;* but their names are not suggested by any of the preceding tables. Twenty *káṭhás* make one *bisi;* and sixteen *bísis*, one *pauli*. The size of the *káṭhá* varies in different districts, in some containing no more than two and a half *sers* of rice, in others five *sers* (80 *sicca* weight), or even more. In the southern districts of Bengal a measure of grain is used, which contains one *ser* and a quarter; it is called *rek*. Four *reks* make one *páli:* twenty *pális* one *soli:* and sixteen *solis* one *káhaṇ*.

The *Vṛihat-rájamártaṇḍa* specifies measures, which do not appear to have been noticed in other Sanskrit writings.

24 *tolakas* = 1 *ser*.
2 *sers* = 1 *prabh*.

It is mentioned in the *Á'yín-i Akbarí* that the *ser* formerly contained eighteen *dáms* in some parts of Hindustán, and twenty-two in others; but that it consisted of twenty-eight at the commencement of the reign of Akbar, and was fixed by him at thirty. The *dám* was fixed at five *tanks* or twenty *máshas*, or, as stated in one place, twenty *máshas* and seven *rattis*. The ancient *ser*, noticed in the *Á'yín-i Akbarí*, therefore coincided nearly with the *ser* stated in the *Rájamártaṇḍa*. The double *ser* is still used in some places, but called by the same name (*panchaseri*) as the weight of five *sers* employed in others.

For measures used in Mithilá and some other countries, we have the authority of Chaṇḍeśwara in the *Bála-bhúshaṇa:* they differ from the second table, interposing a *mánikà* equal to a fourth of a *khárí*, and making the *báha* equal to twenty *kháris*.

4 *palas* = 1 *kuḍava.*
4 *kuḍavas* = 1 *prastha.*
4 *prasthas* = 1 *áḍhaka.*
4 *áḍhakas* = 1 *droṇa.*
4 *droṇas* = 1 *máṇiká.*
4 *máṇikás* = 1 *khárí.*
20 *khárís* = 1 *báha.*

Gopála-bhaṭṭa states another set of measures, without furnishing a comparison to any determinate quantity otherwise known.

4 *áyus* = 1 *śáksha.*[1]
4 *śákshas* = 1 *bilwa.*
4 *bilwas* = 1 *kuḍava.*
4 *kuḍavas* = 1 *prastha.*
4 *prasthas* = 1 *khárí.*
4 *khárís* = 1 *goṇí.*
4 *goṇís* = 1 *droṇiká.*

I have already quoted a comparison of the *kuḍava* to a practical measure of length; and we learn from the *Líláwatí* that the *khárí* or *khárika* of Magadha should be a cube measured by one cubit: "A vessel measured by a cubit in "every dimension is a *ghanahasta*, which, in Magadha, is "called *khárika;* it should be made with twelve corners, or "angles formed by surfaces (that is, it should be made in the "form of a solid with six faces). The *khárika* of Utkala is in "general use on the south of the river Godávarí; there the "*droṇa* is the sixteenth part of a *khárí* (as in the second "table); the *áḍhaka*, the fourth of a *droṇa;* the *prastha*, the "fourth of an *áḍhaka;* and the *kuḍava* a quarter of a *prastha;* "but the *kuḍava*, formed like a *ghanahasta*, should be measured "by three fingers and a half in every dimension. This vessel "must be made of earth or similar materials; for such alone is "a *kuḍava.*"

Both by this statement and by the second table a *khárí* consists of 1026 *kuḍavas;* and since the cubit must be taken at twenty-four fingers or *angulas*, a solid cubit will contain

[1] [Aksha?]

13,824 cubic *angulas* or fingers, and one *kuḍava* thirteen and a half cubic *angulas*. Its solid contents, therefore, are the half of a cube whose side is three fingers: a slight change in the reading would make the description quoted from the *Lílávatí* coincide with this computation, and the *khárika* of Utkala and Magadha would be the same.

However, Lakshmídhara has described the *kuḍava* as a vessel four fingers wide and as many deep; which makes a *kuḍava* of sixty-four cubic *angulas*, or twenty-seven cubic inches.

This will exhibit an *áḍhaka* of 432 inches, similar to a dry measure used at Madras, which is said to contain 423 cubic inches, and is the eighth part of a *markal* of 3,384 cubic inches, nearly double to the *droṇa* of 1,728 cubic inches. If the *kuḍava* of Utkala be a cube, whose side is three and a half fingers, containing forty-three cubic *angulas* nearly, or eighteen cubic inches and a fraction, the *khárika* of Utkala contains 44,118 cubic *angulas*, or 18,612 cubic inches, taking the cubit at eighteen inches.

On the measures of space Gopála-bhaṭṭa quotes a text from *Vṛiddha-Manu*, which traces these from the same minute quantity as weights.

8 *trasareṇus* = 1 *reṇu*.
8 *reṇus* = 1 *bálágra*, or hair's point.
8 *bálágras* = 1 *líkshá*, or poppy-seed.
8 *likshás* = 1 *yúka*.
8 *yúkas* = 1 *yava*, or very small barley-corn.
8 *yavas* = 1 *angula*, or finger.

From this Manu proceeds to larger measures.

12 *angulas* or fingers = 1 *vitasti* or span.
2 *vitastis* or spans = 1 *hasta* or cubit.

In the *Márkaṇḍeya-puráṇa*[1] measures are traced from atoms.

8 *paramáṇus* or atoms = 1 *para-súkshma*, most minute substance.
8 *para-súkshmas* = 1 *trasareṇu*.
8 *trasareṇus* = 1 *mahírajas*, grain of sand or dust.
8 grains of sand = 1 *bálágra*, or hair's point.

[1] [xlix. 37–39, but with some variations in the printed text.]

8 *bálágras* = 1 *likshá.*
8 *likshás* = 1 *yúka.*
8 *yúkas* = 1 *yava.*
8 *yavas* = 1 *angula*, or finger.
6 fingers = 1 *pada*, or breadth of the foot.
2 *padas* = 1 *vitasti*, or span.
2 spans = 1 cubit (*hasta*).
2 cubits = the circumference of the human body.
4 cubits = 1 *dhanus*, *daṇḍa*,[1] or staff.
2 *daṇḍas* = 1 *náḍiká* (or *náḍí*).

In another place the same *puráṇa* notices two measures, one of which is often mentioned in rituals.

21 breadths of the middle of the thumb = 1 *aratni*.[2]
10 ditto = 1 *prádeśa*, or span from the tip of the thumb to the tip of the fore-finger.

But according to the *Kalpataru*, it should be ten breadths of the thumb and a half. And we learn from the *Á'ditya-puráṇa*, that according to Vyása, it should be measured by the breadth of the thumb at the tip. The same *puráṇa* makes two *aratnis* (or 42 thumbs) equal to one *kishku:* but Hárita compares the *kishku* to the cubit, four of which it contains according to his statement; and four *kishkus* make one *nalwa.* Here again the *Á'ditya-puráṇa* differs, making the *nalwa* to contain thirty *dhanus.* It concurs with authorities above cited, in the measures of the cubit, *daṇḍa*, and *náḍí;* the first containing twenty-four fingers; the second, ninety-six; and the *náḍí*, two *daṇḍas.*

The same *puráṇa* notices the larger measures of distance.

2000 *dhanus* = 1 *krośa.*
2 *krośas* = 1 *gavyúti.*
8000 *dhanus* = 2 *gavyútis* = 1 *yojana.*

On one reading of the *Vishṇu-puráṇa* the *krośa* contains only one thousand *dhanus;* accordingly Gopála-bhaṭṭa quotes a text which acquaints us that "Travellers to foreign countries com-

[1] [*Dhanurdaṇḍa?*]
[2] [Printed as *ratni*, but corrected in a MS. note to *aratni.* Both forms of the word occur in dictionaries.]

pute the *yojana* at four thousand *dhanus*." But he adduces another text, which states the measures of the *krośa*, *garyúti*, and *yojana* as they are given in the *Á'ditya-puráṇa*.

The *Lílávatí* confirms this computation.

8 barley-corns	= 1 finger's breadth.
24 fingers	= 1 *hasta*, or cubit.
4 cubits	= 1 *daṇḍa* (= 1 *dhanus*).
2000 *daṇḍas*	= 1 *krośa*.[1]
4 *krośas*	= 1 *yojana*.

The *Lílávatí* also informs us of the measures used for arable land, which are similar to those now in use.

10 hands	= 1 *vanśa*, or bamboo cane.
20 *vanśas* (in length and breadth)	= 1 *niranga* of arable land.

Divisions of time are noticed in the first chapter of *Manu* (i. 64).

18 *nimeshas*, or twinklings of an eye	= 1 *káshṭhá*.
30 *káshṭhás*	= 1 *kalá*.
30 *kalás*	= 1 *kshaṇa*.
12 *kshaṇas*	= 1 *muhúrta*.
30 *muhúrtas*	= 1 day and night (according to mean solar time).

From this he proceeds to the divisions of the civil year.

15 days and nights (*ahorátra*)	= 1 *páksha*, or interval between the syzygies.
first and last *paksha*	= 1 month.
2 months	= 1 season (*ritu*).
3 seasons	= 1 *ayana* (half-year).
2 *ayanas*	= 1 year.

According to the *Súrya-siddhánta* (see As. Res. vol. ii. p. 230),

6 respirations (*práṇa*)	= 1 *vikalá*.
60 *vikalás*	= 1 *daṇḍa*.
60 *daṇḍas*	= 1 sidereal day.

The *Vishṇu-puráṇa* states a mode of subdividing the day,

[1] If the cubit be taken at eighteen inches, then 4000 yards = 1 standard *krośa* = 2 miles and a quarter nearly; and 2000 yards = 1 computed *krośa* = 1 mile and one-eighth; and Major Rennel states the *kroś* as fixed by Akbar at 5000 *gaz* = 4757 yards = 2 British miles and 5 furlongs; and the average common *kroś* at one statute mile and nine-tenths.

on which Gopála-bhaṭṭa remarks, that "it is founded on astronomy," and subjoins another mode of subdivision.

Ten long syllables are uttered in one respiration (*práṇa*).

6 respirations	= 1	*vináḍiká.*
60 *vináḍikás*	= 1	*dhaṭá.*[1]
60 *dhaṭás*	= 1 day and night (or solar day).	

Proceeding to another table, he says, the time in which ten long syllables may be uttered is equal to one respiration.

6 respirations	= 1	*pala.*
60 *palas*	= 1	*ghaṭiká.*
60 *ghaṭikás*	= 1 day and night.	
30 days and nights	= 1 month.	
12 months	= 1 year.	

The *Varáha-puráṇa* concurs with the *Súrya-siddhánta* in another subdivision of time.

60 *kshaṇas*	= 1	*lava.*
60 *lavas*	= 1	*nimesha.*
60 *nimeshas*	= 1	*káshṭhá.*
60 *káshṭhás*	= 1	*atipala.*
60 *atipalas*	= 1	*vipala.*
60 *vipalas*	= 1	*pala.*
60 *palas*	= 1	*daṇḍa.*
60 *daṇḍas*	= a night and day.	
60 nights and days	= 1	*ṛitu* or season.

But the *Bhavishya-puráṇa* subdivides the *nimesha* otherwise.

1 twinkling of the eye while a man is easy and at rest = 30 *tatpanas*, or moments.[2]

1 *tatpana* = 100 *truṭis.*
1 *truṭi* = 1000 *sankramas.*

Raghunandana, in the *Jyotishṭattwa*, gives a rule for finding the planets which preside over hours of the day called *horá;* doubling the *ghaṭis* elapsed from the beginning of the day (or sunrise at the first meridian), and dividing by five, the product shows the elapsed hours or *horás;* the sixth planet, counted

[1] [*Ghaṭi*? Cf. Stenzler, *Zeitschr. d. D. M. S.* ix. 668.]

[2] [Wilson (*Sansk. Dict.*) gives *tatpara* as 'the thirtieth part of the time of the twinkling of the eye.']

from that which gives name to the proposed day, rules the second hour, the sixth counted from this rules the third, and so on for the hours of the day, but every fifth planet is taken for the hours of the night. The order of the planets is ☾ ☿ ♀ ☉ ♂ ♃ ♄. Consequently on a Sunday the regent of the several hours of the day and night are:

Day:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	☉	♀	☿	☾	♄	♃	♂	☉	♀	☿	☾	♄
Night:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	♂	♀	☾	♃	☉	☿	♄	♂	♀	☾	♃	☉

As the days of the week are found by taking every fourth in the same series, we might proceed by this rule to the first *horâ* of the subsequent day, whose regent, the fourth from ☉, is ☾; and thence proceed by the above-mentioned rule to the other regents of *horâs* for Monday. I subjoin the original passage, which was communicated to me by Mr. Davis, and add a verbal translation:

वारप्रवृत्तेर्घटिका द्विनिघ्नाः कालाख्यहोरापतयः शराघ्नाः ।
दिने निशायामृतुबाणवृत्त्या निजाहनाथात्पतयः प्रकल्प्याः ॥ १ ॥
रेखापूर्वापरयोर्वारः सूर्योदयात् परस्तात्प्राक् ।
देशान्तरयोजनमितविघटीभिः पादहीनाभिः ॥ २ ॥

"The *Ghaṭikâs, elapsed* from the beginning of the day, being doubled and divided by (five) arrows, *show* the lords of time called *horâ;* in the day these lords are regulated by intervals of (six) seasons *counted* from the particular regent of the day *proposed,* in the night by intervals of (five) arrows."

"The *commencement of the* day at preceding or subsequent meridians, before or after sunrise *at the first meridian, is known* from the interval of countries, *or distance in longitude,* measured by *yojanas* and reduced into *ghaṭis* after deducting a fourth *from the number of yojanas.*"[1]

The coincidence of name for the hour or twenty-fourth part of the day is certainly remarkable. But until we find the

[1] [Cf. vol. ii. p. 319.]

same division of time noticed by a more ancient author than Raghunandana,[1] it must remain doubtful whether it may not have been borrowed from Europe in modern times.[2]

[1] [Cf. vol. ii. p. 360, note, pp. 474–480.]

[2] [Mr. Colebrooke adds here, in his own copy of the *Researches*, the following note, cf. *Life*, pp. 106–108.

"Chaucer, in his treatise on the Astrolabe, shows that the hours of the planets follow the order of the planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury, and Moon; and consequently the first hour of Saturday being that of Saturn, the 24th of the same day is the hour of Mars, and the first of the next day is that of the Sun, and so on through the week for ever. In the inverse order of the planets the succession of them as regents of *ghaṭikás* will bring the Moon to the first of Monday, and the Sun to the 60th of the same day. Consequently the first of the next day is the *ghaṭi* of Mars, and so on through the week."]

END OF ESSAYS, VOL. I.

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